Why Magufuli administration misses the point on Government splurge

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I believe
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We have already projected the "economy stupid" not the power of the electorate is CCM final nail in her coffin. As more companies go under, unemployment will spike and crime rates will up its antennas..tougher times lie ahead and the police state is powerless to plug the economic slide that the word of God may be fulfilled which says righteousness exalts a nation but electoral injustices bleeds it to economic ruin..and nobody can deliver you out of My hand says the Lord Christ Jesus
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Kenya~ relations very cordial than ours or are we the ones making life difficult to our own people?

Most of our students studying in USA are in FK1 visa but gets two year visa instead of four years as per the duration of their training.. in past we used to give visa as per training duration but someone in the immigration was very greedy so he came up with an idea let us limit Americans visa to not more than two years...so we can collect more cash during renewals oblivious he had condemned own poor students in USA to travel, boarding, visa renewal costs etc just to fly home to renew their visa.. what this "gentleman" had forgotten was to factor in the US will return the favour shooting ourselves in the knee...we have more students in the US than they have studying here...so our own people suffer more and the renewal visa money go more to the US from our poor students than the cash we squeeze from them...it is a counterproductive policy to the policy of encouraging our people to seek foreign employment that in return they may help to rebuild our shattered economy...TZ abroad have been sending billions of shillings and have become an important source of foreign money infusions...if handled right Tanzanian in diaspora may become the top foreign currency earner knocking tourism industry at its perch....the question is why are we killing the goose that is beginning to lay us rare golden eggs?

Kenya visa solely depends on duration of training so kenyan students in the USA unlike bongoland don't incur air travel, hotel and visa renewal costs....Now Kenyan diaspora are leading in foreign exchange remitter and with Covid-19 redefining the tourism sector...diaspora cash will in the near future surpass Safaricom in tax generation to the Exchequer...

Looks Kenya cares more than greedy Tanzanian bureaucrats...why subject your own poor students to cough few dollars they have just to renew passports while they may have got visa as per duration of their training?

Because Kenyans are smarter than Bongoland then their students on average tend to have a four years uninterrupted duration living in the US while a TZ students have to go back to renew passports ...the implications are once securing working permits in the USA up to three years Kenyan students are in pole position to get permanent residence or Citizenship solely based on five or more years living uninterrupted in the USA...No wonder more Kenyans than Tanzanians live and work in the USA sending more than 20 times of foreign remittances per month and do help papering over economic cracks in their home nation compared to Tanzania...the choices to endemic poverty are homemade must add!

Uganda is even worse every year their students have to fly home parting with fewer dollars while they could renew quadrennial

Has someone really done a cost Benefit analysis or we love "economy stupid " too much to break the chain?
 
Rutashubanyuma said:
They reset the colonial button and ruled as an occupation force

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Ningependa usome hii article iliyotoka leo ili usahihishe huu uzi wako. Pili akina Pascal Mayalla wajaribu kuona uwezekano wa kuufahamisha umma kuwa JPM anaanza kueleweka.

Inapatikana: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/2/magfulis-growing-authoritarianism-is-not-an-exception/

Endelea: The recent re-election of John Magufuli, president of Tanzania, by a landslide, whether achieved by fair or foul means, has increased fears about the re-emergence or perhaps consolidation of authoritarianism in Africa. Although some have praised Magufuli’s leadership in the past five years, others have condemned it, especially its human rights track record and crackdown on the opposition.

When talking about authoritarianism in Tanzania, however, it is important to pay attention to the political and socioeconomic dynamics at play. I argue that what is happening in the country is not unique to it, but instead is part of a continent-wide trend.

At independence, most African governments inherited states that were more or less large empty spaces, of course with variation across the continent. Population densities, in Africa, were among the lowest in the world. Many African states had few concentrated urban centres, and the vast majority of Africans in the middle of the 20th century lived in small settlements in so-called hinterlands.

Threats to the power of the newly independent governments primarily arose from fellow government members and the military, or the urban population. Maintaining control, therefore, involved a number of strategies.

First, African leaders had to undertake coup proofing: in most cases, this meant buying off opponents by distributing high-level jobs in the government, state enterprises, and parastatals and setting up preferential economic regulation that created and gave licences to cronies. In the army, vital positions were often reserved for individuals with special ethnic or religious loyalties to the leadership.

Second, there had to be a degree of responsiveness to the urban population, primarily through subsidies of basic urban necessities, such as staple foods, fuel, utilities and housing.

Third, it was necessary to cut off or at least retard the connection between rural areas and urban areas. This was achieved mainly by not extending the road network or electricity infrastructure to rural areas.

Fourth, pan-Africanism, communism and African socialism provided the ideological glue to hold together the otherwise legalistic and administrative states bequeathed by colonialism.

Such strategies worked well for a while because of generally small populations and even smaller urban populations. But over the past few decades, the situation has changed, driven by a few important trends.

Since 2000, the populations of many African states have doubled, with people under the age of 30 remaining a majority. Many of these states have witnessed accelerated urbanisation and the urban population increasing exponentially. For example, the population of Tanzania was over 30 million in 2000; by 2020, it became close to 60 million. The number of urban dwellers has almost tripled from 7 million to 20 million.

Urbanisation, however, has not necessarily led to poverty alleviation. Although poverty rates in Africa appear to have witnessed a small decline from 54 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2015, the number of poor people has increased from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015.




The more sophisticated Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2020 report shows that in sub-Saharan Africa, 71.9 percent of people in rural areas (466 million people) and 25.2 percent (92 million people) in urban areas are multidimensionally poor. In Tanzania, close to half of the population lives on $1.90 or less per day (in 2011 purchasing power parity), despite the growth rate of gross domestic product remaining consistently above 4 percent since 2000.

This has much to do with the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund’s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which many African countries have had to accept in order to access international loans. The provisions of these SAPs aim to dismantle state policies that are invaluable tools for social and economic control; these include complex economic regulation, state-owned enterprises, state subsidies and the inflated state payroll.

As a result, African states have more people living in poverty in urban areas to pacify with fewer tools to do so.

Despite the major challenges, African states have not been prone to collapse (i.e. fully disappearing from the world map). Unlike countries such as Yugoslavia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union, African states, however weak, have persisted. The Soviet Union may have been a stronger state than Nigeria, but Nigeria is still here, and the Soviet Union is not.

If state collapse is not an option, then African countries have only three others left. The first option is to embrace the free market, the rule of law and democracy and seek to reduce poverty through job creation and social welfare. This has been the model that the West has been promoting, at least rhetorically, through the Washington consensus. Let us call it neoliberalism.

The second is to seek to reduce poverty through stronger economic and social control, which may include suppression of the political aspirations of the opposition. This option has become all the more attractive with China’s rise on the international scene; its one-party system combined with state capitalism and focus on massive infrastructure development has moved an unprecedented number of people out of poverty in record time. Let us call this model authoritarian developmentalism.

The third option is the failed state. It is a state that exists only on paper and has an official government which lacks internal sovereignty, while authority is distributed among multiple centres – tribal or ethnic-based structures and armed groups. The third option is a default position that a state occupies when all strategies have failed, as in the case of Somalia, the Central African Republic, Libya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (to some extent).

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, African leaders overwhelmingly went for the first option. But neoliberalism did not work out well for most of them, as in many cases it did not significantly reduce poverty through the Washington consensus and did not prevent the apparent decline of democracy in Africa.

As a result, most African leaders are now eyeing the second option, authoritarian developmentalism, which Tanzania’s Magufuli has also clearly gone for. This means that the Tanzanian president’s growing authoritarianism is a phenomenon, not an incident and it has less to do with his personality and more to do with the circumstances that Tanzania and many other African countries find themselves in. There may be variation in how this plays out, but authoritarian developmentalism is on the rise in Africa.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
 
kolola said:
Ningependa usome hii article iliyotoka leo ili usahihishe huu uzi wako. Pili akina Pascal Mayalla wajaribu kuona uwezekano wa kuufahamisha umma kuwa JPM anaanza kueleweka.

Inapatikana: https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2020/12/2/magfulis-growing-authoritarianism-is-not-an-exception/

Endelea: The recent re-election of John Magufuli, president of Tanzania, by a landslide, whether achieved by fair or foul means, has increased fears about the re-emergence or perhaps consolidation of authoritarianism in Africa. Although some have praised Magufuli’s leadership in the past five years, others have condemned it, especially its human rights track record and crackdown on the opposition.

When talking about authoritarianism in Tanzania, however, it is important to pay attention to the political and socioeconomic dynamics at play. I argue that what is happening in the country is not unique to it, but instead is part of a continent-wide trend.

At independence, most African governments inherited states that were more or less large empty spaces, of course with variation across the continent. Population densities, in Africa, were among the lowest in the world. Many African states had few concentrated urban centres, and the vast majority of Africans in the middle of the 20th century lived in small settlements in so-called hinterlands.

Threats to the power of the newly independent governments primarily arose from fellow government members and the military, or the urban population. Maintaining control, therefore, involved a number of strategies.

First, African leaders had to undertake coup proofing: in most cases, this meant buying off opponents by distributing high-level jobs in the government, state enterprises, and parastatals and setting up preferential economic regulation that created and gave licences to cronies. In the army, vital positions were often reserved for individuals with special ethnic or religious loyalties to the leadership.

Second, there had to be a degree of responsiveness to the urban population, primarily through subsidies of basic urban necessities, such as staple foods, fuel, utilities and housing.

Third, it was necessary to cut off or at least retard the connection between rural areas and urban areas. This was achieved mainly by not extending the road network or electricity infrastructure to rural areas.

Fourth, pan-Africanism, communism and African socialism provided the ideological glue to hold together the otherwise legalistic and administrative states bequeathed by colonialism.

Such strategies worked well for a while because of generally small populations and even smaller urban populations. But over the past few decades, the situation has changed, driven by a few important trends.

Since 2000, the populations of many African states have doubled, with people under the age of 30 remaining a majority. Many of these states have witnessed accelerated urbanisation and the urban population increasing exponentially. For example, the population of Tanzania was over 30 million in 2000; by 2020, it became close to 60 million. The number of urban dwellers has almost tripled from 7 million to 20 million.

Urbanisation, however, has not necessarily led to poverty alleviation. Although poverty rates in Africa appear to have witnessed a small decline from 54 percent in 1990 to 41 percent in 2015, the number of poor people has increased from 278 million in 1990 to 413 million in 2015.




The more sophisticated Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2020 report shows that in sub-Saharan Africa, 71.9 percent of people in rural areas (466 million people) and 25.2 percent (92 million people) in urban areas are multidimensionally poor. In Tanzania, close to half of the population lives on $1.90 or less per day (in 2011 purchasing power parity), despite the growth rate of gross domestic product remaining consistently above 4 percent since 2000.

This has much to do with the World Bank and the International Monitory Fund’s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), which many African countries have had to accept in order to access international loans. The provisions of these SAPs aim to dismantle state policies that are invaluable tools for social and economic control; these include complex economic regulation, state-owned enterprises, state subsidies and the inflated state payroll.

As a result, African states have more people living in poverty in urban areas to pacify with fewer tools to do so.

Despite the major challenges, African states have not been prone to collapse (i.e. fully disappearing from the world map). Unlike countries such as Yugoslavia, East Germany, and the Soviet Union, African states, however weak, have persisted. The Soviet Union may have been a stronger state than Nigeria, but Nigeria is still here, and the Soviet Union is not.

If state collapse is not an option, then African countries have only three others left. The first option is to embrace the free market, the rule of law and democracy and seek to reduce poverty through job creation and social welfare. This has been the model that the West has been promoting, at least rhetorically, through the Washington consensus. Let us call it neoliberalism.

The second is to seek to reduce poverty through stronger economic and social control, which may include suppression of the political aspirations of the opposition. This option has become all the more attractive with China’s rise on the international scene; its one-party system combined with state capitalism and focus on massive infrastructure development has moved an unprecedented number of people out of poverty in record time. Let us call this model authoritarian developmentalism.

The third option is the failed state. It is a state that exists only on paper and has an official government which lacks internal sovereignty, while authority is distributed among multiple centres – tribal or ethnic-based structures and armed groups. The third option is a default position that a state occupies when all strategies have failed, as in the case of Somalia, the Central African Republic, Libya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (to some extent).

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, African leaders overwhelmingly went for the first option. But neoliberalism did not work out well for most of them, as in many cases it did not significantly reduce poverty through the Washington consensus and did not prevent the apparent decline of democracy in Africa.

As a result, most African leaders are now eyeing the second option, authoritarian developmentalism, which Tanzania’s Magufuli has also clearly gone for. This means that the Tanzanian president’s growing authoritarianism is a phenomenon, not an incident and it has less to do with his personality and more to do with the circumstances that Tanzania and many other African countries find themselves in. There may be variation in how this plays out, but authoritarian developmentalism is on the rise in Africa.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
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Hii makala imo humu na imejadiliwa pitia utaikuta. Hii makala haina tija kwa sababu imekwepa suala la kimsingi la uchaguzi na hakuna "kueleweka" kama wapigakura hawana sauti ya kuwachagua viongozi wao.
Hivyo, uzi huu misimamo yake haitikisiki na hiyo makala ambayo mwandishi anakimbilia majumuisho ya Africa nzima wakati mada ni ya Tanzania.

Kaiacha mada yake kakimbilia matukio ya Africa yasiyohusiana na Tanzania sijui hata kama umemwelea
The author is making a case for anarchy as an excuse for development. Unless, of course, you are an anarchist you have no plausible argument to laud such a misplaced thought..what is the difference between CCM, Museveni and Idi Amin Dada? A common denominator in cited cases voters have no say to choose their own leaders
 
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