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The options facing Ecowas over Cote d'Ivoire are all tricky
Ecowas chairman President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria. The bloc met to deliberate on the Ivorian crisis in Abuja on December 24. FILE | AFRICA REVIEW |
By HONORE KOUA in Abidjan (email the author)
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Posted Friday, December 24 2010 at 18:16
West Africas heads of state have been careful about taking unequivocal positions on the post-electoral crisis in Cote dIvoire.
The two figures involved in the standoff, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, have since escalated their fight beyond the electoral and legal domain to the media, military, diplomatic and street arenas.
If Ouattara has succeeded to get the support of the world community, including most of Africas leaders, his rival is still controlling the army, the administration and state-run media. Gbagbo confirmed Tuesday his will to cling on power despite international pressure and increasing sanctions.
The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) bloc, which comprises all the countries of the region, was the first institution in the world to endorse the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire position, declaring Ouattara the only winner of the November 28 poll.
In a statement issued on December 5, the bloc appealed to all stakeholders to accept the results declared by the electoral commission.
Two days earlier, the Cote d'Ivoire Constitutional Council overturned provisional results announced by the Independent Electoral Commission and said Gbagbo had defeated his rival with 51.45 per cent of the vote.
On December 7, Ecowas under the chairmanship of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, hardened its position at an extraordinary session in Abuja. The final communiqué of the summit suspended Cote dIvoire from all Ecowas decision-making bodies until further notice.
Regional presidents
The bloc further condemned in strong terms the attempt to go against the will of the Ivorian people and recognised Ouattara as president-elect of the country.
The Ecowas cover is convenient, for it allowed an umbrella for good number of the heads of state, who did not have the stomach to individually condemn Gbagbo outright.
In fact, out of the 16 regional presidents, only Nigerias Jonathan and Senegalese Abdoulaye Wade have publicly condemned Gbagbos power grab. Tiny Cape Verde, a sort of afterthought in the region, hedged by calling for peace. So, oddly, did democratic and widely-admired Ghana.
Cape Verde and Ghana heads of state called for peace. Gbagbos previous friend in the region, Gambias Yahya Jammeh, surprised everybody by saying he was ready to support any action to find a solution to the crisis.
On her part, Liberias President Ellen Johnson of Liberia called on her countrymen not to get involved as mercenaries in what the UN secretary-general is already foreseeing as a looming civil war.
It should, however, be noted that none of the West African countries was represented at the swearing-in ceremony of Gbagbo on November 4. Neither did any send congratulations, not even his Gambian friend.
The reservation of West Africa leaders could be explained by non-interference reasons, but above all under economic and political grounds.
Cote dIvoires agriculture-based economy has traditionally been the region's second strongest behind Nigeria's. The country is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a major exporter of coffee, cotton, rubber, wood, banana, palm oil, pineapples and tuna fish.
Major oil supplier
Cote dIvoire is also a major oil supplier to the West African region. Abidjan's port is the biggest and most modern in West Africa. It is also the main trans-shipment port for the land locked countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
West African immigrants in Cote dIvoire are estimated at around 5 million, a quarter of the country's total population. These immigrants are mainly from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, and Mauritania.
Thus, the twin fear of reprisals against these migrants and of aggravating the situation, given the economic grip Cote dIvoire exerts on her neighbours, explains the reticence many of the regions leaders are showing in their public utterances regarding Gbagbo.
These countries have all been affected ever since the Ivorian crisis erupted in 2002. The regions economic growth decreased substantially. Also, in the early hours of the civil war, many among the two million Burkinabe immigrants in Cote dIvoire were attacked or fled after Gbagbos camp claimed the rebels were backed by Ouagadougou authorities.
Ecowas member-states met on December 24 in Abuja to assess the Ivorian standoff. The Ouattara camp wanted the session to discuss the possibility of setting up a military intervention force. This option has very few chances of succeeding, for at least two major reasons.
The first one is that people of the Ecowas bloc have very bad memories of its peacekeeping force known as Economic Community Ceasefire Monitoring Group (Ecomog). The armed force was established in 1990 to intervene in the civil war in Liberia and thereafter saw action in neighbouring Sierra Leone.
Many human rights organisations joined in condemnation of atrocities committed by Ecomog soldiers. They were accused of looting, raping, harassing and arbitrarily detaining civilians. In addition, they were put on the dock for summary executions of suspected rebels, use of child soldiers, violations of medical neutrality and indiscriminate bombings against civilians.
Lost their lives
According to records kept by US-based Human Rights Watch, Ecomog in Liberia became complicit in serious human rights violations through its alliances with abusive warring factions.
The second reason why Ecowas will not advocate military intervention in Cote dvoire is that Nigeria largely paid for and led Ecomog. In 2001, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said his country had spent $13bn on the force over 12 years. Over 500 Nigerian soldiers also lost their lives.
Almost 10 years later, the West Africa giant is still the only country in the region able to provide enough troops and resources for a military operation in Cote dIvoire. But it is highly unlikely the current head of state would risk endangering his re-election in upcoming April presidential poll by embarking on another uncertain military adventure.
Outside Ecowas, a military intervention in Cote dIvoire might take a different character. Former New Forces rebels, who back Ouattara, are still in control of northern Cote dIvoire. These rebels could afford the cover for interventionist countries who would send equipment and even troops to back them up.
Unless Gbagbo cedes power, this eventuality will lead to a deadly civil war and the collapse of inter-state relationships built between Cote dIvoire and neighbouring countries.
According to Ivorian opposition Premier Guillaume Soro, the embattled leader has recently bought weapons despite a UN arms embargo. Soro also claims Gbagbo has recruited Liberian and Angolan mercenaries to support the regular army loyal to him.
For the time being, Ecowas summit might tighten the pressure on Gbagbo by applying the financial squeeze, especially by pushing the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) to freeze the countrys loans. Eight of Ecowas member states, including Cote dIvoire, share the same currency issued by the BCEAO.
World Bank President Robert Zoellick, while announcing Wednesday a freeze on loans to Cote dIvoire, also called on BCEAO members to do the same. However, the main problem is that 40 per cent of the BCEAO money in circulation in the eight Francophone countries is accounted for by Cote dIvoire.
Africa Review - The options facing Ecowas over Cote d'Ivoire are all tricky
MY TAKE:
The game has just began
By HONORE KOUA in Abidjan (email the author)
Your Email Message Send Cancel
Posted Friday, December 24 2010 at 18:16
West Africas heads of state have been careful about taking unequivocal positions on the post-electoral crisis in Cote dIvoire.
The two figures involved in the standoff, Laurent Gbagbo and Alassane Ouattara, have since escalated their fight beyond the electoral and legal domain to the media, military, diplomatic and street arenas.
If Ouattara has succeeded to get the support of the world community, including most of Africas leaders, his rival is still controlling the army, the administration and state-run media. Gbagbo confirmed Tuesday his will to cling on power despite international pressure and increasing sanctions.
The Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) bloc, which comprises all the countries of the region, was the first institution in the world to endorse the UN mission in Cote d'Ivoire position, declaring Ouattara the only winner of the November 28 poll.
In a statement issued on December 5, the bloc appealed to all stakeholders to accept the results declared by the electoral commission.
Two days earlier, the Cote d'Ivoire Constitutional Council overturned provisional results announced by the Independent Electoral Commission and said Gbagbo had defeated his rival with 51.45 per cent of the vote.
On December 7, Ecowas under the chairmanship of Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, hardened its position at an extraordinary session in Abuja. The final communiqué of the summit suspended Cote dIvoire from all Ecowas decision-making bodies until further notice.
Regional presidents
The bloc further condemned in strong terms the attempt to go against the will of the Ivorian people and recognised Ouattara as president-elect of the country.
The Ecowas cover is convenient, for it allowed an umbrella for good number of the heads of state, who did not have the stomach to individually condemn Gbagbo outright.
In fact, out of the 16 regional presidents, only Nigerias Jonathan and Senegalese Abdoulaye Wade have publicly condemned Gbagbos power grab. Tiny Cape Verde, a sort of afterthought in the region, hedged by calling for peace. So, oddly, did democratic and widely-admired Ghana.
Cape Verde and Ghana heads of state called for peace. Gbagbos previous friend in the region, Gambias Yahya Jammeh, surprised everybody by saying he was ready to support any action to find a solution to the crisis.
On her part, Liberias President Ellen Johnson of Liberia called on her countrymen not to get involved as mercenaries in what the UN secretary-general is already foreseeing as a looming civil war.
It should, however, be noted that none of the West African countries was represented at the swearing-in ceremony of Gbagbo on November 4. Neither did any send congratulations, not even his Gambian friend.
The reservation of West Africa leaders could be explained by non-interference reasons, but above all under economic and political grounds.
Cote dIvoires agriculture-based economy has traditionally been the region's second strongest behind Nigeria's. The country is the world's largest producer and exporter of cocoa beans and a major exporter of coffee, cotton, rubber, wood, banana, palm oil, pineapples and tuna fish.
Major oil supplier
Cote dIvoire is also a major oil supplier to the West African region. Abidjan's port is the biggest and most modern in West Africa. It is also the main trans-shipment port for the land locked countries of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.
West African immigrants in Cote dIvoire are estimated at around 5 million, a quarter of the country's total population. These immigrants are mainly from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Liberia, and Mauritania.
Thus, the twin fear of reprisals against these migrants and of aggravating the situation, given the economic grip Cote dIvoire exerts on her neighbours, explains the reticence many of the regions leaders are showing in their public utterances regarding Gbagbo.
These countries have all been affected ever since the Ivorian crisis erupted in 2002. The regions economic growth decreased substantially. Also, in the early hours of the civil war, many among the two million Burkinabe immigrants in Cote dIvoire were attacked or fled after Gbagbos camp claimed the rebels were backed by Ouagadougou authorities.
Ecowas member-states met on December 24 in Abuja to assess the Ivorian standoff. The Ouattara camp wanted the session to discuss the possibility of setting up a military intervention force. This option has very few chances of succeeding, for at least two major reasons.
The first one is that people of the Ecowas bloc have very bad memories of its peacekeeping force known as Economic Community Ceasefire Monitoring Group (Ecomog). The armed force was established in 1990 to intervene in the civil war in Liberia and thereafter saw action in neighbouring Sierra Leone.
Many human rights organisations joined in condemnation of atrocities committed by Ecomog soldiers. They were accused of looting, raping, harassing and arbitrarily detaining civilians. In addition, they were put on the dock for summary executions of suspected rebels, use of child soldiers, violations of medical neutrality and indiscriminate bombings against civilians.
Lost their lives
According to records kept by US-based Human Rights Watch, Ecomog in Liberia became complicit in serious human rights violations through its alliances with abusive warring factions.
The second reason why Ecowas will not advocate military intervention in Cote dvoire is that Nigeria largely paid for and led Ecomog. In 2001, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo said his country had spent $13bn on the force over 12 years. Over 500 Nigerian soldiers also lost their lives.
Almost 10 years later, the West Africa giant is still the only country in the region able to provide enough troops and resources for a military operation in Cote dIvoire. But it is highly unlikely the current head of state would risk endangering his re-election in upcoming April presidential poll by embarking on another uncertain military adventure.
Outside Ecowas, a military intervention in Cote dIvoire might take a different character. Former New Forces rebels, who back Ouattara, are still in control of northern Cote dIvoire. These rebels could afford the cover for interventionist countries who would send equipment and even troops to back them up.
Unless Gbagbo cedes power, this eventuality will lead to a deadly civil war and the collapse of inter-state relationships built between Cote dIvoire and neighbouring countries.
According to Ivorian opposition Premier Guillaume Soro, the embattled leader has recently bought weapons despite a UN arms embargo. Soro also claims Gbagbo has recruited Liberian and Angolan mercenaries to support the regular army loyal to him.
For the time being, Ecowas summit might tighten the pressure on Gbagbo by applying the financial squeeze, especially by pushing the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) to freeze the countrys loans. Eight of Ecowas member states, including Cote dIvoire, share the same currency issued by the BCEAO.
World Bank President Robert Zoellick, while announcing Wednesday a freeze on loans to Cote dIvoire, also called on BCEAO members to do the same. However, the main problem is that 40 per cent of the BCEAO money in circulation in the eight Francophone countries is accounted for by Cote dIvoire.
Africa Review - The options facing Ecowas over Cote d'Ivoire are all tricky
MY TAKE:
The game has just began
