A. ABSTRACT
"How do we recognize what is (morally) right? In history, systems of law have almost always been based on religion: decisions regarding what was to be lawful among men were taken with reference to the divinity. Unlike other great religions, Christianity has never proposed a revealed law to the state and to society, that is to say, a juridical order derived from revelation. Instead, it has (always) pointed to (human) nature, and reason as the true source of a (positive) law, and to the harmony of objective and subjective reason , which naturally presupposes that, both spheres are rooted in the creative reason of God... This step had already been taken by Saint Paul in the Letter to the Romans, when he said: “When Gentiles who have not the Law [the Torah of Israel] do by nature what the law requires, they are a law to themselves ... they show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness ...” (Rom 2:14ff.).,"--Speech by Pope Benedict XVI, During His Visit to Germany in 2011.
"The transformation of our country requires the greatest possible cooperation between religious and political bodies, critically and wisely serving our people together. Neither political nor religious objectives can be achieved in isolation. They are held in a creative tension with common commitments. We are partners in the building of our society."--African National Congress Parliamentary Caucus, 2010.
The phrase "Divine paradoxes" refers to seemingly contradictory statements or situations concerning the nature of God, often explored in theological, philosophical and public policy debates. These paradoxes arise from attempts to provide a conclusive solution to the following truncated argument:
- Theists, pantheists and panentheists claim that God exists.
- Atheists, apantheists and apanentheists claim that God does not exists.
- Thus, either God exists or God does not exist, as maintained by agnostics.
There many paradoxical solutions to this argument, none of which is conclusive, a scenario which has a direct implication in public policy debates concerning proper relations between religions and state organs.
Accordingly, pace debates about pantheistic and panentheistic Gods, this contribution summarizes the arguments for and against the claim that a Theistic God Exists in the extra-mental world.
Rational theistic arguments in support are identified and organized syllogistically.
Then, rational atheistic arguments in opposition are identified and organized syllogistically.
Next, a synthesis is made, with a conclusion that neither side provides conclusive arguments.
It is further observed that debates about the validity of God Hypothesis have been with us for more than 5,000 years now and may continue unconcluded until the end of the world.
As a result, pace atheistic agnosticism, agnostic secularism, which is defined in terms of a semi-permeable wall of separation between state and religions, is proposed so as to achieve three goals.
One, to defend the principle of national unity by preventing the practice of doing party politics through the instrumentality of sectarian religions.
Two, to defend the principle of inter-religious and inter-denominational equality by banning the practice of doing religion through the instrumentality of state established institutions.
And three, to acknowledge the existence of freedom of worship and recognize the rights of religious leaders to participate in party politics and state politics as individuals.
This way, agnostic secularism is proposed as a feasible state policy option in so far as religions-and-state relations are concerned, where a cooperationist model of religions and state relations is its practical realization, which works well through some sort of a contractual PPP framework.
Generally, the phrase "semi-permeable wall of separation between religions and state" suggests a partial separation, rather than a complete one, allowing for some interaction and influence between religious institutions and the government. It acknowledges that while the state should not establish a religion, there can still be some level of cooperation and interaction without violating the principle of religious freedom.
Accordingly, the present contribution is organized into the following condensed outline:
- I. Abstract,
- II. Introduction,
- III. Grounds for the god hypothesis: Rational theistic arguments,
- IV. Grounds for the no-god hypothesis: Rational atheistic arguments,
- V. State policy implications: Possible religion-state relation models, and
- VI. References.
Specifically, the expanded version of this content outline is as follows:
I. ABSTRACT
II. INTRODUCTION
- Conceptual Framework
- Problem re-statement
- Relevance of debating the God Hypothesis
- Methodology and parameters of the problem
- Content organization
III. GROUNDS FOR THE GOD HYPOTHESIS: RATIONAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
- Argument from the Origin of the Universe (cosmological argument);
- Argument from objective morality;
- Argument from fine-tuning of the universe for life(teleological argument);
- Argument from consciousness;
- Argument from miracles;
- Argument from intelligent design
- Argument from contingency.
- Argument from the origin of life.
- Argument from natural laws
- Argument from rationality
- Argument from ignorance
- Argument from the fundamental laws of logic
IV. NATURALISTIC OBJECTIONS: RATIONAL ATHEISTIC ARGUMENTS
- Argument from evil
- Argument from the Impossibility of Divine Action
- Argument from Ignorance
- Argument from abstract entities
- Argument from the missing divine spatio-temporal address
- Argument from Perfection-Creation Incompatibility
- Argument from Immutability-Creation Incompatibility
- Argument from Immutability-Omniscience Incompatibility
- Argument from Immutability-All-Lovingness Incompatibility
- Argument from Transcendence-Omnipresence Incompatibility
- Argument from Transcendence-Personhood Incompatibility
- Argument from Omnipresence-Personhood Incompatibility
- Argument from Omniscience-Freedom Incompatibility
- Argument from Justice-Mercy Incompatibility
- Argument from the incompatibility between justice and Eden story
- Argument from the incompatibility between disembodiment and Decalogue authorship story
- Argument from the incompatibility between holiness and objective moral truths
- Argument from the incompatibility between orderly design and miracles
- Argument from incompatibility between Eternal Reward and Punishment teaching and justice
- Argument from the paradox of alternative worlds
- Argument from incompatibility between omniscience and divine agency
- Argument from the incompatibility between omnipotent, perfection and divine agency
V. THEISTIC REBUTTALS TO NATURALISTIC OBJECTIONS
VI. STATE POLICY INDLICATIONS: POSSIBLE RELIGION-STATE RELATION MODELS
- Official state religion model
- Selective religion-state relation model
- The religion-state separation model
- Religion in constitution-making processes
- Religion and political parties
- Religion and human rights
- Constitutions and religion in Africa
- Stock-taking on god-state cooperation models: A case for secularism
B. INTRODUCTION
Dear Reader,
You are cordially welcome to critical reflections on the logical structures of
"Rational Theism," "Dogmatic Theism," "Rational Atheism," and
"Dogmatic Atheism," to which Setfree has implicitly invited us
.
This is a summary of debates between exponents and opponents of the Theistic God hypothesis, namely, the claim that a "Theistic God exists."
In other words, it is a summary that presents the status of the debated question:
Does a Theistic God exist?
I. Conceptual Framework
The idea of a god is either a fact, like sand, or a fiction, like Father Christmass. If it is a fiction, that is, a human invention, then, it is one of the greatest invention in all of human history.
The idea of gods has guided or deluded more lives, changed more history, inspired more music and poetry and philosophy than anything else, real or imagined. It has made more of a difference to human life on this planet, both individually and collectively, than anything else ever has. Thus, it needs to be clarified.
I propose to start my presentation with conceptual and terminological clarifications by focusing on the following question: What is a god and who, among theistic, pantehstic and panentheistic gods counts as one?
Since the dawn of history, humans have been trying to formulate conceptual frameworks for understanding the nature of gods and their relationships to humans and the natural world.
Among the many variations of theories, theism, pantheism, and panentheism, are some of the most prominent attempts at grgrasping divine reality and its connection to our world.
1.
Theistic, Pantheistic and Panentheistic gods
We have seen that theism, pantheism, and panentheism represent three distinct models of God.
Theism posits a separate, transcendent God; pantheism identifies God with the universe; while panentheism sees God as both immanent and transcendent, with the universe existing within God.
Theism, in its traditional sense, emphasizes the existence of a personal, transcendent God who is distinct from the created universe.
This God is often seen as the creator and sustainer of the world, with the potential to intervene in human affairs.
Examples include monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
Pantheism, conversely, views God as identical with the universe, meaning that the universe is God, or that God is all that exists. This perspective often leads to a monistic view of reality, where everything is seen as part of a single, unified divine substance.
Some pantheistic views emphasize the inherent divinity of nature and the interconnectedness of all things.
And panentheism attempts to bridge the gap between theism and pantheism, proposing that God is both immanent (present within the universe) and transcendent (existing beyond it).
God is seen as sustaining and interacting with the universe, but not being limited to or identical with it. The universe is seen as existing within God, rather than being God itself.
This view allows for both the influence of the world on God and God's influence on the world, without losing the distinct identities of either.
Now let us talk about the parameters of the debate. There are gods and goddesses aplenty, and religions aplenty. How shall we narrow the focus of this debate, and by how much?
Figure 01: Tree diagram showing religions and ideas about God
As the figure above shows, religions, and ideas of God, can be divided into seven basic kinds by the following seven divisions:
- Indecision (agnosticism) vs. decision.
- Among decisions, unbelief (atheism) vs. belief.
- Among beliefs, those that are only instinctive, informal, individualistic, or idiosyncratic vs. formal, institutional religions.
- Among formal religions, polytheism vs. monotheism. (By the way, I wonder why of all these religious options, polytheism is the only one that almost no one in the modern West believes? It is at least a simple and obvious answer to the problem of evil.)
- Among monotheism, pantheism or monism (Eastern religions) vs. theism or Creator-creature dualism (Western religions).
- Within theism, impersonal theism ("Nature and Nature's God") vs. personal theism (God as "I AM").
- Within personal theism, Trinitarianism (Christianity) vs. Unitarianism(Judaism and Islam).
The parameters of this debate restrict the God-idea to theism, but not much farther.
2. The concept of theistic god
Specifically, in Western philosophy, the term "God" with capital "G" is an alias name for Yahweh, Elohim, and other similar proper names in scriptures.
It is used in philosophy and Judeo-Christian theological traditions, as a proper name that refers to one member of the class of entities called "gods".
For example in ancient Greece, the proper names of the other members of the class of gods, each starting with a capital letter, included the following:
Zeus (god of the sky), Poseidon (god of the sea), Hera (goddess of marriage), Demeter (goddess of agriculture), Athena (goddess of wisdom), Apollo (god of music and prophecy), Artemis (goddess of the hunt), Ares (god of war), Hephaestus (god of fire), Aphrodite (goddess of love), Hermes (messenger of the gods), either Hestia (goddess of the hearth), and Dionysus (god of wine).
Historically then, we can talk of Baal (god of the Canaanites), Aton (god of the Egyptians), Zeus (god of the Greeks), Brahman (god of the Hindus), or Huitzilopochtli (god of the Aztecs).
All of these, along with another two hundred or so, named in works on comparative religion, were supreme deities. Each was worshiped and obeyed by millions. Yet, most of them are dead today.
The Biblical statement "You shall not have other gods besides me" is the first of the Ten Commandments, emphasizing the importance of worshipping only one god whose proper name was "God," apart from these other gods.
According to Exodus 31:18, this commandment was "inscribed by God's own finger" in the books of Exodus 20:3 and Deuteronomy 5:7.
However, within the context of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the theistic worldview asserts that, there exists an entity whose proper name is God, to which the following properties are attributed:
Theistic God is supernatural, immaterial, intelligent, free, infinite, eternal, transcendental, immanent, concrete, causally effective, all-sufficient, all-knowing, all-wise, all-powerful, all-good, every-where-present, all-sovereign, just, righteous, immutable, invisible, intangible, impeccable, indestructible, and a unity that exclusively created the universe from nothing and sustains its existence continuously.
The task of critical philosophers is to try to understand what exactly is meant by this assertion. After deeper reflections, three camps of philosophers arise: assenters called theists, dissenters called atheists, and skeptics called agnostics.
3. The concept of rational theism
So, theism or
anti-atheism is defined as the belief in the existence of God as defined above. It holds that the existence of God, as defined above, is most likely.
It is a broad family of views, including every view that holds that there is a god of some sort or other.
Since the word ‘god’ is extremely flexible, the variety of theisms (beliefs in gods) is almost limitless.
Atheism is just the view that every one of these many theisms is false. In other words, atheists think that there are no gods of any kind. Philosophers support their positions about with arguments.
In this summary I propose to distinguish between
rational theism from
dogmatic theism.
On one hand,
rational theism is is a position whose exponents hold that unless the opponent is able to show that their worldview, when subjected to all available criticisms appears to be inconsistent or inadequate, then, their opponents should respect the freedom of others to subscribe to this worldview, regardless of its origin.
On their view, their rationality consists not in rejecting a theory on the ground that it is not based on sense-experience, or because it cannot be shown to have a strictly logical foundation, but on their preparedness to expose their own theory and beliefs to possible criticisms, and to abandon or modify them if their inconsistency or inadequacy is shown.
4. The concept of dogmatic theism
Alternatively,
dogmatic theism is a worldview which is never prepared to examine its own set of beliefs and modify it, if necessary, in the face of new and compelling evidence.
In other words,
dogmatic theism refers to a belief in God or a deity, characterized by a rigid, unyielding adherence to specific doctrines or beliefs, often without considering alternative viewpoints or evidence.
Person A is dogmatic with respect to a proposition that P is true if and only if person A believes that proposition P is true, and, moreover, person A has resolved not to be influenced by any future evidence against the proposition that P is true.
Formally, the logical structure of dogmatic theism can be summarized as follows:
(1) At time T1 a believer knows that religious proposition P is true.
(2) At time T1 a believer knows that if evidence E is against religious proposition P, then evidence E is misleading.
(3) At time T1 a believer knows that evidence E is against religious proposition P.
(4) Therefore, at time T1 a believer knows that evidence E is misleading relative to the religious proposition P.
(5) At time T1 misleading evidence must be avoided.
(6) Thus, a believer must avoid evidence E at time T2, at time T3 and at any future time Tn.
The fallacy in this sort of reasoning emerges once an explicit reference to time is analyzed. Specifically, the conclusion at No (6) does not follow from premises. Here is the reason:
If I know at time T1 that proposition P is true, then I know at T1 that any evidence against proposition P is misleading.
However, if at a later time T2 I acquire new evidence E against proposition P, I may well not have known at T1 that E is misleading.
For, given my new body of total evidence accumulated between T1 and T2, I may be justified in believing that proposition P is true at T1 and that proposition P is false at T2, and vice versa.
Thus, knowledge and justified belief may shrink, as well as grow, with the acquisition of new evidence. Despite our finite mind, deciding when we chose dogmatism and when we chose skepticism is what matters most for the modern mind in the third millennium where human knowledge is changing daily.
In short, we can paraphrase dogmatism as (a) a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for patterns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward others.
5. The concept of rational atheism
On the other hand
, atheism or
anti-theism is defined as the denial of the existence of God as defined above. It holds that the existence of God, as defined above, is most unlikely.
Some philosophers hold that the best atheistic worldview is naturalism. The core idea of naturalism is that the natural sciences (physics, biology, chemistry and the like) provide the correct methods for knowing about the world, so that philosophers need to take their cues from scientists.
In short, naturalism is not just a denial of some particular version of theism, but a broader view of the world that implies the non-existence of gods.
Thus, gods are not among the entities studied by science. So anyone who believes in God is going beyond science in the way naturalism says we shouldn’t.
Specifically, then, naturalism is the view that (a) there are none but natural entities with none but natural causal powers, and that (b) well-established science is the touchstone for identifying causal entities and causal powers.
Natural entities and natural causal powers are entities and causal powers of the sort studied by science.
On this view, we can distinguish between rational atheism and dogmatic atheism.
Dogmatic atheism refers to a form of atheism characterized by a strong, unwavering belief in the non-existence of God or deities, often accompanied by a dismissal of any potential evidence or arguments for the existence of the divine.
And rational atheism refers to a stance that rejects the existence of gods or deities based on reason and evidence, rather than blind faith or tradition. It emphasizes scientific inquiry and critical thinking to understand the world.
6. The concept of agnosticism
And finally,
agnosticism is defined as the doubting of the existence of God as defined above.
It is the philosophical position that the existence of God, the divine, or the supernatural is either unknowable in principle or unknown in fact, meaning it's neither proven nor disproven.
II. Problem re-statement
On this view, the broader study question proposed by Setfree is:
Does Theistic God as defined above conceptually exist in the human mind only or does really exist in the extra-mental world too?
Accordingly, I suggest that, in order to answer this question rationally, we need to break it down in two sub-questions:
(1) Are there good reasons to think that Theistic God exists in the extra-mental world? and
(2) Are there good reasons to think that Theistic God exists in the extra-mental world?
In this summary I shall focus on the theistic model of god.
Within this narrow scope, the above two sub-questions, satisfactorily paraphrase with maximum brevity the 25 questions asked by Setfree in this thread.
In short, the claim which the proponents of theism assert, and their opponents deny, is that a certain form of theism has an explanatory power which is stronger than the explanatory power possessed by naturalism.
Accordingly, below I propose to summarise 11 arguments for God hypothesis and 14 arguments against God Hypothesis, this being my style of preparing our intellectual boxing ring.
The debate recorded in this thread is designed to aid anyone who wishes to investigate the question whether God is the greatest of fictions or the greatest of facts.
III. Relevance of debating the God Hypothesis
Let us talk about the motives behind asking and answering the question about God's existence. Why would someone want to prove that God exists? Why would someone want to prove that God does not exist? What is the point behind the arguments? Why this thread? There seem to be at least six possible motives behind each attempt.
An individual may want to prove God exists (1) to convince and convert others; (2) to leave atheism or agnosticism and become a believer; (3) to strengthen his faith if he is a believer but has doubts (faith is compatible with doubt); (4) to glorify God; (5) simply for the sake of truth; or (6) to formulate a national policy on religions-state relations.
Someone else may want to prove God does not exist for similarreasons: (1) to liberate others from illusion; (2) to leave belief and becomean atheist; (3) to strengthen his unbelief (which is also compatible withdoubt); (4) to glorify man; (5) simply for the sake of truth; or (6) to formulate a national policy on religions-state relations.
IV. Methodology and parameters of the problem
In exploring the general question of "proofs for or against the existence of God," I shall distinguish five different questions we can ask about God or anything else, any X. They are the questions of existence, knowledge, proof, and method, namely:
- Does X really exist? (Assuming that existence is a function of space and time, that is to say that existence is a spatiotemporal property)
- If it does, can I know that it exists? (A thing can obviously exist without my knowing it exists: for example, a pink rock on the other side of the moon.)
- If I know X exists, is that knowledge certain? (Much or most of our knowledge is only probable, not certain: for example, that I do not have cancer, or that all dinosaurs died before mankind evolved.)
- If I can be certain X exists, is there a proof, a demonstration of my right to certainty? (I can be certain of some things without being able to give a proof of them to others so that others can share my certainty: for example, that I exist and am conscious and sane, or that my wife's soul is beautiful, like her face.)
- If there is such a proof, is it a scientific proof in the modern sense of scientific-that is, according to the rules of the "scientific method"? Are the premises reducible to evidence that is either empirical or logical and mathematical?
Atheists answer all five of these questions about God in the negative. Logically, this is because answering question (1) negatively entails answering (2) negatively; a negative answer to (2) entails a negative answer to (3); etc.
Some rationalist atheists reason the other way round: from a negative answer to question (5) to a negative answer to question(4), from (4) to (3), etc. That implies that all proofs should be scientific; that all certainty requires proof; that all real knowledge requires certainty; and also (if they go that far) that all reality must be humanly knowable.
Agnostics claim not to know the answer to Question (1), and therefore not to know the answers to all the subsequent questions either.
Theists answer the first two questions yes, but differ on the other three. Most traditional theists answer questions (1) to (4) yes and (5) no.
V. Content organization
The present contribution is organized into the following sections:
- Abstract
- Introduction
- Grounds for the god hypothesis: Rational theistic arguments
- Naturalistic objections: Rational atheistic arguments
- State policy implications: Possible religion-state cooperation models
- References
C. GROUNDS FOR THE GOD HYPOTHESIS: RATIONAL THEISTIC ARGUMENTS
VI. Introduction
The famous twentieth-century British philosopher and atheist Bertrand Russell somehow joined Galileo. He was once asked what he would say to explain his atheism if he were to confront God after his death. Russell's famous reply was: “Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence.”
Russell's response has an implicit and an explicit side. Implicitly his remark indicates that a certain amount of evidence is required for reasonable belief in God. Explicitly, he is claiming that there isn't any such evidence.
But, Setfree appears to have presented some arguments for the existence of God in opposition to what Russell thought.
Specifically, Setfree's arguments appear to be:
1. Argument from the Origin of the Universe (cosmological argument);
2. Argument from objective morality;
3. Argument from fine-tuning of the universe for life(teleological argument);
4. Argument from consciousness;
5. Argument from miracles;
6. Argument from intelligent design
7. Argument from contingency.
8. Argument from the origin of life.
9. Argument from natural laws
10. Argument from rationality
11. Argument from ignorance
12. Argument from the fundamental laws of logic
Each argument has its own logical structure, but none has been presented by Setfree.
Just to assist Setfree toward this direction, I propose to provide flesh to Setfree's presumed "skeleton" of arguments:
VI. Argument from the Origin of the Universe (cosmological argument)
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
4. If the universe has a cause, then that cause is God.
5. Therefore, God exists.
VII. Argument from objective morality
1. The origin of Objective and universal moral norms of right and wrong, good and evil, guilty and innocence, is explained either by theism or non-theistic theories.
2. Theism best explains the origin of objective and universal morality than do the alternative non-theistic theories.
3. Therefore, God exists.
VIII. Argument from fine-tuning of the universe for life (teleological argument)
1. The fine-tuning of the universe for accommodating life is either
-- due to physical necessity, or
-- due to chance, or
-- due to God's intelligent design
2. God's intelligent design best explains fine tuning for life than explained by the alternative theories of physical necessity and chance.
3. Therefore, God exists
IX. Argument from consciousness
1. Consciousness, which is a property of the mind, is best explained by either theism or non-theistic theories:
2. Consciousness is better explained by theism than by the alternative non-theistic theories.
3. Thus, God exists.
X. Argument from miracles
1. Miracles such as the resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth are historical facts, which are either best explained by theism or refuted by non-theistic theories:
2. The hypothesis “God performs these miracles” is the best explanation of these historical facts as opposed to alternative non-theistic skeptical theories.
3. Therefore, God exists.
XI. Argument from intelligent design
1. Human experience shows the perception of order and purpose in the natural world which can be explained either by theism or via non-theistic theories.
2. The order and purpose in the physical world is best explained by theism than by non-theistic theories.
3. Thus, God exists.
XII. Argument from Contingency
1. The contingent existence of all things in the physical universe, as opposed to their impossible necessary existence, is explained by either theism or non-theistic theories.
2. Theism better explains contingent existence of the physical universe better than non-theistic theories do.
3. Therefore, God exists.
XIII. Argument from life
1. Biological life is a bodily property best explained by either theism or by non-theistic theories.
3. The origin of biological life is better explained by theism than non-theistic theories do.
3. Thus, God exists.
XIV. Argument from natural laws
1. The origin of natural laws can be explained either by theism or non-theiatic theories
2. Theism best explains the origin of natural laws better than non-thestic theories do.
3. Thus, God exists.
XV. Argument from rationality
1. Rationality, also known as the logical thinking capacity, is a property in the mind best explained either by theism or by non-theistic theories.
2. Rationality is better explained by theism than by non-theistic theories.
3. Thus, God exists.
XVI. Argument from Ignorance (God of the Gaps Argument)
1. There are natural phenomena, such as gravity, dark matter, etc, which science as yet cannot fully explain.
2. Theism explains the origin of these phenomena better than science does now and may do in the future.
3. Thus, God exists.
XVII. Argument from the fundamental laws of logic
(1) The origin of the laws of logic (The Law of Identity, The Law of Non-Contradiction, The Law of the Excluded Middle), which are abstract entities that are necessary for our knowledge acquisition (i.e. intelligible experience), are best explained by either theism or materialism.
(2) The materialistic/atheistic worldview excludes the existence of abstract entities, including the laws of logic, hence contradicting the possibility of our knowledge.
(3) Thus, theism best explains the origin and existence of the laws of logic.
(4) Theism entails the existence of God
(5) Thus, God exists.
D. NATURALISTIC OBJECTIONS: RATIONAL ATHEISTIC ARGUMENTS
XVIII. Introduction
It is not uncommon to find persons who think that there is something wrong-headed about the project of coming up with arguments for the non-existence of God. “How,” it is often asked, “can one prove the non-existence of something?”
How can we prove, or at least provide good reasons to believe in, the non-existence of anything, God included? They ask.
There are at least three ways. One way we can show the non-existence of something is by showing that the thing described is impossible.
If someone tells you that she has a round square in her pocket, you would know that she is wrong.
You know there is no round square in her pocket (or anywhere else), because you know there cannot be round squares.
Round things necessarily lack corners while squares necessarily have corners. One thing can't both have and lack corners. So there can be no such thing as a round square. Impossibility arguments for the non-existence of God are not uncommon.
This is the strategy used by Martin, M. and Monnnier, R.(2003), the editors of the book entitled "The Impossibility of God," published at Amherst in New York by Prometheus Books. It is a key reference in the present discussion, and is hereby attached in the PDF format.
I suggest that, there are about 14 arguments against the existence of God as far as the literature at my disposal shows. They are:
1. Argument from evil
2. Argument from the Impossibility of Divine Action
3. Argument from Ignorance
4. Argument from abstract entities
5. Argument from the missing divine spatio-temporal address
6. Argument from Perfection-Creation Incompatibility
7. Argument from Immutability-Creation Incompatibility
8. Argument from Immutability-Omniscience Incompatibility
9. Argument from Immutability-All-Lovingness Incompatibility
10. Argument from Transcendence-Omnipresence Incompatibility
11. Argument from Transcendence-Personhood Incompatibility
12. Argument from Omnipresence-Personhood Incompatibility
13. Argument from Omniscience-Freedom Incompatibility
14. Argument from Justice-Mercy Incompatibility
The logical structure of each is summarized next.
XIX. Argument from evil
1. If all-powerful and all-loving God exists, unnecessary suffering does not exist.
2. Unnecessary suffering exists.
3. Therefore, all-powerful and all-loving God does not exist.
Clarification: There seems to be a contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true, the third would be false. The theist must adhere to all three propositions, yet cannot do so consistently.
XX. Argument from the Impossibility of Divine Action
1. If God is timeless, then He can not be causally active in the temporal world.
2. Many religions hold God to be causally active in the temporal world.
3. Therefore, traditional theism is internally inconsistent and cannot be true.
XXI. Argument from Ignorance
1. We should not believe in the existence of entities for which we have no sufficient evidence.
2. There is no sufficient evidence for God’s existence,
3. Thus, we ought not to believe that God exists.
XXII. Argument from abstract entities
1. If there were an eternal and all-sovereign God, then there would not be eternal entities such as abstract entities.
2. There are eternal entities such as abstract entities.
3. Therefore, an eternal and all-sovereign God does not exist.
XXIII. Argument from the missing divine spatio-temporal address
1. In order for anything to be said to exist, it must exist within time and within space.
2. God, however, is defined as originally being located outside of time and space, both of which are his creatures.
3. Therefore, God did not and does not exist.
XXIV. Argument from Perfection-Creation Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is perfect.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. A perfect being can have no needs or wants.
4. If any being created the universe, then he must have had some need or want.
5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
XXV. Argument from Immutability-Creation Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is immutable.
2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.
3. An immutable being cannot at one time have an intention and then at a later time not have that intention.
4. For any being to create anything, prior to the creation he must have had the intention to create it, but at a later time, after the creation, no longer have the intention to create it.
5. Thus, it is impossible for an immutable being to have created anything (from 3 and 4).
6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5)
XXVI. Argument from Immutability-Omniscience Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is immutable.
2. If God exists, then he is omniscient.
3. An immutable being cannot know different things at different times.
4. To be omniscient, a being would need to know propositions about the past and future.
5. But what is past and what is future keep changing.
6. Thus, in order to know propositions about the past and future, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 5).
7. It follows that, to be omniscient, a being would need to know different things at different times (from 4 and 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be omniscient (from 3 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).
XXVII. Argument from Immutability-All-Lovingness Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is immutable.
2. If God exists, then he is all-loving.
3. An immutable being cannot be affected by events.
4. To be all-loving, it must be possible for a being to be affected by events.
5. Hence, it is impossible for an immutable being to be all-loving (from 3 and 4).
6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
XXVIII. Argument from Transcendence-Omnipresence Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).
2. If God exists, then he is omnipresent.
3. To be transcendent, a being cannot exist anywhere in space.
4. To be omnipresent, a being must exist everywhere in space.
5. Hence, it is impossible for a transcendent being to be omnipresent (from 3 and 4).
6. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
XXIX. Argument from Transcendence-Personhood Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is transcendent (i.e., outside space and time).
2. If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being), here defined as a center of rationality.
3. If something is transcendent, then it cannot exist and perform actions within time.
4. But a person (or personal being) must exist and perform actions within time.
5. Therefore, something that is transcendent cannot be a person (or personal being) (from 3 and 4).
6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).
XXX. Argument from Omnipresence-Personhood Incompatibility
(1) If God exists, then he is omnipresent.
(2) If God exists, then he is a person (or a personal being), here defined as a center of rationality.
(3) Whatever is omnipresent cannot be a person (or a personal being).
(4) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1-3).
XXXI. Argument from Omniscience-Freedom Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is omniscient.
2. If God exists, then he is free.
3. An omniscient being must know exactly what actions he will and will not do in the future.
4. If one knows that he will do an action, then it is impossible for him not to do it, and if one knows that he will not do an action, then it is impossible for him to do it.
5. Thus, whatever an omniscient being does, he must do, and whatever he does not do, he cannot do (from 3 and 4).
6. To be free requires having options open, which means having the ability to act contrary to the way one actually acts.
7. So, if one is free, then he does not have to do what he actually does, and he is able to do things that he does not actually do (from 6).
8. Hence, it is impossible for an omniscient being to be free (from 5 and 7).
9. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 8).
XXXII. Argument from Justice-Mercy Incompatibility
1. If God exists, then he is an all-just judge.
2. If God exists, then he is an all-merciful judge.
3. An all-just judge treats every offender with exactly the severity that he/she deserves.
4. An all-merciful judge treats every offender with less severity than he/she deserves.
5. It is impossible to treat an offender both with exactly the severity that he/she deserves and also with less severity than he/she deserves.
6. Hence, it is impossible for an all-just judge to be an all-merciful judge (from 3-5).
7. Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 6).
XXXIII. Argument from t
he incompatibility between justice and Eden story
- Adam and Eve either knew or did not know that obeying God is good and disobeying God is evil.
- If they knew, then God’s test of their righteousness was unfair because they had nothing to gain by disobeying God, and if they did not know, then God’s punishment for wrongdoing was unfair.
- In either case God was unjust.
- Therefore, a necessarily just God does not and cannot exist.
- God is a God of justice. (see Psalm 10, 113, 146, Isaiah 41 and Eze 24)
XXXIV. Argument from t
he incompatibility between disembodiment and Decalogue authorship story
- God wrote the Ten Commandments, also known as the Decalogue, on two stone tablets with his own finger (Exodus 31:18).
- A finger is a material entity which is a party of the physical personal body.
- Thus, God is embodied, that is, a material entity, as proved by the existence of his finger (Fingerites’ sectarian view).
- God is a spirit (John 4:24) (Schmingerites’ sectarian view)
According to the Bible:
- “When the LORD finished speaking to Moses on Mount Sinai, he gave him the two tablets of the Testimony, the tablets of stone inscribed by the finger of God.” (Ex. 31:18)
- “But if I cast out demons by the finger of God, then the kingdom of God has come upon you." (Luke 11:20)
Once upon a time, these two verses gave rise to two sects. There was a small Christian denomination, now nearly forgotten to history, called the “Fingerites,” inhabitants of Obscurantia, formerly part of the Roman Empire. Their reading of the above Exodus verse amounted to this: “God, though entirely bodiless through this time, inscribed Moses’s tablet with his material finger.” They were opposed by a neighboring Christian sect in Obscurantia, which historians now dub the “Schmingerites”. The latter considered the Fingerites to be naive literalists. Both sides were intensely proud of their distinctive readings of the above finger-text, and based their exegesis of other finger of God texts on the above solutions.
It’s not that complicated to understand the dispute that gives rise to the existence of two sects. The war is between literal and metaphoric translation of the Bible. In the above texts Jesus is the finger of God just as Moses is the finger of God. These are metaphors. For example, the title “The Word” was applied to Jesus metaphorically. The “word” is a metaphor, just like Jesus is called “the light” and “the bread”. Jesus was called “the word” because God was “speaking” through him (Hebrews 1:1-2; 1 John 1:1-2) during the time of his public ministry. Similarly, “Jesus is the Word incarnate, meaning that, his life incarnates the words, will and plan of the invisible God”.
XXXV. Argument from t
he incompatibility between holiness and objective moral truths
- For the sake of holiness, it is morally impermissible to violate objective moral truths, that is, moral truths that remain true every time, everywhere and for every subject;
- There are several objective moral truths, which are violated by the Biblical God;
- Thus, Biblical God is not holy,
- The Biblical God is holy.
Examples of objective moral truths violated by Biblical God include:
- PI: It is morally wrong to deliberately and mercilessly slaughter men, women, and children who are innocent of any serious wrongdoing. Yet, In violation of PI, for instance, God himself drowned the whole human race except Noah and his family (Gen. 7:23); he punished King David for carrying out a census that he himself had ordered and then complied with David’s request that others be punished instead of him by sending a plague to kill 70,000 people (2 Sam. 24:1-15); and he commanded Joshua to kill old and young, little children, maidens, and women (the inhabitants of some thirty-one kingdoms) while pur¬ suing his genocidal practices of ethnic cleansing in the lands that orthodox Jews still regard as part of Greater Israel (see Joshua, chapter 10, in particular). These are just three out of hundreds of examples of God’s violations of PI.
- P2: It is morally wrong to provide one's troops with young women captives with the prospect of their being used as sex-slaves. Yet, In violation of P2, after commanding soldiers to slaughter all the Midianite men, women, and young boys without mercy, God permitted the soldiers to use the 32,000 surviving virgins for themselves (Num. 31:17-18).
- P3: It is morally wrong to make people cannibalize their friends and family. Yet, In violation of P3, God repeatedly says he has made, or will make, people cannibalize their own children, husbands, wives, parents, and friends because they haven’t obeyed him (Lev. 26:29, Deut. 28:53-58, Jer. 19:9, Ezek. 5:10).
- P4: It is morally wrong to practice human sacrifice, by burning or otherwise. In violation of P4, God condoned Jephthah’s act in sacrificing his only child as a burnt offering to God (Judg. 11:30-39).
- P5: It is morally wrong to torture people endlessly for their beliefs. Yet, in violation of P5, God’s own sacrificial “Lamb,” Jesus, will watch as he tortures most members of the human race for ever and ever, mainly because they haven’t believed in him. The book of Revelation tells us that “everyone whose name has not been written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb who has been slain” (Rev. 13:8) will go to Hell where they “will be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb; and the smoke of their torment goes up forever and ever: and they have no rest day or night” (Rev. 14:10-11).
XXXVI. Argument from t
he incompatibility between orderly design and miracles
- Order, regularity, and harmony of the universe is evidence of the existence of an omniscient, benevolent and omnipotent God who designed an orderly world.
- A miracle is (i) a physical event beyond the ability of unaided nature to produce, (ii) is brought about by a rational agent, (iii) is extraordinary, in that it is violates natural laws or a permanently inexplicable event, a moment of chaos, a gap in the spatio-temporal order, dissonance in the harmony, and a hole in the patterned fabric of the universe, and (iv) has religious significance.
- Thus, a miracle constitutes evidence against the existence of an omniscient, benevolent and omnipotent God who designed an orderly world.
XXXVII. Argument from incompatibility between Eternal Reward and Punishment teaching and justice
Definition of unfairness: Given that P, A, and B are persons or groups of persons, and that O is a non-immoral outcome desired by both A and B, then:
(1) person P acts unfairly toward person B in comparison to person A with regard to outcome O if and only if, without sufficient reason, either person P intentionally treats person A in a manner that person P knows will assist person A in getting outcome O in a way that person P does not so assist person B, or person P intentionally treats person B in a manner that person P knows will hinder person B from getting outcome O in a way that person P does not so hinder person A; and
(2) The degree of person P’s unfairness is commensurate with the degree to which person P intentionally and knowingly assists person A more than person B, or hinders person B more than person A, in getting outcome O, and also with the importance that outcome O has to the fulfillment of the non-immoral desires of person B and person A.
The Theistic God (omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-benevolent) acts in accordance with Eternal Reward and Punishment Theology, which states the following:
That, God is a judgmental deity who reveals one set of standards for salvation for all human beings;
That, if humans adequately adhere to the standards throughout their accountable lives, God will grant them maximal, eternal, postmortem happiness;
That, such people are said to have been saved or to have gone to heaven;
that, on the other hand, if people do not adequately satisfy the given standards for salvation, then God will punish them with maximal, eternal, postmortem suffering; that, they are then said to have been damned or to have gone to hell; and
That, the postmortem fate of the large group of humans, such as pre-natals, neo-natals, young children, and the severely mentally handicapped, who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability is that, either
(1) they are damned since they do not satisfy the revealed requirements for salvation; or
(2) they are saved since, although they do not satisfy the requirements for salvation, God knows that they cannot satisfy those requirements because of their physical conditions for which they are clearly not responsible; or
(3) they are neither damned nor saved, but granted with an eternal postmortem existence that is considerably less desirable than heaven, but considerably more desirable than hell called “Limbo”; or
(4) they are neither damned nor saved but simply cease to exist after their death.
Then, the Argument from Unfairness runs as follows:
- If God treats the set of persons who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability, then God acts unfairly toward them in comparison to the set of persons who die only after attaining the state of moral accountability with respect to the gain of postmortem eternal salvation and avoidance of postmortem eternal damnation.
- If God treats the set of persons who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability under option one, then God acts unfairly toward the set of persons who die only after attaining the state of moral accountability in comparison with the set of persons who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability with respect to the gain of postmortem eternal salvation and avoidance of postmortem eternal damnation.
- God treats the set of persons who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability under option one or option two or option three or option four.
- Therefore, God acts unfairly toward either the set of persons who die without ever attaining the state of moral accountability or the set of persons who die only after attaining the state of moral accountability with respect to the gain of postmortem eternal salvation and avoidance of postmortem eternal damnation.
- If a person acts unfairly, then that person is not omni-benevolent.
- Therefore, God is not omni-benevolent.
- Therefore, an omni-benevolent God does not exist.
XXXVIII. Argument from the paradox of alternative worlds
- If God the Perfect Creator exists necessarily, then He is the source of all other existence.
- If God the Perfect Creator exists then this is the best of all possible worlds in his mind.
- If this is the best of all possible worlds, then worlds worse than this one are logically possible.
- A logically possible world is any world the existence of which is compatible with logical necessity.
- If “God exists” is necessarily true, then “The world which exists is not the best of all possible worlds” is necessarily false. (That is, if the proposition “God exists” is necessarily true, then any proposition inconsistent with it is necessarily false. But since God’s existence, entails that this is the best of all possible worlds, it also entails that “The world which exists is not the best of all possible worlds” is false. Thus if “God exists” is necessarily true, “The world which exists is not the best of all possible worlds” is necessarily false.)
- If “The world which exists is not the best of all possible worlds” is necessarily false, then no world which is not the best of all possible worlds is a logically possible world. (That is, if “God exists” is necessarily true and if it is His nature to create only the best of all possible worlds, then it is logically impossible that any lesser world could have come into existence—again, assuming that all things depend for their existence on God.)
- Given that this world is the one God chose to bring into existence, if no world worse than this one is logically possible, then it is not the case that this is the best of all possible worlds.
- Conclusion: If this world was created by a necessarily existing Perfect Creator, then it both is and is not the case that this world is the best of all possible worlds. Therefore, it is not possible that the world was created by a necessarily existing Perfect Creator.
XXXIX. Argument from incompatibility between omniscience and divine agency
- To act intentionally, an agent must have a specific intention (that is, the agent must intend a content which embodies reference to particular persons, objects, events, times, or places).
- To have a specific intention one must have specific information about particulars.
- One has specific information about particulars only if one obtains that information through causal interaction with particulars.
- Therefore, Specific information about particulars is not innate.
- Therefore, No specific intention can be innate.
- Therefore, to act intentionally presupposes acquiring a specific intention.
- An agent acquires a specific intention only if there is a time during which that agent is ignorant of some proposition.
- Therefore, there is no omniscient agent.
- God is an omniscient agent.
- Claims (8) and (9) are contradictory.
XL. Argument from the incompatibility between omnipotent, perfection and
divine agency
We are taught that, God is an agent who is capable of setting goals and willing and performing actions. But, when taken together, the divine properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and perfection (moral and otherwise), preclude the possibility of agency.
That is, God cannot act. It is impossible for an omnipotent, omniscient, perfect being to act, that is, it cannot exert its will because it can never find the world in a state that does not conform perfectly with its will. In light of this conclusion, the very notion of divine agency, of God’s possessing plans and acting to achieve ends in the world, becomes meaningless and must be abandoned.
And a God that is incapable of action or agency is not worthy of an attitude of religious reverence. So, since it is not possible for a being to possess all of the necessary properties, God cannot exist. Formally stated, the argument runs as follows:
- By definition, God is an entity which acts, that is, God is an entity which possesses agency.
- A being has agency when it has goals, conceives of them, acts on the basis of those goals with the intention of achieving them, and it could have done otherwise had it chosen to.
- The possession of agency is a necessary (but not sufficient) property of an appropriate object of a religious attitude.
- In order to have agency, a being must recognize some state of affairs in the world (correctly or incorrectly), conceive of another desired state of affairs, and then set about to make the desired/conceived state of affairs real.
- In order for God to exercise agency, the world must actually be in a state of affairs that is different from what God wills or wishes it to be; meaning that, an action gap for God would develop when God accurately comprehends the relevant state of affairs in the world, and there is a divergence between what actually is the case in the world and the state of affairs that God has as a goal.
- In general, If there is an action gap for an agent, then there are three possibilities: Either, (a) the agent desires to close the gap, but it is not possible for the agent to do so because of internal or external constraints; or (b) the agent has the goal of changing the state of affairs but refrains from doing so because of some other overriding goal; or (c) the agent possesses the non-actual state as a goal and acts to make it actual.
- There can be no restraints, internal or external, on the actions of an omnipotent and perfect agent’s will, meaning that 6(a) and 6(b) do not apply to God.
- Therefore, it is impossible for there to be a state of affairs in the world that does not accord perfectly with an omnipotent and perfect agent’s will, since, the world always conforms perfectly with God’s will.
- And since action requires that there be some state of affairs that is different from what an agent wills, an action gap for an agent called God does not exist.
- Thus, an omnipotent and perfect God cannot act.
E. THEISTIC REBUTTALS TO NATURALISTIC OBJECTIONS
XLI. Rebuttals to naturalistic objections
We have seen that anti-theism, also known as naturalism, hypothesizes that gods are born in human minds and borne in human cultures as a result of a complex set of reciprocally reinforcing, phylogenetically inherited, and socially sustained cognitive and coalitional biases.
It argues that, the latter were naturally selected for their survival advantage in early ancestral environments, but today the superstitious beliefs and segregative behaviors they engender are maladaptive in a growing number of contexts.
As naturalist explanations of the world and secularist inscriptions of society take root within a population, people start to lose interest in engaging in religious sects, so the argument goes.
Despite weight arguments for this type of naturalism, the advocates of supernaturalism still maintain the the thesis that contemporary naturalism should be abandoned in light of the serious difficulties raised against it. They draw on a wide range of topics including: epistemology, philosophy of science, value theory to basic analytic ontology, philosophy of mind and agency, and natural theology.
E. STATE POLICY INDLICATIONS: POSSIBLE RELIGION-STATE RELATION MODELS
Under sections B and C above I have tried to summarize the logical structure of theism on one hand, and the logical structure of atheism and/or naturalism, on the other hand. Each of the two explanatory models has its own strengths and weaknesses.
But, none of the sides appears to be conclusive. And most probably the arguments for and against the existence of gods will continue until the end of the world. For this reason, a policy question arises:
How should state organs relate to variously alleged existence of different gods? Alternatively stated, How should state organs relate to various religions which are based on the alleged existence of different gods? Possible
gods-state cooperation models are possible and are discussed next.
XLII. Different religions-state relations models
The different models of relationship between religions and the secular political sphere can be understood as a continuum.
At one end of the continuum, there is the theocratic model in which the state recognizes one religion as an official state religion. Modern examples of state religions are the Orthodox Church of Greece, the Anglican Church of England and the Lutheran Church of Denmark.
Extreme theocracies create a very strong bond between religious rule and the state. Such states are intolerant of other world views contrary to the dominant religious framework.
The idea that one religion should be given priority over others is often justified based on the historical significance, or statistical dominance of a favored religious group.
Moreover, the state is perceived as a religious structure and the rulers are primarily religious leaders, or at least those that ascribe to the doctrine of the state religion.
Theocracies require that religion grants legitimacy to the acceptance of political power, government and its officials, because religious principles and doctrine shape the values and attitudes of the people.
Where there is an official religion of the state, the rule of law might reflect religious dictates in its legal system. Since public activities and moral behavior are interpreted based on religious doctrine, theocracies are non-accommodative of other world views that are contrary to the accepted norms of the established religion or religious group. Saudi Arabia stands as a representative of a theocratic state in the contemporary world.
At the other end of the continuum is the separationist model, which maintains that the state is neutral toward all religions on its territory and grants equal status to all of them. The paradigmatic case is the United States and French.
A separationist state neither favours the presence of an established religion with substantial influence on the state, nor a completely atheist state, which is aggressive towards religion.
While the state has the secular function, religious bodies focus on the sacred. The model of strict separation prevents the state and society from being influenced by religion, which can occur when religious institutions are given excessive power in a theocratic state.
Similarly, the state would betray the separationist principles if it grants support to religion through aid in a way that shows endorsement of any religious organization or institution.
In between the theocratic model and the separationist model there is cooperationist model, which includes many different types of selective cooperation sub-models.
Contrary to the separationist states, cooperationist regimes establish neither an official religion nor act in a way that prefers one religion to another.
The cooperationist model is like the separationist model in the sense that it presupposes a formal separation between state and religion. However, it remains flexible, given that it does not create a strict separation between the two spheres.
The separation with interaction is based on the recognition that although the state and religion are autonomous spheres, they can co-exist and interact based on the idea of freedom of religion. This freedom is the basis of the interaction between the state and religious groups and the recognition of principles such as pluralism, equality, neutrality and tolerance.
Therefore, the relations between the state and religious communities are amicable, since there is a substantial degree of accommodation and collaboration. Examples for countries with cooperationist models in religion-state relations are Austria and Russia.
The cooperationist model is also called the hybrid model of religions and state relations. In other words, this model is based on The relationship between the secular and the sacred.
The relationship between the secular and the sacred is complex, often viewed as both complementary and potentially conflictual, depending on the context and individual perspectives, with some seeing them as separate realms and others as interconnected aspects of human experience.
Complementary Aspects include Shared Values, Complementary Truths, and Mutual Benefit.
Shared Values: The secular and sacred can share common values like justice, compassion, and the pursuit of meaning, even if they approach them from different perspectives.
Complementary Truths: Some argue that the secular world of reason and science can complement the sacred world of faith and spirituality, offering different but equally valid ways of understanding the world.
Mutual Benefit: The secular realm can provide a framework for social organization and the sacred can offer meaning and purpose, potentially benefiting each other.
Conflictual Aspects include Conflicting Worldviews, Power Dynamics and Historical Conflicts.
Conflicting Worldviews: The secular often emphasizes reason and evidence, while the sacred can rely on faith and tradition, potentially leading to clashes in values and beliefs.
Power Dynamics: The secular and sacred can compete for influence in society, with one potentially marginalizing the other.
Historical Conflicts: Throughout history, there have been conflicts between secular and religious powers, often over issues of authority and control.
Examples of both Complementary and Conflictual Aspects are found in Education, Politics and Art and Culture:
Education: Secular education can provide knowledge and skills, while religious education can offer moral and spiritual guidance.
Politics: Secularism can promote the separation of church and state, while religious institutions can advocate for specific policies.
Art and Culture: Secular art can explore human experience and emotions, while sacred art can express religious beliefs and values.
It is important to note that all models along this continuum can, in principle, be compatible with a democratic political regime, but the three models imply starkly different modes of interaction between public religions and the state. In the next section, I discuss each of these models in detail.
XLIII. Official state religion model
State religion models, in Europe for example, are historically rooted in one of the three mono-confessional “culture blocks,” namely: the Lutheran North, Catholic South and Orthodox East.
These models across Europe share important common features, but also differ significantly according to confessions.
Among the similarities are the monopolistic regulation of religion by church and state authorities, a negative bias toward other religions, social and cultural conservatism, and the attempt from the side of the churches to embrace worldly institutions and to guide them.
Confessional differences explain that in the Orthodox East, state churches have traditionally been closely intertwined with politics and the state; whereas in the Protestant North, “the churches of the Reformation were more willing to accept the virtual privatization of religion , thus restricting its purview to matters of personal conscience and social morality.
In a state church model, the established church co-defines the constitutional principles of the state. As a privileged partner of the state, a state church could, for example, seek to protect its own interest vis-à-vis other faith groups on the territory by having a say in law making.
This has been the case of the Orthodox Church of Greece, which has defined its special position in the Greek state in exclusive terms and uses its influence in order to limit the possibilities for other religious groups to achieve equal recognition.
By contrast, the Protestant state churches in twenty-first century Northern Europe have interpreted their role in the opposite way. The proximity between church and state in the Nordic countries has resulted in the inclusion of the national churches into the welfare state systems and has granted special responsibilities to the churches, but has limited their political dimension.
XLIV. Selective religion-state relation model
In a selective cooperation model, the state usually recognizes more than one religion as cooperation partner and treats all these state-recognized religions as equal political players with equal rights and obligations.
In such a model, one religious group will usually pursue only such goals in cooperation with the state that also reflects the interests of other state-recognized religions.
In Austria, for example, the Austrian state refrains from interference with internal affairs of religious organizations and vice versa. Nevertheless, the state cooperates regularly and institutionally with selected religious bodies.
The Catholic Church frequently coordinates its position with other state-recognized Christian churches (the Austrian Protestant Church; the Orthodox Churches) and with the recognized Jewish and Islamic faith communities.
On issues of common concern, in a selective cooperation model religious communities cooperate with each other and with the state in order to achieve particular goals.
The Austrian Jewish and Islamic faith communities, for example, cooperated in order to achieve an exemption from the Austrian law on protection of animals for securing the right to kosher and halal slaughtering of animals for religious reasons.
XLV. The religions-state separation model
In this disestablishment model, all religious groups are equal in their equidistance from the state, no matter their size, and there are no constitutional, established channels of cooperation.
The only access points to politics for religions are lobbying vis-à-vis policy makers and civic action geared at mobilization of the electorate.
At the same time, religions are often highly visible in the public sphere and take over important functions in civil society – for example, in the sectors of welfare, care and private education.
The paradigmatic disestablishment model, where an ideologically neutral state takes an equidistant stance toward the religious communities on its territory, is the United States.
Many religious denominations with very diverse teachings exist side by side and, in part, compete with each other.
As a result of the disestablishment clause in the American Constitution, the state remains neutral toward these religious communities; all of them are part of a fragmented and increasingly polarized civil society.
XLVI. Religion in constitution-making processes
The purpose of a constitution is not only to regulate the distribution of powers among the branches of government and to protect fundamental rights and freedoms, but also to establish the national identity of the people that adopted it. As one of the essential elements of this identity, it comes as no surprise that the vast majority of contemporary constitutions refer to religion.
Statistics also confirm this “ubiquity of religion in constitutions:” out of 194 constitutions in existence today, 186 contain the word “religion”; 183 include some forms of protection of religious freedom; and 114 mention the words “God”, “the divine” or other deities.
Religion is increasingly becoming a core element within constitution-making processes. While in some countries it has not been a contentious issue (e.g. in France), in many others religion has been an extremely complicated and sensitive topic, which has aggravated social cleavages, dividing rather than uniting people, and hindering rather than enabling constituent processes (e.g. in many North African and Middle Eastern countries following the so-called “Arab Spring”).
Furthermore, in extreme circumstances conflict over religion has even played a role in preventing the adoption of a constitution (e.g. in Israel).
The role of religion in constitution-making processes from a comparative perspective is like a three-pronged fork.
First, there are actors that most commonly contribute to shaping the content of constitutional provisions concerning religion during these processes.
A number of different actors contribute to defining the content of constitutional provisions concerning religion during constitution-drafting processes. These include political parties, religious institutions, religious minorities, civil society and external actors.
Second, there are factors that often influence the issue of religion in constitution-drafting processes.
As is the case for the actors, a variety of factors often have a significant impact on the issueof religion in constitution-making processes. These include, in particular, the different typesof constituent processes (whether top-down or bottom-up, national or supranational), constitutional history and tradition, as well as external influences.
Third, there are the most contentious issues that usually emerge during debates within constituent bodies.
Religion in constitution-making processes often raises a number of contentious issues, such as the religious versus secular character of the state, the status of religious law, the protection of religious freedom, the regulation of religious education, the identification of the institution responsible for interpreting religious issues, the relationship between religion and international human rights treaties, and the reference (or the non-reference) to religion in constitutional preambles.
In the light of the numerous and extremely complicated variables that characterize the role of religion in constitution-making processes, one might be tempted to conclude that it is not possible to identify general rules but to say that every country “has its own story.”
Still, it seems that at least three general observations can be made. In the first place, the comparative analysis has shown that the issue of religion in constitutional design is often emotionally charged and sometimes even infused with irrationality.
Second, it should be noted that in some cases, where framers have been unable to reach a clear agreement concerning the most contentious issues surrounding religion, they have opted for “incrementalist” strategies, such as the use of ambiguous wording and/or contradictory constitutional provisions, the deferral of certain matters to ordinary legislation or the inclusion within the constitution of non-justiciable clauses.
The third observation concerns the fact that constitution-making processes are often so deeply affected by religion that the latter should always be considered as one of the fundamental elements to be taken into account when analyzing these processes.
XLVII. Religion and political parties
Looking at the role of religion in political parties in the context of contemporary nation states means first and foremost dealing with a very controversial category: that of religious parties.
Defining a religious party
Religious parties are parties whose ideology is derived from or shaped by religious ideas and which mobilizes the grassroots on the basis of shared religious identities; and which seek regime change by implementing their religious worldviews.
As regards their aims, they often have a defensive stance, in order to “protect” society from the imposition of secular ideologies allegedly aimed at erasing or marginalizing religion; however, they can also adopt more aggressive stances, in order to widen the role of religious values in society.
They are often regarded negatively because, in the eyes of their often secular critics: they are not real parties, and tend to be opportunistic and not committed to electoral democracy and its values; they are intransigently ideological, uncompromising, militant, extremist and aimed at conforming public policy to the imperatives of a single faith; they are authoritarian in their organization and goals; they are culturally conservative, even anti-modern, and resist progressive social policies put into place in modern democracies; and they can engender a potentially radical political instability.
This negative view of religious parties is largely a consequence of the preeminence in nineteenth and twentieth-century thought of the so-called “secularization paradigm,” according to which the advent of modernity also meant the extinction of religions – or at least their disappearance from the public sphere, to become a merely private fact.
Many of the problems linked to the category of religious parties may be solved by adopting the concept of a “religiously oriented party,” defined as a party that can be explicitly religious or formally secular, where religious values in its manifesto are clearly identifiable, where explicit appeals to religious constituencies are made and/or where significant religious factions exist within the party.
The novelty of this concept is represented by the idea that a party is not necessarily “religious” or “secular” in binary terms.
On the contrary, different kinds of parties can have different degrees of religious orientation, according to three criteria: (1) the presence of explicit or implicit references to religious values in their manifestos; (2) the religious identity of a sizeable part of their constituency; and (3) the existence of significant religiously oriented factions within the party.
This definition enables the researcher to analyze the role of the religious factor even informally secular parties, which are usually not included in the category of “religious parties,” but which nonetheless have some kind of religious orientation. Since religious parties often turn out to be very different from each other in terms of ideology, organization and social base, this also makes possible the construction of a typology of religiously oriented parties.
Religiously oriented party can be fundamentalist, conservative, progressive, or a nationalist party.
The “fundamentalist” type party
The “fundamentalist” type party seeks “to reorganize state and society around a strict reading of religious doctrinal principles;” therefore, in the view of their supporters, there must be no separation between religion and state, and religious norms must be imposed on all citizens, irrespective of their private religious beliefs.
A striking feature of these parties is their problematic relation with democracy and pluralism, since they are not really committed to democratic values and to the acceptance of different points of view as legitimate.
Since their rise to power might imply the end of democracy, they may be included in the broader category of anti-system parties, which seek regime change rather than just a majority change18 and are sometimes even ready to achieve this end through the use of violence.
Fundamentalist parties, moreover, do not simply aim to defend the role of religion in society, as in the case of the conservative type (see below); in Neumann’s words, they are parties of “total integration,” with “ambitious goals of seizing power and radically transforming societies, demanding the full commitment and unquestioning obedience of members.
It is not by chance that fundamentalist parties, especially Islamist ones, have been compared to the phenomenon of totalitarianism in twentieth-century Europe.
This totalitarian attitude, often underpinned by patriarchal traditions, also implies a view of human rights which is incompatible with the notion of human rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments.
Although fundamentalist parties are usually concerned with issues directly related to the role of religion in society and the family, they can sometimes share some features of the nationalist type – as, for example, in the case of Israel’s Kach.
On the other hand, an extensive literature exists on the possibility that such parties can follow a trajectory of moderation through inclusion in democratic institutions or other kinds of evolutionary paths.
In short, the influence of fundamentalist parties on democracy is usually not positive, since they tend to polarize the political climate in democratic polities, and to make more difficult the transition toward a pluralistic democracy in non-democratic ones.
The “conservative” party type
The “conservative” party type includes political parties which fully accept democratic values and pluralism, while defending some core religious values.
Such parties may be denominational mass parties which have evolved to exhibit at least some features of catch-all parties, such as European and South American Christian democratic parties, Tunisia’s Ennahda, Turkey’s Justice and Development Party and the conservative parties with a strong religious outlook, such as the U.S. Republican Party.
Because of their catch-all organizational model, these parties usually relate to many different social groups and lobbies, and often enjoy a privileged relation with mainstream religious institutions and related organizations
However, although they also enjoy the support of the latter in electoral campaigns, they usually choose to develop an autonomous network of political activists; and in many cases they also have a very large membership.
They are open to alliances with a wide spectrum of other parties – more often in the mainstream centre and centre-right fields, but sometimes also in the centre-left, usually with a rejection only of openly anti-religious parties.
They are often very positive toward international cooperation – as reflected, for example, in the role played by Christian democracy in the creation and development of the European integration process
As mentioned, their political platforms are based on some core religious values, the defense of their role in society and the support of mainstream religious institutions.
However, unlike fundamentalist parties, religion is neither their only, nor – at least in ordinary circumstances – their main concern.
Moreover, they do not aim to make religion the only basis for state institutions and they tend to be ideologically flexible, unless they perceive some threat to the core religious values they support.
This pragmatism is also coherent with their strategy of vote maximization within pluralistic and often secular societies.
In the economic field, they tend to develop broad agendas which often have a neo-liberal orientation, and enjoy good relations with international finance and capitalism – although their platforms often also include appeals to, and some kind of welfare program in favor of, the poor and the downtrodden.
Because of both their catch-all attitude and the cross-cutting appeal of their religious messages, the internal composition of conservative parties is usually very mixed.
This often implies very lively factional dynamics, with members ranging from centrist to left-wing, conservative and right-wing orientations.
As a result, some scholars have defined Christian democratic parties, for example, as a microcosm of society.
This can also imply changes in their political outlook, as a consequence of shifts both in the internal balance of power and in religious/non-religious orientation: for example, Turkey’s Motherland party exhibited a significant religious orientation in the 1980s, but became a secular center-right party after the death of its founder in the 1990s.
Their constituency is also quite mixed, but usually includes wide segments of the middle class, as well as entrepreneurs and professionals.
Conservative parties are stronger in small towns and rural areas, although they also enjoy a significant level of support in bigger cities.
In poorer countries, they have strong appeal for those traumatized by the process of globalization – especially in comparison to secular parties, which are perceived as inefficient and corrupt, as the case of Morocco’s Justice and Development Party highlights
Conservative parties can play a very positive role in a country’s democratization and in improving the quality of democracy by socializing to democratic procedures and values masses that were previously excluded or even supportive of non-democratic regimes, as in the case of Christian democratic parties in post-Second World War Europe.
On the other hand, their tendency to occupy the center and to enjoy the support of sectors of the population whose commitment to democracy sometimes falters, can result in periods of political and social stagnation – or even, as has recently happened in Turkey, in a regression toward authoritarianism.
The “progressive” type party
Progressive parties tend to be less common than the other types, as a consequence of the fact that religious people in most contexts are usually conservative or centrist politically, rather than left-wing.
Moreover, in both the Christian and Muslim worlds, centrist and conservative parties often share a social and pro-welfare orientation inspired by religious values, which makes the birth of progressive parties less likely.
Where such political groups exist, they are often active as factions within mainstream centrist or center-left parties, rather than as autonomous parties. Examples include the “religious left” wings within the U.S. Democratic Party and Italy’s Partito Democratico (PD).
However, a number of progressive parties may also be mentioned, such as Israel’s Meimad (a party created by a group of Israeli religious Zionists, convinced that the National Religious Party had become too right-wing); and in particular, Italy’s Margherita, which was rather successful in the early 2000s, before becoming part of the PD.
Despite the small number of actual progressive parties, many progressive religiously oriented political movements may be found throughout the world, from those inspired by liberation theology in Latin America to the Buddhist socialist movements of Southeast Asia.
All these parties and political movements share a social orientation in favor of the poor and minorities, and an interest in supporting human rights and peace within a pluralistic, pro-democratic frame.
These parties tend to put little emphasis on moral issues relating to family and sexuality, arguing that these should be left to the private sphere of individuals and targeted through education (a position which often results in tensions between the “progressive” and “religious” dynamics both within progressive parties themselves, and between them and their allies).
Their social and pro-rights orientation is in some cases a consequence of the influence of some strand of socialist or communist thought (as in the experiences of Christian and Buddhist socialism), but may also derive from a peculiar interpretation of the scriptures themselves – as, for example, in the case of the main progressive factions within Italy’s Democrazia Cristiana immediately after the Second World War.
In some cases, such as Israel and Northern Ireland, their socially progressive orientation can be associated to more or less developed nationalist leanings, which can sometimes reduce their potential as dialogue promoters.
As mentioned above, these parties are very positive toward democratic values and pluralism; and, due to their small size, are open toward alliances with a wide range of centrist and left-wing parties that do not completely reject religion.
In some cases, such as Italy, they may even be the link connecting left-wing secular forces with religiously oriented centrists that reject an alliance with the center-right, in a government coalition.
When they choose to merge with other forces, they usually do so either with mainstream conservative parties with a catch-all orientation or with center-left parties with a penchant for religion. In both cases, their peculiar ideology can be the source of some problems of integration, both with religious conservative people and with left-wing secular people.
In rare cases in which larger numbers of people support a progressive religious agenda, as in some Latin American countries, there have also been attempts to create umbrella coalitions that gather together forces with a socially progressive ideology.
Progressive parties are generally compatible with democracy and pluralism in terms of values, and can be very positive for the political climate by acting as bridge builders.
On the other hand, progressive religiously oriented parties tend to be not very stable and to suffer for their mixed orientation, which can create strains both within them and with their allies, especially in relation to some moral issues.
The “nationalist” type party
Religious nationalist parties again relate ambiguously to democracy and pluralism, because of their perception of society as strongly related to ethno-religious identity, to which religion is subordinated.
Therefore, they reject the existence or the public activity of competing groups related to different identities, and can have aggressive attitudes toward them; they generally accept pluralism only insofar as the competing groups are related to their own ethno-religious identity.
It is not by chance, therefore, that these parties exist mainly in deeply divided polities, such as Israel/Palestine, the Balkans and India, where they have often played a crucial role in fueling both interreligious and international conflicts.
Their hostility (as in the Balkans, the India/Pakistan confrontation and the Middle East) is also oriented against neighboring countries with a different identity, especially in cases marked by controversies over contended territories (e.g. the occupied territories in the Middle East and the Kashmir region in the Indian subcontinent).
The struggle can be particularly fierce when those disputed territories include holy sites, which can lead to outright violence – as in the cases of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Jerusalem’s Temple Mount/Dome of the Rock or the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya (India).
Finally, when these parties perceive state institutions as overly secular, they can engage in a parallel struggle against them, to expand the role of their religious tradition in the public sphere.
Summary
This review of the different types of religiously oriented parties makes it possible to highlight some broader theoretical points about the influence of religion on party politics.
Specifically, the fact that religion can influence political parties in different ways – sometimes with a pro-democratic, pro-human rights and peaceful agenda; other times with an authoritarian, intolerant and conflict-oriented agenda – seems to support the idea of the multi-vocality of religious traditions.
This is to say that, a theoretical thesis which claims that the attitude of a religious tradition toward democracy cannot be determined a priori, but is rather the consequence of historical processes, interpretive traditions and social and cultural factors. Therefore, it can change both in different contexts and over time in the same context.
XLVIII. Religion and human rights
As societies modernize, we were told, they would lose the vestiges of public religion and ultimately become committed to secularism. Religion would continue to exist, but would become publicly marginalized, or ‘privatized’, and would increasingly be excluded from the public realm. ‘Secularization’ was the term coined to capture this process.
The idea that modernization leads inevitably to secularization is clearly false. Several societies that have modernized have deepened, rather than ditched, their commitments to religious identification – Malaysia, for example.
Theories of secularization were, however, correct in at least one major respect. The continuing role of religion in public life does give rise to tensions with key aspects of modernity, not least with some aspects of human rights.
Religions are a problem for human rights and human rights are a problem for religions. And both, separately and together, are problems for the courts.
There are three broad areas in which tensions arise between human rights and religion. Essentially, the issues consist of disputes over three ideas:
(1) how far the state should be able to curtail the right of individuals to practice their religion;
(2) how far the state should itself adopt or embrace any particular religion or (more controversially) religion in general, in a way that elevates that religion or religion in general to other than a symbolically special position; and
(3) whether the state (and in some circumstances other private parties, such as employers) should be permitted to discriminate between religions or treat individuals less favorably on the basis of their religious beliefs.
More technically, we find protections for the ‘free exercise’ of religion (the first idea), counterbalanced by ‘non-establishment’ of religion (the second idea). It is through these constitutional provisions that religious issues are primarily considered.
The constitution incorporates an element of non-discrimination (the third idea) within the meaning of ‘free exercise’ and ‘non-establishment’.
At the statutory level, the third idea (non-discrimination on grounds of religion) is developed further in several parliamentary acts, which prohibit religious discrimination, such as in the employment context.
These three elements (free exercise, non-establishment and non-discrimination) are also reflected, to a greater or lesser extent, in international and regional human rights treaties.
They commonly incorporate a ‘freedom of religion’ protection (often interpreted as guaranteeing the freedom from being coerced into the practice of religion by the state) and an ‘anti-discrimination’ provision, guaranteeing the right not to be discriminated against by the state (sometimes only in particular situations) on a series of grounds, one of which is often ‘religious belief ’.
This tripartite set of provisions is now commonplace in several jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United Kingdom and South Africa, and Tanzania.
Overlapping Consensus between Religions and Human Rights
There exists an overlapping consensus that has emerged regarding how states now address religions legally, both in constitutions and in ordinary statutes.
This consensus relates to the forms in which the discourse takes place, rather than to the application of these forms to particular conflicts.
There is a second preliminary point of some importance: the degree of consensus surrounding the appropriate legal norms applying to the relationship between religion and human rights extends beyond law into the values that both systems adhere to.
It would be misleading to ignore or take for granted the significant degree of convergence between religious teaching and the values that underpin secular human rights norms.
Values such as liberty, equality, solidarity, autonomy and dignity are shared, at least at a high level of generality, even if applied differently.
So, there is more of an overlapping ideological consensus than might be supposed by focusing only on disputes between religion and human rights. Let us illustrate the general argument of consensus by drawing on the example of the Catholic Church.
The human rights tradition sees the state as subject to positive obligations to protect the rights holder against others, whether they be state actors or not. The Catholic tradition is aligned with the human rights approach on this issue.
There is a strong preference for a state whose duty it is to actively bring about the conditions under which rights are protected. In the terms we have just identified, there is a preference for positive obligations:
“It is [...] demanded by the common good,” says paragraph 63 of the encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963), “that civil authorities should make earnest efforts to bring about a situation in which individual citizens can easily exercise their rights.”
Like several of the most progressive national constitutions and international human rights law itself, the Catholic Church’s position – again reflected in Pacem in Terris – is straightforward: strongly in favor of an approach to human rights that incorporates socio-economic rights.
Indeed, in several respects, Catholic social teaching outstrips what lawyers would consider is currently required by human rights law.
In this context, the Catholic “preferential option for the poor” has important practical implications for how these rights are to be protected.
On this view, rights to be free from economic deprivation take precedence over some traditional autonomy rights.
For example, rights to private property and free commerce are subordinated to the right of subsistence with dignity.
This is to say that, private property should be subject to the principle that it be used for the common good, thereby authorizing government to regulate, tax, and occasionally expropriate property on behalf of the poor. We should not, then, over-accentuate the tensions between religion and human rights.
Tensions between Religions and Human Rights: Introduction
In some particular respects, however, it is clear that religious and secular conceptions of human rights have diverged significantly.
In these areas, human rights have become a central site of normative contestation over the implications of modernity, with both sides claiming to interpret human rights in the ‘right’ way.
This is possible because of the contested nature of human rights standards and their sources of authority, as well as confusion as to whether there is a lexical ordering of the importance of particular human rights compared with others.
Both sides see themselves as proponents of human rights, often claiming different human rights or different interpretations of the same right in support of their positions.
But, why are there tensions and conflicts between organized religions and the human rights system, and why so many of them seem to land up in courts. There are both ideological and institutional reasons in play. Three ideological developments are of particular importance.
First, there have been significant changes in the discourse on human rights that have resulted in religious practices coming more into conflict with human rights;
Second, there have been significant changes in human rights practice that have resulted in religious practices coming more into conflict with human rights;
Third, there have been significant developments within particular religions that have resulted in more ‘fundamentalist’ approaches to religious doctrine being adopted;
And fourth, religious issues have increasingly become of renewed geopolitical significance, in some ways replacing and in other ways exacerbating other ideological tensions.
When these ‘ideological factors’ are set in a political context of significant migrations between countries of one religion and countries of another religion (or none), the stage is set for increased tensions and conflicts, including conflicts between religions and human rights.
Tensions between Religions and Human Rights: changes in human rights discourse
From the 1960s onwards, there occurred c
hanges in human rights doctrine, where equality discourse in the human rights context took on a strongly individualistic, autonomy-based, anti-essentialist and constructivist rhetoric which was at odds with that adopted by several organized religions.
The anti-essentialist turn is the most interesting, especially when taken together with the constructivist approach.
The term ‘essentialist’ is here used to refer to the idea that “definitions are descriptions of the essential properties of things, and that one can evaluate attempts at definitions in terms of the falsity or truth of the descriptions given by them.”
For example, essentialism is used in some philosophical writing of the view that females (or males) have an essential nature (e.g. nurturing and caring versus being aggressive and selfish), as opposed to differing by a variety of accidental or contingent features brought about by social forces. Often such “essentialism” is seen as based on biological determinism.
It is this understanding that anti-essentialism seeks to challenge, viewing roles as socially constructed and provisional. In particular, social identities are seen as socially constructed and changeable.
Human rights discourse and, to a notable extent, human rights law have significantly adopted an anti-essentialist understanding of, for example, gender equality and sexual orientation.
In contrast, as we shall see subsequently, several organized religions (perhaps particularly Catholicism and Islam) have anthropological understandings of the relationship between women and men, and understandings of gender and sexual orientation more generally, that are strongly essentialist.
Tensions between Religions and Human Rights: changes in human rights practice
The second change in human rights doctrine that contribute to greater tensions between religion and human rights is a change in human rights practice at an international level.
Broadly speaking, international human rights law used to have relatively little to say, either pro or con, about many issues which had a religious dimension. This distance resulted from several different elements of the then dominant interpretation of human rights.
First, human rights primarily applied to actions by the state or state-sponsored bodies, not to non-state actors, such as many organized religions.
Second, human rights primarily imposed negative obligations on the state rather than positive obligations on the state to regulate others.
Third, human rights – at least as enforced – primarily related to the protection of civil and political rights, such as those found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,16 rather than those found in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (eg, the right to health, where controversial issues around contraception and abortion often arose).
And fourth, there were ‘private’ areas such as sexual morality and intra-family relations that were regarded as inappropriate for international intervention and were considered firmly within the sphere of national sovereignty.
The result was to leave large swathes of activity regarding women and sexual minorities, for example, unaddressed in international human rights discourse.
Prior to the 1980s, international organizations, states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interpreted ‘human rights’ as substantially inapplicable to many ‘traditional’ practices which particularly impacted on women’s lives. Perhaps the best-known such issue was that relating to female genital cutting, which was long off-limits as an issue of international human rights concern.
Since the 1980s, however, each of these elements in the dominant interpretation of human rights has been severely challenged.
For example, actions by non-state actors are increasingly seen, at least by NGOs, as included within the sphere of international human rights activism;
Positive obligations on states to ensure the adequate implementation of rights within their jurisdictions by all, including ‘private’ actors, have become commonplace in human rights discourse;
And socio-economic and cultural rights have attracted significantly greater enforcement attention than before; and international human rights actors now consider it legitimate for human rights norms to address issues in the ‘private’ sphere, and, indeed, to make them a central focus of their attention.
As a result of these changes in human rights practice, women’s rights and the rights of marginalized sexual minorities increasingly came to dominate human rights discourse.
This has resulted in a plethora of texts and interpretative statements, as well as national judicial practice, reflecting this position, such as the United Nations Human Rights Committee Resolutions on child marriages and forced marriages, in which ‘traditional values’ were seen as undermining human rights standards.
One of the best-known illustrations of the changes that these doctrinal developments contributed to is that relating to how female genital cutting is regarded in human rights law. From being an issue that few were willing to identify as a breach of human rights standards, it is now widely so regarded.
Tensions between Religions and Human Rights: Emergency of religious fundamentalism
Third, there have been significant developments within particular religions that have resulted in more ‘fundamentalist’ approaches to religious doctrine being adopted.
Specifically, there have been significant shifts within organized religions, in some cases developing positions that are more antagonistic to some human rights development than previously. Developments within the Catholic Church again can illustrate the point.
By the early 1960s there was a growing rapprochement between the church and the developing international human rights movement, culminating in the encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963).
Since then, however, the church has been engaged in an intense continuing debate about how best to respond to such secular developments in human rights.
At that time there appeared two modes of thinking about meaning: those characteristic of ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ culture respectively.
The former is ahistorical and essentialist, secure in having clear and accepted meaning; while the latter is more historical and inductive.
Catholic moral theology was born in the former and by the mid-1960s was confronted with the latter world of meaning.
As a result, within the Catholic theology there developed two camps, namely: a dynamic modern wing, captivated by now this, now that new development, exploring now this and now that new possibility’ in contrast with a rigid classic wing that is determined to live in a world that no longer exists. The former are variously refered to as ‘revisionist’ theologians while the latter are called classical theologians or ‘anti-revisionists.’
The main factors making for revisionism are the importance of historical conscientiousness; the general theological awareness of the development of doctrine; a desire for a more culturally and psychologically sensitive pastoral practice; and the social distance between ecclesial authority and the profession of theology.
The main factors making for anti-revisionism are an essentialist, legalistic and biologistic conception of natural law, with a strong emphasis on its immutability and universality; and the assertion of papal authority in moral matters since the mid-eighteenth century (in the First Vatican Council), with a preoccupation on infallibility and the irreversibility of church teaching.
Between these two camps, a major intellectual development took root in the late 1960s that contributed to opening up the perceived gap between the human rights movement and the Catholic Church.
From the early 1960s, there was a sustained attempt to rethink and reformulate the foundations of ‘natural law’ in a way that grew from and was consistent with Thomist approaches.
One of the most influential of these attempts was what came to be called ‘new natural law’ by its proponents and opponents, including Germain Grisez, John Finnis and Robert George.
The ‘new natural law’ became in practice a controversial challenge to revisionist approaches within the church that were much more in tune with emerging human rights norms.
The ‘New natural law’ was seen by some elements of the church hierarchy – particularly in the United States – as supportive of the traditional elements of some of the existing magisterium and in turn to be supported and encouraged, particularly after the bitter controversy that arose within the church on the publication of Humanae Vitae (1968), concerning contraception.
The major difference between revisionism and anti-revisionism lay in their differing anthropological understanding, within the church, over what is required to ensure human flourishing.
Both approaches appeal to human dignity, but there is sharp disagreement as to what human dignity and human flourishing requires. In general, when anti-revisionism is dominant, the likelihood of tensions with human rights norms is increased.
There are several aspects of the Catholic conception of human rights that are out of sympathy with the current interpretations of human rights. Specifically, a distinctive Catholic understanding of rights theory has evolved, which ‘has both incorporated the insights of liberalism while nevertheless remaining at tension with it in several fundamental respects.
The period of rapprochement between the two, evident during the papacy of John XXIII, as reflected in Pacem in Terris (1963), and the papacy of John Paul II, regarding the need for freedom and democracy, now seems under severe challenge.
The church’s approach to the role of women, issues of sexual identity, contraception, abortion, genetic manipulation and physician assisted suicide, to name but a few current issues, increasingly appears to conflict with emerging human rights norms in these areas.
The church’s official practice towards human rights also appears to manifest a deep unease. One example must suffice.
The Holy See’s record in ratifying human rights instruments is, to put it bluntly, abysmal, putting it somewhere on the level of Zimbabwe and Saudi Arabia in terms of the number of major human rights treaties not ratified, and just below the United States.
The rhetoric of support for the Universal Declaration on Human Rights simply doesn’t translate into willingness to be bound in international law. The Holy See has ratified the Convention on Race Discrimination, the Torture Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
But, as of June 2020, the Holy See had not ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women or the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Many countries ratify these conventions while at the same time entering reservations on particular issues. This is also open to the Holy See.
Tensions between Religions and Human Rights: Emerging geopolitical hegemony
Finally, religious issues have increasingly become of renewed geopolitical significance, in some ways replacing, in others exacerbating other ideological tensions.
In this case, tensions between human rights and religions are exploited for geopolitical ideological benefit. There are two particular examples that illustrate this trend.
First, is the attempt of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to secure a binding UN resolution condemning ‘defamation of religions’.
The issue was first raised in 1999. It developed into an increasingly polarized confrontation involving, on one side, the OIC, Muslim states and some Muslim faith-based organizations (FBOs), such as the Muslim World League. Opposing the pro-defamations of religion coalition was an alliance of Western states and non-state actors, including secular NGOs and FBOs. Both sides used human rights arguments to support their positions.
Even before the events of September 11, conflicts between Islamic values and, for example, the ECHR35 had resulted in considerable doubt being cast on the consistency of Sharia with Western fundamental rights.
Post September 11, however, these issues have been considered in an even more unfavourable light, one where militant Islam is seen by some as posing a threat to national security as well as Enlightenment values in many Western states.
The intensity of the debate and the apparent irresolvability of the disputes have contributed significantly to Islamic practices in several Western states, such as the way some Muslim women dress, coming before national and international adjudicatory bodies.
Conflicts between religion and human rights have also been the focus of even broader geopolitical activism aimed at securing or resisting, depending on your viewpoint ideological hegemony by Russia.
One extreme version of the expression of this approach is to be found in the speech by the Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Kirill to the Human Rights Council in March 2008. Metropolitan Kirill claimed that the development and implementation of human rights principles, such as human dignity, are increasingly diverging from their original grounding in religious values, as attempts are made to separate them from their origins, and religion is becoming marginalized and privatized.
Several recent resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council, proposed by Russia at the initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church, attempt to have the notion of ‘traditional values’ accepted into international human rights discourse, and indirectly into human rights interpretation by judges and others.
They seek to have concepts at the heart of human rights law – in particular, ‘dignity’, ‘freedom’, and ‘responsibility’ – interpreted through the lens of ‘traditional values’, which is left undefined.
XLIX. Constitutions and religion in Africa
An examination of the constitutions of all 55 African countries reveals considerable variation in the way they recognize and protect religious rights.
The nature and scope of the recognition and protection of religious rights in African constitutions have been influenced by a number of international and regional instruments, among them the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Declaration of the Elimination of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and more recently, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Specifically, the general provisions recognizing religious rights can be grouped into three: those providing for a secular state; those recognizing a state religion; and those which, in addition to one or both of these dispensations, recognize traditional African religions.
Religious rights in the context of a secular state
An overwhelming majority of African constitutions declare the state to be secular and thus do not prescribe an official or preferred religion.
This is manifest in at least three ways. First are those constitutions which simply declare that the state and religion are separate, and that there shall be no state religion.
A second common formulation is to declare expressly that the state is secular.
A third approach, found in most anglophone constitutions, is to provide an elaborate provision recognizing and protecting religious freedom in terms that are clearly indicative of a secular approach.
Whatever the formulation used, constitutional entrenchment of the principle of secularity is true even in countries with a dominant Christian or Muslim majority.
For example, there are secular countries with dominant Christian majorities, such as Angola (95 percent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) (95 percent), Rwanda (93 percent), Namibia (90 percent) and the Republic of Congo (85 percent).
Similarly, there are secular countries with dominant Muslim majorities, including Mali (95 percent), Senegal (94 percent) and the Gambia (90 percent).
The concept of secularism is amenable to diverse interpretation. It is thus not surprising that the exact scope of secularism expressed in African constitutions differs from one country to another.
This variation is unavoidable, given that in each of these countries either Christianity or Islam is the dominant religion.
Owing to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the last two decades, religious secularism has come under attack in many African countries. This is the case not only in countries with small Muslim majorities, such as Chad (with a 58 percent Muslim population), but also in those with large Muslim majorities, such as Niger (with a 98 percent Muslim majority).
Religious freedom in the context of state or preferred religion
Islam is the most common state or official religion in Africa. Most African countries that recognize Islam as the state or official religion in their constitutions contain provisions which also recognize the right of freedom of worship.
The only exception to this is Somalia, which in Article 2 of its 2012 Provisional Constitution not only states that “Islam is the religion of the state,” but goes further to declare that “no religion other than Islam can be propagated in the country.”
While most of the Muslim-dominated African countries recognizing Islam as a state or official religion do not go this far, some of them indicate that only Muslims qualify to stand for election as president.
The rare exception where Christianity is made a state religion in Africa is in the 2016 Zambian Constitution, where the preamble declares “the Republic a Christian nation while upholding a person’s right to freedom of conscience, belief or religion.”
Nevertheless, irrespective of what the constitutions say or do not say, if one looks at a preferred or favored religion in terms of the legal, financial or other special benefits that the government provides to some religious groups, then the practical reality is that most African countries tend to favor one or the other of the dominant religions on the continent. It is, however, the place reserved today for African traditional religions that raises numerous questions.
Protection of Religious Freedom Through Non-Discrimination and Equality Clauses
The usual means of protecting religious freedom is to entrench a provision that prohibits discriminatory practices that favor or disadvantage individuals on several grounds, including religion.
However, a majority of African constitutions contain provisions which guarantee equality of treatment and equal protection under the law for every individual regardless of their religious belief. Some constitutions use both expressions, namely, “equality and freedom from discrimination.”
In five constitutions (Algeria, Mauritania, Seychelles, Tunisia and Zambia), there is no specific provision either guaranteeing equality of treatment of all citizens regardless of their religious beliefs or protecting citizens from any discrimination based on their religious beliefs.
All these countries, except Zambia, have Muslim majorities. The common link between them is that all their constitutions provide for a state religion – Islam – again, with the exception of Zambia, which is the only African country to have declared Christianity the state religion.
In the absence of constitutional provisions explicitly or implicitly entrenching the right to equality of treatment of all citizens or non-discrimination on the grounds of religious belief, it becomes difficult to see how the right to freedom of religion could become a practical reality in these countries.
This is particularly so in the light of the numerous legitimate and illegitimate restrictions and limitations placed on the exercise of religious freedoms.
Summary
In short, consistent with current human rights principles, the general trend in African practice appears to be to delink religion from the state. This has been more formal in Christian-dominated countries than Muslim-dominated ones.
L. Stock-taking on religi9n-state relation models: A case for secularism
The three models of religion-state relations stand for different ways in which a religion can interpret its public role: as a quasi-state actor in itself, as partner of the state or as antagonist to the state.
It is usually one model that defines religion-state relations in a country, clearly circumscribed through constitutional provisions and laws. In light of the above inconclusive discussions secularism emerges as a logical option.
One of the major questions that arise in this context concerns the exact meaning of the term ‘secularization’ .
The fundamental principle of Secularism is that, in his whole conduct, man should be guided exclusively by considerations derived from the present life itself.
Anything that is above or beyond the present life should be entirely overlooked. Whether God exists or not, whether the soul is immortal or not, are questions which at best cannot be answered, and on which consequently no motives of action can be based.
All motives derived from religion are worthless. "Things Secular are as separate from the Church as land from the ocean," exponents of secularism say.
However, theologians, philosophers, historians, lawyers and social scientists have varying approaches to this debate. But the problem lies in the fact that not all of these views are compatible with each other and hence the need to untwine the threads arises.
We can distinguish three attributes of secularization operating at different levels of society: the societal, the organizational and the individual.
Societal secularization is a typical consequence of the processes of modernity, and of programs of “laicisation” promoted by political parties.
Individual secularization that is manifested in the decline of church commitment; occurring as individuals re-compose their personal beliefs and practices in a “religion à la carte”; and as the individual’s meaning system becomes compartmentalized and religion is separated from other areas of life.
And a third level, organizational secularization, covers the incidence of the adaptation of religious bodies to secularized society.
Essentially, there are two types of secularism, agnostic and atheistic secularism.
Agnostic secularism refers to a secular worldview that acknowledges the possibility of a divine or supernatural realm while maintaining a distance of neutrality or non-belief, rather than a firm atheistic position.
While both agnostic and atheistic secularism advocate for a secular society, atheistic secularism is based on the belief that God does not exist, whereas agnostic secularism acknowledges the possibility of a higher power without taking a firm stance on its existence.
There are four Key Aspects agnostic secularism:
Neutrality: Agnostic secularism emphasizes neutrality regarding religious beliefs, allowing for a diverse range of faiths and non-faiths to coexist.
Freedom of Belief: It champions the freedom of individuals to choose their own beliefs, or lack thereof, without coercion or discrimination.
Separation of Church and State: It supports the separation of church and state, ensuring that religious institutions do not have undue influence in government or public policy.
Possibility of rhetorical conjunction between the sacred and the secular: A "rhetorical conjunction between the sacred and the secular" refers to the ways in which language and rhetoric can be used to bridge or blend the seemingly distinct realms of religious/spiritual (sacred) and non-religious/worldly (secular).
Rhetorical Conjunction: This involves using language and persuasive techniques to connect or combine these two realms, rather than keeping them separate.
Examples of Rhetorical Conjunction: Using religious language to frame secular issues: For example, a politician might use biblical language to advocate for a policy, or a business might use spiritual language to promote their brand.
Drawing parallels between sacred and secular concepts: A preacher might use a secular metaphor to illustrate a religious point, or a secular writer might use religious imagery to explore a human experience.
Blending sacred and secular themes in art or literature: A piece of art might depict a religious scene in a secular setting, or a novel might explore religious themes through a secular lens.
Why it's important: Understanding cultural dynamics: Studying rhetorical conjunctions can help us understand how societies and individuals navigate the relationship between the sacred and the secular.
Analyzing persuasive strategies: It can help us identify and analyze how persuasive techniques are used to influence people's beliefs and behaviors.
Promoting dialogue and understanding: By recognizing the ways in which the sacred and secular are connected, we can foster more open and inclusive dialogue between different groups.
For example, Pope John Paul II frequently used the phrase "renew the face of the earth," drawing inspiration from Psalm 104:30, to emphasize the importance of the Holy Spirit's role in transforming the world and the need for renewed efforts towards peace and justice.
The phrase "renew the face of the earth" comes from Psalm 104:30: "You send forth your spirit, they are created; and you renew the face of the earth".
Pope John Paul II often quoted this verse, particularly during his homilies and addresses, to highlight the transformative power of the Holy Spirit and the need for a renewal of faith and action in the world.
He used the phrase in the context of various issues, including:
Ecumenism and Dialogue: He used it to call for a renewal of dialogue and understanding between different religions and cultures, promoting peace and unity.
Social Justice: He used it to call for a renewal of efforts to address social injustice, poverty, and inequality, urging people to work towards a more just and equitable world.
Ecological Crisis: He also used it to emphasize the importance of caring for the environment and addressing the ecological crisis, calling for a renewed sense of responsibility towards creation.
For example, in his homily during his first visit to Poland in 1979, he cried out, "Let your Spirit descend. Let your Spirit descend. and renew the face of the earth, the face of this land".
Here, Pope John Paul II's phrase, "Let Thy Spirit Renew This Earth," was used to inspire hope and action for social and political change, particularly in the context of the fall of communism and the rise of democratic movements.
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