said Nundu JR
JF-Expert Member
- Mar 9, 2016
- 466
- 359
Afghanstan, The graveyard of Empires
Like all the empires before America who invaded Afghanistan, more troops in this case are not an advantage. Like all empires the US strains to deploy large numbers of its military at any one time and in the last decade the US was fighting in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To maintain such a large force, far from the US continent, many of these troops were needed in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the US was challenged to field a maximum of 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army.
With the war in Afghanistan, the US is fighting in the Eastern Hemisphere, which is a great distance from the US continent and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical
cost.
More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of material. This absorbs many troops. The
logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops disproportionate to the size
of the combat force. Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the US military is always vastly
outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed.
If parts of these populations
resist as guerrilla forces or employ guerrilla tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber US forces, as was the case in Vietnam. The Soviets maintained a force of around 115,000 troops in Afghanistan in their decade long war and failed to conquer the country.
The US, like its predecessors always had a disadvantage when it came to intelligence. The Afghan people have shown for over two centuries that it can be outnumbered and outgunned but still bleed empires dry.
The US failed to realise the resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain. The
US is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the
effectiveness of US forces is divided by lack of intelligence.
The US faces an insurgency in Afghanistan and this requires counter insurgency forces not the conventional army, who require bases and significant supply lines. Maintaining both fixed and rotary wing aircraft require dozens of ground-crew personnel, despite their appearance of power, these systems rely on extensive ground-support to just be in the air for short periods. If we add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.
The US has fallen victim to the same reality both the Soviet Union and Britain befell previously and that is an invading force, in the long run will ruin itself in attempting to conquer Afghanistan.
If there were a solution to this, it would have been implemented long ago by US policy makers and we would not be writing about the 17th year of a US foreign military invasion.
America has shown it can destroy regimes but its nation building capabilities are usually a failure.
Like all the empires before America who invaded Afghanistan, more troops in this case are not an advantage. Like all empires the US strains to deploy large numbers of its military at any one time and in the last decade the US was fighting in two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To maintain such a large force, far from the US continent, many of these troops were needed in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the US was challenged to field a maximum of 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army.
With the war in Afghanistan, the US is fighting in the Eastern Hemisphere, which is a great distance from the US continent and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical
cost.
More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of material. This absorbs many troops. The
logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops disproportionate to the size
of the combat force. Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the US military is always vastly
outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed.
If parts of these populations
resist as guerrilla forces or employ guerrilla tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber US forces, as was the case in Vietnam. The Soviets maintained a force of around 115,000 troops in Afghanistan in their decade long war and failed to conquer the country.
The US, like its predecessors always had a disadvantage when it came to intelligence. The Afghan people have shown for over two centuries that it can be outnumbered and outgunned but still bleed empires dry.
The US failed to realise the resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain. The
US is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the
effectiveness of US forces is divided by lack of intelligence.
The US faces an insurgency in Afghanistan and this requires counter insurgency forces not the conventional army, who require bases and significant supply lines. Maintaining both fixed and rotary wing aircraft require dozens of ground-crew personnel, despite their appearance of power, these systems rely on extensive ground-support to just be in the air for short periods. If we add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.
The US has fallen victim to the same reality both the Soviet Union and Britain befell previously and that is an invading force, in the long run will ruin itself in attempting to conquer Afghanistan.
If there were a solution to this, it would have been implemented long ago by US policy makers and we would not be writing about the 17th year of a US foreign military invasion.
America has shown it can destroy regimes but its nation building capabilities are usually a failure.
