Tanzania's Foreign Policy

[Game Theory]

duh!

siamini kama niliandika hayo hapo juu

 

[Semenya]

Nhi za Africa nyingi hazina foreign policy yakueleweka au hazina kabisa kutokana na utgemezi. Nchi zilizo endelea au big powers zenyewe zinazo kwani hawaogopi nchi nyingine na wanajitegemea kiuchumi. sisi bado ombaomba kwahiyo inabidi tuwe tupotupo tu.

 

[Companero]

GT tutofautishe FP yetu wakati wa JKN na wakati wa AHM, BWM na JMK - Huwezi kusema hii FP hapa chini ndio hii tuliyonayo sasa!

Nyerere and the Commonwealth

Chief Emeka Anyaoku with Annar Cassam

2009-10-13, Issue 452

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508

The sun set over the British empire in the aftermath of the Second World War and simultaneously, with the independence of India in 1948, there was born a new multinational institution, the Commonwealth of Nations. The new Republic of India became its first non white member in 1949, joining the older ex-dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Ghana, the first independent country from Africa, joined in 1957 and the decade of the 1960s began with a memorable episode in international diplomacy initiated by Julius Nyerere, the leader of the soon-to-be-independent Tanganyika in 1961. The stage was the annual Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting in London in July 1961. On the eve of this gathering, Nyerere (whose own country’s Uhuru date was already set for December 1961), wrote a letter to the Observer and the Manchester Guardian which seriously rattled the British establishment.

The letter also and above all shook the South African government for it questioned the presence of a racist regime in an international institution based on the principles of mutual respect and equality among all nations, new and old. How could Africa join an organisation which had as its member a state which applied apartheid and white supremacy as its official policy, asked Nyerere. In a well-argued letter, he explained that his country would definitely not seek membership in such a case and that his example could well be followed by other African, Asian and Caribbean countries soon to gain independence from the U.K.

The case was unanswerable and Nyerere was seconded by the then Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, who took on the task of “persuading” his South African counterpart (Henrik Verwoerd) to resign from the Commonwealth rather than face being expelled from it. The South Africans left the meeting forthwith, Mwalimu remained and six months later in the same year, Tanganyika was welcomed as a full member.

This event was recalled by the distinguished Nigerian diplomat, Emeka Anyaoku, who spent 34 years at the Commonwealth Secretariat and who became its Secretary-General from 1990 to 2000. As he explained, he had the privilege of observing, aiding and accompanying President Nyerere in his many interventions and initiatives on behalf of Africa and the Third World in general and on behalf of the liberation struggle of South and Southern Africa in particular. In many of these instances, the President came into serious conflict with the British government of the day, for the Commonwealth connection did not turn out to be the cosy network they had perhaps once imagined.

A most difficult chapter opened in 1965 when Ian Smith, head of the white settlers in control of the British colony of Rhodesia, declared himself and the colony “independent” of British rule under UDI (for Universal Declaration of Independence). The matter was discussed at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit that year and President Nyerere and his colleagues demanded in a Resolution that the British government take responsibility for this illegal act of usurpation on the part of Smith, failing which OAU member states would end diplomatic relations with the U.K.

Mwalimu argued that the British should follow the example of General De Gaulle who had had to face a similar challenge from some French settlers of Algeria whose attempt to act unilaterally had been rejected forcefully by the General. The Labour Government of Harold Wilson refused to force Smith to return to legality and in December 1965, Tanzania and Ghana ended all diplomatic contacts with the U.K.

As Chief Anyaoku points out, the matter did not rest there. Mwalimu was consistent in his relentless opposition to racist politics no matter where these were manifest. In this way, he mobilised and inspired many other Commonwealth citizens. One such was the first Secretary General of the Commonwealth, the Canadian Arnold Smith, appointed in 1965. In 1966, at the meeting of the Commonwealth Law Ministers held in London, Arnold Smith solved the dilemma of the break in relations between the U.K. administration and the African states mentioned above in an innovative manner. He invited and encouraged these delegations to come to London because he took the position that the Commonwealth was an international organisation whose activities were not subject to the policies of the host government. He cited the example of the presence of Cuba at the UN in New York. The Law Ministers in question duly attended the meeting at Marlborough House, London.

In September of the same year, these countries also attended the Heads of State and Government Meeting in London where once more, Nyerere led the charge to get the British to act on Ian Smith in Rhodesia. The African group demanded action in the form of sanctions against Rhodesia but the British Prime Minister proposed mere talks with the rebel regime. As a result, the Africans proposed and the Summit adopted the famous resolution on NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule) which embarrassed the British, if not the Rhodesian rebels, in a significant manner.

By the time of the 1971 Commonwealth Summit held in Singapore, another conflict had arisen between Nyerere and the British government, now led by Prime Minister Edward Heath. The British gave notice of their decision to revive the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa for the sale of British arms to that country. Mwalimu protested that these arms were destined to be used against the black population of South Africa and as such the Agreement was indefensible. The British rejected this argument based on the legalistic position of the duty of states to respect treaty obligations. Matters came to a head at Singapore when Mwalimu, supported by President Kaunda of Zambia and President Obote of Uganda, strongly challenged Prime Minister Heath on the Simonstown Agreement issue. In the end, the British bowed to pressure from Africa and the rest of the Commonwealth but a heavy price was paid at the Summit by Uganda whose President was deposed in a coup d’état while attending the meeting and whose population subsequently suffered for years under the bloody and demented reign of Idi Amin.

These Summits were not always so confrontational, as Chief Anyaoku points out. Mwalimu was not always on the war-path with the opposition in these meetings! His preferred method was a mixture of intellectual argument and gentle humour as was the case at the 1975 Summit in Jamaica. During the discussion on the liberation struggle in Africa, President Kaunda had given an emotional statement praising the solidarity and concrete help given to the liberation movements by China and the USSR. Whereupon Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore chided him for having “let the cat out of the bag” by revealing an open secret. Mwalimu immediately diffused the situation in a memorable and spontaneous aphorism, namely that “when the mice are out, we must let out the cat!”

The years 1974-75 brought momentous changes for the liberation struggle in Africa with the collapse of the Salazar regime in Lisbon, the liberation of Mozambique by FRELIMO and the attempted South African invasion of Angola, an attempt that was thwarted by Cuban military assistance to the besieged MPLA government in Luanda. These events destabilised the Cold War boundary-lines in Africa which the West had taken for granted and which the USA especially could not abandon, caught as the Americans were in an ideological time-warp of their own making, in spite of their defeat in Vietnam in 1975. Henry Kissinger's visit to Dar es Salaam in 1977 to meet Nyerere, Chairman of the Frontline States, was a belated exercise in shuffle diplomacy; times had changed and so had the realities on the ground.

By 1979, the Commonwealth too had changed and into this changed world stepped the next British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher to face a cast of experienced old-timers such as Nyerere, Kaunda, Ian Smith and the Queen, the perennial symbolic Head of the Commonwealth. The organisation's Secretary-General was now the former Attorney General of Guyana, Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal, and his Deputy was Emeka Anyaoku, the living institutional memory of the organisation.

The liberation struggle in southern Africa had also been transformed by the formation of the Frontline States, FLS (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola) under the chairmanship of President Nyerere. The next chapter in the FLS strategy centered on the liberation of Rhodesia from the illegal grip of Ian Smith who had never been challenged by the British crown and who had by now made the place into a 'republic.' In 1979, under a so-called “internal settlement”, Smith appointed the first black Prime Minster, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and began to negotiate with the new British government for formal recognition.

At President Kaunda's invitation, the venue of the 1979 Commonwealth Summit was Lusaka and the date was set for August. In May of that year, it became known that Mrs. Thatcher was preparing to recognise the Muzorewa government in spite of the fact that the British had ended formal diplomatic ties with Smith some years previously. In July, the rightwing Prime Minister of New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, came to London to lunch with Mrs. Thatcher, following which he gave a press conference to explain to the media how very concerned he was about the level of safety and security arrangements concerning the Queen during her stay in Lusaka. Within hours, at 6p.m. Buckingham Palace issued a statement to the effect that “it remained the firm intention of Her Majesty to attend the Lusaka Commonwealth Summit”.

As can be imagined, at Lusaka the African Heads of State argued very forcefully against any links with the Muzorewa regime and for direct talks between the British authorities and the leaders of the liberation movements, such as Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Tongogara and Robert Mugabe. Mrs. Thatcher was isolated and outclassed by ALL her Commonwealth colleagues from around the globe, including New Zealand and Australia.

Mrs Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues were completely out-manoeuvred in their last-minute attempts to reverse the situation at Lusaka where the Summit in its entirety passed a resolution which led to the organisation of the Lancaster House Talks, to the temporary return of Rhodesia to colonial status under the British and to the eventual Agreement to prepare for majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe.

Mwalimu attended his last Commonwealth summit as President of Tanzania in 1985 in the Bahamas and once more had to ensure, together with President Kaunda, that the Organisation's efforts in the direction of South Africa were not diluted by British interests. The Bahamas Summit had decided to send an Eminent Persons Group (the EPG) to South Africa to meet the leadership there to ascertain the seriousness of their declarations regarding political change in that country.

After the Summit ended and before the EPG set out, the British press announced that the EPG would be led by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe. The reactions from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka were immediate and unequivocal; the two Presidents rejected the very idea of the EPG if led by the British. Chief Emeka Anyaoku flew to meet Mwalimu and subsequently to see President Kaunda to re-assure them that the EPG would be led not by the British but by 2 co-chairmen; General Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Malcolm Fraser of Australia.

Finally, former Secretary-General Anyaoku recounts with pride that it was at the Kuala Lumpur Summit of 1989 that the Commonwealth leaders took the initiative of establishing the South Commission and the South Center and invited Mwalimu Nyerere to be the Chairman.

This was a fitting and lasting tribute to a champion of South-South cooperation and an advocate of the South in global affairs. Throughout his long and creative association with the many international forums he attended, he brilliantly practised what he believed – the common humanity and equality of all. At the Commonwealth, he led by example and so shaped the history of the institution and the very meaning of international solidarity.

 

[Ndahani]

duh!

siamini kama niliandika hayo hapo juu

Ni moja ya thread nzuri ulizowah kuzituma

 

[shabanimzungu]

Since the Election and Kikwet's presidentship we notice that Tanznaia is becoming the darling of the West esp.USA! The praise accorded to Mwalimu by the US Ambassador a few months ago is unprcented as US has always considered Mwalimu in bad light.
What is at stake?
USA wants to create another PAKISTAN in Africa..and the Tz is the best bet.......
I am sure Kikwete is the stooge of US and this si a dangerous trend.
Tz should look towrads India nd China.....................let us ponderr and discuss this issue in detail..
Thanks

 

[Game Theory]

ahhh well

no one cares

kila mmoja anaangalia atapata vipio dili wamalize vibanda vyao

 

[Kekuye]

GT tutofautishe FP yetu wakati wa JKN na wakati wa AHM, BWM na JMK - Huwezi kusema hii FP hapa chini ndio hii tuliyonayo sasa!

Nyerere and the Commonwealth

Chief Emeka Anyaoku with Annar Cassam

2009-10-13, Issue 452

http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/59508

The sun set over the British empire in the aftermath of the Second World War and simultaneously, with the independence of India in 1948, there was born a new multinational institution, the Commonwealth of Nations. The new Republic of India became its first non white member in 1949, joining the older ex-dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.

Ghana, the first independent country from Africa, joined in 1957 and the decade of the 1960s began with a memorable episode in international diplomacy initiated by Julius Nyerere, the leader of the soon-to-be-independent Tanganyika in 1961. The stage was the annual Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting in London in July 1961. On the eve of this gathering, Nyerere (whose own country’s Uhuru date was already set for December 1961), wrote a letter to the Observer and the Manchester Guardian which seriously rattled the British establishment.

The letter also and above all shook the South African government for it questioned the presence of a racist regime in an international institution based on the principles of mutual respect and equality among all nations, new and old. How could Africa join an organisation which had as its member a state which applied apartheid and white supremacy as its official policy, asked Nyerere. In a well-argued letter, he explained that his country would definitely not seek membership in such a case and that his example could well be followed by other African, Asian and Caribbean countries soon to gain independence from the U.K.

The case was unanswerable and Nyerere was seconded by the then Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, who took on the task of “persuading” his South African counterpart (Henrik Verwoerd) to resign from the Commonwealth rather than face being expelled from it. The South Africans left the meeting forthwith, Mwalimu remained and six months later in the same year, Tanganyika was welcomed as a full member.

This event was recalled by the distinguished Nigerian diplomat, Emeka Anyaoku, who spent 34 years at the Commonwealth Secretariat and who became its Secretary-General from 1990 to 2000. As he explained, he had the privilege of observing, aiding and accompanying President Nyerere in his many interventions and initiatives on behalf of Africa and the Third World in general and on behalf of the liberation struggle of South and Southern Africa in particular. In many of these instances, the President came into serious conflict with the British government of the day, for the Commonwealth connection did not turn out to be the cosy network they had perhaps once imagined.

A most difficult chapter opened in 1965 when Ian Smith, head of the white settlers in control of the British colony of Rhodesia, declared himself and the colony “independent” of British rule under UDI (for Universal Declaration of Independence). The matter was discussed at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit that year and President Nyerere and his colleagues demanded in a Resolution that the British government take responsibility for this illegal act of usurpation on the part of Smith, failing which OAU member states would end diplomatic relations with the U.K.

Mwalimu argued that the British should follow the example of General De Gaulle who had had to face a similar challenge from some French settlers of Algeria whose attempt to act unilaterally had been rejected forcefully by the General. The Labour Government of Harold Wilson refused to force Smith to return to legality and in December 1965, Tanzania and Ghana ended all diplomatic contacts with the U.K.

As Chief Anyaoku points out, the matter did not rest there. Mwalimu was consistent in his relentless opposition to racist politics no matter where these were manifest. In this way, he mobilised and inspired many other Commonwealth citizens. One such was the first Secretary General of the Commonwealth, the Canadian Arnold Smith, appointed in 1965. In 1966, at the meeting of the Commonwealth Law Ministers held in London, Arnold Smith solved the dilemma of the break in relations between the U.K. administration and the African states mentioned above in an innovative manner. He invited and encouraged these delegations to come to London because he took the position that the Commonwealth was an international organisation whose activities were not subject to the policies of the host government. He cited the example of the presence of Cuba at the UN in New York. The Law Ministers in question duly attended the meeting at Marlborough House, London.

In September of the same year, these countries also attended the Heads of State and Government Meeting in London where once more, Nyerere led the charge to get the British to act on Ian Smith in Rhodesia. The African group demanded action in the form of sanctions against Rhodesia but the British Prime Minister proposed mere talks with the rebel regime. As a result, the Africans proposed and the Summit adopted the famous resolution on NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority African Rule) which embarrassed the British, if not the Rhodesian rebels, in a significant manner.

By the time of the 1971 Commonwealth Summit held in Singapore, another conflict had arisen between Nyerere and the British government, now led by Prime Minister Edward Heath. The British gave notice of their decision to revive the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa for the sale of British arms to that country. Mwalimu protested that these arms were destined to be used against the black population of South Africa and as such the Agreement was indefensible. The British rejected this argument based on the legalistic position of the duty of states to respect treaty obligations. Matters came to a head at Singapore when Mwalimu, supported by President Kaunda of Zambia and President Obote of Uganda, strongly challenged Prime Minister Heath on the Simonstown Agreement issue. In the end, the British bowed to pressure from Africa and the rest of the Commonwealth but a heavy price was paid at the Summit by Uganda whose President was deposed in a coup d’état while attending the meeting and whose population subsequently suffered for years under the bloody and demented reign of Idi Amin.

These Summits were not always so confrontational, as Chief Anyaoku points out. Mwalimu was not always on the war-path with the opposition in these meetings! His preferred method was a mixture of intellectual argument and gentle humour as was the case at the 1975 Summit in Jamaica. During the discussion on the liberation struggle in Africa, President Kaunda had given an emotional statement praising the solidarity and concrete help given to the liberation movements by China and the USSR. Whereupon Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore chided him for having “let the cat out of the bag” by revealing an open secret. Mwalimu immediately diffused the situation in a memorable and spontaneous aphorism, namely that “when the mice are out, we must let out the cat!”

The years 1974-75 brought momentous changes for the liberation struggle in Africa with the collapse of the Salazar regime in Lisbon, the liberation of Mozambique by FRELIMO and the attempted South African invasion of Angola, an attempt that was thwarted by Cuban military assistance to the besieged MPLA government in Luanda. These events destabilised the Cold War boundary-lines in Africa which the West had taken for granted and which the USA especially could not abandon, caught as the Americans were in an ideological time-warp of their own making, in spite of their defeat in Vietnam in 1975. Henry Kissinger's visit to Dar es Salaam in 1977 to meet Nyerere, Chairman of the Frontline States, was a belated exercise in shuffle diplomacy; times had changed and so had the realities on the ground.

By 1979, the Commonwealth too had changed and into this changed world stepped the next British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher to face a cast of experienced old-timers such as Nyerere, Kaunda, Ian Smith and the Queen, the perennial symbolic Head of the Commonwealth. The organisation's Secretary-General was now the former Attorney General of Guyana, Shridath 'Sonny' Ramphal, and his Deputy was Emeka Anyaoku, the living institutional memory of the organisation.

The liberation struggle in southern Africa had also been transformed by the formation of the Frontline States, FLS (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana and Angola) under the chairmanship of President Nyerere. The next chapter in the FLS strategy centered on the liberation of Rhodesia from the illegal grip of Ian Smith who had never been challenged by the British crown and who had by now made the place into a 'republic.' In 1979, under a so-called “internal settlement”, Smith appointed the first black Prime Minster, Bishop Abel Muzorewa and began to negotiate with the new British government for formal recognition.

At President Kaunda's invitation, the venue of the 1979 Commonwealth Summit was Lusaka and the date was set for August. In May of that year, it became known that Mrs. Thatcher was preparing to recognise the Muzorewa government in spite of the fact that the British had ended formal diplomatic ties with Smith some years previously. In July, the rightwing Prime Minister of New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, came to London to lunch with Mrs. Thatcher, following which he gave a press conference to explain to the media how very concerned he was about the level of safety and security arrangements concerning the Queen during her stay in Lusaka. Within hours, at 6p.m. Buckingham Palace issued a statement to the effect that “it remained the firm intention of Her Majesty to attend the Lusaka Commonwealth Summit”.

As can be imagined, at Lusaka the African Heads of State argued very forcefully against any links with the Muzorewa regime and for direct talks between the British authorities and the leaders of the liberation movements, such as Joshua Nkomo, Josiah Tongogara and Robert Mugabe. Mrs. Thatcher was isolated and outclassed by ALL her Commonwealth colleagues from around the globe, including New Zealand and Australia.

Mrs Thatcher and her Cabinet colleagues were completely out-manoeuvred in their last-minute attempts to reverse the situation at Lusaka where the Summit in its entirety passed a resolution which led to the organisation of the Lancaster House Talks, to the temporary return of Rhodesia to colonial status under the British and to the eventual Agreement to prepare for majority rule and independence for Zimbabwe.

Mwalimu attended his last Commonwealth summit as President of Tanzania in 1985 in the Bahamas and once more had to ensure, together with President Kaunda, that the Organisation's efforts in the direction of South Africa were not diluted by British interests. The Bahamas Summit had decided to send an Eminent Persons Group (the EPG) to South Africa to meet the leadership there to ascertain the seriousness of their declarations regarding political change in that country.

After the Summit ended and before the EPG set out, the British press announced that the EPG would be led by the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe. The reactions from Dar es Salaam and Lusaka were immediate and unequivocal; the two Presidents rejected the very idea of the EPG if led by the British. Chief Emeka Anyaoku flew to meet Mwalimu and subsequently to see President Kaunda to re-assure them that the EPG would be led not by the British but by 2 co-chairmen; General Olesegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Malcolm Fraser of Australia.

Finally, former Secretary-General Anyaoku recounts with pride that it was at the Kuala Lumpur Summit of 1989 that the Commonwealth leaders took the initiative of establishing the South Commission and the South Center and invited Mwalimu Nyerere to be the Chairman.

This was a fitting and lasting tribute to a champion of South-South cooperation and an advocate of the South in global affairs. Throughout his long and creative association with the many international forums he attended, he brilliantly practised what he believed – the common humanity and equality of all. At the Commonwealth, he led by example and so shaped the history of the institution and the very meaning of international solidarity.

Mkuu Companero I totally agree with what you are saying. But probably one point to note is that if you look at the principles of the new foreign policy and those of the old one (Outlined by the Presidential Circular No 2 of 1964) you will realise that they are more or less the same except that the ordering has changed. And issues such as human rights, economic cooperation/economic development have been added to the New FP principles. But it is obvious that the stategies, objectives have changed.

But I doubt whether we lack a good FP or how qualified (I mean in terms commitment and the understanding of the policy itself) Tanzanians are.
Mkuu GT has raised the question as to ''why academics fail to produce skilled professionals and initiate national debate on FP"
-Part of the reason could be ''academics//consultancy syndrome'' in the sense that FP is not the centre of focus.
-Basing on the above, to what extent the government and the academics willing to invest in such important national issue. This also includes the government's support such institutions mandated to train/produce skilled professionals-in terms of both material and human resources.

 

[Companero]

Mkuu Companero I totally agree with what you are saying. But probably one point to note is that if you look at the principles of the new foreign policy and those of the old one (Outlined by the Presidential Circular No 2 of 1964) you will realise that they are more or less the same except that the ordering has changed. And issues such as human rights, economic cooperation/economic development have been added to the New FP principles. But it is obvious that the stategies, objectives have changed.

But I doubt whether we lack a good FP or how qualified (I mean in terms commitment and the understanding of the policy itself) Tanzanians are.
Mkuu GT has raised the question as to ''why academics fail to produce skilled professionals and initiate national debate on FP"
-Part of the reason could be ''academics//consultancy syndrome'' in the sense that FP is not the centre of focus.
-Basing on the above, to what extent the government and the academics willing to invest in such important national issue. This also includes the government's support such institutions mandated to train/produce skilled professionals-in terms of both material and human resources.

Asante Keku. Academics wa nje ya Ivory Towers tunafuatilia. Alipokuja kututumbelea GW Bush niliandika maneno haya gazetini:

Rethinking foreign policy is particularly pertinent in a country that pathetically fall into the pitfalls of being in the losing end in international negotiations. Tanzania cannot afford to gullibly wonder at the mighty nation and its president. While our finest countrywomen and men are lured to embrace the ‘American Dream,’ our country should also shrewdly unravel the rules of the foreign policy game. It must not ignore or take for granted the basics of this game even if they seem to yield unquantifiable results.

The former [US] Secretary of State [Madelein Albright] underscores some of these basics. The art of statecraft, she observes, “requires a clear grasp of what matters most to those we are trying to influence. For businesspeople, this translates into ‘knowing your customer.’ In world affairs, it means learning about foreign countries and cultures.” No wonder they invest heavily in getting to know our best minds while we simply wonder at their generosity!

Indeed the decisive battlefield in foreign policy is the one of ideas. Thus, the question on whether our torch is that of freedom or liberty is a wake up call to rethink subtly synonymous ideas. It is a plea to look inward and see how much we have in store to achieve our version of the historically denied vision of ‘Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.’

 

[Game Theory]

Mkuu Companero I totally agree with what you are saying. But probably one point to note is that if you look at the principles of the new foreign policy and those of the old one (Outlined by the Presidential Circular No 2 of 1964) you will realise that they are more or less the same except that the ordering has changed. And issues such as human rights, economic cooperation/economic development have been added to the New FP principles. But it is obvious that the stategies, objectives have changed.

But I doubt whether we lack a good FP or how qualified (I mean in terms commitment and the understanding of the policy itself) Tanzanians are.
Mkuu GT has raised the question as to ''why academics fail to produce skilled professionals and initiate national debate on FP"
-Part of the reason could be ''academics//consultancy syndrome'' in the sense that FP is not the centre of focus.
-Basing on the above, to what extent the government and the academics willing to invest in such important national issue. This also includes the government's support such institutions mandated to train/produce skilled professionals-in terms of both material and human resources.

well, where are they? dont tell me Chuo cha Diplomasia?

 

[Bluray]

well, where are they? dont tell me Chuo cha Diplomasia?

Hivi Chuo Cha Diplomasia wanafundisha nini pale? kukaanga chipsi?

 

[Game Theory]

Hivi Chuo Cha Diplomasia wanafundisha nini pale? kukaanga chipsi?

Hivi ushaisoma thesis ya Membe aliyoandika John Hopkins?

 

[Game Theory]

In other news...slightly related:

KENYA COMMERCIAL BANK wamefungua BRANCH kule JUBA southern Sudan

then Leo nimekutana na hii:

Kenya to spend Sh224 mil on Sudanese officials
TABJ – Jan. 5 – Kenya will spend Sh224 million this financial year to train south Sudanese public officials, Nairobi's Business Daily is reporting. The investment, intended to strengthen ties between Kenya and Sudan's south, will go ahead regardless of the outcome of a referendum .

The Kenyan government will have spent Sh280 million to train Sudanese civil servants in total, according to the report. Acting foreign affairs minister George Saitoti told Business Daily that Nairobi would also lend southern Sudan "any further assistance it may require."
Nearly 4 million people are registered to vote in the referendum – about half the population of south Sudan.


A separation between the Muslim north and largely Christian south would have serious economic ramifications. Sudan is one of Africa's largest oil exporters, but the vast majority of its crude production is in the semi-autonomous south.

Kenya to spend Sh224 mil on Sudanese officials - The African Business Journal




Call me crazy if you want but I think MoFA pamoja na waziri MEMBE are not fit for purpose if you ask me

This is the man that wants to be the next president of this country and he couldn't find a budget for his Ministry's website.

Its obvious kuwa SS will be the WORLDS NEWEST COUNTRY je tuna mikakati gani ya kuhakikisha wafanya biashara pamoja na taifa kwa ujumla linanufaika na hili taifa jipya la SS?

I cant wait kuwaona MoFA apologists wanakuja kutetea jambo ambalo haliteteeki

 

[Bambo]

sisi marafiki zetu wabakie wale wa kaskazini..hawa wa kusini bado ni undefined matter!!!!

 

[Mimibaba]

Kulikoni unachosema ni kile ulichokifikia wewe labda na serikali yako ya Rais wa NEC. Hakuna Economic Diplomacy as a policy hayo ni maneno ya siasa za wapuuzi wasiokuwa na utashi wa kitaifa.

Economic Policies and Practices can not be created nor invented now and not in acountry like Tanzania and we do not have to. It is a matter of a choice of economic strategies which suite your vision. Sasa vision yenyewe ya kukopi na kupaste. Economic Diplomacy ya kuuza vivutio vya utalii ambavyo havijatayarishwa zaidi vinaharibiwa kwa maamuzi ya kujikomba. mfano barabara kupitia Serengeti wanaojua wameshauri ni urithi wa dunia sisi tunataka kutimiza ahadi ya mfukoni ya Rais.

Mimi nakubaliana kabisa na mwenye kupost thread pia na baadhi ya wachangiaji hatuna sera ya Mambo ya Nje kwa sababu zifuatazo.

1. Ingekuwa ni sera ya taifa inayohimili mabadiliko ya viongozi wa siasa yaani inayokubalika na vyama vote. Mfano sera ya Marekani kuhusu Israel itatekelezwa na Democrats na Republican wakiwa madarakani. Ikibadilishwa inabaki kuwa ya kitaifa.

2. Hakuna uwezo (Capacity) yo yote ya kusustain a national policy acha economic policy. Tunafikiria mwisho wa pua. Tuna mfumo mbovu wa kila kitu elimu, uchumi, siasa etc. Mbaya zaidi WATAWALA wetu hawajui kama hawajui mifumo hii haiwapeleki po pote.

3. Tumejenga tabaka la watendaji lililodumazwa kimawazo (hasa ya kisiasa) tukakasimu utaifa wetu kwao. Mwanasiasa mpumbavu anazungumzia kitu cha kipumbavu mtaalamu unategemea amshauri vizuri ananung'unika tu. matokeo yake ndiyo hayo wanachoweza kumwambia mtaliano ni kuwa kariakoo si salama; hawana hoja kwa hiyo saizi yao ni mzungumzo ya mtaani tu.

4. Fursa za kupata michango hasa ya mawazo mazuri ya watu wenye upeo imeporwa kwa mfumo wa mwenzetu. Lazima upenye kwenye kundi lao ili wakusikilize. Nani anataka kuingia kwenye kundi la wapuuzi.

Mkapa alimuomba rais wa india msaada wa maendeleo jibu tunalijua wote MNAYO DIRA, DHAMIRA kwa maana nyingine mnao utashi? Tukubali ukweli pamoja na wengi wetu kutaka na kuwa na matumaini na uwezo wa kuipeleka nchi yetu kimaendeleo kizingiti kimekuwa uongozi (utawala) kuwa mbovu siku hadi siku. Ni vicious circle. Matumaini yetu ni hili vugu vugu la siasa linaweza kutoa fursa fulani.

 

[Mimibaba]

i am a firm believer of ari mpya na najua safari hii for sure tutajikwamua matatizoni, give us time and support and challenge!

kama ndiyo hivyo ndiyo maana unang'ania sera ambayo haipo

 

[wimbi la mbele]

Just when you need our bina fide International Affairs expat bwana MBOPO...no where to be seen

 

[Game Theory]

hakuna mwenye interest na mambo haya. watu wana focus na namna ya kumaliza mabanda yao

Let it go

 

[niweze]

JK: Record gave us UN job
DEOGRATIAS MUSHI
Daily News; Tuesday,January 09, 2007

PRESIDENT Jakaya Kikwete yesterday decribed the appointment of Dr Asha-Rose Migiro as the Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations as the outcome of Tanzania's reputable foreign policy...

Continue to discuss...

"Good Catch" I am not sure Where Kikwete was Born and Who Thought Him "Migiro Position Reflects Tanzania Foreign Policy?" This Here is Major Blunder and Continue to Show Why This Joker Got to Go. JK Worked as Foreign Ministry for How Many Years and He Still Reflects UN Jobs as Country's Success? Migiro she isn't There for Tanzanians. Migiro was Given This Position Due to Tanzania Weakness in Foreign Policy. If We Understand UN Well, We Will Find Powerful Countries Always Want Weak Countries to be Apart of UN so They Can Push Their Own Agendas. UN isn't Functional Body for Poor Countries or True Democracy. What Happen to Iraq War and Congo, If UN Couldn't Stop These Crimess and Much So They Can't Prosecute No One for Open Lies. JK is Just Empty in His Head...

 

[Tom]

Licha ya 'eat good food and dress brand-name clothes' policy lakini main foreign policy ya serikali ya CCM ipo wazi kabisa ambayo ni: Kuitangaza CCM, kufungua matawi ya CCM na kutafuta wanachama wasomi wa CCM nje za nchi. Naamini wengi hawaipendi hii policy, lakini ndio iliyopo.

Party za serikali ya CCM kwenye balozi zetu nchi za nje zinafana sana na matawi ya CCM yameanzishwa mengi sana.

 

[Masanja]

I just found this thread wakati natafuta literature kuhusu FP ya Tanzania. I really want to write a nice piece of work in an International Journal on the future of our foreign policy and the allignment of our priorities. Jamani kama alivyosema GT watanzania wengi hatupendi kuandika kabisa. People are so much interested in making some $$$ no body is thinking kuandika. Yet without writing..trust me..we go nowhere... Sometimes I wonder hivi watu wakiomba kazi wanaandika nini kwenye CV zao? Honestly, I find it scary kwamba mtu amefanya kazi kwenye foreign ministry kama Tanzania au other departments..lakini the guy hardly has a publication not even in Mzumbe Journal! You might say..wanaandika academicians..lakini katika dunia ya leo you have to keep abreast na events za dunia....kama tungejua think tank ya US FP iko kwa akina NYE huko Harvard na wengineo huko Princeton..ndo tunge-appreciate huu umuhimu. Lakini mi sishangai..hii dhana ya kuteuana kwa kupeana zawadi..ndo inatufikisha hapa

Anyway, I think kulalamika doesnt help us..we should take up this challenge and critique our FP and how we can improve it.

Jamani watanzania tuache mambo ya utani kwa vitu serious. Membe ajiri vijana ambao wata-contribute something kwenye hiyo wizara yetu nyeti. Tatizo watu wanaona hiyo wizara kama point ya kutokea...kila mtu anataka mwanae aje hapo..apelekwe US na kwingineko..lakini ubaya ni kwamba we deal with mediocres ambao hawawezi kushindana na articulate men and women from IVY Leagues na kwingineko.

Its high time we invest in our soft power capabilities.

We really need to challenge our compatriots kuweka maslahi ya taifa mbele....Kenya are doing a great job in this aspect. Uganda alike. Sisi mpaka leo tunakula matunda ya Mwalimu. We need to create FP yenye maslahi kwa taifa letu.

Mtu yeyote ambaye ameandika in this aspect..please kindly share....