Mzee Baruti
Member
- Nov 11, 2025
- 15
- 11
Bado kuna mawazo ya Nyerere na ya Kambona kuhusu Muungano miongoni mwa viongozi wengi na watu wengine pamoja na securocrats.
Nyerere mpaka mwisho wa maisha yake hakutaka kabisa kuvunja Muungano. Kambona, mara tu baada ya muungano kuundwa, alisema Wazanzibari hawataruhusiwa kuvunja muungano. Alisema muungano ni wa kudumu, ni permanent: Wazanzibari wakijaribu kuuvunja, tutaingia Zanzibar, intervene militarily.
He was blunt about it.
Kuna middle course. Form a confederation. Wape Wazanzibari uhuru wao Zanzibar kuwa independent state, wape Watanganyika uhuru wao Tanganyika kuwa independent state katika kila kitu except in very few areas to be under a confederal government. Godfrey Mwakikagile ameandika katika second edition ya kitabu chake “The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Formation of Tanzania and its Challenges” yafwatayo:
Chapter Nine: Security as an issue in the post-cold war era
EVEN if Tanganyika did not have a leader of Nyerere’s calibre and depth of Pan-African commitment, the unstable situation in Zanzibar only a few miles from the mainland – 21 miles at its closest point –would perhaps have encouraged or compelled another leader to seek such a merger just for the security of the mainland without any concern for African unity.
There is still concern for security. Even today, in the minds of many Tanzanian leaders on the mainland, of paramount concern in the establishment of the union was security for the mainland, brotherhood and Pan-African solidarity aside, despite professions to the contrary.
Manyof them, even Nyerere himself, may not have explicitly said so. But there is no question that in addition to Nyerere's quest for Pan-African solidarity in pursuit of regional and continental unity, security of the mainland and the entire region was also a primary concern.
A radical or an unstable state just a few miles offshore which could destabilise the mainland and possibly even spread chaos to other parts of East Africa, but especially to what was then Tanganyika, would not be tolerated by any leader on the mainland.
We can even envision a scenario, however remote and hypothetical yet possible, in which an independent Zanzibar, if it were to regain its independence, announces it has joined a confederation or a federation with the Gulf States which includes a defence agreement similar to NATO's. An attack on one member is an attack on all.
What is the mainland going to do? An independent Zanzibar would have the right to do so, join whatever group or organisation it wants to join, and become an integral part of a union that guarantees it security and abundant economic benefits because of the oil wealth of the Gulf States.
Will Tanzania, or Tanganyika, be ready to go to war against all those states, all at once, as a unified force protecting one of its members, Zanzibar, if its security were threatened by Zanzibar? It can't win the war.
It is highly probable Zanzibar will pivot towards the Middle East if the union breaks up. Zanzibaris will establish strong ties with the oil-rich countries of the Middle East even if it is for economic benefits alone. And they would have the right to do so as a sovereign country. It will be hard for them to resist an offer of tens ofmillions and may be even hundreds of millions of petrodollars to be invested in their country which Zanzibaris have always said will become another Singapore, Africa's Singapore, if it is left alone. Yes, it could become one. It is a strong possibility.
And that will be great for Zanzibar. It will be a highly commendable achievement mainlanders should not be envious of. Let Tanganyikans find their own way, how to prosper, instead of trying to block Zanzibaris from prospering.
Mainland leaders cannot ignore the possibility that Zanzibar could indeed establish strong security ties with the Gulf States, a defence pact that could be invoked by the member states: “An attack on one member state is an attack on us all. A threat to any one of us, any threat or what is perceived by a member state to be a threat to it, is a threat to us all.”
The border of the Gulf States, as allies of Zanzibar, will have effectively moved to the shores of Tanzania mainland, only a few miles from the isles which will no longer be an integral part of the union after it is dissolved.
There is also a strong possibility it is Zanzibaris, not the Gulf States, who are going to suggest forming a federation with them, given the strong historical and cultural ties, including religious, that have existed among them for centuries, especially Zanzibar's with Oman which is considered a Gulf state because it is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Counciland borders the Gulf of Oman. There was even a time when Zanzibar was the capital of Oman after the sultan of Oman moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar.
So, there are very strong ties between Zanzibar and the Middle East and nothing can be ruled out. Anything is possible. A political federation or confederation or some other kind of union or cooperation with the Gulf States is possible even if it is a remote possibility.
But it also may not happen for various reasons. Gulf States, being Arab, may not want to form a federation with Zanzibar, a predominantly black African country. Yet, because of close economic ties between Zanzibar and the Gulf States, it won't make any difference, in terms of cooperation, whether a political federation is formed or not.
Economicties alone will amount to a form of integration with Zanzibar that may even make formation of a political federation unnecessary.
Petrodollars will do the job. Zanzibar will be drawn into the orbit of the Middle East – not necessarily as a satellite – even without seeking federation with the Gulf States. Forging strong economic ties with them will, for all practical purposes, have accomplished exactly the same goal tantamount to establishing a federation.
Such ties will have achieved the same objectives: unity, security, and economic integration with some of the richest countries in the world even if Zanzibar is not fully integrated with them at the political level.
What is the mainland going to do? Seek an alliance of its own with the West, as a counterweight, and become a virtual colony of the West, a prospect Tanganyika resisted so much in the sixties? That is one of the main reasons Tanganyika united with Zanzibar: to keep the West, and the East, out of the region.
The West is already in the Middle East. The United States and Britain have had military bases in the Gulf States and in other parts of the Middle East for years. Inviting them to establish bases in Tanganyika may be one of the solutions to security threats to the mainland. Or will the leaders of Tanganyika try to do everything they can to save the union before it breaks up in order to maintain the status quo the country has had since the union was formed more than 60 years ago?
It is very easy to see why Zanzibar would gravitate towards the Middle East if the union were dissolved. Not only has Zanzibar had strong commercial and cultural ties with the Middle East, especially with Oman, for centuries; it has had strong religious ties with that part of world, ties which transcend commercial and cultural ties.
Zanzibar has had the same ties with the mainland for an even longer period in terms of commercial and cultural bonds as well as historical and family ties; which raises the question, why would Zanzibaris gravitate to the Middle East? Money. That is the answer. The mainland does not have the kind of money Arab countries have to invest in Zanzibar and help transform it into another Singapore.
Also, before the revolution, Zanzibar actively looked to the Arab world for foreign policy alignment and would have continued to do so had the island nation not united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. It could not do that anymore under the union government. But it will be free to do so again if it is no longer in the union.
And if oil and gas are discovered in the archipelago in substantial amounts, Zanzibar will most likely seek investors from the Middle East to participate in commercial ventures that will be beneficial to both, given the enormous amount of investments oil-rich countries can pour into the independent island nation that was once an integral part of the union. The mainland does not have such large investments. Between the two, Zanzibar will choose investors from the Middle East.
They have virtually unlimited amounts of money to invest in Zanzibar. It would therefore make economic sense for Zanzibar to invite Gul States to invest in the country and keep Tanganyika out.
So, why would the mainland risk breaking up the union instead of maintaining the status quo? The answer, of course, is the equally strong opposition to the union that has gained momentum on the mainland through the years, no less than it has in Zanzibar, probably even more so in the isles, raising concerns about extremism in the former island nation, in response to the refusal by the central government to let Zanzibar go, compounded by a belief among the extremists and other Zanzibaris that the leaders of Tanzania, especially on the mainland, don't care about their well-being and don't listen to their demands, including the demand for secession of Zanzibar from the union, which would automatically end the union.
There are very strong voices from many people on the mainland who are strongly opposed to the union, a sentiment shared by their counterparts in the isles.
One of the issues central to the crisis is the dispute over resources, re-ignited in 2026 by a cabinet member in the Zanzibari government who said resources in Zanzibar are for Zanzibaris only. They cannot be shared with the mainlanders even if they live in the isles.
The implication is obvious. Zanzibar is a separate country, not an integral part of the union. That is why another Zanzibari cabinet member threatened to kick out non-Zanzibaris working in the private sector. In other words, 'Mainlanders, or Tanganyikans, go back to your country, the mainland. Zanzibar is not your country.'” –(Godfrey Mwakikagile, “The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Formation of Tanzania and its Challenges,” 2026, pp. 241 -245).
He goes on to state:
“The people have the right to question the legitimacy of the union and its functional utility. That is why through the years, there have been strident demands by many Zanzibaris for Zanzibar's independence which will mean the end of the union. And there are many mainlanders who will celebrate its dissolution and revival of Tanganyika.
When you hear rumblings from both sides – from Zanzibar and from the mainland – about the union and how counterproductive it is, it is time for a national dialogue.
It is only the people who can make the union work. They are the union. Without their involvement, the union is going to falter. It is not going to be maintained on a solid foundation. Many people say there are already cracks in the union and they are going to get worse.
So, what should be done? Ask the people themselves without whom there is no union. Hold a referendum. The union can be saved and strengthened by addressing the fundamental issues raised by the people on what should be done.
Tanzania is at crossroads: Maintain the union or break it up. But there is a middle course between the two extremes.
Short of dissolution, form a confederation in which Zanzibar will regain its sovereignty, as will Tanganyika, except in defence, security, foreign policy, monetary policy, and immigration which is inextricably linked to national security. These should be handled by the confederal government in a confederation.
The rest should be left to the governments of the two member states. Each should have the ultimate power over its own domestic affairs. Each should retain ultimate authority over its own territory and its people. Each should control its own natural resources.
There will be no more complaints by Zanzibaris that the union government has a tight grip on them and they are being suffocated. A confederal government is not going to have such powers. And Zanzibar will be able to join the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) as a sovereign state; so can Tanganyika just as other African countries which are not Muslim-majority have: Mozambique, Uganda, Cameroon,Togo, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau.
The biggest complaint by Zanzibaris through the years has been domination by the mainland. That will no longer be the case in a confederation.
Under a confederal government, Zanzibar will be able to keep its own natural resources including oil and gas. Tanganyika is also going to keep its own natural resources and will not be required to share any of it with Zanzibar. And that includes land. Zanzibaris will not be allowed to own land on the mainland just as mainlanders will not to own land in Zanzibar as is already the case. They are not allowed to own land in Zanzibar. The same restriction should be applied to Zanzibaris living on the mainland under a confederal government.
Those already on the mainland should be allowed to stay or go back toZanzibar. And don't allow any more Zanzibaris to settle on the mainland. The land belongs to mainlanders just as the land in Zanzibar belongs to Zanzibaris. They can be allowed to live on the mainland under special permission as members of the confederation but they are not going to have the same rights and privileges mainlanders have on the mainland just as mainlanders living in Zanzibar don't have the same rights and privileges Zanzibaris have in Zanzibar.
When Zanzibaris regain their independence, they can no longer say Zanzibar is dominated by Tanganyika or has been swallowed up byTanganyika. It is going to be a union of two independent states in a confederation.
With Zanzibar as a member of the confederation whose defence and security is under a confederal government, the mainland will also, as a member of the confederation, be able to maintain its security it has always worried about because of its proximity to Zanzibar. Defence and security for both must be the exclusive responsibility of the confederal government, not of the member states.
The proximity and membership in a confederation will strengthen bonds of unity between the two countries which have always been united by family ties as well as cultural and historical. That is the best way to save the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and will be a step towards continental unity.
It will be a sigh of relief for both.
But there may be irreconcilable differences between the two sides. They must co-exist. They are locked by geography as neighbours. But coexistence is impossible without dynamic compromise. What cannot be compromised is security for both sides.
Maintaining security for the mainland means securing its border on the Indian Ocean if Zanzibar were to regain its independence. I have deliberately not used the phrase “if Zanzibar were to reclaim its independence” – which probably many Zanzibaris would prefer in this context – because “reclaim” implies that the previous state was wrongfully taken and is now being taken back by right.
The term “reclaim” implies a moral or rightful assertion to repossess something that was unjustly lost or stolen. It carries an active, activist and nationalist undertone and is favoured by secessionists and separatists to frame the union as an injustice that must be undone. There is no question that is the term preferred by individuals and groups in the former island nation who contend that Zanzibar’s distinct international identity and total sovereignty were compromised, making the act of separation a correction of history.
That is not the central thesis of my work. Zanzibar was not forced to join the union. Right from the beginning soon after the revolution, Karume, Hanga and Babu went to Dar es Salaam, on their own, to seek some kind of union with the mainland to protect Zanzibar and stabilise the situation in the isles and told Kambona that is what they wanted: some kind of federation with Tanganyika. I have documented that in the book. No-one forced them to go to Tanganyika to seek some kind of merger with the mainland.
I have therefore used the word “regain” – if Zanzibar were to regain its independence – because of its neutrality in objective analysis and legal frameworks when discussing the technical dissolution of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed in 1964. It is neutral, factual and descriptive of a political change or a shift in status when or if Zanzibar becomes independent again after being an integral part of the union with Tanganyika for more than 60 years, a union whose primary objective was security for both countries.
If the union is going to be dissolved, security must again be the primary concern for both.
Maintaining security for the mainland means securing its border on the Indian Ocean. The mainland is not going to have an outpost of potential instability or threats to its security only a few miles offshore without being able to control it as an effective partner in a security arrangement that guarantees intervention and that can be unilaterally enforced by the mainland. Zanzibar must agree to that if it wants the union dissolved on amicable terms. And that means intervention in the isles by the mainland if it feels threatened by forces within and without.
In order for it to regain its independence, Zanzibar cannot and must not be allowed to have a defence pact or security agreement with any country or countries that does not involve the mainland. Zanzibar must agree to this kind of security arrangement.
That is the only way Zanzibar can regain its independence unless mainland leaders say they are no longer worried about the security of the mainland with a neighbour only 21 miles offshore who may enter into security pacts with countries which may pose a threat or threats to the mainland.
Mainland leaders can, of course, invite some powerful countries to establish military bases on the mainland as a counterweight to whatever security threats it may face from Zanzibar or anywhere else. They can tell them to build military bases on Mafia Island or on any of the other offshore islands that are an integral part of the mainland and even on the mainland itself.
I was discussing with one of my nephews what would happen if the union were dissolved and Zanzibar, as an independent state, decided to unite with the Gulf States for security reasons and economic benefits. He responded, without hesitation, “We will invite Israel to build military bases on Mafia Island.”
It will be a major shift in Tanzania's foreign policy which has never included formation of military alliances with countries outside Africa let alone offering territory to outside powers to establish military bases on Tanzanian soil. Mainlanders can justify that as a strategic decision to strengthen defence and enhance its capability to patrol its territorial waters in what is virtually open territory of the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean while Zanzibar may perceive it as a threat to its own security.
So, instead of providing security for both countries, such agreements may achieve exactly the opposite, insecurity, which did not exist before when they were united. And tensions between them will escalate, generated by suspicion of each other in almost all areas.
Many people of the younger generation, on both sides, want to end the union. There are also those who want to maintain the union. There has to be a middle course. And that is forming a confederation.
Otherwise maintain the status quo the United Republic has had since the union was formed in 1964 but with greater autonomy for Zanzibar that will allow it to manage its own affairs in all areas, as will Tanganyika, except defence, security, foreign affairs, immigration and monetary policy.
There is no other way to end the union. The alternative is polarisation between the two sides that seems to have no end.” – (Ibid., pp.384 – 389).
Nyerere mpaka mwisho wa maisha yake hakutaka kabisa kuvunja Muungano. Kambona, mara tu baada ya muungano kuundwa, alisema Wazanzibari hawataruhusiwa kuvunja muungano. Alisema muungano ni wa kudumu, ni permanent: Wazanzibari wakijaribu kuuvunja, tutaingia Zanzibar, intervene militarily.
He was blunt about it.
Kuna middle course. Form a confederation. Wape Wazanzibari uhuru wao Zanzibar kuwa independent state, wape Watanganyika uhuru wao Tanganyika kuwa independent state katika kila kitu except in very few areas to be under a confederal government. Godfrey Mwakikagile ameandika katika second edition ya kitabu chake “The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Formation of Tanzania and its Challenges” yafwatayo:
Chapter Nine: Security as an issue in the post-cold war era
EVEN if Tanganyika did not have a leader of Nyerere’s calibre and depth of Pan-African commitment, the unstable situation in Zanzibar only a few miles from the mainland – 21 miles at its closest point –would perhaps have encouraged or compelled another leader to seek such a merger just for the security of the mainland without any concern for African unity.
There is still concern for security. Even today, in the minds of many Tanzanian leaders on the mainland, of paramount concern in the establishment of the union was security for the mainland, brotherhood and Pan-African solidarity aside, despite professions to the contrary.
Manyof them, even Nyerere himself, may not have explicitly said so. But there is no question that in addition to Nyerere's quest for Pan-African solidarity in pursuit of regional and continental unity, security of the mainland and the entire region was also a primary concern.
A radical or an unstable state just a few miles offshore which could destabilise the mainland and possibly even spread chaos to other parts of East Africa, but especially to what was then Tanganyika, would not be tolerated by any leader on the mainland.
We can even envision a scenario, however remote and hypothetical yet possible, in which an independent Zanzibar, if it were to regain its independence, announces it has joined a confederation or a federation with the Gulf States which includes a defence agreement similar to NATO's. An attack on one member is an attack on all.
What is the mainland going to do? An independent Zanzibar would have the right to do so, join whatever group or organisation it wants to join, and become an integral part of a union that guarantees it security and abundant economic benefits because of the oil wealth of the Gulf States.
Will Tanzania, or Tanganyika, be ready to go to war against all those states, all at once, as a unified force protecting one of its members, Zanzibar, if its security were threatened by Zanzibar? It can't win the war.
It is highly probable Zanzibar will pivot towards the Middle East if the union breaks up. Zanzibaris will establish strong ties with the oil-rich countries of the Middle East even if it is for economic benefits alone. And they would have the right to do so as a sovereign country. It will be hard for them to resist an offer of tens ofmillions and may be even hundreds of millions of petrodollars to be invested in their country which Zanzibaris have always said will become another Singapore, Africa's Singapore, if it is left alone. Yes, it could become one. It is a strong possibility.
And that will be great for Zanzibar. It will be a highly commendable achievement mainlanders should not be envious of. Let Tanganyikans find their own way, how to prosper, instead of trying to block Zanzibaris from prospering.
Mainland leaders cannot ignore the possibility that Zanzibar could indeed establish strong security ties with the Gulf States, a defence pact that could be invoked by the member states: “An attack on one member state is an attack on us all. A threat to any one of us, any threat or what is perceived by a member state to be a threat to it, is a threat to us all.”
The border of the Gulf States, as allies of Zanzibar, will have effectively moved to the shores of Tanzania mainland, only a few miles from the isles which will no longer be an integral part of the union after it is dissolved.
There is also a strong possibility it is Zanzibaris, not the Gulf States, who are going to suggest forming a federation with them, given the strong historical and cultural ties, including religious, that have existed among them for centuries, especially Zanzibar's with Oman which is considered a Gulf state because it is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Counciland borders the Gulf of Oman. There was even a time when Zanzibar was the capital of Oman after the sultan of Oman moved his capital from Muscat to Zanzibar.
So, there are very strong ties between Zanzibar and the Middle East and nothing can be ruled out. Anything is possible. A political federation or confederation or some other kind of union or cooperation with the Gulf States is possible even if it is a remote possibility.
But it also may not happen for various reasons. Gulf States, being Arab, may not want to form a federation with Zanzibar, a predominantly black African country. Yet, because of close economic ties between Zanzibar and the Gulf States, it won't make any difference, in terms of cooperation, whether a political federation is formed or not.
Economicties alone will amount to a form of integration with Zanzibar that may even make formation of a political federation unnecessary.
Petrodollars will do the job. Zanzibar will be drawn into the orbit of the Middle East – not necessarily as a satellite – even without seeking federation with the Gulf States. Forging strong economic ties with them will, for all practical purposes, have accomplished exactly the same goal tantamount to establishing a federation.
Such ties will have achieved the same objectives: unity, security, and economic integration with some of the richest countries in the world even if Zanzibar is not fully integrated with them at the political level.
What is the mainland going to do? Seek an alliance of its own with the West, as a counterweight, and become a virtual colony of the West, a prospect Tanganyika resisted so much in the sixties? That is one of the main reasons Tanganyika united with Zanzibar: to keep the West, and the East, out of the region.
The West is already in the Middle East. The United States and Britain have had military bases in the Gulf States and in other parts of the Middle East for years. Inviting them to establish bases in Tanganyika may be one of the solutions to security threats to the mainland. Or will the leaders of Tanganyika try to do everything they can to save the union before it breaks up in order to maintain the status quo the country has had since the union was formed more than 60 years ago?
It is very easy to see why Zanzibar would gravitate towards the Middle East if the union were dissolved. Not only has Zanzibar had strong commercial and cultural ties with the Middle East, especially with Oman, for centuries; it has had strong religious ties with that part of world, ties which transcend commercial and cultural ties.
Zanzibar has had the same ties with the mainland for an even longer period in terms of commercial and cultural bonds as well as historical and family ties; which raises the question, why would Zanzibaris gravitate to the Middle East? Money. That is the answer. The mainland does not have the kind of money Arab countries have to invest in Zanzibar and help transform it into another Singapore.
Also, before the revolution, Zanzibar actively looked to the Arab world for foreign policy alignment and would have continued to do so had the island nation not united with Tanganyika to form Tanzania. It could not do that anymore under the union government. But it will be free to do so again if it is no longer in the union.
And if oil and gas are discovered in the archipelago in substantial amounts, Zanzibar will most likely seek investors from the Middle East to participate in commercial ventures that will be beneficial to both, given the enormous amount of investments oil-rich countries can pour into the independent island nation that was once an integral part of the union. The mainland does not have such large investments. Between the two, Zanzibar will choose investors from the Middle East.
They have virtually unlimited amounts of money to invest in Zanzibar. It would therefore make economic sense for Zanzibar to invite Gul States to invest in the country and keep Tanganyika out.
So, why would the mainland risk breaking up the union instead of maintaining the status quo? The answer, of course, is the equally strong opposition to the union that has gained momentum on the mainland through the years, no less than it has in Zanzibar, probably even more so in the isles, raising concerns about extremism in the former island nation, in response to the refusal by the central government to let Zanzibar go, compounded by a belief among the extremists and other Zanzibaris that the leaders of Tanzania, especially on the mainland, don't care about their well-being and don't listen to their demands, including the demand for secession of Zanzibar from the union, which would automatically end the union.
There are very strong voices from many people on the mainland who are strongly opposed to the union, a sentiment shared by their counterparts in the isles.
One of the issues central to the crisis is the dispute over resources, re-ignited in 2026 by a cabinet member in the Zanzibari government who said resources in Zanzibar are for Zanzibaris only. They cannot be shared with the mainlanders even if they live in the isles.
The implication is obvious. Zanzibar is a separate country, not an integral part of the union. That is why another Zanzibari cabinet member threatened to kick out non-Zanzibaris working in the private sector. In other words, 'Mainlanders, or Tanganyikans, go back to your country, the mainland. Zanzibar is not your country.'” –(Godfrey Mwakikagile, “The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Formation of Tanzania and its Challenges,” 2026, pp. 241 -245).
He goes on to state:
“The people have the right to question the legitimacy of the union and its functional utility. That is why through the years, there have been strident demands by many Zanzibaris for Zanzibar's independence which will mean the end of the union. And there are many mainlanders who will celebrate its dissolution and revival of Tanganyika.
When you hear rumblings from both sides – from Zanzibar and from the mainland – about the union and how counterproductive it is, it is time for a national dialogue.
It is only the people who can make the union work. They are the union. Without their involvement, the union is going to falter. It is not going to be maintained on a solid foundation. Many people say there are already cracks in the union and they are going to get worse.
So, what should be done? Ask the people themselves without whom there is no union. Hold a referendum. The union can be saved and strengthened by addressing the fundamental issues raised by the people on what should be done.
Tanzania is at crossroads: Maintain the union or break it up. But there is a middle course between the two extremes.
Short of dissolution, form a confederation in which Zanzibar will regain its sovereignty, as will Tanganyika, except in defence, security, foreign policy, monetary policy, and immigration which is inextricably linked to national security. These should be handled by the confederal government in a confederation.
The rest should be left to the governments of the two member states. Each should have the ultimate power over its own domestic affairs. Each should retain ultimate authority over its own territory and its people. Each should control its own natural resources.
There will be no more complaints by Zanzibaris that the union government has a tight grip on them and they are being suffocated. A confederal government is not going to have such powers. And Zanzibar will be able to join the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) as a sovereign state; so can Tanganyika just as other African countries which are not Muslim-majority have: Mozambique, Uganda, Cameroon,Togo, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau.
The biggest complaint by Zanzibaris through the years has been domination by the mainland. That will no longer be the case in a confederation.
Under a confederal government, Zanzibar will be able to keep its own natural resources including oil and gas. Tanganyika is also going to keep its own natural resources and will not be required to share any of it with Zanzibar. And that includes land. Zanzibaris will not be allowed to own land on the mainland just as mainlanders will not to own land in Zanzibar as is already the case. They are not allowed to own land in Zanzibar. The same restriction should be applied to Zanzibaris living on the mainland under a confederal government.
Those already on the mainland should be allowed to stay or go back toZanzibar. And don't allow any more Zanzibaris to settle on the mainland. The land belongs to mainlanders just as the land in Zanzibar belongs to Zanzibaris. They can be allowed to live on the mainland under special permission as members of the confederation but they are not going to have the same rights and privileges mainlanders have on the mainland just as mainlanders living in Zanzibar don't have the same rights and privileges Zanzibaris have in Zanzibar.
When Zanzibaris regain their independence, they can no longer say Zanzibar is dominated by Tanganyika or has been swallowed up byTanganyika. It is going to be a union of two independent states in a confederation.
With Zanzibar as a member of the confederation whose defence and security is under a confederal government, the mainland will also, as a member of the confederation, be able to maintain its security it has always worried about because of its proximity to Zanzibar. Defence and security for both must be the exclusive responsibility of the confederal government, not of the member states.
The proximity and membership in a confederation will strengthen bonds of unity between the two countries which have always been united by family ties as well as cultural and historical. That is the best way to save the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and will be a step towards continental unity.
It will be a sigh of relief for both.
But there may be irreconcilable differences between the two sides. They must co-exist. They are locked by geography as neighbours. But coexistence is impossible without dynamic compromise. What cannot be compromised is security for both sides.
Maintaining security for the mainland means securing its border on the Indian Ocean if Zanzibar were to regain its independence. I have deliberately not used the phrase “if Zanzibar were to reclaim its independence” – which probably many Zanzibaris would prefer in this context – because “reclaim” implies that the previous state was wrongfully taken and is now being taken back by right.
The term “reclaim” implies a moral or rightful assertion to repossess something that was unjustly lost or stolen. It carries an active, activist and nationalist undertone and is favoured by secessionists and separatists to frame the union as an injustice that must be undone. There is no question that is the term preferred by individuals and groups in the former island nation who contend that Zanzibar’s distinct international identity and total sovereignty were compromised, making the act of separation a correction of history.
That is not the central thesis of my work. Zanzibar was not forced to join the union. Right from the beginning soon after the revolution, Karume, Hanga and Babu went to Dar es Salaam, on their own, to seek some kind of union with the mainland to protect Zanzibar and stabilise the situation in the isles and told Kambona that is what they wanted: some kind of federation with Tanganyika. I have documented that in the book. No-one forced them to go to Tanganyika to seek some kind of merger with the mainland.
I have therefore used the word “regain” – if Zanzibar were to regain its independence – because of its neutrality in objective analysis and legal frameworks when discussing the technical dissolution of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar formed in 1964. It is neutral, factual and descriptive of a political change or a shift in status when or if Zanzibar becomes independent again after being an integral part of the union with Tanganyika for more than 60 years, a union whose primary objective was security for both countries.
If the union is going to be dissolved, security must again be the primary concern for both.
Maintaining security for the mainland means securing its border on the Indian Ocean. The mainland is not going to have an outpost of potential instability or threats to its security only a few miles offshore without being able to control it as an effective partner in a security arrangement that guarantees intervention and that can be unilaterally enforced by the mainland. Zanzibar must agree to that if it wants the union dissolved on amicable terms. And that means intervention in the isles by the mainland if it feels threatened by forces within and without.
In order for it to regain its independence, Zanzibar cannot and must not be allowed to have a defence pact or security agreement with any country or countries that does not involve the mainland. Zanzibar must agree to this kind of security arrangement.
That is the only way Zanzibar can regain its independence unless mainland leaders say they are no longer worried about the security of the mainland with a neighbour only 21 miles offshore who may enter into security pacts with countries which may pose a threat or threats to the mainland.
Mainland leaders can, of course, invite some powerful countries to establish military bases on the mainland as a counterweight to whatever security threats it may face from Zanzibar or anywhere else. They can tell them to build military bases on Mafia Island or on any of the other offshore islands that are an integral part of the mainland and even on the mainland itself.
I was discussing with one of my nephews what would happen if the union were dissolved and Zanzibar, as an independent state, decided to unite with the Gulf States for security reasons and economic benefits. He responded, without hesitation, “We will invite Israel to build military bases on Mafia Island.”
It will be a major shift in Tanzania's foreign policy which has never included formation of military alliances with countries outside Africa let alone offering territory to outside powers to establish military bases on Tanzanian soil. Mainlanders can justify that as a strategic decision to strengthen defence and enhance its capability to patrol its territorial waters in what is virtually open territory of the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean while Zanzibar may perceive it as a threat to its own security.
So, instead of providing security for both countries, such agreements may achieve exactly the opposite, insecurity, which did not exist before when they were united. And tensions between them will escalate, generated by suspicion of each other in almost all areas.
Many people of the younger generation, on both sides, want to end the union. There are also those who want to maintain the union. There has to be a middle course. And that is forming a confederation.
Otherwise maintain the status quo the United Republic has had since the union was formed in 1964 but with greater autonomy for Zanzibar that will allow it to manage its own affairs in all areas, as will Tanganyika, except defence, security, foreign affairs, immigration and monetary policy.
There is no other way to end the union. The alternative is polarisation between the two sides that seems to have no end.” – (Ibid., pp.384 – 389).
