mjingamimi
JF-Expert Member
- Aug 3, 2015
- 39,441
- 45,133
Wewe yaache TU kama yalivyo.
Utofauti ndo ukamilifu
Utofauti ndo ukamilifu
Uislamu unafeli wapi? Imani moja ila msimamo haupo! Iddi lini?
- Thread starter squirtinator
- Start date
Elungata
JF-Expert Member
- Jan 28, 2011
- 40,205
- 33,229
BRIEF HISTORY 1741- 1818
Abd al-Wahhab’s advocacy of these ultra
radical views inevitably led to his expulsion
from his own town — and in 1741, after
some wanderings, he found refuge under
the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe.
What Ibn Saud perceived in Abd al-
Wahhab’s novel teaching was the means to
overturn Arab tradition and convention. It
was a path to seizing power.
Ibn Saud’s clan, seizing on Abd al-Wahhab’s
doctrine, now could do what they always
did, which was raiding neighboring villages
and robbing them of their possessions.
Only now they were doing it not within the
ambit of Arab tradition, but rather under
the banner of jihad. Ibn Saud and Abd al-
Wahhab also reintroduced the idea of
martyrdom in the name of jihad, as it
granted those martyred immediate entry
into paradise.
In the beginning, they conquered a few
local communities and imposed their rule
over them. (The conquered inhabitants
were given a limited choice: conversion to
Wahhabism or death.) By 1790, the Alliance
controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula
and repeatedly raided Medina, Syria and
Iraq.
Their strategy — like that of ISIS today —
was to bring the peoples whom they
conquered into submission. They aimed to
instill fear. In 1801, the Allies attacked the
Holy City of Karbala in Iraq. They massacred
thousands of Shiites, including women and
children. Many Shiite shrines were
destroyed, including the shrine of Imam
Hussein, the murdered grandson of Prophet
Muhammad.
A British official, Lieutenant Francis Warden,
observing the situation at the time, wrote:
“They pillaged the whole of it [Karbala], and
plundered the Tomb of Hussein... slaying in
the course of the day, with circumstances
of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of
the inhabitants ...”
Osman Ibn Bishr Najdi, the historian of the
first Saudi state, wrote that Ibn Saud
committed a massacre in Karbala in 1801.
He proudly documented that massacre
saying, “we took Karbala and slaughtered
and took its people (as slaves), then praise
be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and we do
not apologize for that and say: ‘And to the
unbelievers: the same treatment.’”
In 1803, Abdul Aziz then entered the Holy
City of Mecca, which surrendered under the
impact of terror and panic (the same fate
was to befall Medina, too). Abd al-Wahhab’s
followers demolished historical monuments
and all the tombs and shrines in their midst.
By the end, they had destroyed centuries of
Islamic architecture near the Grand Mosque.
But in November of 1803, a Shiite assassin
killed King Abdul Aziz (taking revenge for
the massacre at Karbala). His son, Saud bin
Abd al Aziz, succeeded him and continued
the conquest of Arabia. Ottoman rulers,
however, could no longer just sit back and
watch as their empire was devoured piece
by piece. In 1812, the Ottoman army,
composed of Egyptians, pushed the Alliance
out from Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In
1814, Saud bin Abd al Aziz died of fever. His
unfortunate son Abdullah bin Saud,
however, was taken by the Ottomans to
Istanbul, where he was gruesomely
executed (a visitor to Istanbul reported
seeing him having been humiliated in the
streets of Istanbul for three days, then
hanged and beheaded, his severed head
fired from a canon, and his heart cut out
and impaled on his body).
In 1815, Wahhabi forces were crushed by
the Egyptians (acting on the Ottoman’s
behalf) in a decisive battle. In 1818, the
Ottomans captured and destroyed the
Wahhabi capital of Dariyah. The first Saudi
state was no more. The few remaining
Wahhabis withdrew into the desert to
regroup, and there they remained,
quiescent for most of the 19th century.
HISTORY RETURNS WITH ISIS
It is not hard to understand how the
founding of the Islamic State by ISIS in
contemporary Iraq might resonate amongst
those who recall this history. Indeed, the
ethos of 18th century Wahhabism did not
just wither in Nejd, but it roared back into
life when the Ottoman Empire collapsed
amongst the chaos of World War I.
The Al Saud — in this 20th century
renaissance — were led by the laconic and
politically astute Abd-al Aziz, who, on
uniting the fractious Bedouin tribes,
launched the Saudi “Ikhwan” in the spirit of
Abd-al Wahhab’s and Ibn Saud’s earlier
fighting proselytisers.
The Ikhwan was a reincarnation of the
early, fierce, semi-independent vanguard
movement of committed armed Wahhabist
“moralists” who almost had succeeded in
seizing Arabia by the early 1800s. In the
same manner as earlier, the Ikhwan again
succeeded in capturing Mecca, Medina and
Jeddah between 1914 and 1926. Abd-al
Aziz, however, began to feel his wider
interests to be threatened by the
revolutionary “Jacobinism” exhibited by the
Ikhwan. The Ikhwan revolted — leading to
a civil war that lasted until the 1930s, when
the King had them put down: he machine-
gunned them.
For this king, (Abd-al Aziz), the simple
verities of previous decades were eroding.
Oil was being discovered in the peninsular.
Britain and America were courting Abd-al
Aziz, but still were inclined to support Sharif
Husain as the only legitimate ruler of Arabia.
The Saudis needed to develop a more
sophisticated diplomatic posture.
So Wahhabism was forcefully changed from
a movement of revolutionary jihad and
theological takfiri purification, to a
movement of conservative social, political,
theological, and religious da’wa (Islamic
call) and to justifying the institution that
upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and
the King’s absolute power.
OIL WEALTH SPREAD WAHHABISM
With the advent of the oil bonanza — as the
French scholar, Giles Kepel writes, Saudi
goals were to “reach out and spread
Wahhabism across the Muslim world ... to
“Wahhabise” Islam, thereby reducing the
“multitude of voices within the religion” to
a “single creed” — a movement which
would transcend national divisions. Billions
of dollars were — and continue to be —
invested in this manifestation of soft power.
It was this heady mix of billion dollar soft
power projection — and the Saudi
willingness to manage Sunni Islam both to
further America’s interests, as it
concomitantly embedded Wahhabism
educationally, socially and culturally
throughout the lands of Islam — that
brought into being a western policy
dependency on Saudi Arabia, a dependency
that has endured since Abd-al Aziz’s
meeting with Roosevelt on a U.S. warship
(returning the president from the Yalta
Conference) until today.
Westerners looked at the Kingdom and
their gaze was taken by the wealth; by the
apparent modernization; by the professed
leadership of the Islamic world. They chose
to presume that the Kingdom was bending
to the imperatives of modern life — and
that the management of Sunni Islam would
bend the Kingdom, too, to modern life.
But the Saudi Ikhwan approach to Islam did
not die in the 1930s. It retreated, but it
maintained its hold over parts of the system
— hence the duality that we observe today
in the Saudi attitude towards ISIS.
On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist.
On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a
different way. It could be seen essentially as
a corrective movement to contemporary
Wahhabism.
ISIS is a “post-Medina” movement: it looks
to the actions of the first two Caliphs, rather
than the Prophet Muhammad himself, as a
source of emulation, and it forcefully denies
the Saudis’ claim of authority to rule.
As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil
age into an ever more inflated institution,
the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained
ground (despite King Faisal’s modernization
campaign). The “Ikhwan approach”
enjoyed — and still enjoys — the support of
many prominent men and women and
sheikhs. In a sense, Osama bin Laden was
precisely the representative of a late
flowering of this Ikhwani approach.
Today, ISIS’ undermining of the legitimacy
of the King’s legitimacy is not seen to be
problematic, but rather a return to the true
origins of the Saudi-Wahhab project.
In the collaborative management of the
region by the Saudis and the West in
pursuit of the many western projects
(countering socialism, Ba’athism, Nasserism,
Soviet and Iranian influence), western
politicians have highlighted their chosen
reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth,
modernization and influence), but they
chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.
After all, the more radical Islamist
movements were perceived by Western
intelligence services as being more effective
in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan — and
in combatting out-of-favor Middle Eastern
leaders and states.
Why should we be surprised then, that from
Prince Bandar’s Saudi-Western mandate to
manage the insurgency in Syria against
President Assad should have emerged a
neo-Ikhwan type of violent, fear-inducing
vanguard movement: ISIS? And why should
we be surprised — knowing a little about
Wahhabism — that “moderate” insurgents
in Syria would become rarer than a mythical
unicorn? Why should we have imagined
that radical Wahhabism would create
moderates? Or why could we imagine that
a doctrine of “One leader, One authority,
One mosque: submit to it, or be killed”
could ever ultimately lead to moderation or
tolerance?
Or, perhaps, we never imagined.
This article is Part I of Alastair Crooke’s
historical analysis of the roots of ISIS and its
impact on the future of the Middle East.
Abd al-Wahhab’s advocacy of these ultra
radical views inevitably led to his expulsion
from his own town — and in 1741, after
some wanderings, he found refuge under
the protection of Ibn Saud and his tribe.
What Ibn Saud perceived in Abd al-
Wahhab’s novel teaching was the means to
overturn Arab tradition and convention. It
was a path to seizing power.
Ibn Saud’s clan, seizing on Abd al-Wahhab’s
doctrine, now could do what they always
did, which was raiding neighboring villages
and robbing them of their possessions.
Only now they were doing it not within the
ambit of Arab tradition, but rather under
the banner of jihad. Ibn Saud and Abd al-
Wahhab also reintroduced the idea of
martyrdom in the name of jihad, as it
granted those martyred immediate entry
into paradise.
In the beginning, they conquered a few
local communities and imposed their rule
over them. (The conquered inhabitants
were given a limited choice: conversion to
Wahhabism or death.) By 1790, the Alliance
controlled most of the Arabian Peninsula
and repeatedly raided Medina, Syria and
Iraq.
Their strategy — like that of ISIS today —
was to bring the peoples whom they
conquered into submission. They aimed to
instill fear. In 1801, the Allies attacked the
Holy City of Karbala in Iraq. They massacred
thousands of Shiites, including women and
children. Many Shiite shrines were
destroyed, including the shrine of Imam
Hussein, the murdered grandson of Prophet
Muhammad.
A British official, Lieutenant Francis Warden,
observing the situation at the time, wrote:
“They pillaged the whole of it [Karbala], and
plundered the Tomb of Hussein... slaying in
the course of the day, with circumstances
of peculiar cruelty, above five thousand of
the inhabitants ...”
Osman Ibn Bishr Najdi, the historian of the
first Saudi state, wrote that Ibn Saud
committed a massacre in Karbala in 1801.
He proudly documented that massacre
saying, “we took Karbala and slaughtered
and took its people (as slaves), then praise
be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds, and we do
not apologize for that and say: ‘And to the
unbelievers: the same treatment.’”
In 1803, Abdul Aziz then entered the Holy
City of Mecca, which surrendered under the
impact of terror and panic (the same fate
was to befall Medina, too). Abd al-Wahhab’s
followers demolished historical monuments
and all the tombs and shrines in their midst.
By the end, they had destroyed centuries of
Islamic architecture near the Grand Mosque.
But in November of 1803, a Shiite assassin
killed King Abdul Aziz (taking revenge for
the massacre at Karbala). His son, Saud bin
Abd al Aziz, succeeded him and continued
the conquest of Arabia. Ottoman rulers,
however, could no longer just sit back and
watch as their empire was devoured piece
by piece. In 1812, the Ottoman army,
composed of Egyptians, pushed the Alliance
out from Medina, Jeddah and Mecca. In
1814, Saud bin Abd al Aziz died of fever. His
unfortunate son Abdullah bin Saud,
however, was taken by the Ottomans to
Istanbul, where he was gruesomely
executed (a visitor to Istanbul reported
seeing him having been humiliated in the
streets of Istanbul for three days, then
hanged and beheaded, his severed head
fired from a canon, and his heart cut out
and impaled on his body).
In 1815, Wahhabi forces were crushed by
the Egyptians (acting on the Ottoman’s
behalf) in a decisive battle. In 1818, the
Ottomans captured and destroyed the
Wahhabi capital of Dariyah. The first Saudi
state was no more. The few remaining
Wahhabis withdrew into the desert to
regroup, and there they remained,
quiescent for most of the 19th century.
HISTORY RETURNS WITH ISIS
It is not hard to understand how the
founding of the Islamic State by ISIS in
contemporary Iraq might resonate amongst
those who recall this history. Indeed, the
ethos of 18th century Wahhabism did not
just wither in Nejd, but it roared back into
life when the Ottoman Empire collapsed
amongst the chaos of World War I.
The Al Saud — in this 20th century
renaissance — were led by the laconic and
politically astute Abd-al Aziz, who, on
uniting the fractious Bedouin tribes,
launched the Saudi “Ikhwan” in the spirit of
Abd-al Wahhab’s and Ibn Saud’s earlier
fighting proselytisers.
The Ikhwan was a reincarnation of the
early, fierce, semi-independent vanguard
movement of committed armed Wahhabist
“moralists” who almost had succeeded in
seizing Arabia by the early 1800s. In the
same manner as earlier, the Ikhwan again
succeeded in capturing Mecca, Medina and
Jeddah between 1914 and 1926. Abd-al
Aziz, however, began to feel his wider
interests to be threatened by the
revolutionary “Jacobinism” exhibited by the
Ikhwan. The Ikhwan revolted — leading to
a civil war that lasted until the 1930s, when
the King had them put down: he machine-
gunned them.
For this king, (Abd-al Aziz), the simple
verities of previous decades were eroding.
Oil was being discovered in the peninsular.
Britain and America were courting Abd-al
Aziz, but still were inclined to support Sharif
Husain as the only legitimate ruler of Arabia.
The Saudis needed to develop a more
sophisticated diplomatic posture.
So Wahhabism was forcefully changed from
a movement of revolutionary jihad and
theological takfiri purification, to a
movement of conservative social, political,
theological, and religious da’wa (Islamic
call) and to justifying the institution that
upholds loyalty to the royal Saudi family and
the King’s absolute power.
OIL WEALTH SPREAD WAHHABISM
With the advent of the oil bonanza — as the
French scholar, Giles Kepel writes, Saudi
goals were to “reach out and spread
Wahhabism across the Muslim world ... to
“Wahhabise” Islam, thereby reducing the
“multitude of voices within the religion” to
a “single creed” — a movement which
would transcend national divisions. Billions
of dollars were — and continue to be —
invested in this manifestation of soft power.
It was this heady mix of billion dollar soft
power projection — and the Saudi
willingness to manage Sunni Islam both to
further America’s interests, as it
concomitantly embedded Wahhabism
educationally, socially and culturally
throughout the lands of Islam — that
brought into being a western policy
dependency on Saudi Arabia, a dependency
that has endured since Abd-al Aziz’s
meeting with Roosevelt on a U.S. warship
(returning the president from the Yalta
Conference) until today.
Westerners looked at the Kingdom and
their gaze was taken by the wealth; by the
apparent modernization; by the professed
leadership of the Islamic world. They chose
to presume that the Kingdom was bending
to the imperatives of modern life — and
that the management of Sunni Islam would
bend the Kingdom, too, to modern life.
But the Saudi Ikhwan approach to Islam did
not die in the 1930s. It retreated, but it
maintained its hold over parts of the system
— hence the duality that we observe today
in the Saudi attitude towards ISIS.
On the one hand, ISIS is deeply Wahhabist.
On the other hand, it is ultra radical in a
different way. It could be seen essentially as
a corrective movement to contemporary
Wahhabism.
ISIS is a “post-Medina” movement: it looks
to the actions of the first two Caliphs, rather
than the Prophet Muhammad himself, as a
source of emulation, and it forcefully denies
the Saudis’ claim of authority to rule.
As the Saudi monarchy blossomed in the oil
age into an ever more inflated institution,
the appeal of the Ikhwan message gained
ground (despite King Faisal’s modernization
campaign). The “Ikhwan approach”
enjoyed — and still enjoys — the support of
many prominent men and women and
sheikhs. In a sense, Osama bin Laden was
precisely the representative of a late
flowering of this Ikhwani approach.
Today, ISIS’ undermining of the legitimacy
of the King’s legitimacy is not seen to be
problematic, but rather a return to the true
origins of the Saudi-Wahhab project.
In the collaborative management of the
region by the Saudis and the West in
pursuit of the many western projects
(countering socialism, Ba’athism, Nasserism,
Soviet and Iranian influence), western
politicians have highlighted their chosen
reading of Saudi Arabia (wealth,
modernization and influence), but they
chose to ignore the Wahhabist impulse.
After all, the more radical Islamist
movements were perceived by Western
intelligence services as being more effective
in toppling the USSR in Afghanistan — and
in combatting out-of-favor Middle Eastern
leaders and states.
Why should we be surprised then, that from
Prince Bandar’s Saudi-Western mandate to
manage the insurgency in Syria against
President Assad should have emerged a
neo-Ikhwan type of violent, fear-inducing
vanguard movement: ISIS? And why should
we be surprised — knowing a little about
Wahhabism — that “moderate” insurgents
in Syria would become rarer than a mythical
unicorn? Why should we have imagined
that radical Wahhabism would create
moderates? Or why could we imagine that
a doctrine of “One leader, One authority,
One mosque: submit to it, or be killed”
could ever ultimately lead to moderation or
tolerance?
Or, perhaps, we never imagined.
This article is Part I of Alastair Crooke’s
historical analysis of the roots of ISIS and its
impact on the future of the Middle East.
rikiboy
JF-Expert Member
- Feb 19, 2017
- 21,546
- 42,106
Jamani kwani si mlee tu idd...
Mambo ya kusubiri shehe ponda asemee mtakufaa njaaa...
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Mimi nimeongea kinachoendelea
Africa dini za miaka ya I800 mwishoni
Dini za kikristo Africa zimefika miaka ya 1800 mwishoni
dega
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 18, 2012
- 3,137
- 3,042
Nynyi mna Mapadri was****e na kanisa limewahalalisha sisi hatusemi
Kuna Mapadri wazungu wanakufumuweni marinda kila siku na kunawanaume walioolewa na MAPADRI nakutafutia picha nikutumie
squirtinator
JF-Expert Member
- Sep 20, 2015
- 2,765
- 4,174
- Thread starter
- #66
mi nakula kesho! kesho nimeiweka kando kwa ajili ya LA MUJER DE MI VIDA! She's the shot caller kesho!Jamani kwani si mlee tu idd...Mambo ya kusubiri shehe ponda asemee mtakufaa njaaa...
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Mfia dini utapata tabu sana, kula bata, kula maisha
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Kaka Usiogope kitimoto mbona mashehe wanakula, wewe nani si mfuasi tu
Padri anakula wake za watu na wewe kula kwa Kamba yako
rikiboy
JF-Expert Member
- Feb 19, 2017
- 21,546
- 42,106
dega
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 18, 2012
- 3,137
- 3,042
Utacheka sena Njia peke ya kutafsir QURAN NA HADITHI niKila ninaposoma vitabu vyenu huwa nakumbushwa UKWELI huu: mtu hawezi kusoma Qur'an na akabaki Muislamu unless mtu huyo ni sampuli ya Dr. Zakir Naik. Hebu soma hapa halafu uniambie kama kuna logic yeyote hapa:
Abu Huraira reported Allah's Messenger (ﷺ) having said:
By Him in Whose Hand is my life, if you were not to commit sin, Allah would sweep you out of existence and He would replace (you by) those people who would commit sin and seek forgiveness from Allah, and He would have pardoned them.
(Reference: Sahih Muslim 2749).
Muhammad anasema usipofanya dhambi Allah anakuua ili aumbe watu watakaokuwa tayari kufanya dhambi ili waungame dhambi zao ili Allah awasemehe!! Really? Bado kuna watu wanaamini MUNGU kweli anaweza akaagiza mtu afanye dhambi?
1 Kukifaham KIARABU
2 Kufaham mazingira na sababu kushushwa aya husika
3 Kufaham mazingira ya Mtume kusema hadithi husika
4 Kurejea ktk Vitabu vikubwa vya SHERHE ZA QURAN NA HADITHI
TRANSLATIONS YA GOOGLE
ITAKUFIKISHA HAPO ULIPOFIKIA WW NGURUWE PORI (Kuua kutoa roho kisha waletwe wengine)!!!
Night Watch
JF-Expert Member
- Apr 4, 2017
- 2,020
- 1,986
Kazi kweli kweli
Kwaio unatwambia kuwa hayo sio maneno ya mungu ni historia tu ya watu na mungu wao na nyie mna mungu wenu tofauti na huyo wa kwenye historia?
Lete ushahidi kama hio ndio asili yake
Tuulize Bibilia inasemaje? aaah nimekumbuka, likiwakaa kooni huwa mnakana maandishi ya mungu mwenyewe
Sasa wewe si ukae uchinje albino
Mfanya ushirikina utapata tabu sana, wacha kuchinja ma albino
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Uwezo wako wa kufikiri IQ ni mdogo sana
Umetoka nje ya uzi, Jadili alicholeta mleta mada, anaongelea kufeli kwa uislam duniani
Tatizo mlipelekwa shule kusomea ujinga mlikariri ndio maana huwezi Jibu hoja za mada husika
Mimi nimejibu kuwa dini zote ni matatizo
Wewe huna point? Unaongelea albino, Albino ni mdudu gani?
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Mkuu kitimoto is the best foodKwaio unatwambia kuwa hayo sio maneno ya mungu ni historia tu ya watu na mungu wao na nyie mna mungu wenu tofauti na huyo wa kwenye historia?
Lete ushahidi kama hio ndio asili yake
Tuulize Bibilia inasemaje? aaah nimekumbuka, likiwakaa kooni huwa mnakana maandishi ya mungu mwenyewe
Mashehe wanaokula ndio wamepanga Iddi na serikali iwe kesho
Mfiaukweli
JF-Expert Member
- Aug 30, 2018
- 5,636
- 8,776
Kwaio unatwambia kuwa hayo sio maneno ya mungu ni historia tu ya watu na mungu wao na nyie mna mungu wenu tofauti na huyo wa kwenye historia?
Lete ushahidi kama hio ndio asili yake
Tuulize Bibilia inasemaje? aaah nimekumbuka, likiwakaa kooni huwa mnakana maandishi ya mungu mwenyewe
Hatuna mungu sisi ila tuna Mungu Jehovah. Nilichoandika ni kuwa umenukuu Agano la Kale. It is valid Yes lakini pia ni situational. Hata ukisoma hayo maandiko yanasema "nikuambiapo"? What does that tell you? Kuwa amri hiyo ni perpetual?
Hebu sasa linganisha na ruhusa mliyopewa. Vinalingana?
GUSSIE
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 2, 2014
- 3,866
- 11,102
Kaka jadili kwanini uislamu unafeli
Bakwata ni tawi la wakristo, Waislamu wanaojitambua Leo wamekula iddi
Nyinyi mnasubiri wakristo kesho na serikali yao watangaze Iddi kupitia Bakwata
Bakwata ni tawi la ukristo na serikali
Kitimoto italiwa sana kesho na guest Kama kawa,
Similar Discussions
-
Sababu zilizopelekea Dini za Hinduism na Budhism kushindwa kumea Afrika- Started by Mhaya
- Replies: 14
-
Msikiti wa Al Aqsa ndiyo Hekalu la Suleman?- Started by Jackwillpower
- Replies: 42
-
-
Dkt. Slaa: Msimamo wangu ni ule ule, wananchi wasipangiwe idadi ya watoto- Started by Suley2019
- Replies: 5
