Do we understand Museveni's real mission?Museveni's real mission is to restore the dominance of pastoralists or Batutsi (generically used to include Bahima, Batutsi, Bahororo and Banyamulenge in the Great Lakes region) through the creation of a Tutsi Empire. He has made and modified alliances at home and abroad with the sole purpose of getting a Tutsi empire. The Great Lakes geopolitics and Uganda's chaotic conditions during Amin's regime created a favorable environment for Museveni to gain access to Uganda politics.
With external media, financial and diplomatic guidance and support, Museveni mastered the art of presenting himself as the redeemer of frustrated Ugandans. He realized that all Baganda were frustrated with UPC and Obote especially because of the lost counties issue and abolition of kingdoms. He also realized that Catholics throughout the country and DP supporters were frustrated with UPC and Obote having lost to it the 1962 and 1980 elections. At an early stage, Museveni abandoned UPC and Obote although they are Nilotic cousins, Protestants and Obote had given Museveni a job in the president's office. He did all these things to be acceptable to Baganda and Catholics.
Museveni then needed agents within Baganda and Catholics in the rest of Uganda to use in advancing his dream. He turned to Batutsi who are also Catholics and scattered in all parts of Uganda especially in Buganda. As we have already said, Batutsi men don't marry non-Batutsi women and when Batutsi women marry non-Batutsi men they do so largely for political purposes. The husbands of Batutsi women join the club of Batutsi and work for them. Museveni's initial support came largely from Buganda, Eastern and Northern regions. Because of Ankole territorial rivalries between Bahororo and Bahima (Bahororo wanted a separate district carved out of Ankole but Bahima refused), Museveni isn't as close to Bahima as he is to Batutsi or more specifically Bahororo, explaining in part why Ankole kingdom was not restored.
So, most of so-called Banyankole supporting Museveni are Batutsi but mostly Bahororo. Bairu who form the majority in Ankole have been impoverished and marginalized. They are dying of poverty and related diseases. They are voiceless and powerless. What Batutsi did in southwest Uganda to impoverish Bairu is being extended to other groups in Uganda including in Buganda. I have written extensively on this subject and posted articles at
www.kashambuzi.com.
For military and intelligence purposes, Museveni has relied more on Batutsi (or Bahororo?) refugees. There are stories subject to confirmation that the so-called Batutsi close to Museveni are actually Bahororo who returned to Rwanda after Mpororo kingdom disintegrated. In this regard, Ehret (2002) has recorded that with the collapse of Mpororo kingdom, "the pastoralist groups lost their special political position, and many of them shifted their support southwards to the then expanding kingdom of Rwanda, where a special higher status for pastoralists was part of an already emerging caste system [of Batutsi and Bahutu]". Karugire has added that wherever they settled Bahororo tenaciously clung together, implying that some day they would regroup and restore and expand their Mpororo kingdom.
In Rwanda Batutsi are located in south and central regions, the northern part is home to Bahutu or Bakiga, a hostile territory for Batutsi. However, following the 1959 Social Revolution in Rwanda a sizeable group of Batutsi travelled through hostile northern Rwanda to seek refuge in Uganda. It has been argued that this is a group of Bahororo who returned to Uganda to be with their Bahororo kith and kin in Ankole and Kigezi. Although there was already human and animal population pressure in Ankole and Kabale areas of Kigezi, the refugees and their cattle were enthusiastically received. Kangaho from Ankole and member of Legislative Council (LEGCO) made a compelling case that "the cattle and refugees can be accommodated in Ankole" (B. L. Jacobs 1965) against the advice of others. Batutsi refugees pleaded not to be settled somewhere else but in Ankole and Kigezi because "they have their kinsmen in Ankole and Kigezi". By the end of 1963 some 35,000 refugees with 15,000 head of cattle were received in Uganda. "One-third of these refugees appear to have settled with relatives [who must be Bahororo who stayed in Ankole and Kigezi when Mpororo kingdom collapsed] in Uganda. … Those refugees who had ‘settled permanently' with relatives or friends near the border were allowed to stay"(B. L. Jacobs 1965). From southwest Uganda refugees and their cattle moved to other parts of Uganda with a heavy concentration in parts of Buganda adjacent to Ankole.
From this analysis one can deduce that it is these Batutsi/Bahororo refugees that have formed the core of Museveni's movement. The two groups of Bahororo (those who stayed in Ankole and Kabale when Mpororo kingdom collapsed and those who rejoined them after 1959 social revolution in Rwanda) in southwest Uganda have worked together under Museveni leadership with the ultimate goal of restoring and expanding Mpororo kingdom in the Great Lakes region under the new name of Tutsi Empire.
Because of Bahima and Bahororo rivalry in Ankole, Museveni didn't have support in DP which supported Kutesa during the 1980 elections. And because Museveni had quit UPC it was impossible for him to go back. In desperation he formed his own political party UPM which lost badly (one candidate won a seat in parliament and Museveni lost to Kutesa, a DP candidate). Therefore Museveni had no support in Ankole and Kigezi when he launched his guerrilla war in 1981 with 27 people. Baganda and Catholics who disliked UPC and Obote hesitated to use force to unseat UPC.
Because some western governments and corporations didn't trust Obote despite conversion to capitalism, they backed Museveni and his guerrilla war. NRA/NRM received media, financial and diplomatic cover. In return, upon capturing power, Museveni accepted structural adjustment program and abandoned the ten-point program (a popular document that won him considerable support of Ugandans). Museveni also agreed to bring Asians back against strong objections. Because Museveni became a trusted agent of western interests, he was allowed to delay elections for ten years and in the process crippled UPC and DP to near extinction and they haven't recovered. External supporters have also turned a blind eye to rigging elections since 1996, eliminating presidential term limits, a non-independent electoral commission and rampant corruption, sectarianism, cronyism, mismanagement of public funds, abuse of human rights and impoverishing the majority of Ugandans because they are using him to advance their national interests in international organizations and especially geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region.
When he formed the government, Museveni put Batutsi in key and strategic positions in all branches of government – in parliament, executive and judiciary branches without Ugandans noticing (Ugandans got a shock when Batutsi we had all along thought were Ugandans and occupied key positions in government, security forces and business left for Rwanda in 1994. Many are still in Uganda and being used to advance Museveni interests). Using these agents in parliament, the constitution was drawn up according to Museveni wishes especially provisions allowing Ugandans to settle anywhere in Uganda and speak their local languages. These provisions cleared the way for Batutsi to grab land from indigenous people, an exercise that is gathering speed. Indigenous people are losing land at a frightening speed in Toro and other places. Land in Buganda is reported to be changing ownership very fast. Refugees mostly Batutsi from DRC are settling in many parts instead of confining them to a few places and are causing tensions with indigenous people as currently in Toro.
After he settled down as president, Museveni began to talk about Pan-Africanism and economic disadvantages of small states with limited market opportunities that limit increased productivity. He placed agents in relevant ministries to hammer this point home in various conferences. He then turned to the political situation in the Great Lakes region. There are stories of Museveni interference in Burundi politics. Although originally denied, Museveni eventually came out that Uganda supported Batutsi to return to power in Rwanda. Museveni and Kagame overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko government hoping to open the door for Tutsi Empire. It didn't work. They tried again. Unfortunately for Museveni and Kagame, leaders in the region especially in Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and others began to understand their real motive of creating a Tutsi Empire and decided to support Kabila. Museveni and Kagame were abandoned by Angola that had supported them during the fight against Mobutu because of alleged association with UNITA. Leaders from these countries feared that after capturing DRC, Museveni and Kagame would then invade and conquer their countries all the way to Namibia.
Parallel with military strategy, Museveni developed an interest in the East African Community and pushed the admission of Rwanda and Burundi which are dominated by Batutsi especially in Rwanda. Initially, the community was to concentrate on economic integration. But with the military avenue to gain control of the Great Lakes region closed (perhaps temporarily), Museveni began to push for East African political federation over economic integration so that he becomes the first president of the federation and uses that position to finalize his Tutsi Empire project. He has hired experts who are now arguing that East Africa needs a political federation ahead of integration. This advice is like putting the cart before the horse. East African community negotiators need to fully understand the background to this line of argument which is to facilitate Museveni becoming the first president of the federation.
Realizing that the federation may not be achieved by 2016, he has launched campaign for another term hoping that before 2021 his dream of a federation will have materialized and he becomes the first federation president. Once president and with his external and internal friends Museveni will eliminate presidential term limits as he did with the Uganda constitution and use his agents drawn from all parts of East Africa to consolidate his position and ultimately declare his Tutsi Empire or its equivalent.
I have studied Museveni carefully from our Ntare School days and I know exactly what he is up to which is not in the interest of Uganda and that is why I am risking to say all these things because I care about our country, present and future generations who may be stateless if we are not careful. The recent announcement of eliminating national borders in the East African community is very scary. This is an indirect way of implementing Tutsi Empire incrementally. It will begin by dismantling the border between Uganda and Rwanda; then the border between Rwanda and Eastern DRC; then the border between Rwanda and Burundi; then the borders with Tanzania and finally the borders with Kenya. Creating a federation does not mean dismantling national or state borders. In fact the nation-state has remained and will remain an essential building block in East African federation and international political order.
As a first step in thwarting Museveni's grand design, Ugandans in or out of government need to identify these agents working for Museveni and isolate them. This is not discrimination or sectarianism. This is a matter of national and security interest and there is nothing to feel sorry about. However, identifying all Banyankole as agents of Museveni is not only wrong it is counterproductive and is going to frustrate efforts to build a solid and national resistance to Museveni. This categorization needs to be recast.
The opposition needs to have leadership that understands Museveni, his motive and how he is implementing it using agents in Uganda and outside. It is reported that Museveni boasted recently that he has agents in opposition parties. Museveni can't be unseated with his agents still in our midst. Museveni can't be defeated when aspiring leaders prefer to keep quiet or talk in vague terms to buy popularity with every stakeholder. Future leaders must speak up and spell out their policies and strategies should they have the opportunity to play a role in Uganda's future. UDU already has a Recovery Plan and a core of seasoned leadership inside and outside Uganda, some of it not yet disclosed. United we stand, divided we fall.
Eric Kashambuzi
Secretary General & Chief Administrator, UDU