Why Did Nyerere Support Biafra?

Zitto said:
why did nyerere support pan africanism and at the same time Biafra? Why did nyerere oppose south african capital and at the same time allow debeers into our diamond?
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In a NUTSHELL Zitto, umetumia mifano hii miwili, ambayo on many occassions imekuwa ikitumiwa na watu waliokuwa hawakubaliani na Nyerere kuthibitisha kuwa Nyerere alikuwa na element za udini, ili kuhalalisha wewe kuwa "unpredictable". Mtu anaweza kukusoma vizuri tu where you draw your wisdom! Watu wanaomhusisha Nyerere na udini vile vile wanajulikana wengi ni kina nani. OK, kama uko huko Zitto, endelea, I wish you all the best. I will not argue on this any more, maelezo yaliyotolewa yanajitosheleza.
 
Companero said:
NAFCO haikuwa sera ya Kijamaa - ilikuwa ni STATE CAPITALISM!

UJAMAA - The Basis of African Socialism ni suala la hiari (IMANI)!
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Sir, State capitalism is the pillar of any sort of socialism, ujamaa included.
 
Companero said:
EU ambayo ni model ya EAC nayo ni African Socialism - they are sharing poverty with Belgium and Ireland?
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Sir, you see that. The Irish debt is about 32% of GDP and the Irish government is about to receive a bailout from other EU countries. If you recall, between 1997-2007, the used to call Ireland the celtic tiger. This is the kind of cooperation that I would like to see in Africa.

Kwa EAC nchi zote hazipo fiscal responsible, zina madeni, zinategemea misaada, rampant unemployment, n.k
 
Mwalimu :rip: Does this past really build our future? Anyway thanks for the history lesson. But knowing the Why he did what he did.... Does it Show us The how we need to do our things?
 
Mzee Tenga said:
Suala la biafra (Nigeria) na suala la ogadenia (Somalia) ni suala linalofanana katika kila kitu. Lakini Nyerere akakubaliana na Biafra, na akakataa ya Ogadenia. Suala la debeer, hata mpaka linatia kichefuchefu hata kulikumbuka. Ingawa kuna watu humu wanalitetea. After all debeer na biafra walikuwa wakiristo anyway; ogadenians jee? waislamu.

Nyerere ndiye aliyepanda mbegu zinazoleta mijadala hii leo hii.
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Yeah mzee tenga you're very right, if we compare biafra (Nigeria) and Ogaden (Somalia) are almost the same, but Nyerere supported Biafra to be independent from mother land while kept a blind eye to Ogaden that's ridiculous! This is where the inconsistency of Mwl.Nyerere found on this matter, i think had lost his sense of humanity instead decided
to support biafra just for da course of Christianity.

On other hand, it was very difficult to support independence of Ogaden coz said barre was his best friend and both followers of socialism regime.

Rgds,

Shaft.:painkiller:
 
Zitto must be kidding himself as he try to question the late Mwalimu 's integrity. If this topic could appear in a swahili newspaper where majority of Tanzanians can access such information , this silly boy (Zitto) 's political future could have finished.
 
Shaft said:
Yeah mzee tenga you're very right, if we compare biafra (Nigeria) and Ogaden (Somalia) are almost the same, but Nyerere supported Biafra to be independent from mother land while kept a blind eye to Ogaden that's ridiculous! This is where the inconsistency of Mwl.Nyerere found on this matter, i think had lost his sense of humanity instead decided
to support biafra just for da course of Christianity.

On other hand, it was very difficult to support independence of Ogaden coz said barre was his best friend and both followers of socialism regime.

Rgds,

Shaft.:painkiller:
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Lets say what you are saying is true, lakini kuiweka hapa na kuijadili inajenga vipi...? Kuquestion udini wa mwalimu ndiko kutakako ondoa udini ? Is this good timing really? Muheshimiwa please tuwakilishe kupigana tupate Tume Mpya na Huru, na Kubadilisha Katiba Hapa taona tunadivert from mambo yatakayotuletea maendeleo....
 
Companero,

Naomba kutoka nje ya mada kidogo, una ile essay ya Mwalimu on frugality? kama unayo in word or pdf form naomba nitumie.
 
Hebu fikiria uasi wa mwaka 1964 Mwalimu aliomba msaada kutoa Nigeria na baadae ni Mwalimu huyohuyo miaka michache sana baadae aliwaunga mkono waasi wa Nigeria!!! Sipendi kusema kitu kwa kufuata ushabiki nawajibika kuutafuta ukweli wa kitu ili kuupata uhakika wake Je unadhani vita ya Biafra ilikuwa juu ya ukandamizaji tu? Ni tu kuwa watu wa Biafra walikuwa wakionewa??? Republic Of Biafra | Encyclopedia.com

Issue ya wa-Ibo inajulikana ilikoanzia, na walioianzisha wanajulikana na kwa mshangao wa wengi mpaka leo wanajiuliza kwanini wahusika hawakushtakiwa kwa mauaji ya Kimbari kama inavofanyika Rwanda na kwa Bashir wa Sudan na kwingineko!!! Inasemekana Kanisa Katoliki na wasomi wa ki-ibo waliwatumia wa-ibo ambao hawakuwa na elimu kuwaunga mkono katika uasi ule ambao wasomi wale na Kanisa Katoliki walijua wazi mwishio wake ni upi!

Je nikikuuliza wakati wa Vita ya Zimbabwe kwanini Mwalimu alimuunga mkono Mugabe na si Joshua Nkomo utanijibuje? Unajua sababu yake?? Je nani alikuwa jeshi lenye nguvu kati ya Mugabe na Nkomo kwa wakati ule? Fuatilia utapata majawabu. Sidhani kama Mh. ZIto ana chuki na mwalimu kama usemavyo. wala sidhani kama kuna mtanzania timamu anaemchukia mwalimu. bali kuna watu watakaosababisha mwalimu achukiwa katika historia ijayo, huo ndio ukweli. JE BAADA YA VITA ZILE TANZANIA IMEPATA NINI? Tuendelee kuufurahia umaskini tuliovuna katika vita zile? Je mnajua ni familia ngapi ambazo zimelemazwa na kudumazwa kutokana na mambo yale?

UKWELI KWA ANAETAKA KUUJUA NA AJIULIZE "JE MWALIMU KUNA MAMBO ALIYAFANYA KWA AJILI YA WATANZANIA WOTE AU KWA AJILI YA WAKATOLIKI? JE WANATAKA KUMTAWAZA MTAKATIFU WA KANISA AU TANZANIA? (Why Catholics Want Nyerere Canonised?)

Kuna mengi ambayo watu hawataki kuchunguza na kufuatilia, napenda sana mtu afuatilie jambo kwa njia zake katika kuutafuta ukweli na si mimi kumpa maneno yangu. Tunapaswa kusoma mazuri kwa mabaya, tunahitaji kusifiwa na kupewa sifa mbaya. Zote hizo ni changamoto za kujirekebisha na kujua madhaifu na ubora wetu. TUPENDE KUSIMAMA KWENYE UKWELI MARA ZOTE ILI TUPATE MAFANIKIO.

"My own strongest disagreements with Nyerere concerned Zanzibar and Nigeria. Did Tanganyika unite with Zanzibar to form Tanzania under pressure from President Lyndon Johnson of the United States and Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas Home of Britain who did not want Zanzibar to become another communist Cuba? Nyerere bristled when it was suggested that the union with Zanzibar was part of the Cold War and not a case of Pan- Africanism.
Nyerere's recognition of Biafra in the middle of the Nigerian civil war was another hot subject. I personally did not share the suspicion that Nyerere recognised Biafra because the Igbo were fellow Roman Catholics claiming to be threatened by Muslim Northerners in Nigeria. But I did believe in one Nigeria and therefore disagreed with Nyerere's policies. Nyerere also bristled if it was suggested that he was ungrateful to Nigeria which had helped him with his own army in 1964, and wanted to create a new force."
- Ali Mazrui
 
Well said mkandara
something is troubling zitto....

nikimsikiliza zitto saingine najiuliza yeye flip flop politician au his mind is some where else
na nikianza kufikiria his mind is somewhere else nakumbuka quote ya juzi juzi ya alex ferguson
Sometimes you look in a field and you see a cow and you think its a better cow than the one youve got in the field. Its a fact, right, and it never really works out that way. Its probably the same cow and its not as good as your own cow. Some players like to think theres a better world somewhere else. It never really works.
 
ZITTO ATUOMBE RADHI HARAKA SANA SISI VIJANA WENZAKE:

Ndugu waheshimiwa ndani JF, nemesikitishwa Sanaaaaaaaaaaaaa na Mhe Zitto Zuberi Kabwe!!!!!!!

Mpata huyu kijana mwenzetu kurudi mpaka miaka ya sitini kutafuta vijiharufu vya uongo na kweli juu ya Mwalimu Nyerere na aizungumzie Jeshi letu kwenda Comoro majuzi tu hapa na wasiende Zimbabwe wala Kenya na Somalia mpaka dakika hii wakati wa michafuko huko, mjue KUNA TATIZO KUBWA MNOO kumbe bila sisi kujua.

Habari zaidi atakua nayo Zitto Zuberi Kabwe Mwenyewe!!! Lakini, kwangu mimi NINA MAJONZI hakuna mfano kuona mwanasiasa chipukizi niliempenda kiasi hiki, kwamba ni KICHWA, nikimpoteza kiurahisi tu kwenye lindi la KUPUMBAZWA NA MAWAZO YA KIUDINI UDINI hivi hivi na kuanza kujengea huja CHUKI ZA KUBUNIWA KIHISTORIA kusaidia kuhalalisha maonevu juu yetu sisi leo hii ambao kabisa hatukuepo huko na tusiweza hata kidogo kuhoji wa kuzuia kitu ...!!!!!!!!!!

Lazima Zitto atuombe Watanzania wote radhi na hasa sisi Vijana bila ya kuleta tofauti za kiitikadi hapa[/SIZE]
 
Zakumi said:
Swari:

Hivi bila kuwepo kwa mafuta kule, Biafra wangefikiria kujitenga? Hivi bila kuwepo kwa madini kwenye jimbo la Shaba, je vita vingetokea Congo?
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Hata bila mafuta, Waibo wangejitenga. Mafuta meant nothing to them; their lives did. They had no security in the federation. Ndiyo maana walikimbilia nyumbani kwao Mashariki ya Nigeria baada ya kuona Winigeria wenzao, hasa kaskazini, hawawataki. Ndiyo maana walikuwa wanauawa. The Nigerian government did nothing to protect them.

Ni kama hapa Tanzania: Ikiwa Wasukuma au Wahaya, au Wamakonde wameanza kuuawa na wananchi wenzao, na serikali ya Tanzania haifanyi chochote to protect them and stop the killings, halafu wanaanza kukimbilia walikotoka mikoa ya Ziwa kaskazini ya nchi yetu, na Wamakonde wanakimbilia kusini, utawalaumu wakiamua kujitenga if that's the only way they can live in peace and security in their home regions or province because our government has refused or is unwilling to protect them? Are they not fellow citizens who are entitled to protection just like everybdy else?

Nyerere explained this predicament with regard to Nigeria when Tanzania recognised Biafra. He stated in his article, "Why Tanzania Recognised Biafra," published in the Observer, London, 28 April 1968:

"Governments...exist for the citizens' protection, their welfare, and the future well-being of their children. There is no other justification for states and governments except man.

In Nigeria this consciousness of a common citizenship was destroyed by the events of 1966, and in particular by the pogroms in which 30,000 Eastern Nigerians were murdered, many more injured, and about two million forced to flee from the North of their country. It is these pogroms, and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the authorities to protect the victims, which underlies the Easterners' conviction that they have been rejected by other Nigerians and abandoned by the Federal Government.

Whether the Easterners are correct in their belief that they have been rejected is a matter for argument. But they do have this belief. And if they are wrong, they have to be convinced that they are wrong. They will not convinced by being shot. Nor will their acceptance as part of the Federation be demonstrated by the use of Federal power to bomb schools and hospitals in the areas to which people have fled from persecution."

I will post the entire article later on.

Kuhusu Congo, kulikuwa na secessionist sentiments katika majimbo yote ya Congo wakati ule. Kulikuwa na majimbo sita. Katanga was the first to secede just eleven days after Congo won independence on 30 June 1960. Then about three months later, Albert Kalonji declared himself King of South Kasai when he announced the secession of Kasai Province in August 1960, jimbo la Waluba, the dominant ethnic group in the province. The other provinces almost followed suit but UN forces had already intervened by then.

Foreign elements were behind Katanga's secession to dismember Congo, fearful that under the leadership of Lumumba, a strong nationalist and Pan-Africanist, they would not be able to exploit the minerals in Katanga, the way they wanted to, if the province remained an integral part of Congo.

In remarkable contrast, Biafra's secession was NOT externally engineered; it was a legitimate expression of the people themselves who felt they had no other option to live in peace and security - but to secede.

Conor Cruise O'Brien, UN representative in Congo during the Congo crisis, also rejected the argument that the secession of Biafra was the same as Katanga's in terms of motivation. He said external forces were at work in the case of Katanga.

Nyerere also rejected this argument when he explained in another article how the analogies of the American civil war and Katanga's secession were being wrongly used to explain Biafra's secession and criticise Tanzania why our country recognised Biafra. He also blamed the British government more than anybody else for fuelling the Nigerian conflict for their own selfish interests. As Nyerere stated:

"What, then, about the analogy which is sometimes drawn to the American Civil War?

Like the Nigerian Civil War, it was about secession. Like that in Nigeria it caused very dreadful suffering. But we do justify wars, or condemn them, because of what they are about. And in America, the South was not trying to break away because Southerners had been rejected in the North, and had been massacred in their thousands with the connivance or the assistance of the forces of law and order. The Southern States were not swarming with millions of refugees who had fled from the North, leaving their property behind, in order to save their skins. Of course it is true that Lincoln fought to save the Union. But he believed, even before the war, that the Union could not last half free, half slave. He was concerned to make it what it had proclaimed itself to be - a society of free and equal men. Had there been a Lincoln in Nigeria, he would have fought the prejudices which led to that inordinate and almost pathological hatred of the Ibos which made secession inevitable and justifiable.

A politically more serious comparison, however, is made between the secession of Biafra and that of Katanga. Tanzania, in particular, is accused of the most blatant inconsistency because it opposed Katanga and recognizes Biafra. I know that there are similarities between Katanga and Biafra. But these similarities can be grouped into those which are superficial and irrelevant and those which are real and crucial. An examination of the real and crucial similarities reveals some apparently unnoticed facts.

First, let me acknowledge the similarities which are advanced by the opponents of Biafra, but which I believe to be superficial and irrelevant to the main issue. Katanga was part of a United Congo; Katanga decided to secede; the Centre objected; a war then broke out between secessionist Katanga and the Centre. (Notice that I am not trying to say "why" Katanga decided to secede; I am merely stating the fact of secession). Similarly, Biafra - or the Eastern Region of Nigeria - was part of a federated Nigeria; Biafra decided to secede; the Centre objected; (this is not quite correct, but I must admit a few similarities); a war broke out between secessionist Biafra and the Centre.

Now, for a different and more fundamental group of similarities. Katanga had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very much interested in this vast amount of wealth; her economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the Centre; when war broke out between Katanga and the Centre, Belgium supported one side in an effort to safeguard her economic interests; she joined the side supported by the copper companies. No need to go further.

Now, for the conflict in Nigeria. Biafra had vital oil resources; the former colonial power was vitally interested in this vast amount of oil; her interests were threatened in the conflict; (the really vital matter was the threat, not whether the threat came from the Centre or the periphery; this is only important in deciding who is going to be ally and who enemy); but in this case, due to relations between the British and the Ibos, the threat came from the secessionists. When war broke out between Biafra and the Centre, Britain, like Belgium, was on the same side as the Foreign Companies - in this case the Oil Companies (italics in the original text).

Let those who love the superficial similarities of secession have the courage and honesty to accept this unpleasant fact also. In Katanga, Belgium and the Copper Companies were on one side; in Nigeria, Britain and the Oil Companies are on one side. This is the one constant and crucial factor in both cases, around which everything else can be variable. In both cases, the former colonial power and the vested economic interests are on one side.

Tshombe was a stooge of the Copper Interests. They filled his coffers with their vast financial resources. Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests; they refuse to pay him a penny from the wealth they derive from Biafran oil. This vital contrast is the corollary to the decision to support the Centre instead of secession.

In the one case it was the Centre under Lumumba which was the threat to the economic interests if the Congo remained united; and therefore it was the Centre which had to be starved of Revenue. In the other case it was a separate Ibo state which was the threat, and it was Biafra, therefore, which had to be strangled. Is this really so difficult to see? Only great simplicity - or even extreme naivety - could lead anyone to accept that Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria, or African Unity in general. She is defending her own economic interests. That may be natural and even understandable, but it is as well that it should be understood and not camouflaged by talk of a particular principle." - (Julius Nyerere's statement on Tanzania's recognition of Biafra, issued by the Government of Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, August 1968).

I will also post the article, from which I have quoted the above, in its entirety later on.

What I have quoted above inatoka kwenye statement which was printed in 1968 and labelled "For private circulation only." Nyerere aliandika statement hiyo aimed at other African leaders ambayo alitaka waisome kabla ya mkutano kuhusu vita ya Nigeria uliofanyika Addis Ababa, August 1968. The statement was later released to the public.

Pia wasiojua ukweli kuhusu vita ya Nigeria wajulishwe hapa kwamba it was NOT the Igbos who wanted to secede first. It was Northern Nigerians. As far back as the 1940s, Northern Nigerian leaders complained that the amalgamation of the North and the South in 1914 was "a big mistake."

Waliendelea kulalamika throught the 1950s when secessionist sentiments were very strong in Northern Nigeria - dominated by the Hausa/Fulani - just before the country won independence in 1960. Lalamiko lilikuwa ni kwamba the federation will be dominated by southerners who had the opportunity to get higher education during colonial rule unlike their northern counterparts. It didn't turn out that way. Instead, it was the Northerners who ended up dominating the Nigerian federal government because of the lopsided structure of the federation which favoured the north in terms of representation in the national legislature. It was the British colonial rulers who were reponsible for that. They built the federation in a lopsided way - then left it to the Nigerians at independence without restructuring it; which they should have, before relinquishing power.

Western Nigeria, dominated by Yorubas also wanted to secede in the 1950s. At the constitutional talks in London on "to whom should power be transferred" when the British were ready to leave at independence, the leader of the Western Nigerian delegation, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, threatened to forcibly incorporate Lagos - a federal territory and home to the federal capital - into the Western Province and declare indepedence if the British colonial secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, did not accept the demand by Yorubas to reclaim Lagos as part of Yorubaland instead of leaving it alone as a federal territory.

Yet, throughout those years, there was not a single threat by leaders of Eastern Nigeria - Nnamdi Azikiwe, Michael Okpara and others - to dismember Nigeria and declare independence for the Eastern Region. It was, instead, Eastern Nigerian leaders who worked hard to preserve the federation, with Azikiwe himself categorically stating" "We are not going to have a Pakistan in this country."

Also, the party led by Zik, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, renamed in 1960 as the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), was the only party which had worn seats in all the provinces of Nigeria in the late 1950s just before independence. It had representatives in the federal legislature from the East, the North and the West. The other two parties, the Northern People's Congress (NPC) led by Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, and the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo of Western Nigeria, were solidly anchored in their home regions - regionally entrenched. Neither had representatives in other parts of Nigeria outise their home regions; only the NCNC led by Zik did.

In July 1966, after the miltary head of state General Aguiyi Ironsi was assassinated in that month, there was another strong attempt by Northern Nigerians to secede; a fact conceded even by Chief Anthony Enahoro who was the leader of the Nigerian delegation to the conference on the Nigerian civil war held in Addis Ababa in August 1968.

Even before the January 1966 miltary coup, there were attempts to expel Igbos from Northern Nigeria, a region where hundreds of them were massacred in Jos in 1945, and later just as many in Kano in 1953. Northern Nigerian leaders did not mince words about their hatred of Igbos, and said so in the northern negislature when regional representatives spewed invective against the Igbos during the February-March 1964 session of the Northern House of Assembly.

Representative Mallam Muhammadu Mustapha Maude Gyari, emphatically stated in the Assembly:

"On the allocation of plots to the Ibos, or the allocation of stalls, I would like to advise the Minister that these people know how to make money and we do not know the way and manner of getting about this business.... We do not want Ibos to be allocated plots, I do not want them to be given plots."

Representative Mallam Mukhtar Bello also bluntly stated:

"I would like to say something very important that the Minister should take my appeal to the Federal Government (controlled by Northerners) about the Igbos....I wish the number of these Igbos be reduced....There are too many of them in the North. They are just like sardines and I think they are just too dangerous to the Region." - (Africa Contemporary Record, 1969, p. 664).

Wabunge wenzao waliwapigia makofi. Among those applauding was the northern premier himself, Ahmadu Bello, who categorically stated that it was foolish for anyone to believe that Nigerians were one people. He went to say that it was not until the British came that the people who now call themselves Nigerians were brought together. But that does not change the fact that they are different people with nothing in common except the fact they were forcibly united by the colonial rulers.

Then came the massacre of Igbos in Northern Nigeria about two years later. The Northern Nigerian government did nothing to protect them. And the federal government itself did nothing.

What did you want the Igbos to do? Sit just like that and continue to be massacred by their fellow countrymen - who, through massacres, had clearly shown that they didn't want them?

When you take all that into account, you will know why Tanzania recognised Biafra; and why Nyerere was consistent in his belief that all citizens are entitled to protection by the government under which they live.
 
Zitto said:
why did nyerere support pan africanism and at the same time Biafra? Why did nyerere oppose south african capital and at the same time allow debeers into our diamond?
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Mkuu acha kujidhalilisha, hayo uliyouliza yana maelezo yake Bw. Mulangira ameeleza na nashangaa huna uelewa ya hayo maswala
 
Mwanamageuko,
Usipindishe historia. Mwalimu alisaidiwa na serikali halali ya Nigeria ambayo ilipinduliwa mwaka 1966 na akina Yakub Gowon. Kulikuwa na makundi mawili ya waasi Nigeria. Kundi lililoongozwa na Gowon na kundi la Ojuku ambalo lilijitenga baada ya kuona ndugu zake Waibo wakichinjwa kama kuku katika maeneo mengine ya Nigeria. Usipindishe historia.
 
Hivi Biafra na Ogaden zinafanana vipi? maanake nijuavyo Biafra walitaka Kujitenga na Nigeria, sasa hao Ogaden walitaka kujitenga na nani?
 
Julius K. Nyerere, The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis:
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In arguments about the Nigeria/Biafra conflict, there has been a great deal of talk about the principles of national integrity and of self-determination; many analogies have been drawn with other conflicts in the world, and particularly in Africa; and finally, there has been a considerable amount of discussion about the role of the OAU and other international organizations in relation to the present conflict. It is my purpose to discuss some of these problems and to examine the lessons which are, and which I believe should be, drawn from the analogies.

Let me look first at the analogies and their relevance to the principles which are under discussion.


Gibraltar
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The British give three reasons for their opposition to the demand for the incorporation of Gibraltar into the Spanish State. First is the Treaty of Utrecht 1713 - to which the Gibraltarians were not a party; second is the opposition of the Gibraltarians; and third is the dictatorship in Spain.

It is the second reason which Britain mostly uses to justify her position, and indeed it is the more important one. For if the Gibraltarians wished, they could say: "To hell with the Treaty of Utrecht: we were not a party to it anyway." If, after that, the territory were incorporated, Britain would not be able to do anything about it, unless she was to come out openly in favour of imperialism.

Yet I believe that Britain is simply using the fact of the Gibraltarians' opposition to incorporation, just as she is using the legalities of the Treaty. When Britain feels that it is in her interests to come to terms with Spain, I doubt that either the Treaty or the Gibraltarians' feelings will prevail - indeed this doubt is buttressed by the fact that Britain will not accept the "integration with Britain" policy. But this is not the point I want to argue.

My point is that two quite separate arguments are used by Britain in this dispute: one, an imperialist Treaty between several powers, including Britain and Spain; and two, the feelings of a group of people who were the object of that Treaty.

In the political climate of the modern world, the opposition of the Gibraltarians is the more important matter for winning world support for Britain's cause. But the Treaty argument also has an importance.

Look now at the analogy with the Nigeria/Biafra issue. Britain appears to be arguing that she is helping Nigeria to stop the Ibos from unilaterally breaking the "Treaty" under which all the peoples of Nigeria agreed to accept independence as a single Federation. In this case, in other words, she is leaving out the question of self-determination, although it is the main plank of her argument on the Gibraltar question.

But in the case of Nigeria and Biafra, the issue is not some minor, technical issue about the legalities or morality of a Treaty. It is an issue of life and death, involving a massacre by one party to that Treaty of more people among another party to the Treaty than all the inhabitants of Gibraltar. After the failure of several serious attempts to secure reassurance for the resultant fears, the People who had been the victims decided to break away to form their own State. If the principle of self-determination is relevant in the case of Gibraltar - as it is - then surely it is relevant under these circumstances? But the rest of Nigeria objects, and says: "These Ibos must remain part of Nigeria." Surely we should be saying to Nigeria: "Get their consent." Instead, what we are saying is: "Shoot and starve them into submission."

It may be argued that all those involved in a Treaty should be consulted about any change in it, and that therefore in this case the Nigerians should be consulted as well as the Biafrans. That is not actually my argument, but let us look at it in these two cases.

Consult the People of Spain about the incorporation of Gibraltar: I do not know what their verdict would be. Consult the People of Britain: they will vote against Spain - not because of the Treaty of Utrecht but because the Gibraltarians do not want to be part of Spain. They would vote, I hope - indeed I am sure - in support of the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar as it has been so freely expressed, not for Spain's claims.

Then ask the Nigerians about the forcible incorporation of the Ibos. At worst their answer would be equivalent to that of the Spanish Government, and of their own Government now: "Keep them part of Nigeria, even against their will." Ask the people of Britain about this issue: in this case I am not sure what their verdict might be, in spite of the clear determination of the 8 million Biafrans to be left alone. But neither is (British Prime Minister Harold) Wilson sure, so we shall never know.

What we do know is that the 29,000 Gibraltarians have been asked their opinion about the dispute in which they are involved, and they have given their answer. The 8 million Biafrans have not been asked, and will not be asked their opinion on their conflict; but they have given their answer nevertheless - with their blood.

Britain invokes the principle of self-determination in the case of Gibraltar, because it serves her interests to do so. She must justify her stand on some acceptable principle - international law, plus self-determination - because she still wants the Rock. Nevertheless, the principles she advances are valid. I am not going to say that they are not valid because they are advanced by Britain. In the case of Nigeria, Britain invokes a different principle - the principle of territorial integrity - because it suits her own interests to do so. The choice of principle is the result of a decision taken on the basis of British interests, not because one principle is more valid than another. If British interests had been different, we would have self-determination being advanced as a reason for supporting Biafra.

If the dictatorship of General Franco is an additional reason for supporting the Gibraltarians, one may rightly ask for similar consideration to be given to the people of Biafra. They object to incorporation because before secession 30,000 Easterners were massacred without anyone being punished; and the same regime threatens them with complete extermination through starvation unless they surrender. Are not such actions, and the attitudes they reveal, at least as good a reason as Franco's dictatorship for the Biafrans' opposition to being incorporated into Nigeria? Have the Gibraltarians so much reason to fear General Franco?


The American Civil War
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What, then, about the analogy which is sometimes drawn to the American Civil War?

Like the Nigerian Civil War, it was about secession. Like that in Nigeria it caused very dreadful suffering. But we do justify wars, or condemn them, because of what they are about. And in America, the South was not trying to break away because Southerners had been rejected in the North, and had been massacred in their thousands with the connivance or the assistance of the forces of law and order. The Southern States were not swarming with millions of refugees who had fled from the North, leaving their property behind, in order to save their skins. Of course it is true that Lincoln fought to save the Union. But he believed, even before the war, that the Union could not last half free, half slave. He was concerned to make it what it had proclaimed itself to be - a society of free and equal men. Had there been a Lincoln in Nigeria, he would have fought the prejudices which led to that inordinate and almost pathological hatred of the Ibos which made secession inevitable and justifiable.

Katanga as a Comparison
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A politically more serious comparison, however, is made between the secession of Biafra and that of Katanga. Tanzania, in particular, is accused of the most blatant inconsistency because it opposed Katanga and recognizes Biafra. I know that there are similarities between Katanga and Biafra. But these similarities can be grouped into those which are superficial and irrelevant and those which are real and crucial. An examination of the real and crucial similarities reveals some apparently unnoticed facts.

First, let me acknowledge the similarities which are advanced by the opponents of Biafra, but which I believe to be superficial and irrelevant to the main issue. Katanga was part of a United Congo; Katanga decided to secede; the Centre objected; a war then broke out between secessionist Katanga and the Centre. (Notice that I am not trying to say "why" Katanga decided to secede; I am merely stating the fact of secession). Similarly, Biafra - or the Eastern Region of Nigeria - was part of a federated Nigeria; Biafra decided to secede; the Centre objected; (this is not quite correct, but I must admit a few similarities); a war broke out between secessionist Biafra and the Centre.

Now, for a different and more fundamental group of similarities. Katanga had vast copper resources; the former colonial power was very much interested in this vast amount of wealth; her economic interests were threatened by Lumumba at the Centre; when war broke out between Katanga and the Centre, Belgium supported one side in an effort to safeguard her economic interests; she joined the side supported by the copper companies. No need to go further.

Now, for the conflict in Nigeria. Biafra had vital oil resources; the former colonial power was vitally interested in this vast amount of oil; her interests were threatened in the conflict; (the really vital matter was the threat, not whether the threat came from the Centre or the periphery; this is only important in deciding who is going to be ally and who enemy); but in this case, due to relations between the British and the Ibos, the threat came from the secessionists. When war broke out between Biafra and the Centre, Britain, like Belgium, was on the same side as the Foreign Companies - in this case the Oil Companies (iitalics in original text).

Let those who love the superficial similarities of secession have the courage and honesty to accept this unpleasant fact also. In Katanga, Belgium and the Copper Companies were on one side; in Nigeria, Britain and the Oil Companies are on one side. This is the one constant and crucial factor in both cases, around which everything else can be variable. In both cases, the former colonial power and the vested economic interests are on one side.

Tshombe was a stooge of the Copper Interests. They filled his coffers with their vast financial resources. Ojukwu is not a stooge of these interests; they refuse to pay him a penny from the wealth they derive from Biafran oil. This vital contrast is the corollary to the decision to support the Centre instead of secession.

In the one case it was the Centre under Lumumba which was the threat to the economic interests if the Congo remained united; and therefore it was the Centre which had to be starved of Revenue. In the other case it was a separate Ibo state which was the threat, and it was Biafra, therefore, which had to be strangled. Is this really so difficult to see? Only great simplicity - or even extreme naivety - could lead anyone to accept that Britain is defending the unity of Nigeria, or African Unity in general. She is defending her own economic interests. That may be natural and even understandable, but it is as well that it should be understood and not camouflaged by talk of a particular principle.

The Netherlands decision to stop the supply of arms to Nigeria after the capture of Port Harcourt and its oil-rich surrounding areas is a reflection of her assessment that the oil supplies were then assured. But the British wish to be more certain. I am told that Britain expects to get 25 per cent of her oil supply from Nigeria by 1972. With her traditional Middle East suppliers being (in her view) unreliable, this is a very serious matter indeed for industrial Britain.

From Britain's point of view, what is vital is her oil interests; as she decides on her own policy, this is what the war is about. The Biafrans are fighting a most unequal war, and if they go on fighting, God alone knows what their end will be. Completely blockaded as they are, Nigeria no longer needs to shoot them into submission. Starvation and disease can fight for Nigeria, and Britain can go on explaining to the world that this is inevitable and justifiable because it is part of warfare.

Those who want peace before the Biafrans are wiped out must convince the British of one of two things. They have to be convinced that, in their present helpless position, the Biafrans are no longer a threat to British interests. And truly, the Biafrans know how weak they are; they are less interested in the oil than in their lives. This is the relatively easier thing to try and convince the British. The more difficult one is to try and convince Britain that her oil interests would be safe in an independent Biafra. But how could they know that Russia would not help Federal Nigeria to win total victory against the Biafrans? And if that happened, where would Britain be?

These are the vital issues, and those who are saying that the OAU can solve this problem are being fooled, or are conveniently fooling themselves. Britain is the vital force in this conflict; more important even than Federal Nigeria. The Biafrans believe they are fighting for their very survival; they are fighting to live in freedom and security. The Nigerian people are not quite sure what they are fighting for. Some of their leaders hate the Ibos; some may have ambitions of being Lincolns; some may even believe that they can force others into a United Nigeria and still have a meaningful nation. But that is all.

Without Britain's military and - in particular - her diplomatic support, the Nigerians would have no hope of winning against the Biafrans. The Soviet Union would not have been able to help them secure victory. Indeed, without Britain, the Soviet Union would have become a huge diplomatic embarrassment to the Nigerians; (and Nigeria would have become a wee embarrassment to Russia). For if Russia had supported Lagos and Britain did not, most of the Western world would have been anti-Lagos; and since there is so much popular sympathy for Biafra in many Western countries, it is hard to think of a reason which would have prevented Western Governments from supporting Biafra. After all, they would be fighting against communism.

Under these circumstances it would not have mattered whether African Heads of Government had continued to fear the effect of an example of successful secession; the Western powers, the only ones who have real power in Africa, would be fearing a different example, and one more vital to their own interests.

But if this argument is not convincing, those who believe that there is a direct and valid comparison between Katanga and Biafra must be able to answer some few questions.

Which tribe in Katanga is the equivalent of the Ibos? Azikiwe, an Ibo at the Centre, was trying hard, under very difficult circumstances, to co-operate with the dominant North to build a United Nigeria: who was his equivalent in the Congo? The Ibos, because of their education, industry, enterprise (and consequent arrogance?) were almost universally hated in Nigeria. Who in Katanga represented this educated, industrous, enterprising, arrogant and almost universally hated People? Who in the Congo represented the 30,000 massacred Easterners? Who in Katanga represented the 1.5 or 2 million refugees? What in the Congo represented the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), a party led mainly by Ibos it is true, but one which was nevertheless truly aimed at Nigerian Unity? Who in the Congo was the equivalent of the Sardauna of Sokoto, so powerful that he did not even bother to go to the Centre but governed the Federation through lieutenants while he himself governed the vital North? What in Katanga was the equivalent of the Northern People's Congress (NPC)?

Or again, who is Biafra's Tshombe? Who in Biafra represents the Copper Companies? Africa appealed to the United Nations to support Patrice Lumumba; why are we not appealing to the United Nations to support General Gowon, who in this analogy would be Nigeria's Lumumba? Perhaps the true answer is that it is not necessary; he already has strong support. But why is not necessary? Because the Ibos are simply fighting for their own survival and therefore have no strong supporter. That is their strength and weakness: it is the major difference between Katanga and Biafra.

In the one case, foreign economic interest was on the side of the secessionists and that made them very strong; in the other case, foreign economic interest is on the side of the Federalists, and makes them too very strong. They can even quote the OAU Charter on non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state. The devil can quote Scripture - when it suits him. In the one case, a despicable African stooge allowed himself to be used as a tool of foreign economic interests; in the other case, a brave African people are fighting against immense odds purely and simply for their own survival and their own self-respect and dignity. How does this analogy stand up to examination?

The break-up of Nigeria is a terrible thing. But it is less terrible than that cruel war. Thousands of people are being shot, bombed, or seeing their homes and livelihood destroyed; millions, including the children of Africa, are starving to death. (It is estimated that possibly more people have died in this war in the last two years (since 1967) than in Vietnam in the last ten years). We are told that nothing can be done about this. It is said that the sufferings of the Biafrans in the war are regrettable, but that starvation is a legitimate war weapon against an enemy. Yet by this statement you have said that these people, the Nigerians and the Biafrans, are enemies, just as Britons and Germans in Hitler's war were enemies.

If that is the case, is it rational to imagine that, once a Federal victory is obtained, they can immediately be equal members of one society, working together without fear? Or is the logic of being enemies not a logic which leads to conquest and domination when side is victorious?

We are told that Ojukwu should end the terrible sufferings of his people by surrender. We are told that he should reason thus: "The Nigerians are stronger than we are and they have stronger friends than we could ever hope to get. If we go on resisting, a combination of bombing, starvation and the inevitable epidemics, would exterminate us." Perhaps he should add, kindly: "Even if the Nigerians never intended to exterminate us." He should then convince the Biafran people about the wisdom of surrendering and then duly send the appropriate notice to the Nigerians. When the Federal Government gets this note, they presumably say: "At last you have come to your senses. As you rightly say, we never intended to exterminate you; but had you gone on resisting we would have continued the bombing and the blockade and the result would have been exactly the same as if we had intended to exterminate you." Perhaps they would add, kindly: "But, of course, the fault would have been yours." Then the Biafrans surrender and all is well.

Historically and logically, however, surrender on such terms as these - with the alternative being extermination - is for the purpose of creating empires. Surrender to an implacable enemy on his own terms, with the only condition being that you should not be killed, cannot lead to any kind of friendship, or even toleration. If it is a battalion which surrenders, the soldiers become prisoners-of-war; if it is a People, they become a colony, or an occupied territory, or something like that. Those who surrender cannot become an integral part of the conqueror's territory because they did not do so of their own free will; they did so as the only alternative to death.

The Internal Domino Theory
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The argument is being advanced that if Biafra is allowed to exist, Nigeria cannot exist. Nigerian leaders themselves have advanced this argument. If the Ibos are allowed to go, so the argument runs, Nigeria will break up completely, for the others will also go.

To deal with this argument seriously, let us assume the worst: let us assume that, if the Biafrans leave the Federation, all the others will also secede and set themselves up as separate States. What this argument amounts to is that only two things bind the Hausa and the Yorubas (these being the major elements) together. These two facts are, firstly, the recent historical accident that all (plus the Ibos) were conquered by, and then governed by, the British; and secondly, the more recent historical fact that, when the British left, they left these Peoples as one Nation.

If these accidents of history were in fact the only reason for Nigeria, and if there is no feeling of mutual benefit arising from the political unity, then the secession of the Biafrans would certainly and inevitably lead to the break-up of the Federation as the Yorubas - and the Hausas? - secede. In using this argument, therefore, we are in effect saying: "The Yorubas, the Hausas (and the others) cannot remain together without the Ibos; we want the Yorubas and the Hausas to remain together; therefore we must forcibly prevent the Ibos from breaking away - even if this attempt to prevent them, together with their stubborn resistance, may lead to their extermination."

This is an extremely logical and nice argument. But it must be directed to people other than the Biafrans. They cannot be asked to sacrifice their freedom in order that two Peoples, who are not otherwise willing to attempt the building of a nation together, may carry on a precarious united existence. It is bad enough to force the Biafrans to make immense sacrifices for their own freedom; it would be worse than absurd to expect them to surrender the freedom for which they are dying in order to maintain a precarious unity among other Peoples - whose own commitment to that unity must be very slight if this argument has any validity at all.

In fact, the argument "If you allow the Ibos to go, the others will also go," inevitably provokes the question: "Who are these others, and where will they go?" For properly considered, this argument is an Imperialist argument. I can well imagine Winston Churchill saying: "If I allow India to go, the others will go, and I was not appointed the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." But how can this kind of thing be said of Nigeria - most all by Nigerians? Who in the Nigerian issue represents Churchill? And who represents the "Others" who would break away if the Ibos are allowed to go? And who is the imperialist metropolitan power in Nigeria?

Those who advance this argument assume the Hausas to be the Churchill and the "others" to be the Yorubas in particular, and also the smaller groups. They assume that the Hausas would like to complete their conquest of the South, which was interrupted by the British, and are saying that the only way the Hausas will be able to continue to dominate the Yorubas and the smaller ethnic groups is if they succeed in dominating the Ibos.

If this is the basis of the argument, and if it stated the actual position, I would be amazed at Africa's reaction to an African Imperialism abetted and supported by British Imperialism. Indeed, it would be very shameful if Africa, which is still groaning from the yoke of European Imperialism, was to make a cynical distinction between that and an internal African Imperialism. Such an argument must be rejected by the whole of Africa. Not only would it make nonsense of the principles we have been proclaiming; it is also an insult to the people of Nigeria - the Hausas, the Yorubas, and the others.

Let us reject the Internal Domino Theory in relation to the Nigerian question. For it assumes that the people now in the Federation of Nigeria are, and wish to be, imperialists. I cannot believe that.

I still believe that they are capable of recognizing the tragedy which has caused one part of the Federation to break away, and of acknowledging that very different tactics are necessary if the old Nigeria is ever to re-created. For surely they could decide to leave the Biafrans to go their own way and, by the kind of Nigeria which they create, to show the Biafrans what they are losing by remaining separated from their brethren. For if the other peoples of Nigeria decide to work together, they will continue to be a strong and powerful force in Africa; they really have the opportunity to build a good nation of which every Nigerian - indeed every African - can be proud. Then it may be that at some time in the future the Biafrans will wish to rejoin the peoples from whom they now wish to part; if this happens, it will be the accession of a free people to a large and free political unit. For if the secession of Biafra is a setback to African Unity - as of course it is - no one is suggesting that we should consequently stop working for African Unity on the basis of willing commitment.

Why then are we suggesting that our Nigerian brethren have a different conception of unity, and that they want a unity of conquest only? I am not making such an argument: I am saying that, although our Nigerian brothers want to maintain one Nigeria, including Biafra, on the basis of equality of citizenship, they are wrong in thinking that this can be done now. I refuse to impute bad motives to General Gowon; I believe he is mistaken in his judgment and that Africa must not make the same mistake.

The African Domino Theory
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There is another Domino Theory which relates to the rest of Africa. We are told that, if we allow "tribalism" to break up Nigeria, no African country would be safe; for every African nation consists of tribes which find themselves in the same country by an accident of history and by the grace of the Imperialists. I fully accept the danger of tribalism in Africa. When we started TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) in 1954, the first of the objectives of our Party was preparation for independence, and the second was "to fight against tribalism." We have not completely succeeded in eradicating tribalism from our society; indeed I was recently forced to remind our people of this objective, and to warn them about certain tendencies.

But the dangers of tribalism are so well-known that, although I would never wish to minimize them, I do not think it is now necessary to expound them afresh. There is, however, a different fact which can be equally dangerous. Sometimes, indeed very often, the spectre of tribalism is raised by the enemies of Africa against Africa. It is dangerous for Africa to accept the argument of tribalism without examining its relevance in every given case. Indeed to the extent that we need to learn from Nigeria's "tribalism,' I have a feeling that Africa is being bamboozled or mesmerized into learning the wrong lesson.

But first, what is a Tribe? And how comparable is Nigeria's position to that which exists elsewhere in Africa? Are the Hausas a tribe? Are the Yorubas a tribe? Are the Ibos a tribe? It may be said that they are not "Nations"; but are they Tribes? There are Scottish clans, but the Scots are not a Tribe simply because of the fact that they are not a Nation. The Welsh: are they a Tribe? Are the Protestants of Northern Ireland a tribe? The Hausas, the Ibos, and the Yorubas, are not Nations in the legal sense; but they are not Tribes either. Each one of them is a "People" which could easily become a very coherent Nation. Each one of these "Peoples" of Nigeria has a better chance of forming a really viable and stable Nation than many of the legal Nations of Africa and other parts of the world.

Indeed, those who glibly compare Nigeria with other African countries show that they did not begin to understand the immense significance for the rest of Africa of the Nigerian experiment. Nigeria was trying (and if they do not allow themselves to be convinced by the internal Nigerian Domino Theory, they may continue trying) to build a Nation which incorporates several Peoples who could have become Nations on their own.

Had Nigeria succeeded (and Nigeria can still succeed if she rejects the argument of all or none), Africa would have a great example before it. We would be able to say: "Within Nigeria there are several Peoples, each conscious of itself and conscious of its ability to be a Nation on its own. If they have nevertheless succeeded in submerging their natural unity into a larger artificial unity, for the greater benefit of them all, then the rest of Africa can submerge its smaller artificial units into that greater artificiality (indeed that more natural unit of all Africa) which holds greater promise for all the peoples of Africa." In other words, any success in Nigeria - even if partial - is a demonstration of the practicability of our declared aim of African Unity - even though a Nigerian failure would not make this aim impossible of achievement. This, I repeat, is Nigeria's real significance to Africa.

No other political unit in our continent has the same significance for Africa; not even the Sudan, although the two cases are similar in one respect. Both have a basic problem of "Peoples" in the sense that the North of Sudan is different from the South, racially, religiously, culturally, and socially - although the one "People" of the South are divided into several different tribes. The Sudan's problem, therefore, is very serious - just as Nigeria's problem is.

But fortunately for Sudan, and for Africa, Southern Sudan is not blessed (or cursed) with immense mineral wealth. As a result, foreign economic interests are not involved in this conflict (until years later when oil was discovered in significant quantities in the South after Nyerere wrote this pamphlet).

However agonising the problem may be for the authorities in Khartoum - and for the people of the country - the former Colonial Power is most unlikely to pour arms into the Sudan to help maintain Sudanese unity. It is also unlikely to intervene in support of any attempt at secession. This situation will continue irrespective of the ideological leanings of the Government in Khartoum, and irrespective of what Russia does. In this case Sudanese leaders, and African leaders, have a real chance of solving the problem provided we do not make the same mistake as we made in Nigeria and act as if there is no genuine problem to be solved.

The solution, as the present Government in the Sudan has rightly foreseen, lies in a constitution which recognizes both the unity of the Sudan, and the legitimate interests of the South. This is what Eastern Nigeria was asking for before it seceded; this is what the Aburi Agreement was all about. It was the refusal, by Lagos, to accept this necessity that finally led to secession and the present situation.

The fact is that the Peoples of Nigeria have less in common, historically, linguistically, culturally, and as regards religion, than the Peoples of Scandinavia. The only thing that the Peoples of Nigeria hve in common is that they are all Africans and all have been under British rule for a few decades - and Britain governed them virtually separately.

It would be infinitely easier for the Peoples of Scandinavia to form one nation than for the Peoples of Nigeria. Those who do not see this do not understand Nigeria's significance for Africa.

One final point must be made about this tragedy. In spite of attempts on both sides of the quarrel to bring in religion, the conflict between Nigeria and Biafra is not a religious one. Yet if it were, that would be simply an additional complication: it would not justify the war. In fact, however, there are Christians and Muslims on both sides: religion cuts across the divisions between the Peoples.

The True Lesson for Africa
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I said earlier that Africa is learning the wrong lesson from the Nigerian tragedy. We are saying that if Biafra is allowed to secede, every country in Africa is going to have its own Biafra. But what we are doing is looking at results without looking at the cause of those results, and then saying that the same results will happen elsewhere without there having been any causes. That is nonsense. But there is a very serious lesson to be learned from the present tragedy.

We should learn that where in any African state there is a dominant group, whether that group is ethnic, religious or otherwise, it must wield its power and influence on behalf of all the elements which go to form that country. In particular, it should be very solicitous of the interests of the minorities, because they are the ones which need the protection of the State. If a dominant group does not act in this protective manner, then civil strife and consequent Biafras become inevitable. That is the lesson Africa should learn from the Nigerian tragedy.

We African leaders had a golden opportunity at the OAU Summit Conference in Kinshasa (in September 1967), but we missed it because we were confused by the tribal domino theory. At that time the whole of Africa, including those countries which now recognize Biafra, supported the territorial integrity of Nigeria. Yet I believe that all States had some sympathy for the Easterners, who had already experienced a massacre of some 30,000 of their brethren, and who were trying to absorb nearly 2 million refugees in the Eastern Region.

Previous to secession the Ibos were simply asking for a loosening of the constitutional structure so as to maintain the Unity of Nigeria and still meet the understandable fears of the Peoples from that Region. Africa should have accepted the legitimacy of this demand. Since we were all supporting Nigeria in its main objective of maintaining national unity, we should have used our moral strength to urge Nigeria to listen to those demands. We should have pointed out that under the circumstances of the two coups and the massacres, what they were asking for was not only understandable but was also justifiable. Since we were supporting the Nigerian authorities in their efforts to keep Nigeria one, and since by that support we were rejecting any claim by the East to secede, we were in a very strong position. We did not have to worry about Domino Theories and the Charter of the OAU. But we were so obsessed, bewitched and terrified by the Domino Theory that we did not dare raise a voice for the Ibos even when we all supported the Federal Authority.

That opportunity was lost. But we must not therefore even appear to acquiesce in the present situation of war and suffering. The least we can do is now ask our brethren in both Nigeria and Biafra to stop fighting and to begin talking about their future relations. It is being said that the situation has changed from what it was two years ago, and that Biafrans need no longer fear for their future. If that is the case, we should ask Nigeria to convince the Biafrans of it at a conference table. You cannot convince people that they are safe while you are shooting and starving them.

The OAU was established by the Heads of African States. But it is intended to serve the Peoples of Africa. The OAU is not a trade union of African Heads of State. Therefore, if it is to retain the respect and support of the People of Africa, it must be concerned about the lives of the People of Africa. We must not just concern ourselves with our own survival as Heads of State; we must even be more concerned about peace and justice in Africa than we are about the sanctity of the boundaries we inherited. For the importance of these lies in the fact that their acceptance is the basis for peace and justice in our continent, and we all have a responsibility to the whole people of Africa in this regard.

Many African Governments, some of them very good governments, have been overthrown through coups. Some countries have had more than one coup; but none of them has broken up. Only the Nigerian Federation is in danger, and this from the effects of a failure to meet the legitimate interests of the Easterners, not directly because of the coups. And the fall of African Governments, however regrettable, is not the same thing as the disintegration of African countries. we must not be like the French monarch who said: "L'etat c'est Moi" - "I am the State." The OAU must sometimes raise a voice against those regimes in Africa, including independent Africa, who oppress the Peoples of Africa. In some countries in Africa it might be the only voice that can speak on behalf of the people. If we dare not do that, even in private, we shall deserve the scorn of those who accuse us of double standards.

In this connection we could learn a good lesson from our former masters. For European Governments are not often very polite to European regimes which fail to show respect for basic human rights within their own countries. Europeans do care about what happens to Europeans. (Sometimes, as in the case of Stanleyville, we are reminded of that fact rather unpleasantly). I think that is a lesson worth learning.

Thus, for example, European Governments do not invade Greece, for they respect the territorial integrity of fellow European States; but they have not left, and will not leave, the Greek regime in any doubt at all about what they think of it. Yet what have the Greek Colonels done? They have carried out a military coup against a constitutionally established government, and are detaining and persecuting the supporters of the constitution - an occurrence so familiar in young Africa that is hardly considered wrong anymore.

If we do not learn to criticise injustice within our continent, we will soon be tolerating fascism in Africa, as long as it is practised by African Governments against African Peoples. Consider what our reaction would have been if the 30,000 Ibos had been massacred by whites in Rhodesia or South Africa. One can imagine the outcry from Africa. Yet these people are still dead; the colour of those who killed them is irrelevant. We must ask Nigeria to stop more killing now, and to deal with the problem by argument, not death.

Justice is indivisible. Africa, the OAU, must act accordingly. - (Julius K. Nyerere, The Nigeria-Biafra Crisis, September 1969, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania).


Another statement by Nyerere:


"Why We Recognised Biafra," The Observer, London, 28 April 1968


Julius K. Nyerere
​

Leaders of Tanzania have probably talked more about the need for African unity than those of any other country. Giving formal recognition to even greater disunity in Africa was therefore a very difficult decision to make. Our reluctance to do so was compounded by our understanding of the problems of unity - of which we have some experience - and of the problems of Nigeria. For we have had very good relations with the Federation of Nigeria, even to the extent that when we needed help from Africa we asked it of the Federation.

But unity can only be based on the general consent of the people involved. The people must feel that this state, or this nation, is theirs; and they must be willing to have their quarrels in that context. Once a large number of the people of any such political unit stop believing that the state is theirs, and that the government is their instrument, then the unit is no longer viable. It will not receive the loyalty of its citizens.

For the citizen's duty to serve, and if necessary to die for, his country stems from the fact that it is his and that its government is the instrument of himself and his fellow citizens. The duty stems, in other words, from the common denominator of accepted statehood, and from the state government's responsibility to protect all the citizens and serve them all. For states, and governments, exist for men and for the service of man. They exist for the citizens' protection, their welfare, and the future well-being of their children. There is no other justification for states and governments except man.

In Nigeria this consciousness of a common citizenship was destroyed by the events of 1966, and in particular by the pogroms in which 30,000 Eastern Nigerians were murdered, many more injured, and about two million forced to flee from the North of their country. It is these pogroms, and the apparent inability or unwillingness of the authorities to protect the victims, which underlies the Easterners' conviction that they have been rejected by other Nigerians and abandoned by the Federal Government.

Whether the Easterners are correct in their belief that they have been rejected is a matter for argument. But they do have this belief. And if they are wrong, they have to be convinced that they are wrong. They will not convinced by being shot. Nor will their acceptance as part of the Federation be demonstrated by the use of Federal power to bomb schools and hospitals in the areas to which people have fled from persecution.

In Britain, in 1950, the Stone of Scone was stolen from Westminster Abbey by Scottish Nationalists while I was still a student at Edinburgh. That act did not represent a wish by the majority of the Scottish people to govern themselves. But if, for some peculiar reason, that vast majority of the Scottish people decided that Scotland should secede from the United Kingdom, would the Government in London order the bombing of Edinburgh, and in pursuing the Scots into the Highlands, kill the civilians they overtook? Certainly the Union Government would not do this; it would argue with the Scots, and try to reach some compromise.

As President of Tanzania it is my duty to safeguard the integrity of the United Republic. But if the mass of the people of Zanzibar should, without external manipulation, and for some reason of their own, decide that the Union was prejudicial to their existence, I could not advocate bombing them into submission. To do so would not be to defend the Union. The Union would have ceased to exist when the consent of its constituent members was withdrawn. I would certainly be one of those working hard to prevent secession, or to reduce its disintegrating effects. But I could not support a war on the people whom I have sworn to serve - especially not if the secession is preceded by a rejection of Zanzibaris by Tanganyikans.

Similarly, if we had succeeded in the 1963 attempt to form an East African Federation, or if we should do so in the future, Tanzania would be overjoyed. But if at some time thereafter the vast majority of the people of any one of the countries should decide - and persist in a decision - to withdraw from the Federation, the other two countries could not wage war against the people who wished to secede. Such a decision would mark a failure by the Federation. That would be tragic; but it would not justify mass killings.

The Biafrans now feel that they cannot live under conditions of personal security in the present Nigerian Federation. As they were unable to achieve an agreement on a new form of association, they have therefore claimed the right to govern themselves. The Biafrans are not claiming the right to govern anyone else. They have not said that they must govern the Federation as the only way of protecting themselves. They have simply withdrawn their consent to the system under which they used to be governed.

Biafra is not now operating under the control of a democratic government, any more than Nigeria is. But the mass support for the establishment and defence of Biafra is obvious. This is not a case of a few leaders declaring secession for their own private glory. Indeed, by the Aburi Agreement the leaders of Biafra showed a greater reluctance to give up hope of some form of unity with Nigeria than the masses possessed. But the agreement was not implemented.

Tanzania would still like to see some form of co-operation or unity between all the peoples of Nigeria and Biafra. But whether this happens, to what extent, and in what fields, can only be decided by agreement among all the peoples involved. It is not for Tanzania to say.

We in this country believe that unity is vital for the future of Africa. But it must be a unity which serves the people, and which is freely determined upon by the people.

For 10 months we have accepted the Federal Government's legal right to our support in a ‘police action to defend the integrity of the State.' On that basis we have watched a civil war result in the death of about 100,000 people, and the employment of mercenaries by both sides. We have watched the Federal Government reject the advice of Africa to talk instead of demanding surrender before talks could begin. Everything combined gradually to force us to the conclusion that Nigerian unity did not exist.

Tanzania deeply regrets that the will for unity in Nigeria has been destroyed over the past two years. But we are convinced that Nigerian unity cannot be maintained by force any more than unity in East Africa could be created by one state conquering another.

It seemed to us that by refusing to recognise the existence of Biafra we were tacitly supporting a war against the people of Eastern Nigeria - and a war conducted in the name of unity. We could not continue doing this any longer. - (Julius K. Nyerere, "Why We Recognised Biafra," The Observer, London, 28 April 1968).
 
Mkandara said:
Hivi Biafra na Ogaden zinafanana vipi? maanake nijuavyo Biafra walitaka Kujitenga na Nigeria, sasa hao Ogaden walitaka kujitenga na nani?
Click to expand...

Ogaden walitaka kujitenga kutoka Ethiopia ili waungane na Somalia. Watu wa Ogaden ni Wasomali lakini jimbo lao ni sehemu ya Ethiopia.
 
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