Ni kweli kitendo cha kuwatia kizuizini miaka na miaka bila mashitaka mashehe wa Zanzibar wasiotaka Muungano ni kitendo cha kionevu na kifashisti. Wengine tunakubaliana kabisa na Edward Lowassa, tunalaani na kukemea uwepo wa political prisoners ambao walishatoka magerezani toka JKN anatoka madarakani miaka ya 80.
Lakini katika kutetea mashehe hao, Lowassa amevuka mipaka kwa kiasi cha kutisha. Lowassa ameongelea vurugu na taharuki za siasa za kidini zilizokuwepo enzi za Ally Hassan Mwinyi na Benjamin Mkapa, mpaka ikafikia kulazimika kudhibiti hali ile kwa kutumia watu wa usalama na askari wenye mbwa kuingia misikitini kusikiliza mawaidha na kukamata watu. Lowassa anataka misikiti na mashehe radical and firebrand wa enzi zile warudi kwa sababu misikiti siku hizi imekuwa baridi.
Lakini uchochezi wa kijahili na mbaya kuliko wote ambao usingeutegemea kutoka kwa Edward Lowassa ni pale aliposema
WAISLAMU SASA WAANZE KUONGEA LUGHA AMBAYO SERIKALI INAIELEWA.
Lugha ya Waislamu ambayo serikali itailewa ni ipi, kujilipua? Muhimu tukumbuke hapa pakiwaka hapa kwa milipuko ya kidini sio wewe wala mimi wala Lowassa wala Magufuli wala polisi wala majeshi yeyote atakaekuwa na hakika ya kubaki salama.
Walivyo wa jabu na hii wataipeleka mahakamani! Loooooooooooooo salale!
KWA TANZANIA
Tanzania Media Act brings trouble for journalists | DOHA CENTRE FOR MEDIA FREEDOM
KWA INDIA
Sedition ingredients:
It is important to note that under the Indian law of sedition, the events at the public meeting, even if completely true, do not even come close to establishing an offence. In
Kedar Nath Singh’s Case, 5 judges of the Supreme Court – a Constitution bench – made it clear that allegedly seditious speech and expression may be punished only if the speech is an ‘incitement’ to ‘violence’, or ‘public disorder’. Subsequent cases have further clarified the meaning of this phrase. In
Indra Das v. State of Assam and
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, the Supreme Court unambiguously stated that only speech that amounts to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be criminalised. In
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the famous 66A judgment, the Supreme Court drew a clear distinction between “advocacy” and “incitement”, stating that only the latter could be punished.
Therefore, advocating revolution, or advocating even violent overthrow of the State, does not amount to sedition, unless there is incitement to violence, and more importantly, the incitement is to ‘imminent’ violence. For instance, in
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions for ‘sedition’, (124A, IPC) and ‘promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race etc.’, (153A, IPC), and acquitted persons who had shouted – “Khalistan zindabaad, Raj Karega Khalsa,” and, “Hinduan Nun Punjab Chon Kadh Ke Chhadange, Hun Mauka Aya Hai Raj Kayam Karan Da”, late evening on 31 October 1984, i.e. a few hours after Indira Gandhi’s assassination – outside a cinema in a market frequented by Hindus and Sikhs in Chandigarh.
Thus, words and speech can be criminalised and punished only in situations where it is being used to incite mobs or crowds to violent action. Mere words and phrases by themselves, no matter how distasteful, do not amount to a criminal offence unless this condition is met.