Hivi kwanini Algeria imevunja DRS?

[MALCOM LUMUMBA]

Raisi wa Algeria ameivunja idara yao ya Usalama wa taifa.
Inasemekana ni moja kati ya Idara zilizokuwa na nguvu sana hapa Barani Africa.
Hii ilianza baada ya kumtoa mkuu wa Idara hiyo ambaye alikuwa ofisini kwa zaidi ya miaka 25.

Hebu wataalamu naomba mtujulishe. Idara kama hii ikivunjwa hakuna hatari yoyote kwa nchi?

 

[Snipper]

Duh....ngoja wajuvi wa haya Mambo waje kutusaidia

 

[Jimena]

Following

 

[Bavaria]

The Ugly Truth about Algeria

State terrorism. Human-rights abuses. Mass repression. How much do we really understand about what happened when Algeria plunged into civil war?

John R. Schindler
July 10, 2012

Despite not really being in the news, Algeria still appears in the Western media intermittently. As the Maghreb’s last dictatorship, the recent wave of regime change and democratization has passed this important country by, at least so far. Algeria is the key state in Northwest Africa—by virtue of its size, position, natural wealth and regional influence—yet has missed out on the trend that has overtaken so much of the Arab world for the past two years. It remains notable that Algeria’s bloody civil war, which began twenty years ago, never really ended. And now with the help of Al Qaeda, the conflict may be spreading across the Sahel region.

Events in Algeria have long been underreported in the U.S. and Western media (with the exception of France), and there is a general lack of understanding of what ails the country. Certainly the terrible fratricide there in the 1990s got little coverage in Western media, despite the fact that it probably claimed twice as many lives as the Bosnian conflict, which ran concurrently and received nonstop Western attention.

Algeria’s nightmare years of 1993–1997 were a focus of the international human-rights community, which correctly pointed out that the conduct of the government was hardly better than that of Islamist terrorists trying to take over the country. But since 9/11, the Algerian narrative has been subsumed into the West’s counterterrorism effort, to the extent it is reported at all. Enormous poverty, inequality, and the regime’s rapacious and brutal conduct get little attention from Western experts, who seem more interested in speculating about potential Al Qaeda attacks in the Maghreb.

The Real Story


The official story is straightforward. Two decades ago, the military-led junta, which had governed the country since independence from France in 1962, cancelled a democratic election that likely would have brought Islamists to power, and mujahidin took up arms against the secular regime. By 1993, the supremely violent Armed Islamic Group (GIA) emerged as the implacable foe of the regime and the local Al Qaeda affiliate. Although GIA was not the only Islamist resistance group in the country, it was unquestionably the bloodiest. It conducted brutal attacks not just in Algeria but in Europe as well, including a wave of bombings in Paris in the summer of 1995, remembered by terrorism gurus as Al Qaeda’s first attacks on the West. Failing to achieve victory, GIA fell into mass murder, slaughtering Algerian civilians by the hundreds, causing Al Qaeda to break ties with the group in early 1997. Largely killed off by the Algerian security forces, by 1998 the remnants of GIA had coalesced into the GSPC, a far smaller group which posed no serious threat to the regime and spent most of its time on kidnappings and robberies.

In 2006, after almost a decade hiatus, Al Qaeda reinitiated Algerian mujahidin into its ranks, renaming the local franchise Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). While AQIM has been more active in terrorism than the GSPC, it also seems more like an armed gang than a bona fide jihadist group. Over the last few years, AQIM’s reach has extended across the Maghreb and into the Sahel, leading some jihad-watchers to posit that it constitutes a threat to the region, a view shared by many in the U.S. government.

While this account is not entirely inaccurate, it leaves out so many important details as to be essentially false. Above all, it omits the role of the Algerian regime in counterterrorism, which has been effective at defeating the jihad even though its methods would make most Westerners shudder. The lead agency in the fight against the Algerian mujahidin has been the country’s military intelligence service, the feared DRS. With a reputation for ruthlessness and efficiency second to none in the Arab world, the DRS is arguably the world’s most effective intelligence service when it comes to fighting Al Qaeda; it is also probably the most cold-blooded. The DRS can be considered the backbone of the military-led junta. General Mohamed Mediene has headed the DRS since 1990, making him the longest-serving intelligence boss in world history—and few doubt that he is the most powerful man in the country.

Trained by the KGB and schooled in the hard fight for independence, Algerian spies have used tactics against homegrown extremists reminiscent of a sinister B-grade movie. Several high-ranking DRS officers have explained what they did to defeat the mujahidin, including violating human rights on an industrial scale, but hardly anyone outside France seems to have noticed.
Simply put, GIA was the creation of the DRS; using proven Soviet methods of penetration and provocation, the agency assembled it to discredit the extremists. Much of GIA’s leadership consisted of DRS agents, who drove the group into the dead end of mass murder, a ruthless tactic that thoroughly discredited GIA Islamists among nearly all Algerians. Most of its major operations were the handiwork of the DRS, including the 1995 wave of bombings in France. Some of the most notorious massacres of civilians were perpetrated by military special units masquerading as mujahidin, or by GIA squads under DRS control. Having driven GIA into the ground by the late 1990s, DRS has continued to infiltrate and influence Islamist groups in the country. To what extent the local Al Qaeda affiliate is secretly controlled by the military—as GIA and GSPC were—is an open question, but its recent record suggests that DRS influence over any Algerian extremist group is considerable.

U.S. Intel Failure?

These realities, understood by Algerians, are little known in the West, particularly in the United States. While French senior officials have hinted they have been wise to DRS games for many years, a similar understanding seems altogether lacking in the Pentagon or the U.S. intelligence community, which have partnered with Algeria in the fight against Al Qaeda since the 1990s. Whether they really are ignorant or simply do not want to know the sordid details is an open and important question.

To be fair to those inside the Beltway, outside “terrorism experts” are just as credulous about Algeria’s “official story,” and an entire subindustry has arisen in recent years that seeks to explain Algeria and its violent homegrown jihad without any reference to basic realities inside the country.
Yet Algeria’s neighbors, who fear the country’s outsized influence in Northwest Africa, are appropriately skeptical of the Algiers-created narrative that portrays AQIM as a major threat to regional stability. They reject the idea that extremists can be combated only by greater Algerian involvement in regional affairs that is implicitly supported by the United States. African officials are known to drop unsubtle hints that AQIM is not quite what it seems to be and ought to be viewed within the broader context of Algerian foreign policy. In one of the rare cases where such doubts were aired openly, Mali’s head of state security, who is charged with keeping Algerian mujahidin out of his country, told the press in June 2009 that “at the heart of AQIM is the DRS.” Shortly thereafter, he was shot dead at home by “unknown gunmen.”

U.S. interest in the Sahel has only grown in recent years, roughly in tandem with the alleged rise of AQIM in the region. It is no coincidence that the U.S. Army is aligning a combat brigade with U.S. Africa Command—which heretofore has had no combat units permanently assigned to it—and the Pentagon’s interest in the region is rising fast. “Terrorist elements around the world go to the areas they think has the least resistance,” explained army chief of staff General Ray Odierno, “and right now, you could argue that’s Africa.”

While Al Qaeda unquestionably has a great deal of interest in the Maghreb, and would surely like to see the Algerian junta fall and be replaced by a Salafi regime bent on rebuilding the imaginary caliphate, the chances of this outcome are virtually nil. DRS methods, plus the usual extremist tone-deafness, have successfully soured the vast majority of Algerians on the jihadist message. While most Algerians want an end to what they simply call le pouvoir (“the power”), the corrupt military elite that has run the country since France left in 1962, few pine for any sort of Islamist dictatorship.

Unsolved Mystery

Last weekend, Algeria celebrated fifty years of independence. But for most Algerians, buffeted by poverty, instability, corruption and war, there is little to celebrate. Mid-May parliamentary elections resulted in a surprising win for the junta, leading to accusations of fraud as well as despair for those hoping for change via the ballot box. It is clear that the military has no intention to bowing to any sort of peaceful regime change, but infighting among the elite may undo the system. When the junta falls, as someday it surely will, the change will rock those who have waged Algeria’s dirty war against terrorism. The effects on the junta’s foreign supporters, who have turned a blind eye to massive human-rights abuses in the name of counterterrorism, will be serious too.

It is time for the U.S. government to follow the lead of human-rights groups: Washington should start asking important questions about what Algiers has really been up to since 1992, and to what extent the junta and the DRS have been engaged in mass repression and state terrorism under the guise of fighting Al Qaeda—all possibly with U.S. assistance. The saga of Algeria over the last twenty years constitutes “one big murder mystery,” said one of the few writers in the Anglosphere to take notice. It’s time to get to the bottom of it.

John R. Schindler is professor of national-security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College as well as chair of the Partnership for Peace’s Combating Terrorism Working Group. He is a former counterintelligence officer with the National Security Agency. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

The Ugly Truth about Algeria

 

[Bavaria]

Weeks after Algeria's head of military intelligence, General Mohamed Mediene, was retired from service, President Bouteflika has broken his silence and explained the latest movings and shakings in the army's forces.

This series of reshuffles and reorganisations inside the military intelligence service, known as the DRS, "concern an architecture existing for 25 years", the president said.

The moves aim to strengthen the capacity and effectiveness of the country's intelligence service, he argued.

According to a government source, who requested anonymity as he was not authorised to speak on the matetr officially, there is more to this than meets the eye.

"There is another side of this story, which they'll never talk about," he said. "Especially the fact that there is a power struggle between the well-known presidential clan and the intelligence services personnel."

For decades, according to our source, a delicate balance of power was found between the president's inner circle and the intelligence service under General Toufik. But the balance has now slipped.

Algeria's new power structure remains a controversial topic

Loose change

To date, Algeria's new power structure remains a controversial topic. As the country is building up a new Constitution, Algeria's ailing president argued on Thursday that "these changes aim to adapt the intelligence services to the national political changes" also already underway.

A series of security and political reforms have been undertaken since 2011, following the lifting of the state of emergency as part of the constitutional revision plan.

For the first time ever, the country's ruler has paid tribute to the DRS, pointing out that it "contributed selflessly to safeguard the state, assuming the tasks of major national interest", and adding that it "conceals human resources who have proven competence".

In power since 1999, Bouteflika has never praised the intelligence service during his three terms of office.

Cleaning job

Ali Zaoui, a former security officer, is now an expert on security related issues.

"This accelerated process of removing highly ranked personnel in the military aims at withdrawing completely this institution from political life," he told al-Araby.

The remake of this image is intended to silence the rumours which claim Bouteflika has no real power over his generals - a theory believed by the majority of Algerians, as well as many outside the country.

According to Zaoui, the image of a country being ruled in shadow by ghosts and corrupt highly ranked army members has to change. Misreading the country's real political situation is likely to bring much more harm.

Many Algerians have no understanding of how the country's political system works.

Nadjib R owns a honey shop he has run for the past 15 years.

"To be honest, I'm 40 now," he said. "I grew up and studied in Algiers, but I never managed to understand the way my country's politics progresses."

Nadjib, who has a degree in political studies, points out his inability to understand how politics is handled in Algeria.

"In fact, it's impossible to predict - as it always misleads everyone, even the most experienced ones in politics," he adds.

"And from what little I do know, Bouteflika's message explaining his decisions has come too late. He should have done it the same day he sent General Toufik to retirement.

"This could have avoided - having all these rumours about General Toufik being fired."

Mohamed Mediene, also known as General Toufik, was sent into retirement in mid-September, after 25 years as the head of the country's intelligence service.

The new chief, 66-year-old General Athmane Tartag, known here as General Bachir, has served as the president's counter-terrorism and security adviser since March 2014.

General Gaid Salah, the army chief of staff, is also expected to be the next leading military official to retire - reportedly by November this year.

Many here think the "pouvoir" - or "deep state" powerful elites - believe the ailing President Bouteflika will be unable to carry on his fourth term, possibly retiring himself as early as 2016.

Non-abiding governors

Meziane Abane is a 32-year-old journalist working for El Watan newspaper, one of the country's best-selling French language outlets.

"These changes were made by the General [Toufik] by himself as a preparation before his departure," he said.

The high-level machinations of the state may have little day-to-day effect on much of the population and their way of life

"And that succeeded, in reality. His departure caused worries and major concerns. Observers I spoke with believe that the intelligence service has been weakened since the restructuring process has kicked off, worsening since the departure of Toufik.”

The high-level machinations of the state may have little day-to-day effect on much of the population and their way of life. The gulf between the population and the power structure governing them opened up a long time ago.

The population's concerns are today much more focused on the impact of the Finance Law 2016, which was adopted on October 5.

The act was approved after oil prices fell 50 percent.

"The country is in a delicate situation and could be facing a serious crisis in the near future," the president told ministers.

The serious disruptions rocking the global hydrocarbon market are likely to affect Algeria.

Algeria is no longer the military state it was when Bouteflika first took office, 15 years ago. But a productive economy and a democratic state is what is both wanted and needed, Abane insists.

"There are many things lacking in terms of real health systems, as well as the country's education system," Abane said.

"Corruption has plagued all of the state's institutions and corrupt officials within the government managed to avoid being charged by the justice department.

"That is why the country requires a real free judicial system, despite all measures implemented so far, since 2011 with the lifting of the state of emergency."

Algeria's latest change is a two-sided story

 

[Kituko]

Huwezi kuvunja Usalama wa Taifa, ni aian fulani ya kubadirisha baadhi ya vitu na mara nyingi huwa ni ushauri wa viongozi wApya wanaoingia kuchukuwa nafasi ya viongozi wa zamani ambao wamekaa kwa miaka mingi kwenye mFumo, so kweli kuna baadhi ya vitu na wAtu wataondoka lakini namba kubwa ya wAtu itabakia ileile