c&p
SEDITION
What do you understand by sedition? Critically comment on the way the courts have interpreted the Section 124(A) of the penal code. (India)
Sedition is about when a person's speech,behaviour, language, written words attracts the group of people or a mob acts rebellion against authority of state or create incitement to public disorder or violence.
In india,sedition is 124A of Indian penal code & when person charged under this IPC. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for life.
Court have interpreted 124A of Indian penal code in many cases relate to 124A section:
Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar 1962: constitutional bench of supreme court made clear that allegedly seditious speech & expression may be punished only if speech is an incitement to violence or public disorder.
Subsequent cases have further clarified the meaning of this phrase.
In Indra Das vs State of Assam & Arup Bhuyan vs State of Assam, Supreme Court stated that only speech that amounts to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be criminalised.
Therefore, advocating revolution or advocating even violent overthrow of State, does not amount to sedition, unless there is incitement to violence & more importantly, incitement is to imminent violence.
One of most important judgements in this regard is Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, Supreme Court overturned the convictions for sedition(124A IPC) and Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc (153 A IPC).
• In this case, accused raised slogans such Khalistan Zindabad, Raj Karega Khalsa (Khalsa will rule) & Hinduan Nun Punjab Chon Kadh Ke Chhadange, Hun Mauka Aya Hai Raj Kayam Karan Da (Hindus will leave Punjab, we will rule) i.e. a few hours after Indira Gandhi’s assassination.
Despite the slogans clearly undermining Indian sovereignty and government, SC acquitted or free from charge or verdict of not guilty the accused because the slogans did not imminently incite violence. Thus, even advocating secession of country or violent overthrow of government, does not attract sedition unless there is imminent incitement to violence.
But in many charges court interpretation is maybe misused by the state for ex arrest of arundhati and recent kanhaiya kumar
Thus, Above cases can be seen in favour of freedom of speech & expression enshrine in fundamental rights of article 19, Supreme Court has tried to indicate that words & speech can be criminalised & punished only in situations where it is being used to incite mobs or crowds to violent action.
Sedition implies such actions or expressions that tend to disrupt the legal operation of government. It is beyond the expression of opinion or dissatisfaction with government policy and its intent is to overthrow the government.
The hon'ble SC of India has adopted a liberal view of the sedition law enshrined under IPC section 124A. The SC in different rulings like Kedarnath case, Indira Das case, Arup Bhuyan case and Shreya Singhal case held that 'incitement' of violence is the real basis for application of sedition law. The SC ruling was liberal and rational than what was perceived by the Privy Council in 1947 that took a very skewed view just with the intention to put restraint on freedom of people.
In the Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India, the court unambiguously held that critcising and drawing general opinions against government policies and decisions within a reasonable limit that doesn't incite people to rebel is consistent with freedom of speech and expression.
More importantly, in the Balwant Singh vs State of Punjab, where the sedition charges were removed even when there were allegation of yelling 'Khalistan Zindabad' is a testimony to the fact that 'incitement' rather than 'advocacy' is the important element of section 124A.
Though SC had repeatedly given explanation of sedition law through these rulings, the SC has not struck down the section 124A. This behavior on part of SC may be attributed to the fact that the 'intent of law' is more important. The intent of the law is to handle genuine cases that incite violence. But the government has more often applied the view of Privy Council than SC rulings in applying sedition charges.
I think it is high time that SC should come forward to strike down the law with a view to mould the language of section 124A in a way so that the misuse can be curbed and only genuine cases are handled.
Brilliant answer, but your conclusion is very reactive. Don't end your answer by taking extreme views. You can end by saying that the definition of sedition needs to changed, and made more lucid. Also, training the police so that they do not violate freedom of speech of people must be done.
The Meaning of "Incitement to Violence"
by Ari Armstrong, February 11, 2006
In a February 8 article, I noted that, in response to the Danish cartoons about Mohammed, an Iranian paper solicited cartoons about the Holocaust. I wrote,
[N]ot all offenses are created equal -- sometimes an offensive cartoon or statement is warranted by the facts, and sometimes it is not.
Obviously the Holocaust did happen, it was a horrible atrocity, and it was mass murder perpetrated by fascists against innocent victims. So publishing a cartoon or statement in order to suggest the Holocaust didn't happen, or that it was a good thing, would be morally wrong (though within one's political rights, excepting incitement to violence). Similarly, publishing a drawing or statement in order to promote racism would be morally wrong, though free speech protects expressions of racism. (Of course, in order to criticize a racist or otherwise immoral message, it might be necessary to reproduce it...)
A reader asked me about the meaning of the phrase, "incitement to violence," and about whether the Danish cartoons might be considered to have incited Muslims to violence. The Danish cartoons most certainly do not constitute "incitement to violence." However, some Muslim statements urging violence and murder do incite other Muslims to violence.
In two e-mails reproduced (and edited) below, I offered a more complete explanation of the phrase, "incitement to violence."
* The right of free expression properly covers any and all beliefs and expressions, as consistent with the property rights of others. Following are some implications of this.
* The political right of free speech protects the right to express ideas immorally (with exceptions outlined below). For instance, racism is immoral, and advocacy of racism is immoral (because racism is irrational and unfair). However, people have a political right to express racist beliefs.
* The term "right" has two distinct meanings. In the political context, a "right" is a protection of action within some sphere (properly defined by property rights). In the moral context, an action is "right" if it meets the requirements of the proper ethical system. So, yes, one has the political right to do many things that are, in fact, immoral (or wrong), including but not limited to the following: consuming dangerous levels of alcohol, practicing unprotected sex, advocating racism, advocating socialism, eating an unhealthy diet, and joining a cult.
* One does not have a political right to express beliefs in a way that violates the rights of others. For example, the reason that there is no right to yell fire in a crowded theater (when there is no fire) is that doing so would violate the property rights of the theater owner (and, by extension, of the patrons who paid money to see a movie). There is no right to reproduce copyrighted material without permission. There is no right to slander others (though in this case as in some others the proper remedy is a civil case, not prior restraint). There is no right to break into a private establishment for purposes of delivering a speech. And there is no right to incite others to particular acts of violence. Some cases can be ambiguous. A clear example of something that should be protected is general advocacy of racism (even though such advocacy is immoral). A clear example of something that should NOT be protected is the distribution of literature that calls for the murder of particular individuals (which would be incitement to violence).
It is crucial to understand the meaning of "incitement to violence." Properly, that concept refers to somebody actively urging violence against particular individuals. For example, it should be against the law for Joe to distribute pamphlets that state, "Murder my neighbor Jim because..." It should also be against the law for Joe to advertise for the services of a hitman.
The question is, does the speech in question purposely and clearly attempt to get others to commit an act of violence against innocent parties? (As I acknowledged, some cases can be ambiguous, but most are clear-cut.)
The Danish cartoons do not incite anyone to violence in the relevant sense. The cartoons don't encourage anyone to commit violence against any Muslim or any other party. Instead, (some of) the cartoons criticize Islam for its tendencies to violence and oppression of women. (As I argued, such criticisms are totally warranted by the facts.) In response, many Muslims have committed acts of violence and threatened violence.
To say that the cartoons incited Muslims to violence would be to blame the cartoonists for the irrational and immoral behavior of the Muslims. Such an approach would blame the victims of crimes for the crimes. Consider also the following examples:
* If somebody wrote an article claiming that Marxism is false, and then a Marxist murdered the author, to claim that the article incited the Marxist to violence would be to claim that the author is to blame for his or her own murder and that the Marxist is excused.
* If somebody said, "Jesus is not the son of God," and then a Christian beat the person to a bloody pulp, the misapplication of the notion of "incitement to violence" would blame the "blasphemer" and excuse the Christian.
* If a person wrote, "Black people should be treated equally under the law," and then the person was attacked by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, to accuse the speaker of "incitement to violence" would be to empower the violent racism of the Ku Klux Klan.
"Incitement to violence" can legitimately apply only to actual encouragement of violence against specific innocent parties by a speaker or writer. It cannot apply to a statement or image that prompts irrational reactions by others who hear or see it. If the author of some message can be blamed for the irrational reaction to the message by some other party, then there is no such thing as free speech, for the subjective whims of anyone can trump free speech on any occasion.
Several of the Danish cartoons are critiques of irrational violence. The fact that some Muslims reacted with violence only proves that the cartoonists are correct in their critiques.
I also wrote in the earlier article, "...Muslims believe that any image of Mohammed should not be published. That's an inherently irrational view, and thus of no moral standing."
In his February 11 column for the Rocky Mountain News, Dave Kopel adds important context: "Contrary to repeated claims by the Associated Press, it is not a fact that Islamic law forbids artistic depictions of Muhammad. The prohibition against depiction of any prophet (not just Muhammad) is not explicitly Quranic, but is a mere interpretation favored by some clerics; the interpretation is hardly unanimous, as shown by the long Islamic tradition of drawing pictures of Muhammad."
“incitement(n): an act of urging on or spurring on or rousing to action or instigating…”
The obvious question would be; is how incitement is legally defined? Starting off with the common law definition of incitement, which is derived from R v Eade, Smart AJ said the following in regards to the offence:
the context in which the words were used, and the circumstances.” “In Young v Cassells… Stout CJ, in an oft quoted passage said: “The word ‘incite’ means to rouse; to stimulate; to urge or spur on; to stir up; to animate.” In R v Massie… Brooking J A, with whom Winneke P and Batt JA agreed said of “incite”, common forms of behaviour covered by the word are ‘command’, ‘request’, ‘propose’, ‘advise’, ‘encourage’ or ‘authorise’”. Whether in a particular case what was said amounts to incitement depends upon
Essentially, the common law definition of incitement aligns quite neatly with the general dictionary definition, however, we should probably add that incitement can also include a person who incites “… another to do an act by threatening or by pressure, as well as by persuasion…” as stated by Lord Denning in Race Relations Board v Applin.
However, it should be emphasised that under the common law – incitement is not in itself a crime, unless what was incited was a criminal offence.
“(1) Subject to this Act, where a person in Victoria or elsewhere incites any other person to pursue a course of conduct which will involve the commission of an offence by-
(a) the person incited;
(b) the inciter; or
(c) both the inciter and the person incited-
if the inciting is acted on in accordance with the inciter's intention, the inciter is guilty of the indictable offence of incitement.
(2) For a person to be guilty under subsection (1) of incitement the person-
(a) must intend that the offence the subject of the incitement be committed; and
(b) must intend or believe that any fact or circumstance the existence of which is an element of the offence in question will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the offence is to take place.
(3) A person may be guilty under subsection (1) of incitement notwithstanding the existence of facts of which the person is unaware which make commission of the offence in question by the course of conduct incited impossible.”
“The learned trial judge ruled that it was not necessary, as an element of the offence, to prove that the person incited acted upon the incitement, although it was necessary to prove that the course of conduct urged would, if it had been acted upon as the inciter intended it to be, amount to the commission of the offence.”
Generally speaking, there is no requirement that a person incited to commit an act, but rather, the inciting behaviour must be within the knowledge of the other person.
“The mere fact that A “incites to” or “urges” the commission of an offence or offences against a Commonwealth law is enough to constitute A an offender. He may “incite” or “urge” a particular person or generally, but, the “incitement” or the “urging” once proved, the offence is complete. Withdrawal does not obliterate it, though no doubt it may affect the measure of punishment. But to be itself an offence the “incitement” or the “urging” must be to the commission of some ‘offence’.”
This piece is only a general outline of the offence of incitement. Anyone who is experiencing an issue with a criminal matter should seek the help of a lawyer who will be able to assist.
SEDITION
What do you understand by sedition? Critically comment on the way the courts have interpreted the Section 124(A) of the penal code. (India)
Sedition is about when a person's speech,behaviour, language, written words attracts the group of people or a mob acts rebellion against authority of state or create incitement to public disorder or violence.
In india,sedition is 124A of Indian penal code & when person charged under this IPC. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for life.
Court have interpreted 124A of Indian penal code in many cases relate to 124A section:
Kedar Nath Singh Vs State of Bihar 1962: constitutional bench of supreme court made clear that allegedly seditious speech & expression may be punished only if speech is an incitement to violence or public disorder.
Subsequent cases have further clarified the meaning of this phrase.
In Indra Das vs State of Assam & Arup Bhuyan vs State of Assam, Supreme Court stated that only speech that amounts to “incitement to imminent lawless action” can be criminalised.
Therefore, advocating revolution or advocating even violent overthrow of State, does not amount to sedition, unless there is incitement to violence & more importantly, incitement is to imminent violence.
One of most important judgements in this regard is Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, Supreme Court overturned the convictions for sedition(124A IPC) and Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc (153 A IPC).
• In this case, accused raised slogans such Khalistan Zindabad, Raj Karega Khalsa (Khalsa will rule) & Hinduan Nun Punjab Chon Kadh Ke Chhadange, Hun Mauka Aya Hai Raj Kayam Karan Da (Hindus will leave Punjab, we will rule) i.e. a few hours after Indira Gandhi’s assassination.
Despite the slogans clearly undermining Indian sovereignty and government, SC acquitted or free from charge or verdict of not guilty the accused because the slogans did not imminently incite violence. Thus, even advocating secession of country or violent overthrow of government, does not attract sedition unless there is imminent incitement to violence.
But in many charges court interpretation is maybe misused by the state for ex arrest of arundhati and recent kanhaiya kumar
Thus, Above cases can be seen in favour of freedom of speech & expression enshrine in fundamental rights of article 19, Supreme Court has tried to indicate that words & speech can be criminalised & punished only in situations where it is being used to incite mobs or crowds to violent action.
Sedition implies such actions or expressions that tend to disrupt the legal operation of government. It is beyond the expression of opinion or dissatisfaction with government policy and its intent is to overthrow the government.
The hon'ble SC of India has adopted a liberal view of the sedition law enshrined under IPC section 124A. The SC in different rulings like Kedarnath case, Indira Das case, Arup Bhuyan case and Shreya Singhal case held that 'incitement' of violence is the real basis for application of sedition law. The SC ruling was liberal and rational than what was perceived by the Privy Council in 1947 that took a very skewed view just with the intention to put restraint on freedom of people.
In the Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India, the court unambiguously held that critcising and drawing general opinions against government policies and decisions within a reasonable limit that doesn't incite people to rebel is consistent with freedom of speech and expression.
More importantly, in the Balwant Singh vs State of Punjab, where the sedition charges were removed even when there were allegation of yelling 'Khalistan Zindabad' is a testimony to the fact that 'incitement' rather than 'advocacy' is the important element of section 124A.
Though SC had repeatedly given explanation of sedition law through these rulings, the SC has not struck down the section 124A. This behavior on part of SC may be attributed to the fact that the 'intent of law' is more important. The intent of the law is to handle genuine cases that incite violence. But the government has more often applied the view of Privy Council than SC rulings in applying sedition charges.
I think it is high time that SC should come forward to strike down the law with a view to mould the language of section 124A in a way so that the misuse can be curbed and only genuine cases are handled.
Brilliant answer, but your conclusion is very reactive. Don't end your answer by taking extreme views. You can end by saying that the definition of sedition needs to changed, and made more lucid. Also, training the police so that they do not violate freedom of speech of people must be done.
The Meaning of "Incitement to Violence"
by Ari Armstrong, February 11, 2006
In a February 8 article, I noted that, in response to the Danish cartoons about Mohammed, an Iranian paper solicited cartoons about the Holocaust. I wrote,
[N]ot all offenses are created equal -- sometimes an offensive cartoon or statement is warranted by the facts, and sometimes it is not.
Obviously the Holocaust did happen, it was a horrible atrocity, and it was mass murder perpetrated by fascists against innocent victims. So publishing a cartoon or statement in order to suggest the Holocaust didn't happen, or that it was a good thing, would be morally wrong (though within one's political rights, excepting incitement to violence). Similarly, publishing a drawing or statement in order to promote racism would be morally wrong, though free speech protects expressions of racism. (Of course, in order to criticize a racist or otherwise immoral message, it might be necessary to reproduce it...)
A reader asked me about the meaning of the phrase, "incitement to violence," and about whether the Danish cartoons might be considered to have incited Muslims to violence. The Danish cartoons most certainly do not constitute "incitement to violence." However, some Muslim statements urging violence and murder do incite other Muslims to violence.
In two e-mails reproduced (and edited) below, I offered a more complete explanation of the phrase, "incitement to violence."
* * *
* The right of free expression properly covers any and all beliefs and expressions, as consistent with the property rights of others. Following are some implications of this.
* The political right of free speech protects the right to express ideas immorally (with exceptions outlined below). For instance, racism is immoral, and advocacy of racism is immoral (because racism is irrational and unfair). However, people have a political right to express racist beliefs.
* The term "right" has two distinct meanings. In the political context, a "right" is a protection of action within some sphere (properly defined by property rights). In the moral context, an action is "right" if it meets the requirements of the proper ethical system. So, yes, one has the political right to do many things that are, in fact, immoral (or wrong), including but not limited to the following: consuming dangerous levels of alcohol, practicing unprotected sex, advocating racism, advocating socialism, eating an unhealthy diet, and joining a cult.
* One does not have a political right to express beliefs in a way that violates the rights of others. For example, the reason that there is no right to yell fire in a crowded theater (when there is no fire) is that doing so would violate the property rights of the theater owner (and, by extension, of the patrons who paid money to see a movie). There is no right to reproduce copyrighted material without permission. There is no right to slander others (though in this case as in some others the proper remedy is a civil case, not prior restraint). There is no right to break into a private establishment for purposes of delivering a speech. And there is no right to incite others to particular acts of violence. Some cases can be ambiguous. A clear example of something that should be protected is general advocacy of racism (even though such advocacy is immoral). A clear example of something that should NOT be protected is the distribution of literature that calls for the murder of particular individuals (which would be incitement to violence).
* * *
It is crucial to understand the meaning of "incitement to violence." Properly, that concept refers to somebody actively urging violence against particular individuals. For example, it should be against the law for Joe to distribute pamphlets that state, "Murder my neighbor Jim because..." It should also be against the law for Joe to advertise for the services of a hitman.
The question is, does the speech in question purposely and clearly attempt to get others to commit an act of violence against innocent parties? (As I acknowledged, some cases can be ambiguous, but most are clear-cut.)
The Danish cartoons do not incite anyone to violence in the relevant sense. The cartoons don't encourage anyone to commit violence against any Muslim or any other party. Instead, (some of) the cartoons criticize Islam for its tendencies to violence and oppression of women. (As I argued, such criticisms are totally warranted by the facts.) In response, many Muslims have committed acts of violence and threatened violence.
To say that the cartoons incited Muslims to violence would be to blame the cartoonists for the irrational and immoral behavior of the Muslims. Such an approach would blame the victims of crimes for the crimes. Consider also the following examples:
* If somebody wrote an article claiming that Marxism is false, and then a Marxist murdered the author, to claim that the article incited the Marxist to violence would be to claim that the author is to blame for his or her own murder and that the Marxist is excused.
* If somebody said, "Jesus is not the son of God," and then a Christian beat the person to a bloody pulp, the misapplication of the notion of "incitement to violence" would blame the "blasphemer" and excuse the Christian.
* If a person wrote, "Black people should be treated equally under the law," and then the person was attacked by a member of the Ku Klux Klan, to accuse the speaker of "incitement to violence" would be to empower the violent racism of the Ku Klux Klan.
"Incitement to violence" can legitimately apply only to actual encouragement of violence against specific innocent parties by a speaker or writer. It cannot apply to a statement or image that prompts irrational reactions by others who hear or see it. If the author of some message can be blamed for the irrational reaction to the message by some other party, then there is no such thing as free speech, for the subjective whims of anyone can trump free speech on any occasion.
Several of the Danish cartoons are critiques of irrational violence. The fact that some Muslims reacted with violence only proves that the cartoonists are correct in their critiques.
* * *
I also wrote in the earlier article, "...Muslims believe that any image of Mohammed should not be published. That's an inherently irrational view, and thus of no moral standing."
In his February 11 column for the Rocky Mountain News, Dave Kopel adds important context: "Contrary to repeated claims by the Associated Press, it is not a fact that Islamic law forbids artistic depictions of Muhammad. The prohibition against depiction of any prophet (not just Muhammad) is not explicitly Quranic, but is a mere interpretation favored by some clerics; the interpretation is hardly unanimous, as shown by the long Islamic tradition of drawing pictures of Muhammad."
What is incitement? And how is it a criminal offence?
by The FindLaw Team
Throughout our daily interactions most of us probably don’t dwell too much on the words we use during our normal course of dealings, because why would we? However, law is dependent on accuracy – even in regards to legal terms which may not on the surface seem to have a definitive legal meaning, such as incitement. Because the law for the most part deals in absolutes, offences such as ‘incitement’ require an outline in respect to what elements are necessary to constitute an offence, which is addressed both within the common law and in statute.What is incitement?
Typing the term, ‘incitement’ into Google, came up with the following web definition from Princeton University:“incitement(n): an act of urging on or spurring on or rousing to action or instigating…”
The obvious question would be; is how incitement is legally defined? Starting off with the common law definition of incitement, which is derived from R v Eade, Smart AJ said the following in regards to the offence:
the context in which the words were used, and the circumstances.” “In Young v Cassells… Stout CJ, in an oft quoted passage said: “The word ‘incite’ means to rouse; to stimulate; to urge or spur on; to stir up; to animate.” In R v Massie… Brooking J A, with whom Winneke P and Batt JA agreed said of “incite”, common forms of behaviour covered by the word are ‘command’, ‘request’, ‘propose’, ‘advise’, ‘encourage’ or ‘authorise’”. Whether in a particular case what was said amounts to incitement depends upon
Essentially, the common law definition of incitement aligns quite neatly with the general dictionary definition, however, we should probably add that incitement can also include a person who incites “… another to do an act by threatening or by pressure, as well as by persuasion…” as stated by Lord Denning in Race Relations Board v Applin.
However, it should be emphasised that under the common law – incitement is not in itself a crime, unless what was incited was a criminal offence.
Incitement and legislation
Incitement is also defined in legislation in many states, and using s 321G of Victoria’s Crimes Act as our statutory example, incitement is:“(1) Subject to this Act, where a person in Victoria or elsewhere incites any other person to pursue a course of conduct which will involve the commission of an offence by-
(a) the person incited;
(b) the inciter; or
(c) both the inciter and the person incited-
if the inciting is acted on in accordance with the inciter's intention, the inciter is guilty of the indictable offence of incitement.
(2) For a person to be guilty under subsection (1) of incitement the person-
(a) must intend that the offence the subject of the incitement be committed; and
(b) must intend or believe that any fact or circumstance the existence of which is an element of the offence in question will exist at the time when the conduct constituting the offence is to take place.
(3) A person may be guilty under subsection (1) of incitement notwithstanding the existence of facts of which the person is unaware which make commission of the offence in question by the course of conduct incited impossible.”
A person does not have to act on the incitement
One of the interesting aspects of incitement, is that the substantive offence does not require a person to act upon the incitement, but rather, an attempt to incite is sufficient, as was noted in the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Dimozantis, with the Court approving the ruling of the trial judge:“The learned trial judge ruled that it was not necessary, as an element of the offence, to prove that the person incited acted upon the incitement, although it was necessary to prove that the course of conduct urged would, if it had been acted upon as the inciter intended it to be, amount to the commission of the offence.”
Generally speaking, there is no requirement that a person incited to commit an act, but rather, the inciting behaviour must be within the knowledge of the other person.
How is the offence proven?
In order for incitement to be proven, the onus is on the prosecution to show that there was incitement to commit an offence as stated by Isaacs J in Walsh v Sainsbury:“The mere fact that A “incites to” or “urges” the commission of an offence or offences against a Commonwealth law is enough to constitute A an offender. He may “incite” or “urge” a particular person or generally, but, the “incitement” or the “urging” once proved, the offence is complete. Withdrawal does not obliterate it, though no doubt it may affect the measure of punishment. But to be itself an offence the “incitement” or the “urging” must be to the commission of some ‘offence’.”
This piece is only a general outline of the offence of incitement. Anyone who is experiencing an issue with a criminal matter should seek the help of a lawyer who will be able to assist.
