Mapokezi ya Nyerere huko Uingereza

Che Guevara, Cuba
and The Algerian Revolution


By Ahmed Ben Bella in The Militant
Vol. 62, no. 4, 2 February 1998


"From Che Guevara and The Cuban Revolution" series

Preface

This selection is part of a series marking the 30th anniversary of the death in combat of Ernesto Che Guevara. Argentine by birth, Guevara became one of the central leaders of the Cuban revolution that brought down the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship in 1959 and, in response to mounting pressure from Washington, opened the socialist revolution in the Americas. Che, as he is popularly known, was one of the outstanding Marxist leaders of the 20th century.

In 1966 - 67, he led a nucleus of revolutionaries from Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru who fought to overthrow the military dictatorship in Bolivia. In the process, they sought to forge a Latin America-wide movement of workers and peasants that could lead the battle for land reform and against U.S. imperialist domination of the continent and advance the struggle for socialism. Guevara was wounded and captured on Oct. 8, 1967. He was shot the next day by the Bolivian military, after consultation with Washington.

As part of the commemoration of this anniversary in Cuba, dozens of articles, speeches, and interviews by those who worked with Che were published, dealing with the Cuban revolution, its impact in world politics, and the actions of its leadership. Many of Guevara's collaborators and family members have spoken at conferences and other meetings, bringing Che to life for a new generation and explaining the importance of his rich political legacy today. These materials contain many valuable firsthand accounts and information, some of which are being written down and published for the first time. They are part of the broader discussion taking place in Cuba today on how to advance the revolution.

The Militant is reprinting a selection of these contributions, along with related material such as the article above, as a weekly feature, under the banner "Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution."

The article below appeared in the October 1997 issue of the French publication Le Monde Diplomatique, under the title, "On the 30th Anniversary of the Death of Che Guevara: Che as I knew him." Its author, Ahmed Ben Bella, was the central leader of the Algerian National Liberation Front, which led the struggle for independence from France. Ben Bella was the president of the revolutionary workers and farmers government that came to power following the victory over Paris in 1962. He was overthrown in a counterrevolutionary coup led by Col. Houari Boumediene in June 1965.

We are reprinting it here as a final, twelfth part to the series of articles and speeches by those who knew and worked with Guevara that The Militant reprinted at the end of 1997 under the rubric "Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution."

The article is copyright 1997 by Le Monde Diplomatique, and reprinted by permission. The translation, subheadings, and footnotes are by The Militant.

On October 9, 1967, in a little schoolroom in La Higuera, Bolivia, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was assassinated. He had been taken prisoner the day before. Thus ended the life of a revolutionary whom Jean-Paul Sartre called "the most complete human being of our era." It had led him from Argentina to Guatemala, from Cuba to the Congo, and finally to Bolivia, always inspired by an ardent hope of relieving the sufferings of the poor. President Ahmed Ben Bella met him many times in Algiers from 1962 - 65 when the city was a haven for all the anti-imperialists of the world.

For thirty years Che Guevara has been challenging our consciences. From beyond space and time, we hear Che's call, which demands that we answer: yes, only the revolution can sometimes transform man into a being of light. We saw this light illuminating his naked body lying somewhere in distant N~ancahuazu',(1) in the photographs that appeared in newspapers all over the world. The message of his final gaze continues to touch the depths of our soul.

Che was a courageous fighter, but a conscious one, with a body weakened by asthma. Sometimes, when I climbed with him to the Chre'a heights overlooking the town of Blida, I saw him suffer an attack that turned him green in the face. Anyone who has read his Bolivian diary knows in what poor health he faced the terrible physical and mental ordeals with which his path was strewn.

It is impossible to speak of Che without speaking of Cuba and the special relations which united us, since his story and his life were so closely bound up with the country that became his second home before he turned to wherever the revolution called him.

I first met Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the autumn of 1962, on the eve of the international crisis around the missile affair and the United States blockade of Cuba.(2) Algeria had just achieved independence and formed its first government. As head of that government, I was due to attend the September 1962 session of the United Nations in New York at which the Algerian flag would be raised for the first time over the UN building, a ceremony marking the victory of our national liberation struggle and Algeria's entry into the concert of free nations.

Visits to Washington and Havana

The National Liberation Front's political bureau had decided that the trip to the United Nations should be followed by a visit to Cuba. More than just a visit, it was intended as an act of faith demonstrating our political commitment. Algeria wished to emphasize publicly its total solidarity with the Cuban revolution, especially at this difficult moment in its history.

I was invited to the White House on the morning of October 15, 1962, and had a frank and heated discussion about Cuba with the president, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. I asked him point blank: "Are you heading towards a confrontation with Cuba?" His reply left no doubt about his real intentions. "No," he said, "if there are no Soviet missiles. Yes, if there are." Kennedy tried hard to dissuade me from flying to Cuba direct from New York. He even suggested that the Cuban military aircraft that was to fly me to Havana might be attacked by Cuban opposition forces based in Miami. To these thinly veiled threats I retorted that I was a fellah who could not be intimidated by harkis, whether Algerian or Cuban.(3)

We arrived in Cuba on October 16 amid indescribable scenes of popular enthusiasm. The program provided for political discussions at party headquarters in Havana immediately after our delegation arrived. But things worked out very differently. As soon as our luggage had been dropped off at the place where we were supposed to stay, we threw protocol overboard and began a heart-to-heart talk with Fidel, Che Guevara, Rau'l Castro, and the other leaders who were accompanying us.

We stayed and talked for hours and hours. I naturally conveyed to the Cuban leaders the impression I had received from my conversation with President Kennedy. At the end of an impassioned discussion, around tables which we had pushed together end-to-end, we realized that we had practically exhausted the questions on the agenda. There was no point in a further meeting at party headquarters, and by mutual consent we moved straight on to the program of visits prepared for us across the country.

This anecdote gives an idea of the total lack of formality that, from the very beginning, was the norm for the relations uniting the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and of my personal relations with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

Cuban troops and Algerian Revolution

The solidarity between us was spectacularly confirmed in October 1963, when the Tindouf campaign presented the first serious threat to the Algerian revolution.(4) Our young army, fresh from a war of liberation, had no air cover (since we didn't have a single plane) or armored transport. It was attacked by the Moroccan armed forces on the terrain that was most unfavorable to it, where it was unable to use the only tactics it knew and had tried and tested in the liberation struggle, namely guerrilla warfare.

The vast barren expanses of desert were far from the mountains of Aures, Djurdjura, the Collo peninsula or Tlemcen, which had been its natural milieu and whose every resource and secret were familiar to it. Our enemies had decided that the momentum of Algerian revolution had to be broken before it grew too strong and carried everything in its wake.

The Egyptian president, Abdel Nasser, quickly provided us with the air cover we lacked, and Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Rau'l Castro, and the other Cuban leaders sent us a battalion of 22 tanks and several hundred troops. They were deployed at Bedeau, south of Sidi Bel Abbes, where I inspected them, and were ready to enter into combat if the desert war continued. The tanks were fitted with infrared equipment that allowed them to be used at night. They had been delivered to Cuba by the Soviet Union on the express condition that they were not to be made available to third countries, even communist countries such as Bulgaria, in any circumstances. Despite these restrictions from Moscow, the Cubans defied all the taboos and sent their tanks to the assistance of the endangered Algerian revolution without a moment's hesitation.

The United States was clearly behind the Tindouf campaign. We knew that the helicopters transporting the Moroccan troops were piloted by Americans. The same considerations of international solidarity subsequently led the Cubans to intervene on the other side of the Atlantic, in Angola, and elsewhere.

The circumstances surrounding the arrival of the tank battalion are worth recalling since they illustrate better than any commentary the nature of our special relations with Cuba.

When I visited Cuba in 1962, Fidel Castro made a point of honoring his country's pledge to give us two billion old French francs worth of aid.(5) Because of Cuba's economic situation, the aid was to be provided in sugar rather than in currency. I objected, arguing that Cuba needed her sugar at that time more than we did, he would not take no for an answer.

About a year after our discussion, a ship flying the Cuban flag docked in the port of Oran. Along with the promised cargo of sugar, we were surprised to discover two dozen tanks and hundreds of Cuban soldiers sent to help us. A brief note from Rau'l Castro, scribbled on a page torn out of an exercise book, announced this act of solidarity.

Obviously, we could not let the ship return empty. We filled it with Algerian products and, on the advice of Ambassador Jorge Serguera, added a few Berber horses. This was the start of a kind of barter between our two countries that was carried on in the name of solidarity and was entirely devoid of commercial considerations. Circumstances and constraints permitting, it was a distinctive feature of our relations.

Che's internationalist work in Africa

Che Guevara was acutely aware of the countless restrictions that hinder and weaken genuine revolutionary action -and indeed of the limits on any experiment, however revolutionary - as soon as it confronts directly or indirectly the implacable rules of the market and the huckster mentality. He denounced them publicly at the Afro-Asian Conference held in Algiers in February 1965.(6) Moreover, the painful terms on which the affair of the missiles installed in Cuba had been concluded, and the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, had left a bitter taste. I myself exchanged very tough words on the matter with the Soviet ambassador in Algiers. All of this, together with the situation prevailing in Africa, which seemed to have enormous revolutionary potential, led Che to the conclusion that Africa was imperialism's weak link. It was to Africa that he now decided to devote his efforts.

I tried to point out that perhaps this was not the best way to help advance the revolutionary maturity that was developing on our continent. An armed revolution can and must find foreign support, but it first has to create the internal resources on which to base its struggle. But Che Guevara insisted that his own commitment must be total and required his physical presence. He made several trips to Cabinda (Angola) and Congo- Brazzaville.

He refused my offer of a private plane to help disguise his movements, so I instructed Algerian ambassadors throughout the region to provide him with every assistance. Whenever he returned from sub-Saharan Africa, we spent long hours exchanging ideas. Each time he came back impressed by the fabulous cultural riches of the African continent but dissatisfied with his relations with the Marxist parties of the countries he had visited and irritated by their approach. His experience in Cabinda and subsequent contacts with the guerrilla struggle around Stanleyville were particularly disappointing.(7)

Meanwhile, parallel to Che's activity, we were pursuing another course of action to save the armed revolution in western Zaire. In agreement with Nyerere, Nasser, Modibo Keita, N'Krumah, Kenyata and Sekou Toure',(8) Algeria contributed by airlifting arms via Egypt, while Uganda and Mali supplied military cadres. The rescue plan had been conceived at a meeting in Cairo convened on my initiative. We were beginning to implement it when we received a desperate cry for help from the leaders of the armed struggle. Despite our efforts, we were too late and the revolution was drowned in blood by the assassins of Patrice Lumumba.

During one of his visits to Algiers, Che Guevara informed me of a request from Fidel. Since Cuba was under close surveillance, there was no real chance of organizing the supply of arms and military cadres trained in Cuba to other Latin American countries. Could Algeria take over? Distance was no great handicap. On the contrary, it could work in favor of the secrecy vital for the success of such a large-scale operation.

I agreed, of course, without hesitation. We immediately began to establish organizational structures, placed under the direct control of Che Guevara, to host Latin American revolutionary movements. Soon representatives of all these movements moved to Algiers, where I met them many times together with Che.

Their combined headquarters were set up in the hills overlooking Algiers in a large villa surrounded by gardens, which we had assigned to them because of its symbolic importance. The name of the Villa Susini has gone down in history. During the national liberation struggle it was used as a torture center where many men and women of the resistance met their death.

One day Che Guevara said to me, "Ahmed, we've just been struck a serious blow. A group of men trained at the Villa Susini have been arrested at the border between such and such countries (I can't remember the names) and I'm afraid they may talk under torture." He was very worried that the secret site of the preparations for armed action would become known and that our enemies would discover the true nature of the import- export companies we had set up in South America.

Che Guevara had left Algiers by the time of the military coup on June 19, 1965. He had warned me to be on my guard. His departure from Algeria, his death in Bolivia, and my own disappearance for 15 years need to be studied in the historical context of the ebb that followed the period of victorious liberation struggles. After the assassination of Lumumba, it spelled the end of the progressive regimes of the third world, including those of N'Krumah, Modibo, Keita, Sukarno and Nasser, etc.(9)

The date October 9, 1967, is written in fire in our memory. For me, a solitary prisoner, it was a day of immeasurable sadness. The radio announced the death of my brother, and the enemies we had fought together celebrated their sinister victory. But as time passes, and the circumstances of the guerrilla struggle that ended that day in the N~ancahuazu' fade from memory, Che, more than ever, is present in the thoughts of all those who struggle and hope. He is part of the fabric of their daily lives. Something of him remains attached to their heart and soul, buried like a treasure in the deepest, most secret, and richest part of their being, rekindling their courage and renewing their strength.

One day in May 1972, the opaque silence of my prison, jealously guarded by hundreds of soldiers, was broken by a tremendous din. I learned that Fidel was visiting a model farm only a few hundred yards away, no doubt unaware of my presence in the secluded Moorish house on the hill whose roof he could glimpse above the treetops. It is certainly for the same reasons of discretion that this very house was, not so long ago, chosen as a torture center by the colonial army. At this moment, the memories flooded back. A kaleidoscope of faces passed before my eyes like an old, faded newsreel. Never since we parted had Che Guevara been so vivid in my memory.

In reality, my wife and I have never forgotten him. A large photograph of Che was always pinned to the wall of our prison and his gaze witnessed our day-to-day life, our joys and our sorrows. But another smaller photo, cut out of a magazine, which I had stuck onto a piece of card and covered with plastic, accompanied us on all our wanderings and is the one that is closest to our hearts. It is now in my late parents' house in Maghnia, the village where I was born, where we deposited our most precious souvenirs before going into exile. It is the photograph of Ernesto "Che" Guevara stretched out on the ground, naked to the waist, blazing with light. So much light and so much hope.

Notes

1. The first guerrilla battle of Guevara's forces in Bolivia took place in the N~ancahuazu' region, where the base camp for the combatants was located.

2. On Oct. 22, 1962, Kennedy initiated the "Cuban missile crisis," or October Crisis as it is known in Cuba. The U.S. president ordered a total blockade of Cuba, threatened an invasion of the island, and placed U.S. forces around the world on nuclear alert. Washington demanded the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles, which had been installed in Cuba by mutual agreement of the two sovereign powers. Cuban workers and farmers responded by mobilizing massively in defense of the revolution. Faced with the determination of the Cuban people, and the knowledge that an assault on Cuba would result in massive U.S. casualties, Kennedy negotiated with Soviet premiere Nikita Khruschev, who decided to remove the missiles without consulting the Cuban government.

3. Fellah is the Arabic for peasant. Harkis were counterrevolutionary auxiliary troops organized by the French colonial army in North Africa.

4. In 1963 Moroccan forces, backed by Washington, invaded Algeria, which had won its independence from France the previous year after an eight-year revolutionary war. At Algeria's request, the Cuban government sent a column of troops under the command of Efigenio Ameijeiras, a veteran of the Cuban revolutionary war, to help stop the attack. The mere presence of Cuban troops forced the Moroccan government to back down and withdraw its forces.

5. Approximately $3.3 million at current exchange rates.

6. This speech appears in Che Guevara Speaks, published by Pathfinder Press.

7. Stanleyville was the former name of Kisangani, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Between April and December 1965, Guevara led a contingent of more than 100 Cuban volunteers assisting revolutionary forces that were fighting the regime in Congo, which was backed by Belgian, South African, and other imperialist forces. In January 1961 Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the fight for independence from Belgium and first prime minister of the Congo, was murdered by proimperialist forces backed by Washington, after being disarmed by a U.S.-led United Nations "peacekeeping" intervention.

8. The presidents of Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Egypt, Mali, Ghana, Kenya, and Guinea respectively.

9. Sukarno was the president of Indonesia until 1967.
 
Che Guevara, Cuba
and The Algerian Revolution


By Ahmed Ben Bella in The Militant
Vol. 62, no. 4, 2 February 1998


From Che Guevara and The Cuban Revolution" series

Preface

This selection is part of a series marking the 30th anniversary of the death in combat of Ernesto Che Guevara. Argentine by birth, Guevara became one of the central leaders of the Cuban revolution that brought down the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship in 1959 and, in response to mounting pressure from Washington, opened the socialist revolution in the Americas. Che, as he is popularly known, was one of the outstanding Marxist leaders of the 20th century.

In 1966 - 67, he led a nucleus of revolutionaries from Bolivia, Cuba, and Peru who fought to overthrow the military dictatorship in Bolivia. In the process, they sought to forge a Latin America-wide movement of workers and peasants that could lead the battle for land reform and against U.S. imperialist domination of the continent and advance the struggle for socialism. Guevara was wounded and captured on Oct. 8, 1967. He was shot the next day by the Bolivian military, after consultation with Washington.

As part of the commemoration of this anniversary in Cuba, dozens of articles, speeches, and interviews by those who worked with Che were published, dealing with the Cuban revolution, its impact in world politics, and the actions of its leadership. Many of Guevara's collaborators and family members have spoken at conferences and other meetings, bringing Che to life for a new generation and explaining the importance of his rich political legacy today. These materials contain many valuable firsthand accounts and information, some of which are being written down and published for the first time. They are part of the broader discussion taking place in Cuba today on how to advance the revolution.

The Militant is reprinting a selection of these contributions, along with related material such as the article above, as a weekly feature, under the banner "Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution."

The article below appeared in the October 1997 issue of the French publication Le Monde Diplomatique, under the title, "On the 30th Anniversary of the Death of Che Guevara: Che as I knew him." Its author, Ahmed Ben Bella, was the central leader of the Algerian National Liberation Front, which led the struggle for independence from France. Ben Bella was the president of the revolutionary workers and farmers government that came to power following the victory over Paris in 1962. He was overthrown in a counterrevolutionary coup led by Col. Houari Boumediene in June 1965.

We are reprinting it here as a final, twelfth part to the series of articles and speeches by those who knew and worked with Guevara that The Militant reprinted at the end of 1997 under the rubric "Che Guevara and the Cuban Revolution."

The article is copyright 1997 by Le Monde Diplomatique, and reprinted by permission. The translation, subheadings, and footnotes are by The Militant.

On October 9, 1967, in a little schoolroom in La Higuera, Bolivia, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was assassinated. He had been taken prisoner the day before. Thus ended the life of a revolutionary whom Jean-Paul Sartre called "the most complete human being of our era." It had led him from Argentina to Guatemala, from Cuba to the Congo, and finally to Bolivia, always inspired by an ardent hope of relieving the sufferings of the poor. President Ahmed Ben Bella met him many times in Algiers from 1962 - 65 when the city was a haven for all the anti-imperialists of the world.

For thirty years Che Guevara has been challenging our consciences. From beyond space and time, we hear Che's call, which demands that we answer: yes, only the revolution can sometimes transform man into a being of light. We saw this light illuminating his naked body lying somewhere in distant N~ancahuazu',(1) in the photographs that appeared in newspapers all over the world. The message of his final gaze continues to touch the depths of our soul.

Che was a courageous fighter, but a conscious one, with a body weakened by asthma. Sometimes, when I climbed with him to the Chre'a heights overlooking the town of Blida, I saw him suffer an attack that turned him green in the face. Anyone who has read his Bolivian diary knows in what poor health he faced the terrible physical and mental ordeals with which his path was strewn.

It is impossible to speak of Che without speaking of Cuba and the special relations which united us, since his story and his life were so closely bound up with the country that became his second home before he turned to wherever the revolution called him.

I first met Ernesto "Che" Guevara in the autumn of 1962, on the eve of the international crisis around the missile affair and the United States blockade of Cuba.(2) Algeria had just achieved independence and formed its first government. As head of that government, I was due to attend the September 1962 session of the United Nations in New York at which the Algerian flag would be raised for the first time over the UN building, a ceremony marking the victory of our national liberation struggle and Algeria's entry into the concert of free nations.

Visits to Washington and Havana

The National Liberation Front's political bureau had decided that the trip to the United Nations should be followed by a visit to Cuba. More than just a visit, it was intended as an act of faith demonstrating our political commitment. Algeria wished to emphasize publicly its total solidarity with the Cuban revolution, especially at this difficult moment in its history.

I was invited to the White House on the morning of October 15, 1962, and had a frank and heated discussion about Cuba with the president, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. I asked him point blank: "Are you heading towards a confrontation with Cuba?" His reply left no doubt about his real intentions. "No," he said, "if there are no Soviet missiles. Yes, if there are." Kennedy tried hard to dissuade me from flying to Cuba direct from New York. He even suggested that the Cuban military aircraft that was to fly me to Havana might be attacked by Cuban opposition forces based in Miami. To these thinly veiled threats I retorted that I was a fellah who could not be intimidated by harkis, whether Algerian or Cuban.(3)

We arrived in Cuba on October 16 amid indescribable scenes of popular enthusiasm. The program provided for political discussions at party headquarters in Havana immediately after our delegation arrived. But things worked out very differently. As soon as our luggage had been dropped off at the place where we were supposed to stay, we threw protocol overboard and began a heart-to-heart talk with Fidel, Che Guevara, Rau'l Castro, and the other leaders who were accompanying us.

We stayed and talked for hours and hours. I naturally conveyed to the Cuban leaders the impression I had received from my conversation with President Kennedy. At the end of an impassioned discussion, around tables which we had pushed together end-to-end, we realized that we had practically exhausted the questions on the agenda. There was no point in a further meeting at party headquarters, and by mutual consent we moved straight on to the program of visits prepared for us across the country.

This anecdote gives an idea of the total lack of formality that, from the very beginning, was the norm for the relations uniting the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and of my personal relations with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

Cuban troops and Algerian Revolution

The solidarity between us was spectacularly confirmed in October 1963, when the Tindouf campaign presented the first serious threat to the Algerian revolution.(4) Our young army, fresh from a war of liberation, had no air cover (since we didn't have a single plane) or armored transport. It was attacked by the Moroccan armed forces on the terrain that was most unfavorable to it, where it was unable to use the only tactics it knew and had tried and tested in the liberation struggle, namely guerrilla warfare.

The vast barren expanses of desert were far from the mountains of Aures, Djurdjura, the Collo peninsula or Tlemcen, which had been its natural milieu and whose every resource and secret were familiar to it. Our enemies had decided that the momentum of Algerian revolution had to be broken before it grew too strong and carried everything in its wake.

The Egyptian president, Abdel Nasser, quickly provided us with the air cover we lacked, and Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Rau'l Castro, and the other Cuban leaders sent us a battalion of 22 tanks and several hundred troops. They were deployed at Bedeau, south of Sidi Bel Abbes, where I inspected them, and were ready to enter into combat if the desert war continued. The tanks were fitted with infrared equipment that allowed them to be used at night. They had been delivered to Cuba by the Soviet Union on the express condition that they were not to be made available to third countries, even communist countries such as Bulgaria, in any circumstances. Despite these restrictions from Moscow, the Cubans defied all the taboos and sent their tanks to the assistance of the endangered Algerian revolution without a moment's hesitation.

The United States was clearly behind the Tindouf campaign. We knew that the helicopters transporting the Moroccan troops were piloted by Americans. The same considerations of international solidarity subsequently led the Cubans to intervene on the other side of the Atlantic, in Angola, and elsewhere.

The circumstances surrounding the arrival of the tank battalion are worth recalling since they illustrate better than any commentary the nature of our special relations with Cuba.

When I visited Cuba in 1962, Fidel Castro made a point of honoring his country's pledge to give us two billion old French francs worth of aid.(5) Because of Cuba's economic situation, the aid was to be provided in sugar rather than in currency. I objected, arguing that Cuba needed her sugar at that time more than we did, he would not take no for an answer.

About a year after our discussion, a ship flying the Cuban flag docked in the port of Oran. Along with the promised cargo of sugar, we were surprised to discover two dozen tanks and hundreds of Cuban soldiers sent to help us. A brief note from Rau'l Castro, scribbled on a page torn out of an exercise book, announced this act of solidarity.

Obviously, we could not let the ship return empty. We filled it with Algerian products and, on the advice of Ambassador Jorge Serguera, added a few Berber horses. This was the start of a kind of barter between our two countries that was carried on in the name of solidarity and was entirely devoid of commercial considerations. Circumstances and constraints permitting, it was a distinctive feature of our relations.

Che's internationalist work in Africa

Che Guevara was acutely aware of the countless restrictions that hinder and weaken genuine revolutionary action -and indeed of the limits on any experiment, however revolutionary - as soon as it confronts directly or indirectly the implacable rules of the market and the huckster mentality. He denounced them publicly at the Afro-Asian Conference held in Algiers in February 1965.(6) Moreover, the painful terms on which the affair of the missiles installed in Cuba had been concluded, and the agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, had left a bitter taste. I myself exchanged very tough words on the matter with the Soviet ambassador in Algiers. All of this, together with the situation prevailing in Africa, which seemed to have enormous revolutionary potential, led Che to the conclusion that Africa was imperialism's weak link. It was to Africa that he now decided to devote his efforts.

I tried to point out that perhaps this was not the best way to help advance the revolutionary maturity that was developing on our continent. An armed revolution can and must find foreign support, but it first has to create the internal resources on which to base its struggle. But Che Guevara insisted that his own commitment must be total and required his physical presence. He made several trips to Cabinda (Angola) and Congo- Brazzaville.

He refused my offer of a private plane to help disguise his movements, so I instructed Algerian ambassadors throughout the region to provide him with every assistance. Whenever he returned from sub-Saharan Africa, we spent long hours exchanging ideas. Each time he came back impressed by the fabulous cultural riches of the African continent but dissatisfied with his relations with the Marxist parties of the countries he had visited and irritated by their approach. His experience in Cabinda and subsequent contacts with the guerrilla struggle around Stanleyville were particularly disappointing.(7)

Meanwhile, parallel to Che's activity, we were pursuing another course of action to save the armed revolution in western Zaire. In agreement with Nyerere, Nasser, Modibo Keita, N'Krumah, Kenyata and Sekou Toure',(8) Algeria contributed by airlifting arms via Egypt, while Uganda and Mali supplied military cadres. The rescue plan had been conceived at a meeting in Cairo convened on my initiative. We were beginning to implement it when we received a desperate cry for help from the leaders of the armed struggle. Despite our efforts, we were too late and the revolution was drowned in blood by the assassins of Patrice Lumumba.

During one of his visits to Algiers, Che Guevara informed me of a request from Fidel. Since Cuba was under close surveillance, there was no real chance of organizing the supply of arms and military cadres trained in Cuba to other Latin American countries. Could Algeria take over? Distance was no great handicap. On the contrary, it could work in favor of the secrecy vital for the success of such a large-scale operation.

I agreed, of course, without hesitation. We immediately began to establish organizational structures, placed under the direct control of Che Guevara, to host Latin American revolutionary movements. Soon representatives of all these movements moved to Algiers, where I met them many times together with Che.

Their combined headquarters were set up in the hills overlooking Algiers in a large villa surrounded by gardens, which we had assigned to them because of its symbolic importance. The name of the Villa Susini has gone down in history. During the national liberation struggle it was used as a torture center where many men and women of the resistance met their death.

One day Che Guevara said to me, "Ahmed, we've just been struck a serious blow. A group of men trained at the Villa Susini have been arrested at the border between such and such countries (I can't remember the names) and I'm afraid they may talk under torture." He was very worried that the secret site of the preparations for armed action would become known and that our enemies would discover the true nature of the import- export companies we had set up in South America.

Che Guevara had left Algiers by the time of the military coup on June 19, 1965. He had warned me to be on my guard. His departure from Algeria, his death in Bolivia, and my own disappearance for 15 years need to be studied in the historical context of the ebb that followed the period of victorious liberation struggles. After the assassination of Lumumba, it spelled the end of the progressive regimes of the third world, including those of N'Krumah, Modibo, Keita, Sukarno and Nasser, etc.(9)

The date October 9, 1967, is written in fire in our memory. For me, a solitary prisoner, it was a day of immeasurable sadness. The radio announced the death of my brother, and the enemies we had fought together celebrated their sinister victory. But as time passes, and the circumstances of the guerrilla struggle that ended that day in the N~ancahuazu' fade from memory, Che, more than ever, is present in the thoughts of all those who struggle and hope. He is part of the fabric of their daily lives. Something of him remains attached to their heart and soul, buried like a treasure in the deepest, most secret, and richest part of their being, rekindling their courage and renewing their strength.

One day in May 1972, the opaque silence of my prison, jealously guarded by hundreds of soldiers, was broken by a tremendous din. I learned that Fidel was visiting a model farm only a few hundred yards away, no doubt unaware of my presence in the secluded Moorish house on the hill whose roof he could glimpse above the treetops. It is certainly for the same reasons of discretion that this very house was, not so long ago, chosen as a torture center by the colonial army. At this moment, the memories flooded back. A kaleidoscope of faces passed before my eyes like an old, faded newsreel. Never since we parted had Che Guevara been so vivid in my memory.

In reality, my wife and I have never forgotten him. A large photograph of Che was always pinned to the wall of our prison and his gaze witnessed our day-to-day life, our joys and our sorrows. But another smaller photo, cut out of a magazine, which I had stuck onto a piece of card and covered with plastic, accompanied us on all our wanderings and is the one that is closest to our hearts. It is now in my late parents' house in Maghnia, the village where I was born, where we deposited our most precious souvenirs before going into exile. It is the photograph of Ernesto "Che" Guevara stretched out on the ground, naked to the waist, blazing with light. So much light and so much hope.

Notes

1. The first guerrilla battle of Guevara's forces in Bolivia took place in the N~ancahuazu' region, where the base camp for the combatants was located.

2. On Oct. 22, 1962, Kennedy initiated the "Cuban missile crisis," or October Crisis as it is known in Cuba. The U.S. president ordered a total blockade of Cuba, threatened an invasion of the island, and placed U.S. forces around the world on nuclear alert. Washington demanded the removal of Soviet nuclear missiles, which had been installed in Cuba by mutual agreement of the two sovereign powers. Cuban workers and farmers responded by mobilizing massively in defense of the revolution. Faced with the determination of the Cuban people, and the knowledge that an assault on Cuba would result in massive U.S. casualties, Kennedy negotiated with Soviet premiere Nikita Khruschev, who decided to remove the missiles without consulting the Cuban government.

3. Fellah is the Arabic for peasant. Harkis were counterrevolutionary auxiliary troops organized by the French colonial army in North Africa.

4. In 1963 Moroccan forces, backed by Washington, invaded Algeria, which had won its independence from France the previous year after an eight-year revolutionary war. At Algeria's request, the Cuban government sent a column of troops under the command of Efigenio Ameijeiras, a veteran of the Cuban revolutionary war, to help stop the attack. The mere presence of Cuban troops forced the Moroccan government to back down and withdraw its forces.

5. Approximately $3.3 million at current exchange rates.

6. This speech appears in Che Guevara Speaks, published by Pathfinder Press.

7. Stanleyville was the former name of Kisangani, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). Between April and December 1965, Guevara led a contingent of more than 100 Cuban volunteers assisting revolutionary forces that were fighting the regime in Congo, which was backed by Belgian, South African, and other imperialist forces. In January 1961 Patrice Lumumba, the leader of the fight for independence from Belgium and first prime minister of the Congo, was murdered by proimperialist forces backed by Washington, after being disarmed by a U.S.-led United Nations "peacekeeping" intervention.

8. The presidents of Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Egypt, Mali, Ghana, Kenya, and Guinea respectively.

9. Sukarno was the president of Indonesia until 1967.

Endelea kutumwagia hii elimu Nd. Shwari.

Ahsante sana.
 
Nyani Ngabu,

Asante sana.

Hilo bandiko lilichapishwa katika gazeti la New York Times. kama ilivyo onyeshwa hapo juu. Liliandikwa na mwandishi wa habari wa gazeti hilo aliyekuwa kwenye mkutano wa OAU, Cairo, July 1964, ambako Nkrumah alimshambulia Nyerere na kumwita "imperialist agent" kwa sababu ambazo nimeeleza kwenye posts zangu katika mjadala huu. Nilikuwa boarding school namaliza darasa la nane, middle school, mwaka huo (1964).

Sijawahi kuiona video ya Nyerere kwenye mkutano huo lakini nitajaribu kuitafuta.
Shwari, umepotea sana. Get in touch.
 
Shwari, umepotea sana. Get in touch.
Jasusi,

Asante sana ndugu.

Kuna nyakati sipo kabisa. Ndiyo maana niko "kimya." Mara nyingi natembelea tu ila sionekani kwa sababu sina la kusema. Sina uwezo wa kuchangia sana lakini nitajitahidi kuonekana zaidi badala ya kupotea.
 
Jasusi,

Asante sana ndugu.

Kuna nyakati sipo kabisa. Ndiyo maana niko "kimya." Mara nyingi natembelea tu ila sionekani kwa sababu sina la kusema. Sina uwezo wa kuchangia sana lakini nitajitahidi kuonekana zaidi badala ya kupotea.

Nkrumah's rivalry with Nyerere should also be looked at in another context.

Nkrumah is credited with coining the term “neocolonialism” - which he first used in 1963 – and formulating the concept underlying this insidious phenomenon. But, in fairness, it must also be acknowledged that Nyerere preceded him in that regard.

It was Nyerere who – at least before Nkrumah – first addressed the subject when he used the term “neo-imperialism” in his article, “Freedom and Unity,” in June 1960, cited earlier, to describe the same phenomenon Nkrumah wrote and talked about three years later. Neo-imperialism is neo-colonialism.

Nyerere also talked about the same subject in his speech to the Second Pan-African Seminar, World Assembly of Youth (WAY), in Dar es Salaam in August 1961 and when he addressed the National Assembly shortly before independence. He talked about the Second Scramble for Africa which he said would be more dangerous than the first.

Is it possible Nkrumah, who probably followed Nyerere closely since he saw him as his rival, was inspired by and got the idea from Mwalimu to formulate the concept of neocolonialism after he heard him talk about neo-imperialism and the Second Scramble for Africa two to three years before the Osagyefo first used the term “neo-colonialism”?

It is a possibility that cannot be discounted or dismissed lightly as a figment of the imagination. After all, Nkrumah did not have a reputation as an original thinker like Nyerere, prompting Professor Ali Mazrui, who admired both leaders but was also critical of them, to state:

“In intellectual terms Nyerere is a more original thinker than Kwame Nkrumah....Julius K. Nyerere...is the most intellectual of all English-speaking Heads of African States.

Of all the top political figures in English-speaking Africa as a whole, Nyerere is perhaps the most original thinker....Julius Nyerere is the most enterprising of African political philosophers....

Nyerere as president was a combination of deep intellect and high integrity...(and) was in a class by himself in the combination of ethical standards and intellectual power....

Intellectually, I admired Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania higher than most politicians anywhere in the world....

In global terms, he was one of the giants of the 20th Century....He did bestride this narrow world like an African colossus....

Julius Nyerere was my Mwalimu too. It was a privilege to learn so much from so great a man."

Jonathan Power stated the following about Nyerere:

“"Measured against most of his peers, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Ahmed Sekou Toure of Guinea, he towered above them. On the intellectual plane only the rather remote president of Senegal, the great poet and author of Negritude, Leopold Senghor, came close to him."

And Trevor Grundy wrote this about Nyerere:

“He had a blotting paper brain...(and a) formidable intellect...Hardly a soul at Edinburgh guessed he would turn into Africa's number one brain box in years to come....Statesmen and journalists were amazed at his knowledge....The Rhodesian leader Ian Smith several times referred to Nyerere as Africa's 'evil genius.'"

Nyerere's outstanding role and leadership in the liberation of Africa is beyond question. The record is clear, despite Nkrumah's desperate attempts to belittle Nyerere and tarnish his image by calling him “an imperialist agent”; an outlandish accusation which can be attributed to Nkrumah's insecurity because he was dwarfed by Mwalimu intellectually and was even overshadowed by him in championing the cause of African liberation especially in the context of southern Africa.
 
Malcolm X met with many leaders when he was in Africa for many months from April to November 1964 before returning to the United States. He arrived in New York on November 24th. As Professor Ira Dworkin stated in his book, Congo Love Song: African American Culture and the Crisis of the Colonial State:

“The Congo remained prominent in the news during Malcolm X's months in Africa, where he met with political figures....Many of the figures Malcolm X met were actively supporting the struggles of the Congolese rebels against Tshombe's illegitimate rule.

By September 1964, the OAU, whose leaders Malcolm X had worked with in Cairo during the summer, was trying to negotiate a settlement between the rebels and Tshombe's regime. In early October, Malcolm X observed with admiration as President Nasser, with the support of other delegates, blocked Tshombe from attending the Conference of Non-Aligned States.

On October 9, 1964, Malcolm X traveled from Kenya to recently unified Tanganyika and Zanzibar – which was renamed Tanzania at the end of the month. There, he was hosted by Mohamed Abdul Rahman Babu, a revolutionary Zanzibari government minister whom he had met at the July OAU meetings in Cairo. Babu, who quickly became one of Malcolm X's closest African allies, met Lumumba in Congo in 1958 anf facilitated meetings for Malcolm X with Congolese rebels, African American expatriates, and Tanzanian dignitaries, including an initially reluctant President Nyerere. After a scheduled three-minute October 13 meeting with Nyerere lasted three hours, Malcolm decided to remain in Tanzania for a few additional days.

Whether by fluke or not, his extended stay coincided with both a meeting of the Liberation Committee of the OAU and an October 15 – 16 summit between the presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, and Kenya to discuss the Congo. In any event, on an October 17 flight from Dar es Salaam to Nairobi, Malcolm X was seated between Uganda prime minister Obote and Kenya president Jomo Kenyatta, who was chairing a series of OAU meetings about the Congo crisis.” - (Ira Dworkin, Congo Love Song: African American Culture and the Crisis of the Colonial State, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA: The University of Carolina Press, 2017, pp. 265 – 266).

And according to Professor Markle:

“Malcolm X also met with Tanzanian government ministers and TANU leaders, most notably Oscar Kambona, the minister of foreign affairs, and Bibi Titi Mohamed, head of the women's wing of the ruling party....

Malcolm spent a considerable amount of time with Babu, who acted informally as his governmental host....'Well-informed..., an extremely alert man,' Malcolm wrote (about Babu), 'and dedicated to what he believes.' As Malcom would later reveal, Babu's hospitality manifested in rich, private conversations at his office, at the bar lounges of the Paradise Hotel and the New Africa Hotel where revolutionaries in Dar es Salaam socialized, and in the privacy of his home, where he was able to meet Babu's children. Babu also accompanied Malcolm on a trip to Zanzibar. For Babu, spending time with Malcolm only seemed to reaffirm the first impressions he held of the black nationalist leader when they first met in Cairo. As he did at the OAU summit, Babu sought out Nyerere, yet this time to orchestrate a meeting between the Tanzanian president and Malcolm X.

At a dinner with Babu and his family, Malcolm was informed of his meeting with the president. The news caused him to later write in his diary, 'I was elated.' By all accounts, President Nyerere did not hold the same feeling. In fact, it took consistent pleading from Babu as well as Kambona. Nyerere finally relented and consented to a three-minute meet-and-greet. It is not altogether clear as to why Nyerere did not want to meet with Malcolm. He was already aware of Malcolm's radical politics, having been the one to get Malcolm's 'Appeal to African heads of State' on the debating table of the Cairo conference. This did not mean he agreed entirely with Malcolm's point of view....Nor did Nyerere subscribe to 'racialist thinking.'

Another point of contention had to do with the question of armed struggle. Malcolm X had never abandoned his belief in revolutionary violence even after leaving the Nation of Islam. Despite his growing support of armed struggles in white minority-ruled territories in central and southern Africa, Nyerere did not believe that African Americans had reached a stage in their struggle where revolutionary violence was necessary....

Three minutes was all Malcolm needed to win over the Tanzanian president and transform a brief meet-to-greet into a three-hour conversation.

The meeting took place around 7 p.m. on October 13, the day China had successfully developed its very own nuclear capabilities. Babu, who was present at the meeting, later remembered part of their exchange:

'President Nyerere said, 'Malcolm, for the first time today in recorded history, a former colonial country has been able to develop weapons at par with any colonial power. This is the end of colonialism through and through.' And Malcolm replied, 'Mr. President, this is what I've been thinking all the way as I was coming my hotel to this house''....

Nyerere's interests in China, in socialism, even in African continental unity, seemed to take Malcolm by surprise. Again, he turns to his diary to describe his new impressions of the president:

'He is very shrewd, intelligent, disarming [the word disarming underlined by Malcolm], a man who laughs and jokes much – but deadly serious.'

By all accounts, the meeting went extremely well. It was as much about breaking down 'image' barriers than anything else. In the Western press, Nyerere was regarded as the 'Darling of the West' while Malcolm was widely seen as a racial extremist. By conferring with Nyerere, such an image was turned on its head. Malcolm made a point of this later when meeting with African American expatriates in Paris. When someone asked him if Nyerere was an ally to the United States, Malcolm laughed it off, claiming that he 'had conversations with with some of these so-called moderates recently, and some of the things they said would make the hair stand up on the back of your neck.'

The notion that Nyerere was beholden to the West was severely exaggerated. According to Malcolm, the conversation lleft him thinking about socialism as a viable economic strategy of liberation and China as a potentially powerful Third World ally. Most important, it left him convinced of Tanzania's importance to advancing OAAU's (Organisation of Afro-American Unity's) internationalist agenda.” - (Seth Markle, A Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism, op. cit.).

Markle went on to state:

“Meeting with Nyerere and getting to know Babu were the high points of Malcolm's two-week stay in Dar es Salaam. Nyerere was an African head of state open to the idea of transnational exchange and solidarity, while Babu became a close friend with access to a large Third World network. Although this was Malcolm's first and last visit to Tanzania, it would not not be the last time he connected with Babu.

In late November (1964), Babu was part of the Tanzanian delegation to the Sixth Ordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly held in New York City. The UN session occurred right at the time when the postcolonial situation in the Congo had again grabbed international headlines. When Congolese guerrilla fighters opposed to the coalition government seized control of the city of Stanleyville, taking hostage 1,600 European expatriates, the United States and Belgium responded by sending in military forces in late November, resulting in both Congolese and European casualties. While the U.S. government perceived its military intervention as a humanitarian initiative, African American radicals and the Tanzanian state viewed it as another act of imperialist aggression that began with the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, the democratically elected prime minister, in 1961. To add insult to injury, the U.S.-backed Congolese prime minister who sanctioned the rescue mission was none other than Moise Tshombe, the former secessionist leader who played an instrumental role in Lumumba's assassination.

These latest developments in the Congo served as a political point of convergence. On the whole, African Americans and the Tanzanian government condemned the actions of the United States and Belgium. Malcolm X and Babu were especially outraged at the two countries' complicity in the affair. With Babu in New York City, an opportunity to collectively scrutinize an American policy in Africa shaped by Cold War imperatives presented itself. Thus, Babu agreed to speak on three separate occasions at political rallies and forums held throughout the city, most of which were sponsored or orchestrated by Malcolm X's OAAU.

Before packed crowds that ranged from a few hundred to a few thousand, he shared his views not only on the Congo situation but also on the history of the Zanzibar revolution, and how Africans started to view pan-Africanism as a movement inclusive of black people in the African Diaspora.

On December 13 Babu spoke at an OAAU rally in Harlem to an estimated crowd of 1,500. He was running late that night, putting Malcolm in a position to extrapolate on his experiences abroad, making known how Nyerere assisted him at the Cairo conference:

'And I'm proud to state that the one who was responsible for bringing that resolution forth and getting it agreed upon by the other African heads of state was probably the last one that you and I would expect to do it because of the image that he's been given in this country. But the one who came forth and suggested that the African summit conference pass a resolution thoroughly condemning the mistreatment of Afro-Americans in Africa and also thoroughly supporting the freedom struggle for human rights of our people in this country was President Julius Nyerere. I was honored to spend three hours with him when I was in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika, shortly before it became known as Tanzania'....

The FBI was particularly concerned with Malcolm X's contacts with African leaders. Reporting back to the FBI office in New York City, one informant noted that Babu told the crowd how 'all black people were united in opposition to the Congo.' Following the rally, informants were urged to continue to attend these rallies and report back on the African leaders and other foreign delegates in attendance, including Babu, Ahmed Hassan of Sudan, and Ernesto “Che” Guevara of Cuba.”

The CIA was just as busy with its nefarious schemes to undermine and destroy African leaders who were considered to be enemies of the United States. About one year and two months later, after Babu and Malcolm X addressed rallies in New York City in December 1964, Nkrumah was overthrown in February 1966 in a military coup engineered and masterminded by the CIA, orchestrated at the behest of President Lyndon B. Johnson.

With Nkrumah gone, Nyerere and Sekou Toure remained prime targets of Western powers determined to undermine leaders who were staunch African nationalists and Pan-Africanists. As Larry Grubbs stated in his book, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s:

"Americans' only real regret about the wave of African coups was that Sekou Toure and Julius Nyerere were not among its victims....The United States came to hold the view that 'under the mercurial and fiercely independent leadership of Nyerere, Tanzania is the bastion of radicalism in East Africa.'" - (Larry Grubbs, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009, p. 157).

John Prados stated in his book, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA:

"The Special Group (at the CIA) reportedly considered a State Department proposal to supply arms to certain groups in Tanzania, where secret-war wizards saw President Julius Nyerere as a problem, in the summer of 1964....Like Nyerere, Washington viewed Ghana's leader Kwame Nkrumah as a troublemaker." - (John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA, Chicago, Illinois, USA: Ivan R. Dee, 2006, p. 328).

And as Professor Markle, quoting Malcolm X, stated:

“To Malcolm, Tanzania, specifically, was 'one of the most militant and uncompromising' independent states in Africa 'when it comes to the struggle for freedom for our people on the African continent, as well as over here and anywhere else on this earth.'” - (S. Markle, A Motorcycle on Hell Run: Tanzania, Black Power, and the Uncertain Future of Pan-Africanism, 1964 – 1974, op. cit.).

That was mainly because of the kind of leadership Tanzania had under the stewardship of Mwalimu Nyerere. It will be hard, very hard, to get another leader of his calibre, if at all.
 
African Unity Elusive:
Meeting of Leaders in Cairo Points Up to Divergent Views
on How the Goal Is to Be Achieved


The New York Times

July 26, 1964

CAIRO—July 25—The 34 member Organization of African Unity beg ?n this week as a new state of development, reavowing its determination to “liberate” Africans in white dominated South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique and Angola.

With permanent headquarters now established in Addis Ababa and a permanent Secretary General in the person of Diallo Telli of Guinea, the O.A.U. will intensify its liberation efforts. This means that the heads of state at their meeting in Cairo hoped to get some kind of effective, coordinated freedom fighting under way soon. No one here was very proud of the lack of accomplishment in the last year.

Meanwhile, Mr. Diallo Telli was instructed to “study” means of promoting what the organization by its very name set out, first of all, to achieve —African unity. That objective, it is now plain, is more elusive than either liberation or independence and will take longer to capture and harness.

The euphoria of African brotherhood that mellowed the proceedings in Addis Ababa at the charter meeting 14 months ago has evaporated in the last year. In Cairo, this week, observers in the wings of the conference hall often gasped in the thin air of African disunity.

It would be a mistake in the view of some old Africa observers to consider the discordance and disarray to be found in the many long‐winded speeches delivered here, a sign of the impending break‐up of this family of new aspiring nations. On the other hand, it would be going much too far to accept the word of the African leaders themselves that they engaged only in “frank exchanges. of opinion.”

The speech of President Julius K. Nyerere of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar was nothing less than a personal attack on President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Dr. Nyerere received the conference's biggest ovation for making it.

He called President Nkrumah “cynical” and branded his demands for union now “ridiculous.”

Dr. Nkrumah lost once more to moderates at this conference. There were no resolutions calling for anything that will bring federation or union in the foreseeable future. The resolution approved calls only for “study.”

What then can one say for the development of intra‐African relations or even “the spirit of unity” that President Nasser said was still lacking.

First, there is continent‐wide agreement about driving out the “imperialists,” whether Portuguese, South African whites or “neo‐colonialist exploiters everywhere.”

Second, the Organization of African Unity, moderate and weak as it is, is sufficiently alive and active to attract at least lip service from all factions—the former pro‐Western conservatives of the Monrovia group, the more belligerent nationalists of the Casablanca group. There is at present no faction or regional grouping of states seeking in any way to rival or subvert the organization.

Third, if this unity organization has as yet not gathered the strength of arms, finances or technology to achieve its aims, it may be said that such resources at least are not being siphoned off in conflicting or competing enterprises. The new Secretary General goes to work in Addis Ababa without a treasury or budget, but at least he has first call on the 34‐member states for any contributions available.

Offsetting such assets and gains are all the lingering prejudices of past associations, not all of them hostile. For example, the former French territories in West and South Africa tend to cling together, as they did in an unsuccessful effort to name Dr. Emile Zinson of Dahomey as the Secretary General.

These French‐speaking states are proud and jealous of their economic and cultural ties to France; and they do not really forget the fact when they shout, “Down with the imperialists!”

As already suggested, the old Monrovia and Casablanca groups are moribund, but most of their leaders are still in action and they have not changed, whether it be President William V. S. Tubman of Liberia or President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic.

There is above all an overweening zeal everywhere for independence and sovereignty that all but makes it a mockery, at this stage of things, to talk about cooperation and unity. For how can one cooperate without losing a bit of sovereignty?

Dr. Nkrumah assured tha delegates that their independent states “would not lose any of their sovereignty” in his United States of Africa, but plainly no one in the conference room believed him.

The absence of the Congo's leaders from this conference was a serious matter which may be more deeply regretted in the future. There were some misgivings here that the more aggressive nationalists should have succeeded in keeping President Joseph Kasavubu's duly appointed Premier Moisa Tshombe, from the conference table.

Mr. Tshombe may be cordially disliked for his secessionist leadership in Katanga Province and he may or may not be to blame for the murder of Patrice Lumumba, who was a favorite of the African nationalists. But the point is that members of the O.A.U. are committed not to interfere in one another's internal affairs.

The serious immediate repercussion is that Mr. Tshombe, if he succeeds in holding the Congo's shaky regime together, may be disposed to make it harder than ever for Holden Roberto to lead the guerrilla freedom fighters in Angola from his present base in the Congo, and there is no other suitable base of operations for the Angolan.

The coming year is a crucial one for the Organization of African Unity. Unless the liberation movement makes real progress, there will be real dissatisfaction if not disruption at the next top‐level meeting scheduled for Accra in September, 1965.

Already Dr. Nkrumah is dissatisfied. Ha suggested that freedom fighting lagged last year because the organization's Committee on Liberation established itself, not in Leopoldville (with Holden Roberto) but in Dr. Nyerere's capital Dar es Salaam. Dr. Nyerere conceded that the committee had not been too active, but he gave as one reason the fact that Ghana, annoyed at not being named to the nine‐member committee, had refused to pay its liberation dues.

The prospect is for a long gradual and not uninterrupted march to unity. The new Secretariat in Addis Ababa is likely to operate much as does the Organization of American States, except that, as one delegate put it, “there is no Washington to back us up.”

The question is, who can carry on the leadership within this framework. Emperor Haile Selassie demonstrated again here that he is the chief moderator and the most effective catalyst in the discordant company. But Haile Selassie observed his 74th birthday on Thursday. President Nasser is developing moderation with the years, but,” like President Ben Bella of Algeria, he is suspect as a north‐of‐the‐Sahara Arab African. Dr. Nkrumah is suspect because of his excessive eccentricity.

President Nyerere would like to see continental unity grow out of the regional groupings. He and Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya have been thinking of federating their states with Uganda to form an East African Federation. King Hassan II of Morocco and Presidents Bourguiba of Tunisia and Ben Bella are still thinking of a Maghreb, the union of their states in an Arabian North Africa. There could be others.

Thus the African leaders are united on goals but disunited on means to the goals. The Organization of African Unity must expect turbulent times and at best many ups and downs.
 
Nyerere provided the most effective response to Nkrumah's unrealistic proposal for immediate continental unification at the OAU summit in Cairo in July 1964; a response which determined the course – a gradualist approach – African countries could have taken to achieve continental unity had they decided to do so.

Nyerere's response also underscored the fundamental differences the two leaders had in pursuit of continental unity. As Ama Biney stated, Nkrumah met his intellectual match, Nyerere, at that summit.

In fact, intellectually, Nyerere was more than a match for Nkrumah, demonstrated by the logic of his arguments and by the rousing ovation he was accorded by other African leaders at the end of his speech. He was applauded more than any other leader who spoke at that summit. Biney stated:

"The writing and publication of Africa Must Unite in 1963 needs to be understood within the context of the formation of the OAU in Addis Ababa on May 23 1963....

Shortly before the Addis meeting Nkrumah sent his ambassadors to African capitals to distribute this book and gain support for his proposal of a political union of African states. They were to lobby African heads of state and foreign ministers for a common foreign policy, continental planning for economic and industrial growth; a common currency and defence system. The book therefore is an impassioned call for Union Government for Africa....

Whether his contemporaries read Africa Must Unite is uncertain, but it prepared the political ground for him to further enunciate his Pan-African ambitions at the founding of the OAU....

President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania entered into a political duel with Nkrumah over their opposing views on how African unity could be attained.

The speeches of Nkrumah and Nyerere at the OAU summit reflected the polemical political discourse on Pan-Africanism over the most viable approach towards the attainment of African unity. Whilst Nkrumah was clearly the leading advocate of African Union Government, Nyerere was 'the most eloquent exponent of the gradualist approach.'

Mwalimu ('teacher'), as Nyerere was popularly referred to, believed that a United States of Africa could not be achieved in one step and could not happen overnight. He argued it was a process for 'it has not been given to us human mortals to simply will things into existence. Between our willing of an end and the achievement of that end there is a process. This process is sometimes long and sometimes short, and indeed the greater the objective the longer may be the process,' he argued.

Nyerere made a stinging attack on Nkrumah when he accused him of employing the notion of Union Government for propaganda purposes. He declared: 'I am becoming increasingly convinced that we are divided between those who genuinely want a continental Government and will patiently work for its realization, removing obstacles, one by one; and those who simply use the phrase ‘Union Government’ for the purpose of propaganda.'

Moreover, he went on to question Nkrumah’s repudiation of the East African Federation as contrary to African unity. For Nyerere, 'To rule out a step by step progress towards African Unity is to hope that the Almighty will one day say, ‘Let there be unity in Africa,’ and there shall be unity.’ Furthermore, 'to say that the step by step method was invented by the imperialists is to reach the limits of absurdity.'

Nkrumah had met his intellectual equal at the OAU summit of 1964.

'It was, in all' claims Agyeman 'a spirited performance that left the objective of a Union Government bleeding to death on the floor of the Cairo conference hall, speared, as it were, by Nyerere’s flashing verbalism.'” - (A. Biney, Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography, op. cit., pp. 228, 231, 276 – 278; O. Agyeman, Nkrumah's Ghana and East Africa: Pan-Africanism and African Inter-state Relations, p. 83).
 
Hii ndiyo inastahili kuitwa ''official state visit'' ambazo marais wetu wanastahili kuzikubali na kufanya ziara ya kiserikali. Maana kila kitu kiko katika mpangilio maalum na wenyeji wanahamu ya kubadilishana mawazo kama equal partners angalau katika ngazi ya fikra sahihi ingawa kunaweza kuwa na tofauti za ukubwa wa kiuchumi n.k

Kweli mkuu
 
Back
Top Bottom