Declassified KGB documents: Churchill alimuua Stalin

Declassified KGB documents: Churchill alimuua Stalin

MASAMILA said:
Ndio tunarudi kule kule mkuu kwenye hizo declassified docs kuwa Churchill/Britons walimuua Stallin. Huyo bwana(Beria) nae pia alikuwa ni m'Georgia' kama Stalin(homeboy wa man of steel)

Huyo Beria walikuja kumuncover kuwa ni jasusi wa waingereza baadae sana(connect the dots to those declassified docs) na hisia zinakuwa kubwa kwa huyu sababu ya nguvu aliyokuwa nayo hata baada ya Stallin kufariki.
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Ila si aliuwawa na wakina Nikita Khrushchev mwaka huohuo aliokufa Iosif Stalin ? Ukiangalia ushahidi wa kimazingira ilikuwa ni lazima Stalin afe tu, maana alitaka kuanzisha The Third Purge ili kuua wenzake ndani ya chama.
 
Malcom Lumumba said:
Ila si aliuwawa na wakina Nikita Khrushchev mwaka huohuo aliokufa Iosif Stalin ? Ukiangalia ushahidi wa kimazingira ilikuwa ni lazima Stalin afe tu, maana alitaka kuanzisha The Third Purge ili kuua wenzake ndani ya chama.
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Naona walicollude wenzake serikalini na mabeberu kumuua Man Of Steel. Stalin ndie kiongozi pekee wa Soviet alieogopwa kuliko wote ndani ya nchi na nje ya nchi. Kujaribu kumuua wenyewe tu on their own nadhani ni ngumu sana taking into account alivyotawala kwa mabavu na mitandao migumu. Inasemekana Stalin alikuwa amejiandaa na vita ya Nuclear miaka ya karibuni kabla ya kifo chake na hakuwa muoga hata chembe yule jamaa, pressure hii nadhani ndio hypothesis yenye nguvu
 
Malcom Lumumba said:
Achana na General Yuri Drozdov wa Illegals Program.
Huyu alikuwa ni Counter Intelligence Officer based in Japan.
Yaani yeye alikuwa ni msomi wa Chuo Kikuu na alikamata sana majasusi wa CIA na MI6 kwa wingi.
NATO walichanganyikiwa sana wakawa wanahisi labda kuna watu wanatoa siri za CIA na MI6; kumbe jamaa katembelea nchi zote za Warsaw Pact na zile za Kikomunisti duniani akafanya utafiti mkubwa kuhusu tabia za kipekee (Peculiar Human Behavior) za majasusi wa CIA na MI6 na akatengeneza Bango-Kitita (Matrix) kubwa kweli akawapelekea KGB.

Hivyo mle ndani kukawa na somo kabisa wanafundishwa majasusi wa KGB-Counter Intelligence kuhusu CIA behaviour. Wanakwambia zaidi ya asilimia 85% ya tabia zilizoorodheshwa mle zilikuwa ni za majasusi wa CIA na MI6. Baada ya kuanguka Urusi ya kisovieti CIA walimfuata awaeleze alitumia mbinu gani kuwakamata wengi vile. Baadae wakaja kuambiwa ni kutumia Peni, Karatasi na kuangalia kwa jicho la tatu tu......!

NB 1: Tafuta kitabu cha Oxford kinaitwa "Near and distant neighbours: A new history of soviet Intelligence (The Extraordinary achievements of Yuri Totrov Page 251 na Page 252)" kimeandikwa na Jonathan Haslam. Sasa huwa najiuliza sana maswali kama: Hivi miaka ya 70's na 80's KGB walikuwa wanafanya hivi unategemea leo ndiyo nchi yenu inakutana na majasusi wa namna hii hivi kuna kupona kweli ???

NB 2: Yuri Totrov ni uthibitisho tosha kwamba hakuna silaha kubwa duniani kama Ubongo wa mwanadamu, pia hakuna kitu chenye nguvu kama Human Intelligence. Aliweza kufanya ujasusi kwa kutumia COMMON SENSE na kuweza kushindana na CIA ambayo ilikuwa iko mbele sana kwenye swala la teknolojia na fedha.

Watanzania tuna nini cha kujifunza hapa ???
Tunaweza tusiwe na pesa nyingi na teknolojia kubwa sana lakini tukafanikiwa kwa kiasi kikubwa mno katika kulinda maslahi mapana ya nchi. Japo ni kweli kwa dunia ya sasa tunahitaji pesa na teknolojia lakini hili halitakiwi kutufanya tulemae na kutegemea kuomba msaada wa taarifa au kununua vyombo vya kijasusi kutoka nchi za nje: Ni hatari sana kwetu.......

NB: Ukitaka hiki kitabu kinachomzungumzia Yuri Totrov utakipata kwenye bandiko namba [HASHTAG]#120[/HASHTAG], tunamshukuru sana Mkuu Palantir kwa kufanya jitihada za ziada kututafutia nakala yake (Softcopy) ili wengi wakisome.

CC: Consigliere, Red Giant , zitto junior , chige , mng'ato, Mbimbinho, Da'Vinci , Dragoon , mngony , Bukyanagandi
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How the KGB Found CIA Agents
An illustration of complex, specified information (CSI) in the world of foreign intelligence agencies Mind Matters November 26, 2018
Share



Mathematician William Dembski introduced the concept of complex, specified information: “Given an event, object, or structure, to convince ourselves that it is designed we need to show that it is improbably (i.e. complex) and suitably patterned (i.e. specified).”


The concept, which has been controversial with respect to the universe as a whole, can be conveniently illustrated on a smaller scale in the events of our time. Consider the case of the phantom Soviet moles.


During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s KGB seemed to have little difficulty identifying CIA agents in the field. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, ending the Soviet Union, CIA directors hoped to discover the identities of the treacherous agents within their own system who fingered their colleagues, in some cases endangering their lives.


One person was primarily responsible. But he did not work for the CIA. Yuri Totrov worked for the CIA’s opposite number, the KGB. He theorized that CIA agents would likely show the same patterns in lifestyles so he combed the files of the Soviet Bloc, looking for patterns in the lives of known agents. And after much study, he got lucky. He came up with 26 “unchanging indicators”:


Thus one productive line of inquiry quickly yielded evidence: the differences in the way agency officers undercover as diplomats were treated from genuine foreign service officers (FSOs). The pay scale at entry was much higher for a CIA officer; after three to four years abroad a genuine FSO could return home, whereas an agency employee could not; real FSOs had to be recruited between the ages of 21 and 31, whereas this did not apply to an agency officer; only real FSOs had to attend the Institute of Foreign Service for three months before entering the service; naturalized Americans could not become FSOs for at least nine years but they could become agency employees; when agency officers returned home, they did not normally appear in State Department listings; should they appear they were classified as research and planning, research and intelligence, consular or chancery for security affairs; unlike FSOs, agency officers could change their place of work for no apparent reason; their published biographies contained obvious gaps; agency officers could be relocated within the country to which they were posted, FSOs were not; agency officers usually had more than one working foreign language; their cover was usually as a “political” or “consular” official (often vice-consul); internal embassy reorganizations usually left agency personnel untouched, whether their rank, their office space or their telephones; their offices were located in restricted zones within the embassy; they would appear on the streets during the working day using public telephone boxes; they would arrange meetings for the evening, out of town, usually around 7.30 p.m. or 8.00 p.m.; and whereas FSOs had to observe strict rules about attending dinner, agency officers could come and go as they pleased. Jonathan Haslam, “How to explain the KGB’s amazing success identifying CIA agents in the field?” at Salon (2015)​

Using a public telephone box at a time when most mid-level employees had a phone in their office might certainly attract attention, though espionage wouldn’t be the only possibility. At any rate, Totrov produced masses of information on CIA agents and became known among his peers as the “shadow director of personnel at CIA.” As Haslam sums up, once Totrov had enough evidence that CIA agents were treated differently by the American bureaucracy from other foreign service personnel, he needed only to “follow through schematically and draw out the pattern.”


Specified complexity? The complexity was the sheer number and variety of Americans working for their government abroad. The specification was that some of these individuals were treated differently but not randomly so; rather, according to a specific pattern. And the pattern was not merely mechanical repetition. It seemed to be a choice made by intelligent beings who knew that there was something different about those individuals. The most likely difference, that they were CIA agents, proved correct for Totrov.


The senior American bureaucrats who treated CIA agents differently from others were intelligent agents even though they were behaving unwisely. Intelligence includes the ability to assess and act on information; wise decisions do not necessarily follow.


Hat tip: Eric Holloway


See also: Does information theory support design in nature (Eric Holloway)


and


Human intelligence as a halting oracle Jonathan Bartlett proposes to model the human mind as a halting oracle. Eric Holloway

Natanguliza shukurani kwako Malcolm
 
lee van cliff said:
How the KGB Found CIA Agents
An illustration of complex, specified information (CSI) in the world of foreign intelligence agencies Mind Matters November 26, 2018
Share



Mathematician William Dembski introduced the concept of complex, specified information: “Given an event, object, or structure, to convince ourselves that it is designed we need to show that it is improbably (i.e. complex) and suitably patterned (i.e. specified).”


The concept, which has been controversial with respect to the universe as a whole, can be conveniently illustrated on a smaller scale in the events of our time. Consider the case of the phantom Soviet moles.


During the Cold War, the Soviet Union’s KGB seemed to have little difficulty identifying CIA agents in the field. After the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, ending the Soviet Union, CIA directors hoped to discover the identities of the treacherous agents within their own system who fingered their colleagues, in some cases endangering their lives.


One person was primarily responsible. But he did not work for the CIA. Yuri Totrov worked for the CIA’s opposite number, the KGB. He theorized that CIA agents would likely show the same patterns in lifestyles so he combed the files of the Soviet Bloc, looking for patterns in the lives of known agents. And after much study, he got lucky. He came up with 26 “unchanging indicators”:


Thus one productive line of inquiry quickly yielded evidence: the differences in the way agency officers undercover as diplomats were treated from genuine foreign service officers (FSOs). The pay scale at entry was much higher for a CIA officer; after three to four years abroad a genuine FSO could return home, whereas an agency employee could not; real FSOs had to be recruited between the ages of 21 and 31, whereas this did not apply to an agency officer; only real FSOs had to attend the Institute of Foreign Service for three months before entering the service; naturalized Americans could not become FSOs for at least nine years but they could become agency employees; when agency officers returned home, they did not normally appear in State Department listings; should they appear they were classified as research and planning, research and intelligence, consular or chancery for security affairs; unlike FSOs, agency officers could change their place of work for no apparent reason; their published biographies contained obvious gaps; agency officers could be relocated within the country to which they were posted, FSOs were not; agency officers usually had more than one working foreign language; their cover was usually as a “political” or “consular” official (often vice-consul); internal embassy reorganizations usually left agency personnel untouched, whether their rank, their office space or their telephones; their offices were located in restricted zones within the embassy; they would appear on the streets during the working day using public telephone boxes; they would arrange meetings for the evening, out of town, usually around 7.30 p.m. or 8.00 p.m.; and whereas FSOs had to observe strict rules about attending dinner, agency officers could come and go as they pleased. Jonathan Haslam, “How to explain the KGB’s amazing success identifying CIA agents in the field?” at Salon (2015)​

Using a public telephone box at a time when most mid-level employees had a phone in their office might certainly attract attention, though espionage wouldn’t be the only possibility. At any rate, Totrov produced masses of information on CIA agents and became known among his peers as the “shadow director of personnel at CIA.” As Haslam sums up, once Totrov had enough evidence that CIA agents were treated differently by the American bureaucracy from other foreign service personnel, he needed only to “follow through schematically and draw out the pattern.”


Specified complexity? The complexity was the sheer number and variety of Americans working for their government abroad. The specification was that some of these individuals were treated differently but not randomly so; rather, according to a specific pattern. And the pattern was not merely mechanical repetition. It seemed to be a choice made by intelligent beings who knew that there was something different about those individuals. The most likely difference, that they were CIA agents, proved correct for Totrov.


The senior American bureaucrats who treated CIA agents differently from others were intelligent agents even though they were behaving unwisely. Intelligence includes the ability to assess and act on information; wise decisions do not necessarily follow.


Hat tip: Eric Holloway


See also: Does information theory support design in nature (Eric Holloway)


and


Human intelligence as a halting oracle Jonathan Bartlett proposes to model the human mind as a halting oracle. Eric Holloway

Natanguliza shukurani kwako Malcolm
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Hahahaha, kuna kitabu kimewekwa hapa kinazungumzia haya mambo yalivyokuwa. Kuna watu wana akili hadi utakimbia.
 
Malcom Lumumba said:
Hahahaha, kuna kitabu kimewekwa hapa kinazungumzia haya mambo yalivyokuwa. Kuna watu wana akili hadi utakimbia.
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Namuunga mkono mdau mmoja humu aliyesema kuwa afadhari sasa pia tunasikia kuwa kuna vichwa vikali Russia maana tulizoea kupata kusikia kua vichwa vikali viko US tu.Tuelimishe Malcom
 
lee van cliff said:
Tunateseka wote mkuu,mimi na wewe.
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Malcom alicoment hivi
QUOTE="Malcom Lumumba, post: 26642589, member: 94736"]Uchina alivamia kabisa kambi ya jeshi la Urusi na kuua wanajeshi lakini Urusi hakufanya lolote lile.[/QUOTE]

Nami nikakazia tu jibu kwa kiswahili rahisi na cha kisasa. Sasa wewe kwa kuwa umezoea unazi, toka mwaka jana umeibuka leo na unazi wako. Kwa nini uteseke!

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Sexer said:
Malcom alicoment hivi
QUOTE="Malcom Lumumba, post: 26642589, member: 94736"]Uchina alivamia kabisa kambi ya jeshi la Urusi na kuua wanajeshi lakini Urusi hakufanya lolote lile.
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Nami nikakazia tu jibu kwa kiswahili rahisi na cha kisasa. Sasa wewe kwa kuwa umezoea unazi, toka mwaka jana umeibuka leo na unazi wako. Kwa nini uteseke!

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pole kama nikmekukwaza kukutaji Gen MUHAMED FARAH AIDIID.
 
Sexer said:
Malcom alicoment hivi
QUOTE="Malcom Lumumba, post: 26642589, member: 94736"]Uchina alivamia kabisa kambi ya jeshi la Urusi na kuua wanajeshi lakini Urusi hakufanya lolote lile.
Click to expand...

Nami nikakazia tu jibu kwa kiswahili rahisi na cha kisasa. Sasa wewe kwa kuwa umezoea unazi, toka mwaka jana umeibuka leo na unazi wako. Kwa nini uteseke!

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Haha haa haa Sexer bana! unaichukulia hii mijadala ya humu ya kujifurahisaha kwa uzito mkubwa sana.hizi ni stori tu kama za simba na yanga.Maana wewe ukiona marekani inakosolewa unakonda kabisa na siku hiyo huli.ha hahaa.wengine humu tunajifurahisha tu wewe mwenzetu unaugulia kabisa.iga wenzakao akina ze kukoyo na Nalendwa & co hawa tunawachukulia kama watani wa jadi.
 
lee van cliff said:
Nami nikakazia tu jibu kwa kiswahili rahisi na cha kisasa. Sasa wewe kwa kuwa umezoea unazi, toka mwaka jana umeibuka leo na unazi wako. Kwa nini uteseke!

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Haha haa haa Sexer bana! unaichukulia hii mijadala ya humu ya kujifurahisaha kwa uzito mkubwa sana.hizi ni stori tu kama za simba na yanga.Maana wewe ukiona marekani inakosolewa unakonda kabisa na siku hiyo huli.ha hahaa.wengine humu tunajifurahisha tu wewe mwenzetu unaugulia kabisa.iga wenzakao akina ze kukoyo na Nalendwa & co hawa tunawachukulia kama watani wa jadi.[/QUOTE]

Huyo malcom niyemquote hata hachukulii kama wewe hii mijadala. Mwenyewe unajua

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