Msaada- realism, liberalism and constructivism

[Annina]

Waugwana naomba msaada wa literature (soft copy) juu ya theories za realism, liberalism na constructivism. Naandika paper on Doha Round why is it taking so long to be concluded. Nataka ku argue from realist, liberalism and social constructivist perspective.

Natanguliza shukrani.

 

[Bluray]

Angalia www.feedbooks.net na www.gutenberg.org huko utapata vitabu vyote vya dead philosophers.

Kama una a specific author au book niambie nitakutafutia, mradi iwe katika public domain.

Otherwise naweza kukuonyesha wanapouza.

 

[Annina]

Asante Bluray,
nimevisit link ulizonipa -sijafanikiwa. Sina specific author, lakini nakumbuka nimewahi kusoma the globalisation of world politics nadhani ni Baylis na Smith na global political economy by ravenhill. kwa sasa sina literature yeyote juu ya theories hizi. Nitashukuru sana kama utaweza kunisaidia zaidi.

Asante sana

 

[Bluray]

The doha round is taking so long to be concluded, according to me, because the world is diverging into an unprecedented mulipolarity.To put it simply, It is harder to achieve consensus in a multipolar world than a bi-polar/ tripolar world (The East/ West or East/West/Rest designations. Although this may slow things down, it can be argued that this is not a bad thing entirely.

Hii si specialty yangu kwa hiyo nitataja vitabu vya general public vinavyoongelea mambo haya na ku support point hii, ambayo unaweza kuifanya moja ya points nyingi utakazotumia.

From the liberal point of view tafuta Fareed Zakaria's "The Post American World"

Pia "The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World Order" Samuel P. Huntington.

For a non US centric view kuna kitabu kimepewa good press among economic circles "The Doha Blues : Getting the Trading System Back on Track"

Pia ona hii article ya NYT

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/31/opinion/31iht-edkuttner.2345219.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print

BOSTON - The Doha failure

Shed no tears for the recent collapse of the trade talks, widely portrayed as a big setback for the trading system and developing nations. The suspension opens the door to a more realistic agenda.

The current round of trade talks began in 2001 at Doha, Qatar, an authoritarian location conveniently off-limits to protesters. It was billed as a "development round" - something for poor countries.

The U.S. government was promoting its latest grand bargain. Emerging economies like India and Brazil, which limit the ability of foreign capital to use their economies as speculative playgrounds, should fling their doors open. In return, the United States and Europe would cut farm subsidies, so third-world nations could export more agricultural products.

This was described as a win-win deal: good for third-world farmers, for U.S. and European investors, poor countries that need foreign capital, and good for consumers. But talks were suspended last week because the parties could not agree on a formula. The press has reported this largely as greedy U.S. and European farmers influencing governments to refuse to cut subsidies. However, a World Bank study in 2005 concluded that when all the costs and benefits were added up, the deal would be a net loser for most developing countries, and benefit mainly rich ones.

The trade agenda has been set by business elites who would impose one economic model on the world - the model of laissez-faire. This model rejects more than a century of Western history, during which democracies have relied on government regulation and social investment to temper the instability and income extremes of a pure market economy. The elite model would also coerce third-world countries to give up their successful development strategies, in which government helps local business develop new technologies and markets, and fledgling economies are sheltered from foreign speculation.

To the extent that third-world countries have already given in to U.S. pressures, results have often been disastrous. East Asia's economic meltdown of 1998 was largely caused by too abrupt an opening of local financial markets. Speculative capital poured in, overheating local economies; then, when the winds shifted, it poured right out, sinking economies that were otherwise sound. Much the same thing happened to Mexico.

Current trade rules make it too easy for global business to deny workers in both poor and rich countries the fair fruits of their labors, despite rising productivity. U.S. multinationals outsource in search of cheaper labor. China runs a huge trade surplus, in part by denying its workers fundamental rights and decent wages. This puts downward pressure on wages in the United States, Europe, even Mexico.

To appreciate the business domination of the trade agenda, consider the fates of property protection and labor protection. The U.S. government, prodded by business, successfully fought to add enforceable protections of patents, trademarks and copyrights to trade negotiations. It just as fiercely resisted adding labor protections. A realistic trade negotiation agenda would address these questions:

How can the trading system promote fair compensation of workers everywhere, rather than helping transnational corporations and repressive governments play off workers in different countries?

How can the system recognize that different countries choose different development strategies, rather than imposing a one-size-fits-all model convenient to U.S. finance?

How to distinguish legitimate strategies (e.g., subsidizing technologies) from illegitimate ones (stealing intellectual property, denying rights to workers).

How to help the poorest countries, without making them mere appendages of Western private capital?

It embarrasses free-trade ideologues that the most successful emerging economies like Japan and South Korea, and more recently Brazil, India and China, have generated their own domestic savings and entrepreneurs, and have not relied much on foreign investors. This has both produced high rates of growth, and insulated them from imported instability.

The West has a fair complaint that if these nations want access to its more open markets, they need to show greater reciprocity - but in product markets, not capital markets. America's structural trade imbalance reflects the failure of U.S. leaders to negotiate a reasonable buffer with nations that export to our open system while they practice more closed systems.

In the end, the trade round stalled not just because the United States and Europe failed to agree on farm policy, but also because key leaders of developing countries weren't keen on the whole approach. It wasn't such a great deal for most Americans, either.

A true grand bargain would address not just the needs of American business, but of working people everywhere.

 

[Bluray]

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/25/opinion/25iht-edbowring.2288509.html

HONG KONG - It says much about the disconnect between financial markets and the real global economy that stockmarkets boomed - Wall Street rising 2 percent and most of Asia and Europe following suit - on the day the Doha round of world trade talks collapsed, perhaps irretrievably.

Of course markets often turn on a misplaced comma while the consequences of the blow to the World Trade Organization may take years to be fully felt. However, it is as well to focus on the fundamentals before markets awake to the consequences of the demise of Doha so soon after the pious platitudes at the G-8 summit meeting.

Leave aside for the moment the issue of who was most to blame - the United States, the European Union, or developing countries led by India and Brazil.

Leave aside the collapse of the first real effort to bring the same trade rules to bear on agriculture that have existed on industrial products ever since the founding of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the WTO's predecessor, 58 years ago.

Leave aside the fact that this trade round was supposed to help most of all the poorest people and countries who thus far have been largely excluded from the benefits of open trade.

Leave aside the fact that with China now a major member and Russia on the brink of joining the WTO, a global commitment to a market-based trading system seemed to be almost complete.

Concentrate instead on what this failure says about the lack of commitment of countries, the United States in particular, to multilateralism. It is hard not to see in this an aspect of the U.S. retreat from the rule-based world that it was instrumental in creating after World War II.

If one scorns the United Nations, rejects a global court, incessantly ignores or vetoes UN resolutions, one cannot expect trade to survive forever as the sole focus of multilateralism.

That the United States long stuck to its WTO principles despite unilateralism elsewhere was attributable in large part to the efforts of former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick. Two quick changes of the trade representative since his departure were evidence of Washington's lack of commitment to Doha.

The Doha story bodes ill for other areas of global concern - such as the environment - where multilateralism is essential. Developing countries have failed to recognize that their best hope for sustained growth is more open trade, especially with each other.

The old rich with aging demographics have, for the sake of their tiny agricultural minorities, passed up an opportunity to open up markets growing much faster than their own ever can.

The consequences of the failure of Doha for Wall Street may come sooner rather than later as the forces of trade and finance collide.

Of course, the WTO is still here. No one has left it. Its rules and levers sill exist. But an institution so weakened by failure will have a hard time standing up to the pressures building on the trading system due to the massive trade and financial imbalances, of which the imbalance between the United States and China is the most threatening.

For sure, the WTO cannot itself resolve these. Both countries must face up to the dangers of letting desire for short-term growth lead them to avoid imposing discipline on their financial sectors, changing fiscal policies and accepting painful currency adjustments.

However, a weakened WTO is likely to see countries - and not just the United States - taking short cuts to resolving trade imbalances by imposing quantitative restrictions, anti-dumping measures and other non-market measures.

More broadly the failure of Doha will encourage the proliferation of regional and bilateral trade deals that purport to further free trade but often have scant practical value. Worse, they often undermine the whole principle on which world trade has been based since GATT was formed - that of non-discrimination.

The EU single market and the creation of the North American Free Trade Area have generally been examples of regional deals enhancing global free trade. Fears around 1990 that the two would become competing trade blocs enclosed behind their regional walls were not realized because both the EU and the United States recognized their mutual self- interest in open regionalism.

However, the tensions in global trade are now not primarily between two groups of advanced nations with shared values and balanced trade. The much greater danger now is of competing blocs.

The tensions are increasingly between the developed and the developing world, most obviously represented by China as the new industrial power, and between east Asia - principally Japan, Korea and China - and the West.

Can leaders look up for a moment from small wars and minor crises to a fundamental crisis in the arrangements that helped create post-1945 global prosperity?

 

[Annina]

Asante sana,
Nitaangalia vitabu ulivyopendekeza. Ni kweli kabisa ni ngumu kuwa na single undertaking katika majadiliano yanayoendelea sasa WTO, kuna sababu nyingi zikiwemo ulizotaja.

Sijui ilikuwaje LDC's tukakubali hii Round kubadilishwa kutoka Doha Development Agenda -DDA kwenda Doha Agricultural Agenda! maana majadiliano yamebadili muelekeo sasa ni agri! Round hii ilikuwa iwe na maslahi kwetu nchi zinazoendelea maana interest yetu ipo kwa development issues. Nchi tajiri zilitakiwa zichukue majukumu ya kuzisaidia kimaendeleo LDC's na si kusaidia kila zinapojisikia kufanya hivyo na wakati mwingine wakiwa na hidden agenda...

Issues za trade facilitation and aid for trade zilitakiwa ziwe ni commitments za nchi tajiri kwa nchi zinazoendelea, ndio maana wajanja wakatupiga chenga na kuhamishia attention kwenye agriculture ambayo ni vita isiyoisha ya big elephants in WTO!

Kitu kingine ni kwamba sina hakika kama negotiators wanajua wanachotaka out of this round, ninachokiona ni ushindani wa nani atapata zaidi na kujilinganisha kwa mfano US atapata nini au EU, India, Brazil atapata nini out of the deal - I find it childish!

Negotiators wangejua wanachokitaka, wange calculate surplus za nchi zao sio za nchi nyingine - US akipata 100 as surplus na alitegemea kupata 150, wewe ukipata 50 as a surplus na ulitegemea kupata 20 then kimsingi wewe ndo umepata zaidi - simple mathematics! Kwasababu kila nchi ina negotiating zone yake - hazifanani, hivyo hivyo level ya kunufaika haiwezi kufanana.

Nasikia mawaziri wa LDC's walikutana dar kujadili mustakabali wa DDA, sijui kama waliyaona haya na wamejipanga vipi -sijabahatika kuona makubaliano ya mkutano huo.

Once again, Asante sana umekuwa wa msaada mkubwa kwangu.

 

[Bluray]

Thanks,

Tatizo, at least kwa Tanzania, mawaziri wenyewe ndio kina Mkullo and his likes. Hata hiyo simple analysis uliyoitoa sijui kama wanaielewa, wao wanajali per diem tu, haya mambo mengine artsy fancy hata hawana habari nayo washaanza kujichokea, tena na hivi uchaguzi unakaribia waziri yuko katika vikao hivi kimwili tu, mawazo yote yanapiga mahesabu ya kuhonga watu jimboni, kiasi gani kitahitajika kununua pombe, kofia na ubwabwa.

We unaongea lofty ideals Mkullo ana muda huo?

 

[Annina]

Bluray,
Its sad hatujui tunayo waandalia wajukuu zetu kutokana na kuchukulia mambo kirahisi rahisi tu. Haya makubaliano na mengine tunayojiingiza ni vitanzi vitakavyotunyonga muda si mrefu. Sasa hivi tupo busy ku negotiate Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) na EU, ukifuatilia madudu yanayofanyika huko unaweza kukubaliana na zoezi la upimaji akili liendelee kwa ngazi zote!

 

[Serendipity]

Waugwana naomba msaada wa literature (soft copy) juu ya theories za realism, liberalism na constructivism. Naandika paper on Doha Round why is it taking so long to be concluded. Nataka ku argue from realist, liberalism and social constructivist perspective.

Natanguliza shukrani.

Jaribu ku- google pia unaweza bahatisha

 

[Annina]

Asante Wande,
Nitajaribu pia. Jina lako kama la kihehe vile, Wande niliambiwa ni upendo kwa kihehe... ni kwa njia njema usinielewe vibaya

Shukran!

 

[Annina]

Bluray,
Angalia www.evenett.com Simon Evenett amechambua vizuri sababu za kutomalizika majadiliano katika Doha Round kwenye paper yake ya "Reciprocity and Doha Round Impasse"