Le Padrino
JF-Expert Member
- Nov 13, 2016
- 513
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Katika siku za hivi karibuni, wachambuzi na waandishi wa habari wengi wa Magharibi wamekuwa wakihangaika kueleza ufa unaokua kati ya Saudi Arabia na UAE. Maoni mengi yanayochapishwa yanakinzana au ni ya juu juu. Makala hii inalenga kueleza kwa ufupi na kwa mtazamo wa kimaudhui hatua kuu zilizopelekea mpasuko huu.
Kihistoria, Saudi Arabia ilijivunia kuwa nchi pekee ya Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC ambayo haikuwahi kukaliwa na mkoloni, na kwa kupinga utawala wa Uingereza katika Mashariki ya Kati. Kabla ya kuundwa kwake, United Arab Emirates UAE ilikuwepo kama “Trucial States” za Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, na Umm Al Quwein (na Bahrain na Qatar ambazo zilijitoa)chini ya ulinzi wa Uingereza, ambapo London ilidhibiti masuala ya ulinzi na sera za kigeni huku watawala wa ndani wakisimamia mambo ya ndani. Riyadh iliendelea kuhimiza uhuru na kujitawala, kama ilivyofanya katika sehemu kubwa ya ulimwengu wa Kiarabu. Hatimaye, Waingereza waliamua kumaliza uwepo wao, na Saudi Arabia ilichukua jukumu muhimu katika kuunga mkono kuundwa kwa UAE. Mfalme Faisal alikuwa miongoni mwa wa kwanza kuitambua UAE na alitoa msaada mkubwa wa kisiasa na kifedha mwanzoni mwa miaka ya 1970.
UAE ilipoendelea kukua kwa kasi, WaSaud waliitazama maendeleo yake kwa fahari, hasa mabadiliko ya kiuchumi ya Dubai katika miaka ya 1990, ambayo yalitoa mfano wa mafanikio yasiyotegemea mafuta. WaSaud wengi wa kizazi chao cha 1970s-1980s walizungumza kwa sifa na fahari kuhusu Dubai katika miaka ya 2000 kama hadithi ya mafanikio ya Kiarabu ya kisasa. Fahari hiyo ilikuwa ya dhati.
Kwa muda mrefu, Saudi Arabia imeonekana na wachambuzi makini ndani ya GCC kama nguzo ya kina cha kimkakati na uti wa mgongo wa usalama wa eneo. Hili lilionekana wazi katika ukombozi wa Kuwait na baadaye katika upelekwaji wa haraka wa vikosi vya Gulf Shield kulinda Bahrain dhidi ya uingiliaji wa Iran. Kidiplomasia, mtazamo huohuo ulitumika kwa UAE. Iran ilipoanza kuichokoza UAE kijeshi, Saudi Arabia, kupitia Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje Prince Saud Al Faisal, ilitoa tamko kali tarehe 9 Septemba 2008 ikithibitisha azma ya Saudi kuzikomboa visiwa vitatu vya Imarati vilivyokaliwa na Iran.
Chini ya mwezi mmoja baadaye, tarehe 30 Oktoba 2008, Abu Dhabi, UAE ilishangaza Riyadh, KSA kwa kumtuma waziri wake wa mambo ya nje Tehran kusaini makubaliano ya kina ya ushirikiano. Ilionekana kana kwamba Abu Dhabi ilikuwa ikiomba radhi kwa Tehran kwa tamko la Riyadh. Ingawa Saudi Arabia haikupinga hadharani, muda na mtindo wa hatua hiyo ulizua wasiwasi mkubwa Riyadh, Washington na kwingineko. Kadri muda ulivyopita, wasiwasi huo uliongezeka. Leo, UAE ni mshirika wa pili kwa ukubwa wa kibiashara wa Iran, na vikwazo vya Hazina ya Marekani vimekuwa vikionyesha mara kwa mara mitandao yenye makao UAE inayotumika kusafisha fedha na kufadhili ugaidi, mara ya hivi karibuni tarehe 16 Januari 2026.
Mnamo 2015, Saudi Arabia iliunda muungano wa kulinda Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa, kupambana na wanamgambo wa Houthi wanaoungwa mkono na Iran, na kurejesha serikali halali ya Yemen. Mwanzoni, UAE ilionekana kuafikiana kikamilifu. Riyadh ilizawadia ushirikiano huo kwa kuanzisha baraza la kimkakati la pande mbili na kuihusisha UAE kwa kina katika miradi ya Dira ya 2030 na miradi mikubwa ya Saudi. Nchi hizo mbili zilionyesha taswira ya kutotenganishwa.
Hata hivyo, uaminifu huo haukulipizwa kwa kiwango sawa. Abu Dhabi ilizidi kutumia mifumo ya pamoja kuelewa mipango ya kiuchumi ya Saudi, kisha ikafuata mikataba sambamba na inayoshindana kivyake. Hatimaye, Riyadh ilihitimisha kuwa UAE haikuwa mshirika wa kuaminika kiuchumi na ikapunguza ushirikiano.
Mgawanyiko wa mwisho ulitokea Yemen. Hatua za Abu Dhabi zilionyesha kuwa ushiriki wake katika muungano haukuwa hasa kurejesha umoja wa Yemen, bali kuunga mkono vikosi vya kujitenga na kujihakikishia ushawishi juu ya bandari muhimu, zikiwemo Aden na maeneo karibu na Mlango wa Bab al-Mandab, ambako takribani asilimia 20 ya biashara ya dunia hupita.
Kufikia wakati huo, muungano unaoongozwa na Saudi ulikuwa umekomboa karibu asilimia 80 ya Yemen, na vikosi vya serikali vilikuwa chini ya kilomita 20 kutoka Sana’a. Kisha likaja pigo la kushangaza. Abu Dhabi iligawa jeshi la Yemen, ikageuza makundi yake yapigane wenyewe kwa wenyewe, na kuunda Baraza la Mpito la Kusini (STC), ikitumia malalamiko halali ya kusini kwa faida ya kijiografia na kisiasa. Hapo ndipo Riyadh ilihitimisha kuwa UAE haikuwa tena mshirika wa kuaminika kiuchumi, kisiasa, wala kiusalama. Hata hivyo, Saudi Arabia ilionyesha kujizuia, mara nyingi ikiilinda Abu Dhabi dhidi ya ukosoaji wa serikali ya Yemen.
Mnamo Septemba 2020, UAE ilijiunga na Makubaliano ya Abraham, Abraham Accrods na kurekebisha uhusiano na Israel. Riyadh haikupinga uamuzi huo, angalau hadharani. Hata hivyo, sauti za juu za Imarati, akiwemo Waziri Anwar Gargash, ziliwasilisha hadharani normailization hiyo kama chombo cha kuongeza ushindani wa kikanda wa UAE. Wengine walikwenda mbali zaidi, wakiwasilisha kama msingi wa muungano mpya uliolenga kupinga miungano iliyopo ya kikanda.
Abu Dhabi ilionekana kuamini kuwa kujipanga na Israel kungeilinda huku ikiongeza uungaji mkono kwa waigizaji wasio wa kiserikali kote eneo. Hili lilikuwa kosa kubwa la mahesabu.
Licha ya yote, Riyadh iliendelea kuikubalia Abu Dhabi kwa kushawishi serikali ya Yemen kulijumuisha STC katika baraza la mawaziri, kwa matumaini ya kuhifadhi umoja. Badala yake, Abu Dhabi iliwawezesha watu kama Hani bin Buraik, aliyewahi kuhusishwa na al-Qaeda na kuwa makamu wa rais wa STC, na Aidarous Al Zubaidi, kiongozi wa STC, mwenye historia tata ikiwemo madai ya kufundishwa na Hezbollah miongo miwili iliyopita. Wote wawili walipewa uraia wa UAE. Waliwezeshwa si kama wanasiasa bali kama viongozi wa wanamgambo. Abu Dhabi iliwatumia kama vibaraka wake wakuu na kuiona Yemen ya kusini kama ubao wa mchezo wa chess.
Ni muhimu kutaja kwamba mnamo 2015, Spika wa Bunge la Iran, Ali Larijani, aliripotiwa kuwaambia watu wa kujitenga wa Yemen kwamba “Iran haina tatizo na Yemen mbili, moja ya Kishia kaskazini na nyingine rafiki kusini.” Kauli hii, ikichukuliwa pamoja na hatua za Abu Dhabi ardhini, ilizua wasiwasi mkubwa kuhusu mwingiliano wa malengo kati ya miradi ya kujitenga na mkakati wa kikanda wa Iran. Si ajabu basi kwamba baadaye Houthis walilaani mashambulizi ya Saudi dhidi ya vikosi vya wanamgambo wa STC.
Mnamo 2018, shirika la Associated Press lilifichua tabaka jingine la mkanganyiko huu, likiripoti kwamba kile kilichodaiwa kuwa vita vya UAE dhidi ya ugaidi Yemen kwa kiasi kikubwa kilikuwa maigizo. Uchunguzi huo ulionyesha jinsi vikosi vinavyoungwa mkono na Imarati vilivyowaajiri, kuwafadhili na kuwawezesha baadhi ya wanamgambo hatari zaidi wa al-Qaeda nchini Yemen kwa kubadilishana utii na udhibiti wa maeneo, jambo lililodhoofisha moja kwa moja malengo yaliyotangazwa ya muungano.
Zaidi ya Yemen, Abu Dhabi ilikabiliwa na moja ya migogoro mikubwa zaidi ya sifa katika historia yake, tarehe 26 Oktoba, baada ya wakala wake nchini Sudan, wanamgambo wa RSF, kuhusishwa na mauaji ya kimbari, mauaji ya halaiki na ubakaji wa kutisha. Wiki mbili baadaye, katikati ya hasira kubwa ya kimataifa iliyoelekezwa kwa UAE, Abu Dhabi ilitangaza kwa mara ya kwanza kabisa siku tatu za mafunzo ya kijeshi ya shirikisho kote falme i.e. Emirates zote tarehe 11 Novemba 2025, na kuwaonya raia na wakaazi wasipige picha. Onyesho hili la nguvu linaweza kufasiriwa kwa urahisi kama ujumbe wa ndani, ukionyesha ni nani mwenye mamlaka ya mwisho na kwamba upinzani wa ndani dhidi ya sera za nje za Abu Dhabi hautavumiliwa.
Muda mfupi baadaye, tarehe 29 Novemba, serikali ya Abu Dhabi ilitangaza msamaha mkubwa wa mikopo, mchanganyiko wa kawaida wa shuruti na upendeleo, au mbinu ya “upanga na dhahabu” Sword and Gold.
Wengi ndani ya UAE, ikiwemo Dubai, hawajisikii salama na mwelekeo wa jumla wa Abu Dhabi na safari zake za kikanda zisizo na ukomavu, ambazo zimeharibu sana sifa ya falme zote. Hili ni muhimu hasa kwa kuwa falme au Emirates nyingine sita hazitegemei mafuta kama Abu Dhabi, bali hutegemea kwa kiasi kikubwa sifa zao kama vituo vya utalii, biashara na fedha.
Katika hatua hii, Abu Dhabi iliingia katika hali ya wasiwasi wa kisiasa. Miduara ya juu iliamini kimakosa kwamba Mrithi wa Ufalme wa Saudi , Mohammed bin Salman, MBS alikuwa ameshawishi binafsi Washington kuiwekea UAE vikwazo kutokana na uungaji mkono wake kwa wanamgambo wa RSF nchini Sudan. Dai hili lilikuwa la uongo kabisa. Hakukuwa na ombi kama hilo. Hata hivyo, imani hii potofu iliathiri sana mwenendo wa Abu Dhabi baadaye na kuchangia mfululizo wa maamuzi ya kiholela.
Kosa kubwa zaidi la Abu Dhabi lilitokea ilipoelekeza wakala wake wa STC kujaribu kutwaa maeneo zaidi wakati wa mkutano wa GCC nchini Bahrain, hasa Hadramout. Operesheni hizi zilisababisha vifo vya raia, uhamishaji wa kulazimishwa na vitisho vya wazi, yote yakirekodiwa na kuibua tahadhari kubwa. Riyadh ilitoa ultimatum ya saa 72 kwa STC kuondoka katika maeneo yaliyotekwa. Waasi kadhaa wa STC baadaye walithibitisha kuwa Abu Dhabi ilimuelekeza wakala wake, Aidarous Al Zubaidi, asitii. Saudi Arabia kisha ilichukua hatua kali, ikishambulia mizinga mipya ya kijeshi ya UAE na silaha katika bandari ya Mukalla zilizokusudiwa kupewa wanamgambo wa STC, licha ya ahadi ya Abu Dhabi ya kutosafirisha tena silaha. Riyadh pia ilisaidia serikali halali ya Yemen kuivunja STC ndani ya siku tano, na kusambaratisha mradi wa Abu Dhabi uliokuwa umeleta vurugu kwa muongo mmoja.
Ni muhimu kutambua kwamba Riyadh bado haijachukua uamuzi wowote kuhusu uhusiano wake wa pande mbili na Abu Dhabi. Hakujawa na kukatika rasmi kwa diplomasia, hakuna vikwazo vya kiuchumi, hakuna kufungwa kwa mipaka, hakuna marufuku ya anga, wala chochote cha aina hiyo hadi sasa. Kile ambacho Riyadh ilifanya ni kumaliza kabisa safari ya Abu Dhabi nchini Yemen na kuruhusu vyombo vyake rasmi vya habari kukosoa na kufichua uzembe na uhalifu wa Abu Dhabi nchini Yemen, Sudan na maeneo mengine.
Kwa kuwa sasa ukosoaji mkubwa unatoka kwenye vyombo vya habari vya nchi za Kiarabu na Kiislamu, pamoja na baadhi ya lawama rasmi, huenda Abu Dhabi imegundua, albeit too late kwamba kinga yake halisi ilikuwa Riyadh. Nchi nyingi huzitazama nchi za GCC kupitia lenzi ya Baraza hilo, ambalo kichwa chake ni Riyadh, na zilikuwa zimejizuia kuikosoa Abu Dhabi kutokana na mwavuli wa Saudi. Riyadh iliinua tu mwavuli huo kidogo, si kuondoa kabisa, angalau kwa sasa. Pia ni muhimu kutaja kwamba Saudi Arabia haijawahi kuwa na azma kubwa kama ilivyo sasa ya kuwasaidia majirani zake kulinda nchi zao na kupambana na waigizaji wasio wa kiserikali na wenye misimamo mikali. Wachambuzi makini wanapaswa kufuatilia kwa karibu hatua zinazofuata za Riyadh. Uwezo wa kumaliza mradi wa kuvuruga uliodumu miaka kumi ndani ya siku tano nchini Yemen unaweza kurudiwa kwingineko, jambo litakalolinufaisha eneo na dunia kwa ujumla.
Kurudi kwenye mfumo wa Friedman, mpasuko huu hatimaye unahusu mpangilio dhidi ya machafuko. Abu Dhabi ilimsaliti Riyadh, na Riyadh ikajibu kwa uamuzi thabiti, kurejesha mipaka. Abu Dhabi pia imeisaliti Misri nchini Sudan na Pembe ya Afrika.
Kwa sasa falme nyingine zinafikiria kumtoa madarakani Rais Mohammed bin Zayed, MBZ wa Abu Dhabi na urais apewe al Maktoum wa Dubai ingawa makubaliano ya kuanzishwa kwa UAE Federation ni kwamba Rais atatoka Abu Dhabi, Makamu wa Rais na Waziri Mkuu atatoka Dubai
Katika uhasama unaoendelea baina ya Iran na Magharibi kwa mara ya kwanza Saudi Arabia (pamoja na Qatar, Jordan, Egypt na Turkiye) imekataa anga yake isitumike na US kuipiga Iran wakati UAE ina support kupigwa kwa Iran ili kupunguza super powers (power hegemony) eneo hiko wakati Saud wanajua athari ya machafuko Iran kijamii, kibiashara na mustakabali mzima wa eneo la Middle East na kuwa atakayefuata baada ya Shia Islam kuangushwa na ni wao waSunni licha ya kuwa na support ya US na kuwapa base zao
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The Origin of the Hostility Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE
In recent days, many Western analysts and journalists have struggled to explain the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Much of the commentary published so far has been contradictory or superficial. This article seeks to briefly explain, in a substantive and contextual way, the key steps that led to this rupture.
Historically, Saudi Arabia took pride in being the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that was never colonized, and in its resistance to British dominance in the Middle East. Before its formation, the United Arab Emirates existed as the “Trucial States” of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, and Umm Al Quwain (with Bahrain and Qatar later withdrawing), under British protection. London controlled defense and foreign policy, while local rulers managed internal affairs. Riyadh consistently advocated for independence and self-determination, as it did across much of the Arab world. When the British eventually decided to withdraw, Saudi Arabia played a key role in supporting the creation of the UAE. King Faisal was among the first leaders to recognize the UAE and provided significant political and financial support in the early 1970s.
As the UAE grew rapidly, Saudis viewed its progress with genuine pride, particularly Dubai’s economic transformation in the 1990s, which became a model of post-oil success. Many Saudis from the 1970s–1980s generation spoke admiringly of Dubai in the 2000s as a modern Arab success story. That pride was sincere.
For decades, Saudi Arabia has been regarded by serious GCC observers as the region’s strategic depth and security backbone. This was evident in the liberation of Kuwait and later in the rapid deployment of Gulf Shield forces to protect Bahrain from Iranian interference. Diplomatically, the same approach applied to the UAE. When Iran began militarily provoking the UAE, Saudi Arabia, through its Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, issued a strong statement on 9 September 2008 reaffirming Saudi resolve to support the liberation of the three Emirati islands occupied by Iran.
Less than a month later, on 30 October 2008, Abu Dhabi surprised Riyadh by sending its foreign minister to Tehran to sign a comprehensive cooperation agreement. It appeared as though Abu Dhabi was apologizing to Tehran for Riyadh’s strong stance. Although Saudi Arabia did not publicly object, the timing and manner of the move caused serious concern in Riyadh, Washington, and elsewhere. Over time, these concerns deepened. Today, the UAE is Iran’s second-largest trading partner, and U.S. Treasury sanctions have repeatedly highlighted UAE-based networks involved in money laundering and terrorist financing, most recently on 16 January 2026.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to uphold UN resolutions, confront the Iran-backed Houthi militias, and restore Yemen’s legitimate government. Initially, the UAE appeared fully aligned. Riyadh rewarded this cooperation by establishing a bilateral strategic council and deeply integrating the UAE into Vision 2030 projects and major Saudi initiatives. The two countries projected an image of inseparability.
However, this trust was not reciprocated. Abu Dhabi increasingly used joint frameworks to study Saudi economic plans, then pursued parallel and competing deals of its own. Eventually, Riyadh concluded that the UAE was not a reliable economic partner and scaled back cooperation.
The final rupture occurred in Yemen. Abu Dhabi’s actions revealed that its participation in the coalition was not primarily about restoring Yemeni unity, but rather about supporting separatist forces and securing influence over strategic ports, including Aden and areas near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which roughly 20 percent of global trade passes.
At that point, the Saudi-led coalition had liberated nearly 80 percent of Yemen, and government forces were within 20 kilometers of Sana’a. Then came a shocking turn. Abu Dhabi fractured the Yemeni military, turned factions against one another, and created the Southern Transitional Council (STC), exploiting legitimate southern grievances for geopolitical and political gain. This was when Riyadh concluded that the UAE was no longer a reliable economic, political, or security partner. Even so, Saudi Arabia exercised restraint and often shielded Abu Dhabi from criticism by the Yemeni government.
In September 2020, the UAE joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel. Riyadh did not publicly oppose the move. However, prominent Emirati voices, including Minister Anwar Gargash, framed normalization as a tool to enhance the UAE’s regional competitiveness. Some went further, presenting it as the foundation of a new alliance aimed at countering existing regional blocs. Abu Dhabi appeared to believe that aligning with Israel would protect it while expanding support for non-state actors across the region. This was a major miscalculation.
Despite everything, Riyadh continued to accommodate Abu Dhabi by persuading Yemen’s government to include the STC in the cabinet, hoping to preserve unity. Instead, Abu Dhabi empowered figures such as Hani bin Buraik, a former al-Qaeda-linked individual and vice president of the STC, and Aidarous Al Zubaidi, the STC leader, whose background includes allegations of Hezbollah training two decades ago. Both were granted UAE citizenship. They were empowered not as politicians, but as militia leaders. Abu Dhabi treated southern Yemen as a chessboard and used them as its primary proxies.
It is also important to note that in 2015, Iran’s parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani reportedly told Yemeni separatists that “Iran has no problem with two Yemens, a Shiite one in the north and a friendly one in the south.” This statement, combined with Abu Dhabi’s actions on the ground, raised serious concerns about overlapping objectives between separatist projects and Iran’s regional strategy. It is therefore unsurprising that the Houthis later condemned Saudi strikes against STC militias.
In 2018, the Associated Press uncovered another layer of this complexity, reporting that the UAE’s claimed war on terrorism in Yemen was largely theatrical. The investigation revealed how UAE-backed forces recruited, funded, and empowered some of al-Qaeda’s most dangerous militants in Yemen in exchange for loyalty and territorial control, directly undermining the coalition’s stated objectives.
Beyond Yemen, Abu Dhabi faced one of the worst reputational crises in its history on 26 October, when its proxy in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was linked to genocide, mass killings, and horrific sexual violence. Two weeks later, amid intense global outrage directed at the UAE, Abu Dhabi announced, for the first time ever, three days of federal military drills across all emirates on 11 November 2025, warning citizens and residents not to take photos. This display of force can easily be interpreted as a domestic message, signaling who holds ultimate authority and that internal dissent over Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy would not be tolerated.
Shortly afterward, on 29 November, the Abu Dhabi government announced a large-scale debt amnesty, a familiar mix of coercion and patronage, the classic “sword and gold” approach. Many within the UAE, including in Dubai, no longer feel secure about Abu Dhabi’s overall direction and its reckless regional adventures, which have severely damaged the reputation of all the emirates. This is especially significant given that the other six emirates do not rely on oil like Abu Dhabi, but instead depend heavily on their image as hubs for tourism, trade, and finance.
At this stage, Abu Dhabi entered a state of political anxiety. Senior circles mistakenly believed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) had personally lobbied Washington to impose sanctions on the UAE over its support for the RSF in Sudan. This claim was entirely false. No such request was made. However, this false belief significantly influenced Abu Dhabi’s subsequent behavior and contributed to a series of erratic decisions.
The most serious miscalculation came when Abu Dhabi directed its STC proxy to attempt further territorial seizures during the GCC summit in Bahrain, particularly in Hadramout. These operations resulted in civilian deaths, forced displacement, and explicit threats, all of which were documented and triggered serious alarm. Riyadh issued a 72-hour ultimatum for the STC to withdraw. Several STC defectors later confirmed that Abu Dhabi instructed Aidarous Al Zubaidi to defy the order. Saudi Arabia then took decisive action, striking newly arrived UAE military equipment and weapons at the port of Mukalla intended for STC militias, despite Abu Dhabi’s pledge to halt arms shipments. Riyadh also helped Yemen’s legitimate government dismantle the STC within five days, effectively ending a decade-long destabilization project.
It is important to note that Riyadh has not yet made any final decision regarding its bilateral relationship with Abu Dhabi. There has been no formal diplomatic break, no economic sanctions, no border closures, and no airspace bans. What Riyadh did do was decisively end Abu Dhabi’s project in Yemen and allow its official media to criticize and expose Emirati misconduct in Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere.
Now that harsh criticism is coming from Arab and Islamic media, along with some official condemnations, Abu Dhabi may have realized, albeit too late, that its real shield was Riyadh. Many countries view the GCC through the lens of the Council itself, whose center of gravity is Riyadh, and had previously refrained from criticizing Abu Dhabi under the Saudi umbrella. Riyadh has merely lifted that umbrella slightly, not removed it entirely, at least for now. It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia has never been more determined than it is today to help its neighbors protect their states and confront extremist non-state actors. Serious analysts should closely watch Riyadh’s next steps. The ability to dismantle a ten-year destabilization project in Yemen within five days could be replicated elsewhere, benefiting the region and the world at large.
Returning to Friedman’s framework, this rift ultimately comes down to order versus chaos. Abu Dhabi betrayed Riyadh, and Riyadh responded decisively by restoring boundaries. Abu Dhabi has also betrayed Egypt in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. At present, some emirates are reportedly considering removing Abu Dhabi’s President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and transferring the presidency to the Al Maktoum family of Dubai, despite the founding agreement of the UAE federation stipulating that the president comes from Abu Dhabi, while the vice president and prime minister come from Dubai.
Finally, in the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the West, Saudi Arabia has, for the first time, refused to allow its airspace to be used by the United States to strike Iran. The UAE, by contrast, is seen as supporting strikes on Iran to weaken regional superpowers. Saudi Arabia understands the profound social, economic, and regional consequences that chaos in Iran would trigger, including the long-term future of the Middle East. Riyadh is acutely aware that if Shiite political Islam were to collapse in Iran, the next target could be Sunni Islam itself, regardless of U.S. support or the presence of American military bases in the region.
Kihistoria, Saudi Arabia ilijivunia kuwa nchi pekee ya Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC ambayo haikuwahi kukaliwa na mkoloni, na kwa kupinga utawala wa Uingereza katika Mashariki ya Kati. Kabla ya kuundwa kwake, United Arab Emirates UAE ilikuwepo kama “Trucial States” za Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, na Umm Al Quwein (na Bahrain na Qatar ambazo zilijitoa)chini ya ulinzi wa Uingereza, ambapo London ilidhibiti masuala ya ulinzi na sera za kigeni huku watawala wa ndani wakisimamia mambo ya ndani. Riyadh iliendelea kuhimiza uhuru na kujitawala, kama ilivyofanya katika sehemu kubwa ya ulimwengu wa Kiarabu. Hatimaye, Waingereza waliamua kumaliza uwepo wao, na Saudi Arabia ilichukua jukumu muhimu katika kuunga mkono kuundwa kwa UAE. Mfalme Faisal alikuwa miongoni mwa wa kwanza kuitambua UAE na alitoa msaada mkubwa wa kisiasa na kifedha mwanzoni mwa miaka ya 1970.
UAE ilipoendelea kukua kwa kasi, WaSaud waliitazama maendeleo yake kwa fahari, hasa mabadiliko ya kiuchumi ya Dubai katika miaka ya 1990, ambayo yalitoa mfano wa mafanikio yasiyotegemea mafuta. WaSaud wengi wa kizazi chao cha 1970s-1980s walizungumza kwa sifa na fahari kuhusu Dubai katika miaka ya 2000 kama hadithi ya mafanikio ya Kiarabu ya kisasa. Fahari hiyo ilikuwa ya dhati.
Kwa muda mrefu, Saudi Arabia imeonekana na wachambuzi makini ndani ya GCC kama nguzo ya kina cha kimkakati na uti wa mgongo wa usalama wa eneo. Hili lilionekana wazi katika ukombozi wa Kuwait na baadaye katika upelekwaji wa haraka wa vikosi vya Gulf Shield kulinda Bahrain dhidi ya uingiliaji wa Iran. Kidiplomasia, mtazamo huohuo ulitumika kwa UAE. Iran ilipoanza kuichokoza UAE kijeshi, Saudi Arabia, kupitia Waziri wa Mambo ya Nje Prince Saud Al Faisal, ilitoa tamko kali tarehe 9 Septemba 2008 ikithibitisha azma ya Saudi kuzikomboa visiwa vitatu vya Imarati vilivyokaliwa na Iran.
Chini ya mwezi mmoja baadaye, tarehe 30 Oktoba 2008, Abu Dhabi, UAE ilishangaza Riyadh, KSA kwa kumtuma waziri wake wa mambo ya nje Tehran kusaini makubaliano ya kina ya ushirikiano. Ilionekana kana kwamba Abu Dhabi ilikuwa ikiomba radhi kwa Tehran kwa tamko la Riyadh. Ingawa Saudi Arabia haikupinga hadharani, muda na mtindo wa hatua hiyo ulizua wasiwasi mkubwa Riyadh, Washington na kwingineko. Kadri muda ulivyopita, wasiwasi huo uliongezeka. Leo, UAE ni mshirika wa pili kwa ukubwa wa kibiashara wa Iran, na vikwazo vya Hazina ya Marekani vimekuwa vikionyesha mara kwa mara mitandao yenye makao UAE inayotumika kusafisha fedha na kufadhili ugaidi, mara ya hivi karibuni tarehe 16 Januari 2026.
Mnamo 2015, Saudi Arabia iliunda muungano wa kulinda Mkataba wa Umoja wa Mataifa, kupambana na wanamgambo wa Houthi wanaoungwa mkono na Iran, na kurejesha serikali halali ya Yemen. Mwanzoni, UAE ilionekana kuafikiana kikamilifu. Riyadh ilizawadia ushirikiano huo kwa kuanzisha baraza la kimkakati la pande mbili na kuihusisha UAE kwa kina katika miradi ya Dira ya 2030 na miradi mikubwa ya Saudi. Nchi hizo mbili zilionyesha taswira ya kutotenganishwa.
Hata hivyo, uaminifu huo haukulipizwa kwa kiwango sawa. Abu Dhabi ilizidi kutumia mifumo ya pamoja kuelewa mipango ya kiuchumi ya Saudi, kisha ikafuata mikataba sambamba na inayoshindana kivyake. Hatimaye, Riyadh ilihitimisha kuwa UAE haikuwa mshirika wa kuaminika kiuchumi na ikapunguza ushirikiano.
Mgawanyiko wa mwisho ulitokea Yemen. Hatua za Abu Dhabi zilionyesha kuwa ushiriki wake katika muungano haukuwa hasa kurejesha umoja wa Yemen, bali kuunga mkono vikosi vya kujitenga na kujihakikishia ushawishi juu ya bandari muhimu, zikiwemo Aden na maeneo karibu na Mlango wa Bab al-Mandab, ambako takribani asilimia 20 ya biashara ya dunia hupita.
Kufikia wakati huo, muungano unaoongozwa na Saudi ulikuwa umekomboa karibu asilimia 80 ya Yemen, na vikosi vya serikali vilikuwa chini ya kilomita 20 kutoka Sana’a. Kisha likaja pigo la kushangaza. Abu Dhabi iligawa jeshi la Yemen, ikageuza makundi yake yapigane wenyewe kwa wenyewe, na kuunda Baraza la Mpito la Kusini (STC), ikitumia malalamiko halali ya kusini kwa faida ya kijiografia na kisiasa. Hapo ndipo Riyadh ilihitimisha kuwa UAE haikuwa tena mshirika wa kuaminika kiuchumi, kisiasa, wala kiusalama. Hata hivyo, Saudi Arabia ilionyesha kujizuia, mara nyingi ikiilinda Abu Dhabi dhidi ya ukosoaji wa serikali ya Yemen.
Mnamo Septemba 2020, UAE ilijiunga na Makubaliano ya Abraham, Abraham Accrods na kurekebisha uhusiano na Israel. Riyadh haikupinga uamuzi huo, angalau hadharani. Hata hivyo, sauti za juu za Imarati, akiwemo Waziri Anwar Gargash, ziliwasilisha hadharani normailization hiyo kama chombo cha kuongeza ushindani wa kikanda wa UAE. Wengine walikwenda mbali zaidi, wakiwasilisha kama msingi wa muungano mpya uliolenga kupinga miungano iliyopo ya kikanda.
Abu Dhabi ilionekana kuamini kuwa kujipanga na Israel kungeilinda huku ikiongeza uungaji mkono kwa waigizaji wasio wa kiserikali kote eneo. Hili lilikuwa kosa kubwa la mahesabu.
Licha ya yote, Riyadh iliendelea kuikubalia Abu Dhabi kwa kushawishi serikali ya Yemen kulijumuisha STC katika baraza la mawaziri, kwa matumaini ya kuhifadhi umoja. Badala yake, Abu Dhabi iliwawezesha watu kama Hani bin Buraik, aliyewahi kuhusishwa na al-Qaeda na kuwa makamu wa rais wa STC, na Aidarous Al Zubaidi, kiongozi wa STC, mwenye historia tata ikiwemo madai ya kufundishwa na Hezbollah miongo miwili iliyopita. Wote wawili walipewa uraia wa UAE. Waliwezeshwa si kama wanasiasa bali kama viongozi wa wanamgambo. Abu Dhabi iliwatumia kama vibaraka wake wakuu na kuiona Yemen ya kusini kama ubao wa mchezo wa chess.
Ni muhimu kutaja kwamba mnamo 2015, Spika wa Bunge la Iran, Ali Larijani, aliripotiwa kuwaambia watu wa kujitenga wa Yemen kwamba “Iran haina tatizo na Yemen mbili, moja ya Kishia kaskazini na nyingine rafiki kusini.” Kauli hii, ikichukuliwa pamoja na hatua za Abu Dhabi ardhini, ilizua wasiwasi mkubwa kuhusu mwingiliano wa malengo kati ya miradi ya kujitenga na mkakati wa kikanda wa Iran. Si ajabu basi kwamba baadaye Houthis walilaani mashambulizi ya Saudi dhidi ya vikosi vya wanamgambo wa STC.
Mnamo 2018, shirika la Associated Press lilifichua tabaka jingine la mkanganyiko huu, likiripoti kwamba kile kilichodaiwa kuwa vita vya UAE dhidi ya ugaidi Yemen kwa kiasi kikubwa kilikuwa maigizo. Uchunguzi huo ulionyesha jinsi vikosi vinavyoungwa mkono na Imarati vilivyowaajiri, kuwafadhili na kuwawezesha baadhi ya wanamgambo hatari zaidi wa al-Qaeda nchini Yemen kwa kubadilishana utii na udhibiti wa maeneo, jambo lililodhoofisha moja kwa moja malengo yaliyotangazwa ya muungano.
Zaidi ya Yemen, Abu Dhabi ilikabiliwa na moja ya migogoro mikubwa zaidi ya sifa katika historia yake, tarehe 26 Oktoba, baada ya wakala wake nchini Sudan, wanamgambo wa RSF, kuhusishwa na mauaji ya kimbari, mauaji ya halaiki na ubakaji wa kutisha. Wiki mbili baadaye, katikati ya hasira kubwa ya kimataifa iliyoelekezwa kwa UAE, Abu Dhabi ilitangaza kwa mara ya kwanza kabisa siku tatu za mafunzo ya kijeshi ya shirikisho kote falme i.e. Emirates zote tarehe 11 Novemba 2025, na kuwaonya raia na wakaazi wasipige picha. Onyesho hili la nguvu linaweza kufasiriwa kwa urahisi kama ujumbe wa ndani, ukionyesha ni nani mwenye mamlaka ya mwisho na kwamba upinzani wa ndani dhidi ya sera za nje za Abu Dhabi hautavumiliwa.
Muda mfupi baadaye, tarehe 29 Novemba, serikali ya Abu Dhabi ilitangaza msamaha mkubwa wa mikopo, mchanganyiko wa kawaida wa shuruti na upendeleo, au mbinu ya “upanga na dhahabu” Sword and Gold.
Wengi ndani ya UAE, ikiwemo Dubai, hawajisikii salama na mwelekeo wa jumla wa Abu Dhabi na safari zake za kikanda zisizo na ukomavu, ambazo zimeharibu sana sifa ya falme zote. Hili ni muhimu hasa kwa kuwa falme au Emirates nyingine sita hazitegemei mafuta kama Abu Dhabi, bali hutegemea kwa kiasi kikubwa sifa zao kama vituo vya utalii, biashara na fedha.
Katika hatua hii, Abu Dhabi iliingia katika hali ya wasiwasi wa kisiasa. Miduara ya juu iliamini kimakosa kwamba Mrithi wa Ufalme wa Saudi , Mohammed bin Salman, MBS alikuwa ameshawishi binafsi Washington kuiwekea UAE vikwazo kutokana na uungaji mkono wake kwa wanamgambo wa RSF nchini Sudan. Dai hili lilikuwa la uongo kabisa. Hakukuwa na ombi kama hilo. Hata hivyo, imani hii potofu iliathiri sana mwenendo wa Abu Dhabi baadaye na kuchangia mfululizo wa maamuzi ya kiholela.
Kosa kubwa zaidi la Abu Dhabi lilitokea ilipoelekeza wakala wake wa STC kujaribu kutwaa maeneo zaidi wakati wa mkutano wa GCC nchini Bahrain, hasa Hadramout. Operesheni hizi zilisababisha vifo vya raia, uhamishaji wa kulazimishwa na vitisho vya wazi, yote yakirekodiwa na kuibua tahadhari kubwa. Riyadh ilitoa ultimatum ya saa 72 kwa STC kuondoka katika maeneo yaliyotekwa. Waasi kadhaa wa STC baadaye walithibitisha kuwa Abu Dhabi ilimuelekeza wakala wake, Aidarous Al Zubaidi, asitii. Saudi Arabia kisha ilichukua hatua kali, ikishambulia mizinga mipya ya kijeshi ya UAE na silaha katika bandari ya Mukalla zilizokusudiwa kupewa wanamgambo wa STC, licha ya ahadi ya Abu Dhabi ya kutosafirisha tena silaha. Riyadh pia ilisaidia serikali halali ya Yemen kuivunja STC ndani ya siku tano, na kusambaratisha mradi wa Abu Dhabi uliokuwa umeleta vurugu kwa muongo mmoja.
Ni muhimu kutambua kwamba Riyadh bado haijachukua uamuzi wowote kuhusu uhusiano wake wa pande mbili na Abu Dhabi. Hakujawa na kukatika rasmi kwa diplomasia, hakuna vikwazo vya kiuchumi, hakuna kufungwa kwa mipaka, hakuna marufuku ya anga, wala chochote cha aina hiyo hadi sasa. Kile ambacho Riyadh ilifanya ni kumaliza kabisa safari ya Abu Dhabi nchini Yemen na kuruhusu vyombo vyake rasmi vya habari kukosoa na kufichua uzembe na uhalifu wa Abu Dhabi nchini Yemen, Sudan na maeneo mengine.
Kwa kuwa sasa ukosoaji mkubwa unatoka kwenye vyombo vya habari vya nchi za Kiarabu na Kiislamu, pamoja na baadhi ya lawama rasmi, huenda Abu Dhabi imegundua, albeit too late kwamba kinga yake halisi ilikuwa Riyadh. Nchi nyingi huzitazama nchi za GCC kupitia lenzi ya Baraza hilo, ambalo kichwa chake ni Riyadh, na zilikuwa zimejizuia kuikosoa Abu Dhabi kutokana na mwavuli wa Saudi. Riyadh iliinua tu mwavuli huo kidogo, si kuondoa kabisa, angalau kwa sasa. Pia ni muhimu kutaja kwamba Saudi Arabia haijawahi kuwa na azma kubwa kama ilivyo sasa ya kuwasaidia majirani zake kulinda nchi zao na kupambana na waigizaji wasio wa kiserikali na wenye misimamo mikali. Wachambuzi makini wanapaswa kufuatilia kwa karibu hatua zinazofuata za Riyadh. Uwezo wa kumaliza mradi wa kuvuruga uliodumu miaka kumi ndani ya siku tano nchini Yemen unaweza kurudiwa kwingineko, jambo litakalolinufaisha eneo na dunia kwa ujumla.
Kurudi kwenye mfumo wa Friedman, mpasuko huu hatimaye unahusu mpangilio dhidi ya machafuko. Abu Dhabi ilimsaliti Riyadh, na Riyadh ikajibu kwa uamuzi thabiti, kurejesha mipaka. Abu Dhabi pia imeisaliti Misri nchini Sudan na Pembe ya Afrika.
Kwa sasa falme nyingine zinafikiria kumtoa madarakani Rais Mohammed bin Zayed, MBZ wa Abu Dhabi na urais apewe al Maktoum wa Dubai ingawa makubaliano ya kuanzishwa kwa UAE Federation ni kwamba Rais atatoka Abu Dhabi, Makamu wa Rais na Waziri Mkuu atatoka Dubai
Katika uhasama unaoendelea baina ya Iran na Magharibi kwa mara ya kwanza Saudi Arabia (pamoja na Qatar, Jordan, Egypt na Turkiye) imekataa anga yake isitumike na US kuipiga Iran wakati UAE ina support kupigwa kwa Iran ili kupunguza super powers (power hegemony) eneo hiko wakati Saud wanajua athari ya machafuko Iran kijamii, kibiashara na mustakabali mzima wa eneo la Middle East na kuwa atakayefuata baada ya Shia Islam kuangushwa na ni wao waSunni licha ya kuwa na support ya US na kuwapa base zao
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The Origin of the Hostility Between Saudi Arabia and the UAE
In recent days, many Western analysts and journalists have struggled to explain the growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Much of the commentary published so far has been contradictory or superficial. This article seeks to briefly explain, in a substantive and contextual way, the key steps that led to this rupture.
Historically, Saudi Arabia took pride in being the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country that was never colonized, and in its resistance to British dominance in the Middle East. Before its formation, the United Arab Emirates existed as the “Trucial States” of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaimah, and Umm Al Quwain (with Bahrain and Qatar later withdrawing), under British protection. London controlled defense and foreign policy, while local rulers managed internal affairs. Riyadh consistently advocated for independence and self-determination, as it did across much of the Arab world. When the British eventually decided to withdraw, Saudi Arabia played a key role in supporting the creation of the UAE. King Faisal was among the first leaders to recognize the UAE and provided significant political and financial support in the early 1970s.
As the UAE grew rapidly, Saudis viewed its progress with genuine pride, particularly Dubai’s economic transformation in the 1990s, which became a model of post-oil success. Many Saudis from the 1970s–1980s generation spoke admiringly of Dubai in the 2000s as a modern Arab success story. That pride was sincere.
For decades, Saudi Arabia has been regarded by serious GCC observers as the region’s strategic depth and security backbone. This was evident in the liberation of Kuwait and later in the rapid deployment of Gulf Shield forces to protect Bahrain from Iranian interference. Diplomatically, the same approach applied to the UAE. When Iran began militarily provoking the UAE, Saudi Arabia, through its Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal, issued a strong statement on 9 September 2008 reaffirming Saudi resolve to support the liberation of the three Emirati islands occupied by Iran.
Less than a month later, on 30 October 2008, Abu Dhabi surprised Riyadh by sending its foreign minister to Tehran to sign a comprehensive cooperation agreement. It appeared as though Abu Dhabi was apologizing to Tehran for Riyadh’s strong stance. Although Saudi Arabia did not publicly object, the timing and manner of the move caused serious concern in Riyadh, Washington, and elsewhere. Over time, these concerns deepened. Today, the UAE is Iran’s second-largest trading partner, and U.S. Treasury sanctions have repeatedly highlighted UAE-based networks involved in money laundering and terrorist financing, most recently on 16 January 2026.
In 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a coalition to uphold UN resolutions, confront the Iran-backed Houthi militias, and restore Yemen’s legitimate government. Initially, the UAE appeared fully aligned. Riyadh rewarded this cooperation by establishing a bilateral strategic council and deeply integrating the UAE into Vision 2030 projects and major Saudi initiatives. The two countries projected an image of inseparability.
However, this trust was not reciprocated. Abu Dhabi increasingly used joint frameworks to study Saudi economic plans, then pursued parallel and competing deals of its own. Eventually, Riyadh concluded that the UAE was not a reliable economic partner and scaled back cooperation.
The final rupture occurred in Yemen. Abu Dhabi’s actions revealed that its participation in the coalition was not primarily about restoring Yemeni unity, but rather about supporting separatist forces and securing influence over strategic ports, including Aden and areas near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which roughly 20 percent of global trade passes.
At that point, the Saudi-led coalition had liberated nearly 80 percent of Yemen, and government forces were within 20 kilometers of Sana’a. Then came a shocking turn. Abu Dhabi fractured the Yemeni military, turned factions against one another, and created the Southern Transitional Council (STC), exploiting legitimate southern grievances for geopolitical and political gain. This was when Riyadh concluded that the UAE was no longer a reliable economic, political, or security partner. Even so, Saudi Arabia exercised restraint and often shielded Abu Dhabi from criticism by the Yemeni government.
In September 2020, the UAE joined the Abraham Accords and normalized relations with Israel. Riyadh did not publicly oppose the move. However, prominent Emirati voices, including Minister Anwar Gargash, framed normalization as a tool to enhance the UAE’s regional competitiveness. Some went further, presenting it as the foundation of a new alliance aimed at countering existing regional blocs. Abu Dhabi appeared to believe that aligning with Israel would protect it while expanding support for non-state actors across the region. This was a major miscalculation.
Despite everything, Riyadh continued to accommodate Abu Dhabi by persuading Yemen’s government to include the STC in the cabinet, hoping to preserve unity. Instead, Abu Dhabi empowered figures such as Hani bin Buraik, a former al-Qaeda-linked individual and vice president of the STC, and Aidarous Al Zubaidi, the STC leader, whose background includes allegations of Hezbollah training two decades ago. Both were granted UAE citizenship. They were empowered not as politicians, but as militia leaders. Abu Dhabi treated southern Yemen as a chessboard and used them as its primary proxies.
It is also important to note that in 2015, Iran’s parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani reportedly told Yemeni separatists that “Iran has no problem with two Yemens, a Shiite one in the north and a friendly one in the south.” This statement, combined with Abu Dhabi’s actions on the ground, raised serious concerns about overlapping objectives between separatist projects and Iran’s regional strategy. It is therefore unsurprising that the Houthis later condemned Saudi strikes against STC militias.
In 2018, the Associated Press uncovered another layer of this complexity, reporting that the UAE’s claimed war on terrorism in Yemen was largely theatrical. The investigation revealed how UAE-backed forces recruited, funded, and empowered some of al-Qaeda’s most dangerous militants in Yemen in exchange for loyalty and territorial control, directly undermining the coalition’s stated objectives.
Beyond Yemen, Abu Dhabi faced one of the worst reputational crises in its history on 26 October, when its proxy in Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was linked to genocide, mass killings, and horrific sexual violence. Two weeks later, amid intense global outrage directed at the UAE, Abu Dhabi announced, for the first time ever, three days of federal military drills across all emirates on 11 November 2025, warning citizens and residents not to take photos. This display of force can easily be interpreted as a domestic message, signaling who holds ultimate authority and that internal dissent over Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy would not be tolerated.
Shortly afterward, on 29 November, the Abu Dhabi government announced a large-scale debt amnesty, a familiar mix of coercion and patronage, the classic “sword and gold” approach. Many within the UAE, including in Dubai, no longer feel secure about Abu Dhabi’s overall direction and its reckless regional adventures, which have severely damaged the reputation of all the emirates. This is especially significant given that the other six emirates do not rely on oil like Abu Dhabi, but instead depend heavily on their image as hubs for tourism, trade, and finance.
At this stage, Abu Dhabi entered a state of political anxiety. Senior circles mistakenly believed that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) had personally lobbied Washington to impose sanctions on the UAE over its support for the RSF in Sudan. This claim was entirely false. No such request was made. However, this false belief significantly influenced Abu Dhabi’s subsequent behavior and contributed to a series of erratic decisions.
The most serious miscalculation came when Abu Dhabi directed its STC proxy to attempt further territorial seizures during the GCC summit in Bahrain, particularly in Hadramout. These operations resulted in civilian deaths, forced displacement, and explicit threats, all of which were documented and triggered serious alarm. Riyadh issued a 72-hour ultimatum for the STC to withdraw. Several STC defectors later confirmed that Abu Dhabi instructed Aidarous Al Zubaidi to defy the order. Saudi Arabia then took decisive action, striking newly arrived UAE military equipment and weapons at the port of Mukalla intended for STC militias, despite Abu Dhabi’s pledge to halt arms shipments. Riyadh also helped Yemen’s legitimate government dismantle the STC within five days, effectively ending a decade-long destabilization project.
It is important to note that Riyadh has not yet made any final decision regarding its bilateral relationship with Abu Dhabi. There has been no formal diplomatic break, no economic sanctions, no border closures, and no airspace bans. What Riyadh did do was decisively end Abu Dhabi’s project in Yemen and allow its official media to criticize and expose Emirati misconduct in Yemen, Sudan, and elsewhere.
Now that harsh criticism is coming from Arab and Islamic media, along with some official condemnations, Abu Dhabi may have realized, albeit too late, that its real shield was Riyadh. Many countries view the GCC through the lens of the Council itself, whose center of gravity is Riyadh, and had previously refrained from criticizing Abu Dhabi under the Saudi umbrella. Riyadh has merely lifted that umbrella slightly, not removed it entirely, at least for now. It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia has never been more determined than it is today to help its neighbors protect their states and confront extremist non-state actors. Serious analysts should closely watch Riyadh’s next steps. The ability to dismantle a ten-year destabilization project in Yemen within five days could be replicated elsewhere, benefiting the region and the world at large.
Returning to Friedman’s framework, this rift ultimately comes down to order versus chaos. Abu Dhabi betrayed Riyadh, and Riyadh responded decisively by restoring boundaries. Abu Dhabi has also betrayed Egypt in Sudan and the Horn of Africa. At present, some emirates are reportedly considering removing Abu Dhabi’s President Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and transferring the presidency to the Al Maktoum family of Dubai, despite the founding agreement of the UAE federation stipulating that the president comes from Abu Dhabi, while the vice president and prime minister come from Dubai.
Finally, in the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the West, Saudi Arabia has, for the first time, refused to allow its airspace to be used by the United States to strike Iran. The UAE, by contrast, is seen as supporting strikes on Iran to weaken regional superpowers. Saudi Arabia understands the profound social, economic, and regional consequences that chaos in Iran would trigger, including the long-term future of the Middle East. Riyadh is acutely aware that if Shiite political Islam were to collapse in Iran, the next target could be Sunni Islam itself, regardless of U.S. support or the presence of American military bases in the region.
