Kuna kipindi kulikuwa na thread humu iliyomtuhumu Dr Shayo kuwa ni Plagiarist aliyebobea na kuna watu waliquestion mpaka authenticity ya kuitwa "Dr"
Well...Juzi kamwaga article kule Michuzi Blog ( JF hatii mguu maana huku kuna wale arm chair critics ambao they enjoy nothing but kunyambua makala kama za akina Shayo). Jamaa aliandika article Michuzi on Libya kumbe si yake na haku acknowledge source
Sasa wenye article yao ni gazeti hili la Egypt wamescan wakakuta kuwa huyu Dr wa Michuzi alinyofoa article kwao bila kutoa reference:
Nimeona bora niiwahi kabla Dr wa Michuzi hajaamka akaomba iondolewe katika ile style ya kuchomoa kama anazofanya Mange kwenye blog yake kule.
nimeshindwa ku copy na kuleta hiyo allegation humu lakini mwenye uwezo naomba awahi kabla Michuzi hajaifuta.
The conspiracy in me kinda thinks hii ni set up ya the other dude by the name of JOHN MASHAKA
article aliyoiiba SHAYO hii hapa:
Al-Ahram Weekly | Opinion | The end of change from abroad
na akaenda kuibandika michuzi hapa:
http://issamichuzi.blogspot.com/2011/03/democracy-at-barrel-of-gun-doesnt-work.html#comments
Al Ahram wenyewe naona kuna SNITCH kaenda kuwaaambia kuhusu huu wizi wanataka maelezo toka kwa michuzi hapa:
http://issamichuzi.blogspot.com/2011/03/authenticity-of-article-dr-shayo.html
kwa kuongezea tuu ni kuwa in 2008 alishawahi kuchambuliwa vilivyo hapa JF kwenye thread iliopo hapa:
https://www.jamiiforums.com/celebrities-forum/21236-dr-hildebrand-shayo.html
kwenye ile thread inasemekana mwenyewe au mtu wake wa Karibu alikuja kuweka records sawa na kumwaga wasifu wake kwa kusema hivi:
jamani kama reference yake ni Dr NCHIMBI then we have a problem kwa sababu Nchimbi naye PhD yake jamaa wamei question sana
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nimepitia hizo links, inasikitisha, amefanya watu kwenye blog ya michuzi wampongeze na kumsifu kwa contributions zake kwenye jamii na bara la afrika..duh, itabidi aombe msamaha.
huyu jamaa (Dr) na yeye anasikitisha sana, watu wana plagiarize sana tena, lakini sio ku copy na ku paste article nzima, watu hua wanachomoa angalau ideas au lines kadhaa...
hii aina ya plagiarism inaonyesha kwamba huyu jamaa hana kabisa uwezo wa kufikiria hata kidogo mpaka kashindwa hata kubadilisha maneno!
Hivi huyu jamaa anatoa wapi ujasiri wa kujitokeza hadi kugombea nafasi za public office bila hofu yoyote?
hapa mimi naona ni wivu tuu
kweli jamaa ni mweupe kichwani lakini ndio kashakula dume tena
Nimefunfua link jamaa ka-copy na ku-paste. Kwa nini ili kulinda heshima yake ya Phd hasingebadilisha hata kidogo akaweka kingereza chake au hakipandi? Uhenda ikawa hata Thesis zake alikuwa anaiba research za watu na kudefend kama yake.
Yeye kama Dr msomi alitakiwa asome article apate idea then ifanyie ukarabati kwa kuongeza na hoja zake na siyo kunyofoa kama original na kuchapika kwa Michuzi.
Dr Mwakyembe kakosea kumweka kwenye Board ya Wakurugenzi ya Bandari. haifai kabisa kuitwa katika jamii ya wasomi
[h=2]Authenticity of the Article; Dr. Shayo Cautions Western Powers: Democracy at the Barrel of a Gun doesnt work[/h]
by Dar es salaam , Tanzania on Tuesday, 22 March 2011 at 10:02 ·
Hello Blog owner
This is an open letter and we would like to request you to publish it in your blog for all your readers and writers to read.
We have read in dismay, a paper that was recently published in your blog by Doctor Shayo; Dr. Shayo Cautions Western Powers: Democracy at the Barrel of a Gun Doesn't work which is a copy-paste of an article in one of our oldest and reputable newspaper here in Egypt, Al-ahram. Please refer to the article by Azmi Ashour (Managing Editor), The End of Change from Abroad inAl-Ahram Weekly | Front Page2011/1036/op174.htm
We would like you as the owner of this blog to authenticate the legality of using this article in your blog without prior consent of the original author, Mr. Azmi or the management of Al-ahram. I would like to edify you and your readers/writers that to use someones intellectual work for your own interest without prior consent of the owner of such article or work is a serious offense against intellectual property laws and it may result into serious legal action. Please understand this is a serious matter and that you should take serious measures to repudiate the thievery by your writer in your blog. This is the initial contact with you. You will be contacted soon by the author himself and/ or the management of the company Al-ahram or our lawyers for further clarification and follow-up. We advice you to take immediate action presage your writers about plagiarism and your action to post this open letter in your blog will show us your commitment to resolve this.
Thank you for your understanding
ALAIHISSALATU WASSALAM
Sanjeeve
(Contributor, Al-ahram, Egypt)
pril 30, 2004
hoover digest » 2004 no. 2 » international relations
Why Gun-Barrel Democracy Doesn't Work
by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs
Over the past half century, the United States has repeatedly sent its military forces abroad in the name of democracy. Yet very few of the countries we have invaded have become democratic. By Hoover fellow Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs.
When it involves itself in the affairs of others, the United States likes to say that it is doing so in defense of freedom and democracy. That's what we said in Iraq, among other things, when we toppled Saddam Hussein. That was part (though not all) of our argument for going after the Taliban in Afghanistan. But it's also what we said in Vietnam in the 1960s, in Grenada in 1983, in Panama in 1989, and in numerous other interventions during the twentieth century.
In fact, presidents rarely fail to trot out "democracy" as a justification for their actions abroad. That's because it is popular with Americans, who like to feel they are on the side of the angels. But if it's democracy we're after, we are failing miserably.
Between World War II and the present, the United States intervened more than 35 times in developing countries around the world. But our research shows that in only one case-Colombia after the American decision in 1989 to engage in the war on drugs-did a full-fledged, stable democracy with limits on executive power, clear rules for the transition of power, universal adult suffrage, and competitive elections emerge within 10 years. That's a success rate of less than 3 percent.
After other interventions-such as Guatemala (1954), Nicaragua (1978 and 1982), and Thailand (1966)-various trappings of democracy, such as noncompetitive elections and a limited franchise, were added in the decade that followed, but the critical elements of a fully developed democracy simply never emerged.
The results of our engagements in Lebanon (1958), the Republic of the Congo (1967), and, again, Guatemala (1966, 1972) were more dismal still. In these cases intervention was actually followed by deterioration in the modest progress these states had achieved. For instance, the Guatemalan executive was substantially less constrained by law or by the legislature in 1982 than in 1972.
We reached these conclusions by correlating known interventions-including not just large-scale wars but also small actions like flyovers or "advisory" missions-with what is known as the Polity IV Index, an academically accepted measure of the status of democracy and autocracy country by country and year by year. Although cause and effect cannot always be determined, what is clear is that, time after time, American engagement abroad has not led to more freedom or more democracy in the countries where we've become involved.
Why does the United States show such unimpressive results? Whatever the problem is, it isn't exclusive to the United States; the record of other interveners-both democratic and non-democratic-is no better. Neither Britain, France, Canada, nor any other country has an enviable record of creating democracy by military intervention. Nor can the problems be blamed on the countries in which we chose to intervene. Although many of these interventions took place in poor countries where the education level was low and where there was little previous experience with democratic institutions, there is scant evidence to suggest that this is why democracy failed to take hold. In fact, neighboring countries generally experienced more progress toward democracy in the ensuing decade than did the states where the intervention occurred. Moreover, even under the best conditions, the chances of success for externally imposed democracy were quite small.
We think a better explanation lies in the inherent tension between America's stated desire to implement democratic processes in the intervened-in nations and its desire to ensure that these nations will pursue policies that reflect U.S. interests. Conflict between these two goals is almost inevitable, except in the case of primarily humanitarian interventions, which are quite rare and often fail because of a lack of commitment on the part of the interveners (as in the case of Somalia in 1993).
In the typical cases, the United States-like other interveners-has been motivated less by a desire to establish democracy or reduce human suffering than to alter some aspect of the target state's policy. (For instance, the recent invasion of Afghanistan was aimed more at ending that country's support for Osama bin Laden than at bringing democracy to its people.) Although democracy would no doubt be a nice by-product, it is rarely the most important goal.
In many cases, such as Iraq, American administrations have strong incentives to leave as little as possible to chance. This is because the "Iraq holds the key to winning the war on terror" rhetoric that mobilizes public support for the war leads the same public to expect the Iraqi government that emerges to be an ally in that battle. The creation of a state that is critical of U.S. policy, much less one that is openly sympathetic to enemies of U.S. interests, is simply not an acceptable result.
Unfortunately, the goal of leaving as little as possible to chance is incompatible with the goal of promoting democracy. There's no guarantee that free, fair, open elections in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan will produce governments that back fundamental U.S. policies like opposition to terrorism, a commitment to the free flow of oil to the West, and support for the Middle East peace process.
The far more reliable path to a favorable policy outcome is to (a) prop up leaders-usually autocrats-who have a demonstrated track record of sympathy with U.S. goals; (b) appoint a U.S.-interest-dominated "acting government" and then charge it with holding free and fair elections when conditions permit; and (c) design an electoral process that is virtually certain to elect a sympathetic government and promote the dominance of single-party rule or weak central authority for the foreseeable future (the often-forgotten outcome in some of the best cases, such as Japan and Germany).
Experience has taught us that these strategies rarely, if ever, lead to anything that looks and functions like a genuine democracy in the short or medium term. But they do give the administration of the intervening country the kind of ally it needs to help achieve its foreign policy goals abroad and its electoral goals at home.
Happy to be free of the burdens of war, voters back home are generally willing to embrace their administration's assurances that however imperfect the new government might appear to nitpickers, it is now well on the road to democracy. In the case of Iraq, the only ones who will notice that the "model democracy" is really more of an autocracy-or a loose confederation of three separate autocratic states-on the road to nowhere will be its citizens and those of the other Middle Eastern countries.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Silver Professor of Politics at New York University.
George W. Downs is dean of social science and professor of politics at New York University.
This essay appeared in the Los Angeles Times on February 4, 2004. Available from the Hoover Press is The Transnational Dimension of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, edited by Abraham D. Sofaer and Seymour E. Goodman. Also available is The New Terror: Facing the Threat of Biological and Chemical Weapons, edited by Sidney D. Drell, Abraham D. Sofaer, and George D. Wilson. To order, call 800.935.2882.
Dr Shayo cautions western powers: "Democracy at the barrel of a gun doesn't work!
by Dar es salaam , Tanzania on Sunday, 20 March 2011 at 09:15 ·
By Dr. Hildelbrand Shayo
Will 2011 mark the year of the fall of Arab dictatorships and the end of the maxims that helped keep them alive? Egypt's unprecedented youth revolution, which brought millions of people from all the diverse sectors of society into the streets to tell that country's dictator for 30 years to leave, and its success in achieving this aim, furnishes tangible proof of the failure of the notion that democracy can be imposed from abroad by military force or by pressuring authoritarian regimes to democratise while supporting their self-perpetuation in order to safeguard foreign interests.
Huge question marks now hang over the policies of Western powers, and the US in particular, not only in light of the results and repercussions of the Egyptian revolution but also in light of the events in other Arab countries, such as unfolding crisis in Libya and Yemen, where sustained mass protest campaigns strive to overthrow rulers who have been in power for decades.
Sometimes history can help countries avoid making the same mistakes, especially when the mistakes are repeated in the same general area, environment and culture. The attacks of 11 September 2001 galvanised the Bush administration into adopting a strategy aimed at eliminating what it regarded as the root causes behind this event, notably the lack of democracy, rampant corruption and the consequent spread of radicalism. The strategy was to employ military force in order to supplant despotic regimes with democratic governments.
Afghanistan and Iraq were the first countries to be targeted by this strategy. There were significant differences between the socio-political orders in the two societies. In Afghanistan, conditions had so deteriorated as to clear the way for radical forces to outbid each other in the struggle for power, a process that resulted in Taliban rule and a secure base for Al-Qaeda, which masterminded the 11 September attacks.
Iraq, meanwhile, had long been in the grip of an authoritarian regime that not only repressed its own people but also began to threaten its neighbours and the Western interests that were vested in these countries. In all events, almost 10 years later, following the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan and the enormous human and material toll that ensued, it is palpably apparent that democracy did not win out.
Indeed, the contrary occurred: radicalism increased, social and sectarian violence proliferated, and neighbouring powers extended their tentacles into these countries by manipulating sectarian and ideological divides, all of which worked to prolong tensions and perpetuate instability.
Not only did the US fail to bring democracy at the barrel of a gun, it also failed to do so through the use of "soft power", in the form of economic aid and educational training and assistance. The problem with this strategy was twofold. On the one hand, it was excessively idealistic and divorced from realities on the ground. On the other, it was closely linked to the promotion and protection of US interests. The use of soft power thus became prey to the logic of the use of military force. The absence of democracy and abuses of human rights were reduced from moral wrongs to foreign policy or negotiating instruments, wielded by the State Department as it saw fit, in order to pressure on non- democratic governments.
To round out the picture, Washington funded many human rights and pro-democracy societies and NGOs in order to create a kind of bargaining front, regardless of how effectively these groups were in disseminating human rights awareness and democratic culture. Observers of such organisations soon discovered that they had become goldmines for certain segments of the intelligentsia, that the pace of their activities was synched with American election seasons, and the periodic conferences that accompany them, and that their publications were devoid of analytical and factual substance.
In sharp contrast to the two previous approaches to democratic transformation are the home grown modern revolutions that unfolded in Tunisia and then Egypt. To a large extent these were the product of the new virtual reality, which has become a major source for shaping the awareness of youth in many societies governed by dictatorial regimes. This, in turn, has worked to break down the barriers of fear and deception that had once been secured by the slogans and lies of government propaganda machines.
The positive outcome of this was reflected in the rise of protest movements, as exemplified by the Kifaya (Enough) Movement in Egypt. Beginning as a relatively small activist movement in 2004, Kifaya sparked the growth of parallel movements in subsequent years. The mutual feedback between these groups in virtual space enhanced their ability to address social concerns while developing the political consciousness of young people through blogging and social networking websites.
Simultaneously, the proliferation of the independent media became the "unknown soldier" who cast into relief all the protest movements and other activist movements over the years and helped catalyse an ongoing process of fermentation. The result was that barely a day went by without a strike by the workers of a privatised factory, a sit-in by employees demanding salary raises to help them meet the soaring costs of living, and other protest actions of various forms with varying aims. These, too, combined to shape the new mentality of the youth, whose determination to bring change grew all the more resolved in the face of the deliberate blindness and entrenched stubbornness of a regime that refused to respect their aspirations for real economic growth, as opposed to the plundering of the country by a coterie of super wealthy business magnates, and for political rights and an effective voice in public affairs, as opposed to a voice artificially produced by forged elections.
The result of the interaction between all these factors was the explosion of the revolution of anger that surpassed all expectations and that simultaneously put paid to all arguments and assumptions that change can be imposed from abroad by the use of military force. While that logic has hopefully died in the debris of the tragedies it wrought in Afghanistan and Iraq, the voices of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt resound with the news that democratisation and change can come from within, spearheaded by the robust and vibrant mentality of our new generations.
God bless Africa
shayoh@lsbu.ac.uk
Hacheni wivu