Hakuna mantiki ku link na Cabo Delgado wao wana gas na sisi tunayo link ya Mombasa from Dar ndio inatakiwa ila jamaa hela ya kuchangia gharama hawana fiscal space yao ni ndogo sana mkuu.
ku-link ni muhimu ila tu kama nao watatupa access ya pipeline yao kwenda South Africa! Sisi si watu wa emotions na kijiba!
Nigeria and Mozambique’s gas buildout: A case of false promises
Baird Langenbrunner
December 2024
The scale of
energy poverty in Africa is substantial. Six hundred million people lack access to electricity, and over two-thirds of Africans cannot access clean cooking solutions, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite a renewable energy potential
1,000 times greater than projected 2040 demand, the continent sees little
green investment, even as the global renewable energy sector booms.
At the recent COP29 in Baku, funding mechanisms to support the green transition in developing countries fell short. Rich countries agreed to provide
US$300 billion annually by 2035, up from an amount that some see as
insufficient compared to the
US$1.3 trillion per year requested. Meanwhile, the oil and gas industry continues to invest heavily in the continent as energy majors
backtrack on green energy goals.
Across Africa, 39 midstream gas transmission pipeline projects are proposed and under construction at an estimated US$47.1 billion in capital expenditure costs, led by Mozambique, South Africa, and Nigeria. By length, this planned buildout is about 29,000 kilometers (km) of new pipelines, nearly
one-quarter of the current length of electricity transmission lines across Africa.
Gas transmission infrastructure, including pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, is an integral part of the gas value chain, and its development provides a litmus test for the health of the industry.
In sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria and Mozambique epitomize major themes, hosting projects that represent the shifting interests of legacy oil and gas investors, as well as more recent newcomers. These plans face significant risk, including fluctuations in global gas demand, potential for civil unrest, and political instability at home. All this while the International Energy Agency (IEA) has projected global fossil fuel demand will
peak by 2030, and Africa’s biggest export markets — Europe and Asia — are exhibiting declining and unpredictable gas demand.
If these trends are any indication, continued gas development is unlikely to bring the economic and energy development promised, and countries like Nigeria and Mozambique will remain vulnerable.
Nigeria
Nigeria, the world’s sixth largest LNG exporter, has
enormous gas reserves, yet it is also home to the globe’s
leading electricity access deficit.
Currently, the country is developing 3,700 km of gas transmission pipelines. While some of this development is planned to address the domestic electrification deficit, the bulk is intended for exporting gas via pipeline or LNG terminals.
But this planned buildout is occurring in an industry that has stalled over the past two decades. Since 2008, two national gas initiatives have been released by the government to provide gas-fired power and development in Nigeria — and both have largely
failed.
For example, the
Ibadan–Jebba Gas Pipeline, a proposed 510-km network designed to expand gas access across Nigeria’s western and central states, has remained only a proposal since 2017. Similarly, the
Trans Nigeria Gas Pipeline, aimed at connecting pipeline networks across Nigeria, has progressed slowly, though its first phase — the
Ajaokuta–Kaduna–Kano (AKK) Pipeline — is nearing completion and is hailed as a critical
driver for economic growth and industrialization.
The most ambitious projects, however, carry the goal of gas export to Europe and Asia. Two competing proposals, the
Trans-Sahara Gas Pipeline and the
Nigeria–Libya Gas Pipeline, would transport gas from Nigerian extraction areas to North Africa and onward to Europe. Meanwhile, the
Nigeria–Morocco Gas Pipeline has recently entered the land acquisition phase, with plans to supply gas to thirteen countries en route to Spain. The
Gulf of Guinea Gas Pipeline will carry gas from the Nigerian coast to Bioko Island, where it will be processed for LNG export at the
Punta Europa LNG Terminal.
These projects rely on broader forces driving oil and gas development, particularly in extraction areas. But onshore production in the Niger Delta is
declining, and foreign developers like Shell are moving
offshore to the Gulf of Guinea, leaving decades of environmental degradation and corporate accountability issues
behind.
While France and the United States continue to maintain a significant investment presence in Nigeria, newer players like China and India are increasingly investing in African fossil fuels, driven by their own energy security needs and strategic partnerships through projects like the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese banks, for example, are reported to have
funded 85% of the US$2.8 billion AKK Pipeline, and CNOOC
holds a stake in two offshore fields.
Mozambique
Mozambique exemplifies the volatile intersection of gas development and civil unrest in Africa. The country holds significant gas resources in the Rovuma Basin, offshore from Cabo Delgado province, but since 2017, an Islamic insurgency has disrupted stability and development in the region, partly fueled by local grievances over the lack of benefits from the exploited gas.
The
Rovuma LNG Terminal and
Mozambique LNG Terminal, along with a small related
pipeline, are key export projects that have faced delays due to the ongoing insurgency, and a recently contested presidential election
threatens to worsen this situation. Additionally, two competing pipelines are proposed to transport gas from production from these offshore resources to neighboring South Africa.
The
African Renaissance Pipeline, which would be 2,600 km in length, is a joint venture among Mozambican, South African, and Chinese state-owned enterprises. But the project is several years behind schedule and remains in limbo, highlighting the faltering and increasingly
unappealing nature of these ambitious export routes to South African importers. The alternative
GasNosu Pipeline has met a similar fate.
To Mozambique’s north, the proposed
Tanzania–Kenya Gas Pipeline aims to link Cabo Delgado’s transmission network to Mombasa, Kenya, promising energy independence. However, as with many major pipelines in Africa, progress is plagued by slow development and financial hurdles.
The continued development of upstream resources offshore Cabo Delgado, combined with sluggish but persistent pipeline development in Mozambique, highlights how gas exports are being prioritized at the expense of gas electrification domestically. And, similar to Nigeria,
China and
India are investing substantially in Mozambique’s oil and gas resources.
The future of gas in two African hotspots
In both Nigeria and Mozambique, decades of oil and gas development spurred by Western corporations have largely
failed to benefit locals, either through foreign direct investment or by providing domestic access to fossil resources. Instead, these projects have encroached on
farmland, impacted
ecosystems, and fueled
theft and
civil disorder.
As legacy investors shift priorities, they
benefit from weaknesses in local regulatory and compliance processes, leaving African nations burdened with the negative externalities of these developments. Yet major pipeline projects continue to receive backing from African heads of state, and these pipelines are being developed on timelines that coincide with a global peak in gas demand — a critical inflection point.
While the goals of electrifying and industrializing are key, the case for achieving these aims with renewables, instead of gas, is compelling. Africa is rich in
renewable resources that can be deployed on decentralized grids, which would make electricity
cheaper as a result.
In contrast, gas electrification
relies on centralized networks and geopolitics, and it
depends on capital-intensive pipelines, distribution, and storage — none of which are widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, making it more expensive. Relying on gas also
exposes countries to global price volatility and geopolitical risks. If Africa continues with current gas infrastructure plans, it could face billions in stranded assets and be left to manage a far costlier environmental and financial burden.
About the Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker
GGIT is an information resource on natural gas transmission pipeline projects and liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and export terminals. The internal GGIT database and wiki pages are updated continuously throughout the year, and an annual release is published and distributed with data summary tables. The data are released under a creative commons license and can be downloaded
here.
What is Global Energy Monitor?
Global Energy Monitor (GEM) develops and shares information in support of the worldwide movement for clean energy. By studying the evolving international energy landscape and creating databases, reports, and interactive tools that enhance understanding, GEM seeks to build an open guide to the world’s energy system. Follow us at
www.globalenergymonitor.org and on Twitter/X
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Media Contact
Baird Langenbrunner
Project Manager, Global Gas Infrastructure Tracker and Global Oil Infrastructure Tracker
baird.langenbrunner@globalenergymonitor.org