Madagascar imemfuta uraia aliyekuwa rais wa nchi hiyo kabla ya kupinduliwa na jeshi. Waziri mkuu, Herintsalama Rajaonarivelo ndiye ametia sahini maamuzi haya ya kihistoria.
Habari hii ni kwa mujibu wa BBC
View attachment 3493509
Andry Rajoelina, who was removed from power in a coup last week, had already acquired French nationality.
www.bbc.com
TOKA MAKTABA:
RFI limeeleza kuwa Rais Rajoelina alisafirishwa nje ya nchi Jumapili kwa kutumia ndege ya kijeshi ya Ufaransa
Kwa hivyo mkuu wa nchi za SADC rais Rajoelina amekimbia urais wa Madagascar pia nafasi yake kama mwenyekiti wa nchi za SADC hivyo
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Mauritius, Eswatini, Lesotho, Angola, Mozambique kiongozi wao wa SADC ameondolewa na GenZ.
Je mataifa ya SADC yatatoa tamko gani kuhusu mwenyekiti wa SADC kungolewa kutoka madaraka yake ya urais wa Madagascar
Mambo ni mengi :
TOKA MAKTABA
Rais wa Madagascar, Andry Rajoelina, kuwa mwenyekiti wa SADC wakati ni raia wa Ufaransa, imeruhusiwa kivipi na marais wa nchi za SADC wakati ni kitu siyo sahihi, soma makala hii ikichambua ukosefu wa umakini wa marais wa nchi za SADC :
Opinionista
We have a European citizen as head of SADC – and no one seems to care
By
Nadia Gava
25 September 2025
On 17 August 2025, the 45th SADC Heads of State Summit and Government took place in Antananarivo, Madagascar. The summit elected Andry Rajoelina, President of Madagascar, as Chairperson of SADC. He’ll hold this rotating position for the next year, after which South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa will take over.
Photo : Andry Rajoelina, President of Madagascar, and Chairperson of SADC.
Rajoelina’s appointment is significant because of one shocking fact all SADC heads of state seem to conveniently forget: he is a French citizen. To be clear, he doesn’t hold dual citizenship of France and Madagascar; he is solely a French citizen. To be even clearer, we currently have a European citizen at the helm of SADC. And no one seems to care.
According to Article 42 of the Malagasy Nationality Code, a Malagasy citizen who voluntarily acquires a foreign nationality loses their Malagasy citizenship.
In 2023, shortly before the Malagasy national elections, a media frenzy broke out when it was revealed that Rajoelina had obtained French citizenship as far back as 2014, a fact he wilfully concealed. Madagascar was a French colony from 1896 to 1960.
His decision to keep this information secret was obviously driven by his desire to run in the election, something he should not have been allowed to do, seeing as Article 46 of the Malagasy Constitution states that all candidates for the presidential election must be Malagasy nationals.
Conflict of interest
It is further worth noting that France, with full knowledge of Rajoelina’s citizenship, sent observers to the 2023 elections. The organisation,
Internationale de la Francophonie, mounted an electoral assessment mission for the 2023 presidential election and issued a public report in June 2025 illustrating ongoing French-speaking institutional oversight and support to electoral processes.
The conflict of interest here seems obvious: a former colonial power observing the election of its former colony in which the prime candidate is one of its own citizens.
Rajoelina is no stranger to controversy. In 2009, he took power through a military-supported coup d’état, ousting the then President Marc Ravalomanana. The coup threw the country into a political crisis and ultimately led to the signing of the historic SADC-mediated “
Roadmap for Ending the Crisis in Madagascar” in September 2011.
In essence, the roadmap is an agreement initiated by SADC laying the road to peace in Madagascar and addressing the question of elections. It provided recommendations to support progress towards long-term peace and stability.
Rajoelina and Ravalomanana were, as part of the agreement, prevented from contesting the 2013 elections. At the time, the African Union stated in a press conference that “perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government cannot participate in the elections organised to restore democratic order. The (Peace and Security) Council stressed that the AU (would) not recognise the Malagasy authorities which would be elected in violation of the relevant AU and SADC decisions.”
The 2013 elections went ahead relatively smoothly, but Rajoelina and Ravalomanana returned to face off in the 2018 elections, which Rajoelina won despite widespread allegations of fraud and election rigging.
Breach of AU charter
His unconstitutional ousting of Ravalomanana put him in breach of the
African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which, if applied by the AU and/or SADC, would have prevented his assuming the presidency.
Despite the AU’s strong views on the legitimacy of Rajoelina’s presidency following the coup, and in the run-up to the 2013 elections, there is no reporting indicating that they took issue with his re-appointment in the most recent two elections.
Their initial condemnation of a president who took power through an “unconstitutional change of government” is irreconcilable with their seemingly silent acquiescence to his re-appointment and continued stay in office.
Nor is there any indication that they take issue with the revelation that he is legally no longer a Malagasy citizen and, therefore, in terms of the country’s own constitution, ineligible for the position of president.
A similar silence echoes within SADC: all recent reports indicate that SADC acknowledges Rajoelina’s presidency and has, if not expressly, then at least tacitly, ratified his election through its actions, most notably the decision to not only proceed with the SADC Summit of Heads of State in Madagascar, but also elect Rajoelina as chairperson of SADC.
On a continent that still faces the legacies of colonialism, it is mindboggling that our institutions and leaders are accepting what is, in effect, a pseudo-colonial leader as chairperson of one of our most significant political organs.
Why does it matter?
First and foremost, from a legal and policy perspective, Rajoelina is an unconstitutional president. This cannot be disputed, even if Madagascar’s own High Constitutional Court declared that it is “not competent to say and judge whether Rajoelina Andry Nirina has lost Madagascar nationality”.
The court’s refusal to deal with at least two cases concerning Rajoelina’s citizenship (and, in effect, fraud) only shows that the judiciary has been captured.
Second, if the continent’s strongest institutions cannot enforce their own regulations, what legitimacy does the organisation and its leadership hold?
In an instance such as Rajoelina’s illegal coup, the AU is empowered to condemn and impose certain sanctions, such as the temporary suspension of the country from participating in the policy organs of the AU.
Importantly, the AU stipulates that persons taking part in unconstitutional changes of government cannot participate in subsequent elections to restore constitutional order. Rajoelina acceded to the pressure and stood back from the 2013 election (which was an election to restore constitutional order), but the fact that he was allowed to run for a second and third term (despite restrictions in Madagascar’s constitution limiting presidential terms to two) begs the question: who will hold our leaders accountable?
There are reports that Rajoelina is seeking to amend the Malagasy constitution to allow him to run for another term. If he could succeed in his bid for the presidency of Madagascar as a French citizen, who is to stop him from amending the constitution? This compromises the legitimacy and stability of democracy on the entire continent.
French influence in Africa
Third, there is the problem of President Emmanuel Macron and French influence in Africa.
One example of how French influence is already (or still) negatively impacting Madagascar can be seen in Rajoelina’s handling of the so-called Scattered Islands. These five islands are nature preserves covering a total land area of 43km2, and each comes with an exclusive economic zone, giving the governing country rights to resources in more than 640,000km2 of nearby waters and possible gas reserves.
The islands are scattered through the Mozambique Channel, which is a major transit route for international trade. It is rich in gas and oil and is an important trade route.
However, for Malagasy citizens, the islands hold not only environmental and heritage importance, but also serve as a symbol of France’s continued hold over the country, and calls for total sovereignty have increased. Recently, President Macron and Rajoelina met in Paris to discuss the future of these islands, governed by France, but claimed by Madagascar since the island nation’s independence from France in the 1970s.
While the outcome of these talks has not yet been publicised, it serves as evidence of the strong hold France has over Madagascar and may call into question Rajoelina’s interests as a French citizen.
There has also been ample reporting on President Macron’s April 2025 visit to Madagascar (the first French diplomatic visit to Madagascar in more than 20 years) during which several agreements and memoranda of understanding were signed regarding French investment in and support for Malagasy energy infrastructure, agriculture and education.
The reporting does not, however, indicate what France gets in return for its support. Perhaps continued control over a few islands?
In Madagascar, there’s a saying, “
tenim-bazaha tsy miverina indroa”, which roughly translates to “a white man never gives his word twice”. The saying indicates a refusal to repeat oneself, but it carries a deep-seated scepticism toward foreign (colonial) powers and the promises they make.
As a French citizen at the head of an African state and one of the continent’s most influential regulatory bodies, it is crucial to ask: whose interests does Rajoelina protect?
DM
Daily Maverick did offer the AU an opportunity to respond. They did not do so despite being given a week, we will add their comment should they opt to do so.
N.B
Nadia Gava is an admitted attorney and Senior Associate at Concentric Alliance, a conflict and dispute resolution practice. She completed her post-graduate LLB studies at the Institute for International Human Rights at Abö Akademi in Finland, and recently graduated from Harvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation.
DM
