On 22 April, the articles for the Tanganyika-
Zanzibar union were signed by Nyerere and
Karume. Like the relationship between
Northern Ireland and Britain the union gave
Zanzibar
limited regional administrative autonomy
but ensured that overall power â foreign
affairs,
defense, trade union matters, and control of
foreign exchange was held by the centre at
Dar es
Salaam. However as Carlucci reported,
Karume was âstill under the impression
that he was
agreeing to the federation of two
autonomous states.â
The Policies of âAfrican Socialismâ
The months and years which followed the
union were a time of chaos and violence in
Zanzibar. The CIA continued to keep a close
eye on the region. In May 1965 they noted
that
in Zanzibar, the union was still far from
popular⦠âKarume gave little thought
to the
consequences of such a union and of
ratification of the [union] agreement even
though only
one third of the islandâs Revolutionary
Council voted in favor and despite strong
opposition
from radical labor and youth elementsâ
(8).
In fact the union brought untold suffering
to the people of Zanzibar and continues to
do so. It
was carried out in secret, as it were, without
popular consultation. As Babu was to write:
âThe aims of the revolutionary
government of Zanzibar and those of the
Tanganyikan
African National Union (TANU) government
on the mainland were not identical. The
aims of
the former were necessitated by the
revolution itself which led inevitably to a
decisive break
with colonialism and imperialismâ¦The
TANU government was still encumbered by
the
trappings of an Uhuru government, carefully
groomed by the colonialists and the World
Bank. It was set firmly on the road to
neocolonialism and made no attempt to
assert its
independence. In other words trying to
unite the two countries was like trying to
mix oil and
water.
13
The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.1,
no.9, August 2007
7
The human and social cost of uniting these
two disparate entities [Zanzibar and
Tanganyika]
â¦was enormous. In Zanzibar the post-
union government of Karume freed from the
discipline
imposed by the revolution, embarked on an
adventurist policy of leveling down to the
lowest
social denominator. The aims of the
revolution had been subverted, vulgarized
and reduced to
the pettiness and nastiness of racial hatred
and prejudice. Several leading members of
the
revolution were silenced either through
physical liquidation or exile, while their
executioners,
even to this day, are being protected and
even honoured by the unionâ(9).
After the union, Babu was transferred to the
mainland and offered a series of fairly
insignificant posts in the Tanzanian cabinet.
He told me âI was not in charge; there
were three
Ministers of State. All three of us were under
the President. There was nothing we could
doâ¦There was a French Director of
Planningâ¦I was Minister of Economic
Planning but I
could not plan policies or implement themâ
(10).
However, in this period, as Minister of
Economic Planning, Babu wrote a series of
articles in
the countryâs main daily paper, âThe
Nationalistâ. Titled âThe Meaning of Self
Relianceâ, and
written not under his name but simply as
Pressmanâs Commentary, these seminal
essays,
traced most of Africaâs problems to the
economic and political structures inherited
from
colonialism. He argued that colonial
structures had been put in place for the
benefit of
metropolitan capital and were held in place
by repressive laws and policies, now, they
must
now be rejected.
He laid out clearly and in painstaking detail
the policies which would meet the needs of
Tanzaniaâs own people. He believed that
for a country which had been a colony,
reconstructing its economy and becoming
self-reliant âeconomic nationalism â
was the
central strategy of a socialist struggle. (While
this was true in the colonial and immediately
post-colonial eras it is, of course, even more
the case in the contemporary phase of the
globalization of capital). Babu, as we have
seen, was never to implement his plans for
economic transformation of Tanzania, but
his approach brought him into sharp
contradiction
with Nyerereâs policies of so-called
African Socialism.
Nyerere, by this time, had consolidated
power in his own hands. By 1967, he and
his ruling
party were supreme. The constitution had
been changed and all mass organizations
brought
under the party â the trade union
movement, the cooperative movement,
womenâs and youth
organizations and even religious
organizations.
The centralization of power meant also that
there was no arena for debate or criticism
and
that those who tried to criticize were
branded subversives or enemies of the
state.
At the same time, focusing on welfarism,
Nyerere neglected the crucial task of
restructuring
the colonial economy and Tanzania began to
face serious economic problems.
In search of a populist strategy Nyerere
started a programme of indiscriminate
nationalization
â often targeting small businesses. Babu
opposed this. He predicted (correctly) that it
would
damage the economy, raise the cost of
distribution and dislocate the business
system. In his
view socialist priorities should rather entail
the development of productive forces by
integrating private and government
resources.