Stuxnet
JF-Expert Member
- Feb 12, 2011
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Kwa wote wanaochangia mjadala huu kama vile straatkasyambe, Judith, mwanakatwe ambao nawalinganisha na mwanafunzi development studies anayejibu swali ili kupata maksi za mtihani bila kujali anachoamini naomba musome hapa chink muons jinsi muungano huu ulivyoshinikizwa na nchi za magharibi;
When, therefore on 26th April, 1964, the Peoples Republic of Zanzibar and the Republic of Tanganyika announced that they had merged to form a Union, the international community felt that Zanzibar and Tanganyika had succeeded where the four East African countries together had failed. But was it the ideals of Pan-Africanism that brought Zanzibar and Tanganyika together? Was the Union the result of an African initiative or was it propelled by cold war rivalry? The circumstances in which the Union was formed raised a lot of questions, many of which are still unanswered, and some have been at the centre of continuing debates and controversies in Tanzania in the last twenty years. Were the fears of ZNP that Zanzibar would be taken over by Tanganyika had been proven true? In later years, the Union was to haunt the Zanzibar politicians for a long time, with each of them playing the Union card either for legitimacy on the Mainland or for support at home.
Nyerere stated that he casually proposed the idea of the Union to Karume when the latter visited him to discuss the fate of John Okello. According to Nyerere, Karume immediately agreed to the idea and suggested that Nyerere should be the President of such a Union. In a New Year message to the Nation on 2 January 1965, Nyerere implied that even if the ASP had come into power through constitutional means and not as a result of a revolution, the Union would still have taken place. But Amrit Wilsons research has revealed that there was a very strong Western pressure, especially from the United States, for the Zanzibar Revolution to be contained because it was felt that it held the threat of the spread of communism in the East African region. The Untied States, Britain and the then West Germany, which Tanganyika was heavily dependent on at the time, viewed the revolutionary government in Zanzibar as either a surrogate of the communist powers or dancing to their tune. The international press had already started to characterize Zanzibar as the Cuba of Africa, though to be fair to Duggan, he had referred to Zanzibar as Tanganyikas Cuba far back in July 1963 when he had interviewed Nyerere in Washington during the latters state visit to the US.
In a cable message to US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed his diplomats to urge Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote to explain to Karume the dangers involved in his dependence on Babu and:
The danger Babu represents to the security of Zanzibar and East Africa generally they should recognize here that the big problem is that Karume himself has great confidence in and dependence on Babu also that Nyerere has said that Karume needs Babu who, despite his background, can and must be worked with. Kenyatta and Joseph Murumbi on the other hand appear to regard Babu as undesirable and the chief threat to Karume. Would it be useful to raise with Nyerere, despite his previous objection, the idea of a Zanzibar-Tanganyika Federation as a possible way of strengthening Karume and reducing Babus influence? Such action at this time may also help Nyereres own position.
In an interview with Amrit Wilson in 1986, Frank Carlucci, the US Consul in Zanzibar at the time of the Union who was later thrown out of Zanzibar because of CIA activities (and who later rose to become the Director of CIA and US Secretary of State for Defence), confessed that there was United States pressure on Nyerere.
Susan Crouch in her book Western Responses to Tanzanian Socialism 1967-1983 reveals that:
To this end the American Central Intelligence Agency was active in trying to create the conditions for union, fanning antagonisms among Zanzibars revolutionary leaders, and creating a fear of Zanzibar as a communist threat among East African leaders.
Was the Union then, as is indicated in U.S. State Department papers, dictated by cold war considerations first and the questions of pan-African ideals of unity were secondary to ideological factors and questions of personal survival?
It has also been suggested that Karume wanted a Union with Tanganyika as a means of warding off his Marxist and Left wing colleagues. What seems to be the case is that after the electoral defeat of July 1963 Karumes leadership within the ASP parliamentary group was shaky. There was a schism in it, with Karume being challenged by Othman Shariff, and some of the partys MPs calling for a government of national unity that would bring together in government all the political parties in parliament. After the revolution, Umma Party radical elements in the government (Babu, Khamis Abdalla Ameir, Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfoudh, Salim Rashid, Badawi Qullatein, etc) were forging links with the ASP leftists (Abdallah Kassim Hanga. Abdulazizi Ali Twala, Hassan Nassor Moyo, etc.), and this might have scared Karume and other moderate elements within the regime. At the same time, the radical way in which the revolution was surging ahead might have alarmed the regime in Dar es Salaam. It should not be forgotten that within days of the revolution in Zanzibar, an army mutiny took place in Tanganyika (later repeated in Kenya and Uganda); and even though we know now that there was no link between the revolution and those mutinies, it was difficult to see it that way at the time.
When, therefore on 26th April, 1964, the Peoples Republic of Zanzibar and the Republic of Tanganyika announced that they had merged to form a Union, the international community felt that Zanzibar and Tanganyika had succeeded where the four East African countries together had failed. But was it the ideals of Pan-Africanism that brought Zanzibar and Tanganyika together? Was the Union the result of an African initiative or was it propelled by cold war rivalry? The circumstances in which the Union was formed raised a lot of questions, many of which are still unanswered, and some have been at the centre of continuing debates and controversies in Tanzania in the last twenty years. Were the fears of ZNP that Zanzibar would be taken over by Tanganyika had been proven true? In later years, the Union was to haunt the Zanzibar politicians for a long time, with each of them playing the Union card either for legitimacy on the Mainland or for support at home.
Nyerere stated that he casually proposed the idea of the Union to Karume when the latter visited him to discuss the fate of John Okello. According to Nyerere, Karume immediately agreed to the idea and suggested that Nyerere should be the President of such a Union. In a New Year message to the Nation on 2 January 1965, Nyerere implied that even if the ASP had come into power through constitutional means and not as a result of a revolution, the Union would still have taken place. But Amrit Wilsons research has revealed that there was a very strong Western pressure, especially from the United States, for the Zanzibar Revolution to be contained because it was felt that it held the threat of the spread of communism in the East African region. The Untied States, Britain and the then West Germany, which Tanganyika was heavily dependent on at the time, viewed the revolutionary government in Zanzibar as either a surrogate of the communist powers or dancing to their tune. The international press had already started to characterize Zanzibar as the Cuba of Africa, though to be fair to Duggan, he had referred to Zanzibar as Tanganyikas Cuba far back in July 1963 when he had interviewed Nyerere in Washington during the latters state visit to the US.
In a cable message to US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Kampala, the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed his diplomats to urge Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote to explain to Karume the dangers involved in his dependence on Babu and:
The danger Babu represents to the security of Zanzibar and East Africa generally they should recognize here that the big problem is that Karume himself has great confidence in and dependence on Babu also that Nyerere has said that Karume needs Babu who, despite his background, can and must be worked with. Kenyatta and Joseph Murumbi on the other hand appear to regard Babu as undesirable and the chief threat to Karume. Would it be useful to raise with Nyerere, despite his previous objection, the idea of a Zanzibar-Tanganyika Federation as a possible way of strengthening Karume and reducing Babus influence? Such action at this time may also help Nyereres own position.
In an interview with Amrit Wilson in 1986, Frank Carlucci, the US Consul in Zanzibar at the time of the Union who was later thrown out of Zanzibar because of CIA activities (and who later rose to become the Director of CIA and US Secretary of State for Defence), confessed that there was United States pressure on Nyerere.
Susan Crouch in her book Western Responses to Tanzanian Socialism 1967-1983 reveals that:
To this end the American Central Intelligence Agency was active in trying to create the conditions for union, fanning antagonisms among Zanzibars revolutionary leaders, and creating a fear of Zanzibar as a communist threat among East African leaders.
Was the Union then, as is indicated in U.S. State Department papers, dictated by cold war considerations first and the questions of pan-African ideals of unity were secondary to ideological factors and questions of personal survival?
It has also been suggested that Karume wanted a Union with Tanganyika as a means of warding off his Marxist and Left wing colleagues. What seems to be the case is that after the electoral defeat of July 1963 Karumes leadership within the ASP parliamentary group was shaky. There was a schism in it, with Karume being challenged by Othman Shariff, and some of the partys MPs calling for a government of national unity that would bring together in government all the political parties in parliament. After the revolution, Umma Party radical elements in the government (Babu, Khamis Abdalla Ameir, Ali Sultan Issa, Ali Mahfoudh, Salim Rashid, Badawi Qullatein, etc) were forging links with the ASP leftists (Abdallah Kassim Hanga. Abdulazizi Ali Twala, Hassan Nassor Moyo, etc.), and this might have scared Karume and other moderate elements within the regime. At the same time, the radical way in which the revolution was surging ahead might have alarmed the regime in Dar es Salaam. It should not be forgotten that within days of the revolution in Zanzibar, an army mutiny took place in Tanganyika (later repeated in Kenya and Uganda); and even though we know now that there was no link between the revolution and those mutinies, it was difficult to see it that way at the time.
