Ibara ya 30:5

[Augustoons]

Mhe,Mwanakijiji
Nimejibu maombi yako na kufanya kazi uliyonituma hapa:
MJADALA KUHUSU IBARA YA 30(5) YA KATIBA YA JAMHURI YA MUUNGANO WA TANZANIA, 1977.
UTANGULIZI.

Ndugu Wadau,
Hapa JF kulibuka mjadala mkali sana kuhusu ibara ya 30(5) ya katiba ya Tanzania,mjadala ambao uliiibuliwa na Mwanakijiji akitaka kujua mambo yafuatayo:-

1. Je,mahakama ikisema sheria Fulani ni batili na kinyume cha katiba kwa mujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) sheria hiyo inatenguka mara moja?

2. Je, neno “badala” linapotumika katika ibara tajwa hapo juu ni sawa au neon baada ndilo lingetumika?

3. Kama mahakama inasema sheria Fulani ni kinyume cha katiba ni kwa msingi gani sheria hiyo inaendelea kutumika?

Watu mbalimbali walichangai mada hii,kiasi cha kupelekea kuibua hoja au maswali mengine mengi (ambayo kisheria nayaita issues) yaliyohusiana na ibara hiyo.Moja ya maswali hayo ni kma yafuatayo:-

1. Je,nini kitatokea iwapo mahakama imeipa serikali muda wa maalumu mathalani miezi 3 kurekebisha sheria na serikali haikufanya hivyo,ipi ni hadhi(status) ya hiyo sheria au kipengele chake?

2. Je,mamlaka au uwezo wa mahakama kuamua au kutoamua kutenda jambo Fulani(discretion) unatoka wapi?mbona hauelezwi kwenye katiba?

3. Je,nini kitatokea kwa wafungwa waliokwisha hukumiwa mf.kifo iwapo mahakama itatengua sheria ya adhabu ya kifo kuwa ni kinyume na katiba na hivyo ni batili?

4. Unaposoma iara ya 30(5) unaona tatizo gani kubwa ambalo linasababisha kutotekelezwa kwa hukumu ya mahakama kuu kuhusu wagombea binafsi?

5. Je,kitendo cha kukata rufaa kinaweza kusimamisha utakelezajiwa hukumu ya mahakama ya chini iayokatiwa rufaa?

6. Je,mahakama inapotoa mwanya wa serikali kurekebisha sheria yake ambayo yenyewe imeiona kupingana na katiba je,hiyo itawakilishwa vipi serikalini?

Kutokana na umuhimu wa mjadala wenyewe,Mwanakijiji aliniomba nitoa legal opinion au nitoea summary ya majadiliano yote na majibu yangu katika mjadala huu kwa faida ya jamii ya jf na wengineo. Nami kwa kuheshimu ombi la mwanakijiji na jamii nyingine inayotaka kujua kuhusu katiba nimekubali kutumia muda wangu mwingi na akili kutoa maelezo yanayohusiana na ibara hiyo.Natambua kuwa hata baada ya kutoa maelezo haya wapo watu ambao yatawasumbua au watayahoji,au kutokubaliana nayo kabisa,lakini mimi nayatoa huku nikiamini hiyo ndiyo sheria kwa mujibu wa ufahamu na imani yangu kulingana na maamuzi mbalimbali ya mahakama.Bado wasioelewa nitaendelea kushirikiana nao kwa nia ya kujenga na wale tutakaotofautiana nitakubali kutofatiana nao kwani “lawyers always agree to disagree”.Kabla hatujaendelea na mjadala wenyewe ngoja ninukuu ibara ya 30(5) ya katiba ya Tanzania kama inavyosomeka kwenye toleo la mwaka 2000.

.
(Msisitizo wa kwangu mwenyewe)

MADA YENYEWE.

Mada hii kwa ujumla wake inahusu uhuru wa mahakama, kwa kimombo “independence of judiciary” lakini pia inagusa mawanyo wa madaraka(separation of power).Kama makavyoona apo juu maswali ya msingi ni machache lakini yameibua maswali ya nyongeza sita au zaidi ya hayo. Ili kuelewa mada hii nitaanza na kueleza chanzo au chimbuko la uwezo wa mahakama hasa katika nchi za jumuiya ya madola.

Mahakama ya Tanzania kama zilivyo mahakama nyingine duniani pote zinayo mamlaka na nguvu za kutoa maamuzi yene athari mbalimbali.Uwezo huu huitwa jurisdiction.Katika masuala ya katiba na haki za msingi za watu mahakama ina mamlaka ya pekee na ya asili(exclusive and inherent jurisdiction).Uwezo au mamlaka haya hautokani na katiba wala sheria yoyote kama nilivyosema ni uwezo wa asili ambao mahakama ina wivu sana mara uwezo huu unapotaka kuondolewa.Uwezo na mamlaka haya vimeafikiwa na katiba ya jamhuri ya muungano wa Tanzania ibara ya 107A na 107B lakini pia vimesisitizwa katika ibara ya 108(2) ambapo inasema:-


au
”

Nimewekea uzito neno mila za sheria kwa sababu maalumu. Mila za sheria zinazotumika Tanzania tulizipokea tangu tarehe 22 july 1920 kupitia kitu kinachoitwa Receptio clause kwa sheria inayoitwa The Judicature and Aplication of Laws Ordinace(JALO).JALO hili ndilo lililoleta sheria hapa Tanzania zikitokea uinereza kupitia India,ambapo tangu wakati huo mahakama kuu ya Tanzania inafunwa na maamuzi yake yenyewe na yale ya iliyo juu yake.Na kwamba mahakama kuu itatumia maaamuzi yaliyopita(precedents) katika kuamua mgogoro uliopo mbele yake na vilevile Common law, statutes of general application na doctrines of equity ambazo zinatumika uingereza kwa tarehe ile na ambazo hazijatanguliwa bado.Athari ya kifungu hiki ni kuirithisha mahakama ya Tanzania uwezo asilia na mila za mahakama duniani pote.Mila hizi ni zile zinazoifanya iwe na uwezo wa kukitolea maamuzi kitu chochote,kutangua au kutengua sheria inayokinzana na katiba,kutoa amri mbalimbali(interlocutory or interim orders) na vilevile mamlaka ya usimamizi na kufanya judicial review.Mfano wa mahali ambapo mahakama inaweza kutumia uwezo wake wa asili(inherent power) hata bila kuombwa kutoa maamuzi ni kama hapa:

“”

Kutokana na hali hii,mara baada ya uhuru wa Tanganyika 1961 mahakama kuu iliendelea na mamlaka yake na kuendelea kuzifuta sheria nyingi au vipenele vya sheria vilivyokinzana na katiba.Hali hii ilijitokeza sana hasa baada ya kuingizwa haki za msingi za binadamu katika katiba(Bill of rights).Baada ya kuona kuwa mahakama inatangaza sheria nyingi kukinzana na katiba na hivyo ni batili(unconstitutional and therefore null and void),serikali ilishituka na kuamua kukianyiamarekebsho kifungu cha 30 cha katiba kwa kuongeza ibara (5) ili kubana uhuru wa mahakama katika kufuta sheria zake na sababu ambazo wao walisema mahakama isiiingilie uhuru wa bunge kwa kufuta sheria ilizozitunga.Moja ya kesi maarufu sana ambapo mahakama kuu ilizifuta sheria zinazopingana na katiba ni kama ifuatavyo:-Daudi Pete v R,ambapo mahakama kuu ilikifuta kifungu cha 148(5) cha sheria ya mwenendo wa makosa ya jinai kilichokuwa kinanyima dhamana mtuhumiwa wa kesi ya unyang’anyi.Mahakama ya rufani ilikubaliana na jaji mwalusanya kuwa kipengele hicho ni kinyume cha katiba na hivyo ilikifuta mara moja kwa kusema

“.

Ambapo ni katika kesi hii pia ulijitokeza utata kuhusu ipi ni tafsiri halali ya katiba ya Tanzania je ni ile ya kiingereza au ya Kiswahili, mahakama ilisema hivi(nanukuu);



Mahakama pia iliwahi kuifuta sheria katika kesi ya KUKUTIA OLE PUMBUN and others v AG,JULIUS ISHENGOMA NDYANABO Vs.AG(Civil Appeal No. 64 of 2001) (,MBUSHUU DOMINIC V.R[1995] TLR 97,PETER NG’OMANGO V.GERSON MWANGWA AND AG(Civil Application No. 33 of 2002), LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE (LHRC) AND OTHERS V ATTORNEY GENERAL (1) (Miscellaneous Civil Case No 77 of 2005) [2006] TZHC 1 (24 April 2006)[MAARUFU KAMA KESI YA TAKRIMA] na nyingine nyingi.

Katika kesi zote hizi mahakama imetumia uwezo wake asilia(inherent power) kuzifuta sheria ama kuipa serikali muda kuzibadilisha,na ndio maana tunasema mahakama inayo discretion yaani uwezo wa kuipa serikali muda wa kurekebisha sheria husika ama kuitangaza moja kwa moja kuwa ni batili na hivyo kuifuta kwenye vitabu vya sheria.Sasa tunakuja wenye maswali ya Mwanakiji kama ifuatavyo:-

1. Je,mahakama ikisema sheria Fulani ni batili na kinyume cha katiba kwa mujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) sheria hiyo inatenguka mara moja?

Jibu hapa ni ndiyo,sheria hiyo inatenguka mara moja,kwani neon batili maana yake kwa kiingereza void na kwa tafsiri ya kisheria void maana yakeni sawa sawa na hicho kitu hakikuwepo vile.Hivyo mahakama ikishasema imeridhika kuwa sheria hiyo inakinzana na katiba na hivyo ni batili basi serikali haina ubavu tena wa kuibadili kwa kuwa huwezi kubadili kitu ambacho hakikuwepo.Madhara yake ni sheria hiyo kutenguka mara moja na mtu aliekuwa ameshitakiwa kuachiliwa huru mara moja bila masharti.(kwa uhakika angalia hiyo hukumu ya Daudi Pete mahakama imesemaje)mwisho wa kesi sentensi ya mwisho mahakama ilisema hivi(nanukuu) “Thus we dismiss the appeal. Since the respondent is already a free man, we make no order inrespect of him”. Mifano hai ya sheria kutenguka yanyewe ni katika kesi ya MTIKILA V.AG(ile kesi ya kwanza kabisa),Daudi pete v.R,Kukutia Ole Pumbun,Peter Ng’omango v.R n.k)

2. Je, neno “badala” linapotumika katika ibara tajwa hapo juu ni sawa au neon baada ndilo lingetumika?

Neno badala linapotumika katika ibara ya 30:5 hapo juu ni sahihi kabisa kwa kuwa neon hilo kwa kiingereza lnamaanisha “instead of” wakati neon baada linamaanisha “after”.Badala mzizi wake ni badili,hivyo badala ya kutamka kwa ni batili,mahakama itaipa serikali muda wa kuirekebisha.Hivyo hapo hakuna tatizo kabisa.


3. Kama mahakama inasema sheria Fulani ni kinyume cha katiba ni kwa msingi gani sheria hiyo inaendelea kutumika

Sheria hiyo inaendelea kutumika kwa misingi ya ibara ya 30(5) ya katiba ambapo kama sheria inapingana na katiba basi sheria hiyo kama haikutamkwa kuwa ni batili(void) itakuwa ni batilifu(voidable).Kitu kinapokuwa voidable au batilifu,ni halali bado ila kinawezwa kuepukwa kwa kutangazwa void kwa chaguo la upande wowote(ie. It may be avoided at the option of either parties).Either parties hapa ni serikali na mahakama,iwapo mahakama imeipa muda serikali kuirekebisha hiyo sheria,sheria hiyo itakuwa batilifu(voidable) hadi ule muda upite ndipo itakuwa batili(void).Kuthibitisha hilo ibara hii inajieleza
“na sheria hiyo au hatua inayohusika itaendelea kuhesabiwa kuwa ni
halali hadi ama marekebisho yatakapofanywa au muda
uliowekwa na Mahakama Kuu utakapokwisha”
Hivyo basi muda wa mahakama ukiisha sheria hiyo ni batili kama haujaisha sheria hiyo ni halali,na watu wataendelea kuhukumiwa au kuhudumiwa kwa kutumia hiyo sheria hadi serikali itakapoirekebisha au muda husika kwisha.

Angalisho:

Jambo la kuzingatia hapa ni kwamba si lazima sheria inayopingana na katiba kuwa batili,sheria au kipengele cha sheria kinaweza kupingana na katiba lakini bado kisiwe batili.Ni mahakama peke yake ndiyo yenye uwezo wa kutangaza kipengele Fulani kuwa ni batili.Kwani mara nyingi inatokea kwamba kipengele Fulani ni batili lakini kinakuwa na saving provision ambayo inacure huo ubatili na kukifanya kiendelee kuwa halali.mfano katika kesi ya Mbushuu mahakama pamoja na kukubaliana kuwa “The death penalty, and hanging in particular, is inherently inhuman, cruel and Degrading” ilisema “The death penalty provision could be saved by Art 30(2) of the Constitution which allows a law to derogate or limit an individual’s basic rights on public
interest grounds ”

Hata hivyo kuokolewa huku kwa kipengele ambacho ni kinyume na katiba hakuji moja kwa moja(automatic) lazima kipengele hicho kikidhi jaribio au kipimo kimoja kinachoitwa proportionality test, kama ambavyo jaji anaeleza hapa.

”.

Kikishindwa kukidhi kipimo hicho kipengele husika lazima kianguke.
Hivyo basi ni mpaka pale mahakama iakapomalizia kama hivi

“” .

Kwa kuongezea tu ni kwamba “In order to determine whether a particular law is repugnant or inconsistent with the fundamental rights it is the provisions of the act that must be looked at and not the manner in which the power under the provisions is actually exercised. Inconsistency or repugnancy does not depend upon the exercise of the power by virtue of the provisions in the Act but on the nature of the provisions themselves” .

4. Je,nini kitatokea kwa wafungwa waliokwisha hukumiwa mf.kifo iwapo mahakama itatengua sheria ya adhabu ya kifo kuwa ni kinyume na katiba na hivyo ni batili?

Bado watanyongwa endapo walihukumiwa kabla ya sheria hiyo kutangazwa kuwa kinyume cha katiba,kwani ni mahakama hiyohiyo ambayo iliwahukumu kifo hivyo uamuzi wake unaifunga.Lakini ikumbukwe kuwa kazi ya mahakama inaishia pale kwenye kuhukumu,utekelezaji wake sio kazi ya mahakama ni kazi ya serikali(executive).Hivyo iwapo let say umehukumiwa kunyongwa leo,kesho katika kesi nyingine mtu akachallenge adhabu ya kifo kuwa ni unconstitutional kama alivyofanya mbushuu dominic na wenzake,na mahakama ikakubaliana nao na kuwapa miezi 3 wairekebishe hiyo sheria serikali haikuirekebisha,na wewe uliyehukumiwa jana hukukata rufaa(japo kwenye kesi za hukumu ya kifo hii huwa automatic right) basi utanyongwa kama serikali ikiamua unyongwe na yule aliyechallenge adhabu hiyo atakuwa amesalimika kwani baada ya hiyo miezi mitatu adhabu ya kifo haitakuwa sheria tena.

Kila kesi ikija mahakamani watu kwa kutumia doctrine of precedents au stare decisis watatumia uamuzi wa mahakama hiyohiyo kujiokoa,unless kama uamuzi huo ulitupiliwa mbali na mahakama ya juu.Vilevile mahakama ikitangaza mara moja kuwa adhabu ya kifo ni kinyume cha katiba na hivyo ni batili,basi ni jukumu la AG kukata rufaa mahakama ya rufani au kutokata rufani ambapo itamaanisha amekubaliana na mahakama kuu. Hata hivyo atakayefaidika na umauzi huo ni huyu mshitakiwa wa mwisho wale waliokwisha hukumiwa huko nyuma hawana haki.


5. Je,kitendo cha kukata rufaa kinaweza kusimamisha utakelezajiwa hukumu ya mahakama ya chini inayokatiwa rufaa.

Katika kesi za kawaida zisizohusu katiba au haki za binadamu,uamuzi wa kukata rufaa au rufaa yenyewe haisimamishi moja kwa moja utekelezaji wa maamuzi ya mahakama ya chini.Utekelezaji utasimamishwa tu endapo mkata rufani amepeleka pia maombi ya kusimamisha utekelezaji wa hukumu(yaani stay of execution). Ifahamike wazi pia kuwa hata ukishinda kesi ya madai kama hukukazia hukumu Yule unayemdai hawezi kuanza kukulipa hivyo lazima upeleke maombi mengine baada ya hukumu kukazia hukumu hasa pale ambapo hataki kulipa kwa hiyari yake baada ya kuwa umemshinda kesi.
Kesi za katiba zinaongozwa na katiba yenyewe,basic right and duties enforcement Act,Appelate jurisdiction Act(kwa upande wa rufaa).Mtikila alishinda madai yake katika mahakama kuu,serikali ikawasilisha kusudio la kukata rufaa.Ieleweke kuwa kusudio la kukata rufaa sio rufaa wala maombi ya rufaa.Unaweza kupeleka kusudio la kukata rufaa halafu muda ukapita usikate rufaa bado maamuzi ya mahakama ya awali yatasimama tu na kuwa sheria.Ila kama serikali ilipeleka kusudio la kukata rufaa na baadaye maombi ya kukata rufaa,basi kwa kesi za katiba maombi hayo pia yanatumika kama stay of execution.Hivyo uamuzi wa mahakama kuu umesimamishwa kwa muda,ambapo mahakama ya rufani ikiuthibitisha utakuwa sheria na ikiutangua(quash) basi uamuzi wa mahakama kuu utaanguka na ule wa mahakama ya rufani kuwa sheria.

Yapo matukio mbalimbali ambapo serikali imewahi kuwasilisha kusudio la kukata rufaa,halafu baadaye ikaahirisha kupeleka maombi ya rufaa kwa kuwa ndani ya serikali yenyewe tayari kulikuwa namchakato wa kubadili sheria hiyoMfano halisi ni ile kesi ya takrima ambapo AG alikusudia kukata rufaa baadaye akawithdraw kwa kuwa tayari rais alishakuwa na nia ya serikali kubadili sheria hiyo.

6. Je,mahakama inapotoa mwanya wa serikali kurekebisha sheria yake ambayo yenyewe
imeiona kupingana na katiba je,hiyo itawakilishwa vipi serikalini?

Mwakilishi wa serikali katika kesi za kikatiba na madai zinazohusu serikali ni mwanasheria mkuu (AG), hivyo mahakama ikitoa uamuzi aina haja ya kuiandikia serikali ile hukumu inatosha kabisa kuwa notice kwa serikali kupitia AG(state attorney).

7. Unaposoma ibara ya 30(5) unaona tatizo gani kubwa ambalo linasababisha kutotekelezwa kwa hukumu ya mahakama kuu kuhusu wagombea binafsi?

Kwa maoni yangu mimi binafsi, ninaposoma ibara tajwa apo juu kuhusiana na suala la uekelezaji wa hukumu ya mgombea binafsi,kwa kweli Napata utata,nashindwa kuelewa ni kwa nini serikali haikukata rufaa kwenye ile hukumu ya mwanzo mwaka 1995 na inataka kukata sasa,je,hizo sio delaying techniques?Hii inaonesha nia isiyo ya dhati ya serikali kutekeleza na kuheshimu maamuzi ya mahakama zetu.Mahakama katika kesi ya MTIKILA V.AG (Lugakingira J),imesema wazi kabisa kuwa

“
Na jaji Manento kumalizia kuwa;
“.

It is so ordered.


A.R. MANENO
PRINCIPAL JUDGE”
Hivyo hii hukumu ya jaji Manento ndiyo iliyotoa muda kwa serikali kurekebisha sheria zake hadi uchaguzi mkuu mwingine ufike, wakati ile ya Lugakingira ilitoa haki kwa wagombea binafsi bila kutaja muda maalumu wa serikali kufanya hivyo.Nadhani wakati sasa umefika wa hukumu hizi kukaziwa kwa kupata msimamo wa mahakama ya rufani kuhsu suala hili,ili tujue tuakuwa na mgombea binafsi ama la?Hivyo kwangu mimi tatizo apa sio ibara bali serikali yetu na bunge.
Katika hukumu ya kesi ile ya Uchaguzi wa Tunduru mahakama kuu haikugusia suala la mgombea binafsi,bali ilijikita sana katika interim injunction na atahri zake kwa taifa na wagombea wengine waliokwisha kuanza kampeni.Hivyo mtikila hakushindwa on the basis kwamba mgombea binafsi haruhusiwi Tanzania bali athari za amri ya mahakama juu ya watu waliokwisha tumia pesa zao,muda nk katika kampeni,pia haki yao ya kusikilizwa.Maamuzi hayo yalizingatia ibara ya 107A(2) na kesi ya ATILIO V.MBOWE iliyokuja kuthibitishwa na Glaxo Group Limited v Agri-Vet Limited. Hivyo ieleweke kwamba katika kesi hii mahakama kuu haikutengua maamuzi yake yenyewe kwenye kesi zilizopita kuhsu mgombea binafsi.Hata hivyo bado kesi hii ilitusumbua wengi,penginepo wengine tulifikiri majaji hapa walishindwa kutumia uwezo wao na mamlaka kisawa sawa kwa kuihofia serikali hasa ukichukulia majaji hawa(Jaji Chande Othman, Jaji Robert Makaramba na Jaji Amir Mruma) waliosikiliza kesi hiyo walikuwa tu wametoka kuteuliwa muda si mrefu na Rais,hivyo labda walihofia kumwangusha.
wa
Kwa kumalizia, nawashukuru sana wachangiaji wote wa mjadala huu na hasa mwanakijiji kwa kunipa nafasi hii kuieleimisha jamii juu ya mambo kadhaa yahusuyo sheria na katiba.Nafahamu bado wengi wetu tuna kiu ya kujua zaidi lakini kwa haya machache nadhani yatawasaidia.Asaneni sana.
Mwandishi anapatikana kwa barua pepe augustoons@yahoo.co.uk

Nadhani hapa sasa mada iko clear,au vipi wadau?

 

[Kuhani]

Nadhani hapa sasa mada iko clear,au vipi wadau?

Kwenye "inherent power" za Mahakama hicho kitu sijawahi kukisikia kama ulivyokieleza hapa.

Pia, kwenye ubatili wa sheria ambayo iko kinyume na katiba bado kuna mkanganyiko hapo. Kuna sehemu unasema kwamba kuna sheria ilionekana ni kinyume cha Katiba kwa hiyo ni batili, halafu baadae unakuja unasema kilichokuwa kinyume na Katiba sio lazima kiwe batili.

Sasa hayo mambo mawili ndio yako katikati ya huu mjadala, na hayajajibiwa.

Mahakama kuu imepata wapi hizo "inherent powers" ambazo hazipo kwenye Katiba wala kuwa construed kwenye uamuzi wowote wa nyuma. Na hilo la ubatili vs. sio batili halina jibu.

 

[Augustoons]

Kwenye "inherent power" za Mahakama hicho kitu sijawahi kukisikia kama ulivyokieleza hapa.

Pia, kwenye ubatili wa sheria ambayo iko kinyume na katiba bado kuna mkanganyiko hapo. Kuna sehemu unasema kwamba kuna sheria ilionekana ni kinyume cha Katiba kwa hiyo ni batili, halafu baadae unakuja unasema kilichokuwa kinyume na Katiba sio lazima kiwe batili.

Sasa hayo mambo mawili ndio yako katikati ya huu mjadala, na hayajajibiwa.

Mahakama kuu imepata wapi hizo "inherent powers" ambazo hazipo kwenye Katiba wala kuwa construed kwenye uamuzi wowote wa nyuma. Na hilo la ubatili vs. sio batili halina jibu.

Kuhani
Labda sijui nikufafanulie kwa lugha ipi rahisi ili unielewe,napenda sana unielewe,nitajaribu tena.Inherent power za mahakama ni mamlaka asilia ya kitu chochote kinachoitwa mahakama,mamalaka haya yanazaliwa na neno mahakama lenyewe.Hizi zinazoitwa inherent power historia yake ni ndefu sana kiasi kwamba nikiamua kueleza hapa JF mjadala utakuwa mrefu sana,na zinarithiwa toka mahakama moja hadi nyingine.Ni sawa sawa kabisa na haki za binadamu,zinaaminika kuwa ni inherent,yaani haki hizi hazianzishwi na katiba bali katiba inachofanya ni kuziappreciate tu uwepo wake,mfano ukisema binadamu ana haki ya kula,haki ya kula haijaelezwa popote katika katiba,unataka kuniambia kuwa hii siyo haki ya msingi ya binadamu?hii haki ni inherent na inaenda sambamba na ile haki ya kuishi,hata isingeandikwa kwenye katiba bado ingetambulika kuwa haki ya msingi tu.Vivyo hivyo kwa inherent power,zenyewe nazo zimeafikiwa tu kwenye katiba,lakini mahakama ilikuwa nazo hizi nguvu hata kabla ya kuundwa kwa katiba hii ya sasa au ile ya mwaka 1961,na nguvu au mamlaka haya kwa mahakama yetu ya Tanzania ilizirithi kutoka serikali ya waingereza kupitia kitu kinachoitwa reception clause hapo tarehe 22/7/1920.Kabla ya tarehe hii hakukuwa na mahakama kama unazoziona sasa Tanganyika wala sheria,sheria zilianza kutumika hapa nchini tarehe hiyo.Kabla ya hapo ilikuwa ni amri na proclamation mablimbali.

Si rahisi kusikia hili neno inherent power in a common man's language kwani ni terminology ya kisheria zaidi,na utalikuta mara nyingi kesi zote za katiba zinapohusika hasa kukiwa na ubishi juu ya jurisdiction ya mahakama katika jambo fulani,mfano mzuri rejea ile hukumu ya mtikila mgombea binafsi tunduru ambayo iliripotiwa kwenye gazeti la majira na hapa jf ipo mahakama ilisema hivi(na hapa nanukuu sehemu mojawapo ya habari hiyo)
Katika hoja hiyo, jopo la majaji lilikubaliana kwamba mawazo hayo ya mawakili wa Serikali ni dhaifu mbele ya sheria.

Wakasema Mahakama Kuu ina uwezo usio na ukomo (exclusive jurisdiction) na pia uwezo wa kihistoria (inherent jurisdiction), katika kusikiliza mashauri mbalimbali ya madai yakiwemo yanayogusa haki na wajibu mbalimbali wa raia

Ungekuwa mwanasheria au mtu unayesomea sheria ungelielewa hili kupitia somo linaloitwa CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AU LEGAL METHOD.Ukitaka judgment zilizoelezea kuhusu hizi inherent power basi nitakuwekea hapa kwa faida yako na wengine.

Narudia tena kuwa sheria ikiwa kinyume na katiba sio lazima iwe batili kwa maana ya void,inaweza kuwa batilifu kwa maana ya voidable.Iwapo sheria ni batili kwa maana ya null and void sheria hiyo inakuwa moja kwa moja ni kinyume cha katiba na pili inafutika kabisa katika vitabu vya sheria kama ilivyotokea kwenye kesi ya kukutia ole pumbun na Daudi pete.Ila iwapo sheria inakinzana na katiba na mahakama badala ya kuitangaza kuwa batili ikaipa muda serikali kuirekebisha sheria hiyo inakuwa batilifu hadi muda uliowekwa uishe ndio itageukakuwa batili,kwa maana nyingine sheria hiyo bado inakuwa halali na ndio maana nilisema sio lazima ikipingana na katiba iwe batili,badala yake inaweza kuwa batilifu.[i.e.THE LAW WHICH CONTRAVENES THE CONSTITUTION,MAY EITHER BE VOID OR VOIDABLE under article 30(5) depending on the pronounciation of the court].Hata mkataba ukiingia kwa niaba ya mtoto ambaye hajafikisha umri wa miaka 18,mkataba huo unakuwa voidable kwa maana kwamba utaendelea kuwa halali ila mtoto akifikisha umri wa miaka 18 au age of majority anao uwezo wa kuukataa(repudiate) kuwa haumfungi in which case utakuwa void au akauafiki(ratify) in which case utakuwa valid na utamfunga for the rest of the contract duration.

Sasa kwa faida ya wengi,naziweka kesi hapa zilizowahi kuamuliwa kuhusu constitutionality ya vipengele vya katiba,japo ni ndefu naomba tuvumiliane tu.

 

[Augustoons]

THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA

AT DAR ES SALAAM

(MAIN REGISTRY)

(CORAM: KIMARO, J; MASSATI, J AND MIHAYO, J)
MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NO. 77 OF 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA, 1977

AND

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION TO ENFORCE A

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIC RIGHT UNDER THE BASIC

RIGHTS AND DUTIES ENFORCEMENT ACT, 1994

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE ELECTIONS ACT, NO.l OF 1995

AND

IN THE MATTER OF A PETITION TO CHALLENGE AS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL SECTIONS 98(2) AND 98(3) OF THE

ELECTORAL LAW (MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENT)

ACT 4/2000

BETWEEN

LEGAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE (LHRC) - 1ST PETITIONER
LAWYERS' ENVIRONMENTAL
ACTION TEAM (LEAT) - 2ND PETITIONER
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
LEGAL ASSISTANCE (NOLA) - 3rd PETITIONER
VERSUS
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL - RESPONDENT
/

JUDGMEN T KIMARO, J.


This is a petition by originating summons filed under sections 4 and 5 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act (Cap 3 R.E. 2002), Art. 64(5) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 as well as section 95 of the Civil Procedure Code 1966.

The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRCJ, Lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT) and the National Organization Legal Assistance (NOLA) filed the petition. All the petitioners are charitable, voluntary, and non-partisan human rights interested nongovernmental organisations dully registered in terms of the provisions of the Companies Ordinance Cap.212. The originating summons is supported by a joint affidavit sworn by Helen Kijo Bisimba, Julius Clement Mashamba and Antipath Lissu, the Executive Directors of the petitioners' organizations. Learned Advocates Mr. Alex Mgongolwa, Mr. Kiwangoma and Mr. Issa Maige represent the petitioners in their respective order.

The Respondent is the Attorney General and Mr. Mwaimu, learned Principal State Attorney, represents him and Mr. Nikson Ntimbwa, learned State Attorney, assisted him.

The petition challenges the constitutionality of the provisions of section 98(2) and 98(3) of the Elections Act, 1985 as amended by the Electoral Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, N0.4 of 2000. The

1


petitioners aver that the provisions are violative of Articles 13, 21 and 29 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977.

Before we proceed, we take judicial notice under section 58(i)(a) of the Law of Evidence Act (Cap.6 R.E. 2002) that we now have a revised edition of Laws of Tanzania. The revised edition is for the year 2002 and it was prepared on the authority of The Laws Revision Act (Act No.7 of 1994), which was made operative retrospectively by Government Notice No. 124 published on 6/5/2005. The Act provided for the preparation and publication of a revised edition of the Laws of Tanzania and for continuous revision and maintenance up to date. The Elections Act is now known as The National Elections Act, (Cap 343 R.E. 2002). It incorporates all amendments up to 2001. In 2005, Act No.3 of 2005 amended it again.

This petition was filed in September, 2005 and it appears obvious that the petitioners were not aware of the existence of Government Notice No.124 of 6/5/2005 because they would have quoted the proper number of the provisions which appear in the revised edition of The National Elections Act, (Cap.343 R.E. 2002). We do not consider the omission to be fatal and we would ignore it in line with Article 107 A (2)(e) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 which requires the court to focus on substantial justice and do away with technicalities which defeat justice. We are aware that there are a lot of problems in printing the government notices. The date which appears on the Government

3


Notice as a printing date may not reflect the reality. At times the government notices are printed months after the dates which appear as the printing dates and this court cannot shut its eyes at real situations.

In terms of the revised edition of The National Elections Act, (Cap 343 R.E. 2002) the provisions which are being challenged by the petitioners are now sections 119(2) and 119(3). It is this prevailing position of the law that will be referred to.

The grounds for filing this petition as pleaded by the petitioners are that:

The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania guarantees fundamental basic rights. Among them is equality before the law and the right to participate in governance by voting or being voted for in fair and free elections. Given these guaranteed rights, the Parliament is prohibited from enactment of ^cts which discriminate the citizens of Tanzania on grounds of age, gender, race and the status of the beneficiaries. The petitioners contend that these guaranteed rights are in tandem with various International Human Rights instruments to which Tanzania is a party.

Now the petitioners' grievances are based on the amendments which were made to the National Elections Act by Act No. 4 of 2000. Through the amendments, section 98 (2) (now 119(2) of the 2002 revised edition), was deleted and replaced, and a new subsection 3

4


was added. The petitioners aver that the amendments introduced provisions which legalized the offering, by a candidate in election campaigns of anything done in good faith as an act of hospitality to the candidate's electorate or voters. The introduced amendments are popularly known as "takrima" and we will be referring to the provisions by their popular name ("takrima" provisions).

The petitioners aver further that the "takrima" provisions are silent on the amount and timing of the hospitality to be provided to the electorate. Candidates who contested in the said elections and the survey which was carried out showed that they first practiced them in the 2000 general elections and the election campaigns were marred by corrupt loopholes in the said law to influence the electorate to vote in their favour.

It is their contention that the "takrima" provisions are offensive and encourage corruption in the electoral process because they violate the right against discrimination, the right to equality before the law and the right of the citizens of Tanzania to participate in fair and free elections. They say that these rights aim at promoting integrity, transparency, good governance and democracy.

The petitioners plead that the petition is specifically based on Part III of the Constitution. They allege that the enforcement of the "takrima" provisions breach Articles 13(1) which guarantee the right to equality, Article 21(1) and (2) which guarantee the right of citizens to participate in governance of the United Republic of Tanzania,

5


including equal participation in free and fair elections, and the right of citizens to participate in governance of public affairs as well as the right of citizens to enjoy fundamental rights under Article 29(1).

The petitioners have also given particulars of contravention of articles of the constitution. They are Articles 13(1) which prohibits discrimination and Article 13(2) which prohibits enactment of any law that directly or by implication discriminates citizens of Tanzania. Others are Articles 21(1) and 21(2) which guarantee among others the right of enfranchisement to citizens of Tanzania.

The petition in general challenges the "takrima" provisions to the extent that they infringe the right of every citizen to vote and be voted for in a fair and free elections as well as the right to equality before the law. They are also being challenged in as much as they contravene the provisions of the constitution that prohibit any law enacted by the Parliament to contain provisions that discriminate citizens of the country as guaranteed for under Article 29(1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977.

The petitioners pray for declaratory orders to the effect that the "takrima" provisions are unconstitutional, null and void. They also pray for costs of this petition.

The Attorney General does not deny the basic rights which the petitioners aver that they are guaranteed by the Constitution. What he denies is the allegations by the petitioners that the "takrima"

6


provisions are violative of the Constitution. He asserts that the provisions are clear, self-explanatory and with no violation of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. He prays that the petition be dismissed with costs.

The Attorney General also gave a notice of preliminary objection raising two points. The first point of objection is that the petitioners have no locus standi to challenge the "takrima" provisions and the second one is that the petition does not disclose a cause of action.

From the nature of the petition itself, we did not consider it worthwhile calling witnesses. We were satisfied that the issue which is involved is one of law and could fairly be disposed of by written submissions from the parties under Order XV rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Code 1966. To save time and costs the hearing of both the preliminary objections and the petition proceeded by written submissions and simultaneously.

The arguments raised to support the first point of preliminary objection by the Attorney General is that Article 30(3) of the Constitution and section 4 of the Basic Rights and Duties Enforcement Act (Cap 3 R.E. 2002) are the enabling provisions of the law for filing this petition. The said provisions give locus standi to natural persons only. The petitioners being registered institutions are legal persons. They are not the persons envisaged by the law to file a petition to complain about infringement of human rights. The learned

7


State Attorney argued strongly that the infringement of human rights could only be against natural persons and not legal persons. His view is that the petitioners have come up with a hypothetical case because human rights violation cannot be against a company or an institution.

The counter argument by the petitioners is that the argument by the learned State Attorney is not supported by any authority.

The petitioners concede that the Constitution does not give a definition of the term "person" but they argued that short of a definition in the Constitution, guidance must be sought from the definition given by the Interpretation of Laws And General Clauses Act, (Cap l R.E.2002) which defines the word person as -

"... a public body, company or association of persons, corporate or incorporate."

The petitioners' firm view is that since the definition of a person given by the said law is not restricted to natural persons but extends to legal entities, the enabling provisions of the law to file this petition cover them.

The petitioners argued further that as Activists Human Rights Organizations, they are vested with a duo capacity; the capacity as an individual and the capacity as a member of the community and this is the Scheme of Part III, Chapter one of the Constitution. The petitioners contend that as members of the community, they are

8


vested with the capacity to seek and protect the communities' rights enshrined in the Constitution. They argued that this scheme reflects the modern trend in Constitutionalism which recognizes the preeminence of the community in the formulation of the Constitution. They submitted that the gate to access the courts for Constitutional declaratory orders is wide enough to accommodate legal persons as well. The court was referred to a Nigeria case of Attorney General ofBendel State v Attorney General ofMzevia [1982] 3 NCLR 188 where in interpreting an article in pari materia to our Article 30(3) the court held that the article opened the gate to the courts for persons who do not want to be governed by laws not enacted in accordance with the Constitution.

It was argued further by the petitioners that Article 30(3) of the Constitution caters for both personal and public interest litigations and so the argument by the learned State Attorney on who has locus standi is devoid of any merit. The petitioners said Article 26(2) is an additional source for locus standi for them. Their argument is that the provision falls under the sub-title; Duties to the Society and therefore the doctrine of public interest litigation is embodied in the Constitution and it is not something which has to be imported from other jurisdictions. The petitioners made reference to decisions from other jurisdictions which are Inland Revenue Comrs VS National Federation of Self Employed and Small Businesses Ltd (1981) 2 All ER 93, Minister for Justice Vs Borouiski (1981) 2 SCR 375, Adesanya V President of Nigeria < Another (1981) NLR I and Peoples Union for

9


Democratic Rights V Minister of Home Affairs AIR 1985 Delhi 268. They argued that in all the decisions the issue of locus standi was raised and the court adopted a liberal interpretation arguing that the petitions were based on public interest and in public interest litigations all that the petitioner is required to show is bona fide claim for public interest.

The petitioners also supported their argument by the celebrated case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila Vs Attorney General [1995]

TLR 31. They prayed that the objection on locus standi be dismissed for being devoid of any merit.

It was unfortunate that we could not get hold of some of the authorities cited by the Advocates for the petitioners; particularly the Nigerian cases and copies were not supplied. After a thorough scrutiny of the submissions made by the learned State Attorney and the Advocates for the petitioners we agree with the learned Advocates that the petitioners have locus standi. It is not true as submitted by the learned State Attorney that natural persons only can bring violations against human rights to court. There is nothing in Article 30 which confines the definition of a person to natural persons. As correctly submitted by the learned Advocates for the petitioners the definition of the term person in the Interpretation of Laws Act [Cap I R. E. 2002] includes corporate bodies like the petitioners.

In the case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila V Attorney General [1995] TLR 31 the Hon. Justice Lugakingira (as he then

10


was) discussed at length the principle of locus standi and how locus standi is vested under our Constitution. It is vested in every person in the capacity of an individual by virtue of Articles 12 to 24 of the Constitution and in the capacity of a member of the Community by virtue of Articles 25 to 28 of the Constitution. The petitioners are members of the Community who have constituted themselves to corporate bodies for purposes of carrying out human rights activities for the benefit of the community. It is the community which is the beneficiary of those activities. The nature of the activities for which the petitioners have constituted themselves is a determinant factor of their locus standi in the petition which they have filed. It is a public interest petition. We are therefore in all fours with Hon. Lugakingira J (as he then was) who observed in Rev. Christopher Mtikila Vs Attorney General 1995 (supra) that if a public spirited individual (and we add a corporation like the petitioners) springs up in search of the court's intervention against legislation or actions that pervert the Constitution, the court as guardian and trustee of the Constitution, must grant him (her/it) a standing.

The same issue arose in the case of Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo vs The Attorney General Civil Appeal No 64 of 200i(unreported). The Court of Appeal equally discussed the issue at length and it held that in an appropriate case a juristic person might complain before the High Court of a violation of the equality before the law. This is an appropriate case for the petitioners to complain of violation of human rights. We dismiss the first

11


preliminary objection on the petitioners lacking standing for being devoid of any merit.

The second preliminary point of objection is cause of action. It was submitted for the Attorney General that the petitioners have not shown who is being discriminated by the "takrima" provisions and the nature of the discrimination. The learned State Attorney argued that in order to challenge the constitutionality of any provision, a person must clearly specify an act which constitutes a breach or violation of his right. The learned State Attorney argued further that the "takrima" provisions have been made in accordance with Article 30(2) of the Constitution. He went on to give analysis of the provisions and arrived at a conclusion that the term good faith used in the "takrima" provisions was intended to differentiate those acts done and expenses incurred in providing food, drink and entertainment with provisions offered for the purpose of inducing or influencing any person to vote or refrain from voting a candidate in elections.

The response by the Advocates for the petitioners is that the issue which is involved is the constitutionality of the "takrima" provisions. What the court has to look at is the law and how it works. We were referred to the case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila V Attorney General (supra) which quoted with approval a passage from Chitaly & Rao, the Constitution of India (1970:686), citing Prahad Jena VState AIR 1950 Orissa 157 where it was held that:

12


" In order to determine whether a particular law is repugnant or inconsistent with the fundamental rights it is the provisions of the act that must be looked at and not the manner in which the power under the provisions is actually exercised. Inconsistency or repugnancy does not depend upon the exercise of the power by virtue of the provisions in the Act but on the nature of the provisions themselves."

The petitioners argued further that since it is the validity of the "takrima" provisions which are in dispute, on the face of it, the necessary cause of action is established and the question of proving the allegations comes at the stage of hearing. The petitioners also prayed for the dismissal of the preliminary objection.

It is easy for us to dispose of this point of preliminary objection. We need not detain ourselves on this matter. Firstly, in the case of John M. Byombaliriva v Agency Maritime Internationale (Tanzania) Ltd 1983 TLR I the Court of Appeal held that for purposes of deciding whether or not a plaint discloses a cause of action, it is the plaint that must be looked at. Looking at what is pleaded in the petition it discloses cause of action.

Secondly, this being a petition in which the validity of the "takrima" provisions are being questioned, what this court has to look at are the provisions themselves vis-a-vis the articles of the Constitution which are alleged to have been breached. As correctly submitted by the Advocates for the petitioners, the question of how

13


those articles have been breached has to be dealt with in the course of the hearing of the petition itself. The case of Mukisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd V West End Distributor Ltd (1966) EA 696 sets out a criteria of matters which can be argued as preliminary objections.

" They must be point of law pleaded or arise as a clear
implication from the pleadings."

For this objection the learned State Attorney crossed the borders of the preliminary objection when he submitted that the petitioners have not shown acts of contravention. That is a matter of evidence.

The same issue arose in the case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila V Attorney General (supra) where Hon. Justice Lugakingira J (as he then was) agreed with the decision of Prahalal Jena V State (supra), which is reproduced in Chitaley & Rao, the Constitution of India. This petition is similar to the case of Rev. Mtikila(supra) in that the constitutionality of the provisions which bar independent candidate from standing for elections was in question. In this petition the constitutionality of the "takrima" provisions are in question.

We hold as in the first preliminary point of objection that the second point of preliminary objection has no merit and it is equally dismissed.


Our next stage is the petition itself. The grounds for filing this petition as contained in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are mainly two.

The first ground is that section 119(2) and 119(3) of the National Elections Act (the "takrima" provisions) are inconsistent in substance with the provisions of Article 13(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania which prohibits enactment of any law or commission of any act which is directly discriminatory or discriminatory in effect.

A brief background to the petition given by the Advocates for the petitioners is that although the offences of corrupt practices were removed and transferred into the Prevention of Corruption Act in 1990, they were re-introduced again into the Elections Act in 1995. The effect of the reintroduction of the offences was felt soon after the first multiparty elections in 1995 by the big number of election petitions which were filed in the High Court challenging the election results on the ground of corrupt practices by the victorious candidates in the election process. Their view is that this reason led to the 2000 amendments which legalized the offering by a candidate in election campaigns of anything done in good faith as an act of normal or traditional hospitality "takrima" to the candidate's electorate or voters. They said, the provisions which were practiced for the first time in the 2000 general elections showed their true discriminatory effect because the campaigns were marred by corrupt tendencies because the "takrima" provisions were used by the candidates to influence the electorate to vote in their favour. They submitted

15


further that the trend repeated itself in the 2005 elections and there have been complaints all over the country that "takrima" is killing democracy and free elections.

The Advocates argued that by having the "takrima" provisions an act which would have amounted to treating, bribery or illegal practice under sections 115,117 and 118 would not be illegal if done in good faith. Their opinion is that the provisions justify the giving and receiving of something of normal or traditional hospitality or incurring what is called normal or ordinary expenses in election process in good faith.

They referred to the interpretation of the definition of the
expression "discrimination" in Article 13(5) of the Constitution as
given by the Court of Appeal in the case of Julius
iVdyanabo(supra) and argued that the provisions are

discriminatory in two ways;

One, the high-income political candidate is capable of offering the so called "takrima" hospitality to the voters because of his/her financial capability while a low-income political candidate may not have the financial capability to do so. The "takrima" provisions entail differential treatment of persons contesting the elections basing on their station of life. The wealth of the high-income political candidate will place him/her at an advantaged position of winning elections because of the popularity gained from offering "takrima" to the voters. This is a position which cannot be available to a low-income

16


political candidate who has nothing to offer as "takrima." Thus whereas the high-income political candidate stands at an advantageous position the low-income political candidate stands of a disadvantaged position. The Advocates said that this is the ultimate result of the "takrima" provisions despite of the fact that we have no law in Tanzania which provides for the candidate's level of wealth as a prerequisite condition or qualification to contest for any position in the election process.

Second, the advantage or the exception provided for in the "takrima" provision is only available as between political candidates and voters. It is not applicable in other instances like employer and an applicant for employment. In other words the "takrima" provisions have the effect of justifying some acts if done in the election campaigns while if they are done outside the election campaigns are offensive notwithstanding that the former might have the same or even more serious effect than the latter.

They said what determines the discrimination of an act in case of indirect discrimination is not necessarily the intention of the doer but the effect of his/her acts. Reference was made to the case of R Vs Birmingham City Council Exparte Equal Opportunities Commission 1989 2 W.L.R 520 at pp 523-6 which was given recognition in Tanzania by this court in AJl.Sisya and 35 Others Vs Principal Secretary Ministry of Finance & Another Civil Case N0.5 of 1994 (unreported)

17


It is the argument of the learned Advocates that the "takrima" provisions are discriminatory in effect and this is a question of fact. This can be gathered from the framing of the provisions and its application in 2000 and 2005 general elections. They said that commonsense alone, without assistance of knowledge would suggest that as between a political candidate who has offered gifts to voters and another who has not, the one who has offered gifts stands a better chance to be voted for and this is in consonance with the Swahili proverb that says "Mkono mtupu haulambwi."

As for the counter affidavit sworn by Mr. Nixon Noege Ntimbwa where in he denied that the "takrima" provisions are unconstitutional because the wording does not suggest nor indicate that the constitutional rights has, will or is about to be infringed, nor does it encourage any infringement or breach of the Constitution, the Advocates said it is not the. wording which matters but the implication. The Advocates referred again to the decision of A. A Sisya and 35 Others Vs Principal Secretary, Ministry of Finance (supra). The court was invited to hold that in as far as the "takrima" provisions discriminate a political candidate who offers "takrima" to a voter before elections and a plaintiff who offers "takrima" to a judge before decision, is discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.

The learned State Attorney did not; in his reply deny what is provided by Articles 13 and 21 of the Constitution. He said the issue to

18


be addressed by the court is whether the "takrima" provisions infringe and abridge the constitutional rights cited by the petitioners.

His submission is that the concept of treating as a corrupt act and therefore an offence existed since the enactment of the National Elections Act 1985. Section H9(i)(a) creates an offence against a person who gives, provides or pays expenses for food, drink or entertains another person with a view of corruptly influencing such other person to vote or refrain from voting at an election. Section H9(i)(b) deals with a receiver of those services. Section 119(1) prohibits the use of food, drinks and entertainment as an inducement to voters. It is not all acts of giving, providing or paying expenses for food, drinks or entertainment done during the elections period that amount to corrupt practices of treating. Section 119(1) covers those acts which in law are intended to influence voters - that is to do acts at the benefit of the giver, provider or payer. This influence is aimed at making the candidate win the elections.

The learned State Attorney conceded that section 119(2) and 119(3) were introduced after the big number of election petitions filed in court seeking for the nullification of the election results. In his opinion, the Parliament used its wisdom to curb the problem after taking into consideration the time consumed and the costs incurred. It was noted that during the elections period candidates incur expenses for food, drinks and transport. Candidates are natural persons and they live with voters. Therefore they are part and parcel

19


of the society. It is impossible for the election candidate to avoid voters' visits at their homes.

He paused a question whether in an African tradition it is possible to avoid hospitality to a person who visits an election(s) candidate's home as a neighbour or one who goes to discuss issues not related to the elections. He went on to pause another question whether it is possible for an election(s) candidate to campaign without a campaign team, dancing troupes or music bands and choirs given the fact that a candidate needs to travel in the constituency in order to advocate policies or election manifesto of his/her party and convince the would be voters to vote for him or her. The learned State Attorney is firm in his mind that by necessary implication there are expenses which cannot be avoided during the elections period. It was in the light of those circumstances that the Parliament decided to introduce the "takrima" provisions as an exception to the general rule of treating.

The court was referred to the cases of the Court of Appeal which held that facilitation of transport by an election candidate to a campaign team as well as provision of food and drinks to a campaign teams and ngoma dancers invited to perform at campaign rallies was lawful. These are the cases of Lutter Nelson V The Hon. Attorney General and Ibrahim Msabaha Civil appeal No. 24 of i999(unreported), Peter Msikalile V Leonard Derefa Civil Appeal No.32 of 1997 (unreported) and Gilliard Joseph Mlaseko

20


and 2 Others Vs Coroma Faida Busongo and Another Civil
Appeal No.57 of 1996 (unreported).

The learned State Attorney went on to submit that the "takrima" provisions were enacted subsequent to the decisions of the Court of Appeal because the Parliament found that there were genuine expenses for food, refreshments and entertainment incurred as genuine costs by an election candidate. The law was intended to justify those expenses and this was with the support of the decisions of the Court of Appeal. To that extent it cannot be claimed that the two subsections violate Article 13 of the Constitution. The normal or traditional hospitality and the normal or ordinary expenses spent are only those done in good faith and the good faith must be construed in line with the provisions of section 119(1) of The National Elections Act (Cap 343 R.E. 2002). By necessary implication if the expenses are incurred without good faith it means it is treating or a corrupt influence as provided for under section 119(1) and the candidate can be punished accordingly upon so finding by the court to that extent.

Mr. Mwaimu disagreed with the construction of the principle of good faith which the Petitioners' Advocates said could be extended to sections 115, 117 and 119 of the Act. He said the interpretation is wrong because sections 117 and 118 do not deal with treating and so the aspect of good faith invoked in the "takrima" provisions does not apply. His view is that the "takrima" provisions are only an exception to the general rule laid out in section 119(1) of the National Elections Act and the exception reflects the finding of some of the decisions of

21


the Court of Appeal cited. In his opinion the "takrima" provisions are meant to give courts of law a guide when deciding whether the act is done in good faith or otherwise. That the test which distinguishes between treating in section 119(1) and the exception in the proviso to sections 119(2) and (3)(the "takrima" provisions) is the mens rea. The process of making decision entails answering a lot of questions, such as what was the purpose of paying expenses or giving or providing food, drink, entertainment or provision? Was it intended to influence voters to vote for an election candidate? Was it intended to facilitate his/her campaign and other related questions?

The learned State Attorney denied that the "takrima" provisions are discriminatory. It was submitted that the "takrima" provisions are meant to serve situations where election(s) candidate incur expenses and costs in furthering election campaigns but not in circumstances where they are meant to inducing or influencing voters. Whatever is done with the intention of inducing or influencing voters in this regard is treating under section 119(1).

Mr. Mwaimu said having no express law which caters for elections costs and expenses should not be a warrant to expunge the "takrima" provisions. It was further opinion of Mr. Mwaimu that the "takrima" provisions do not discriminate elections candidate on basis of station of life. His belief is that in the nomination of candidates to vie the elections, there cannot be a weak candidate because the political parties would not stage such a candidate. The law treats all election candidates from political parties with equal status.

11


Further submission by the learned State Attorney was that the Advocates for the petitioners misinterpreted the law when they associated the "takrima" provisions with gift. He said section 118(1) (c) of the National Elections Act, which is not related to treating covers gift. Mr. Mwaimu is also of an opinion that the case of A. A Sisya (supra) is distinguishable from this case because the subject matter in that suit was the Motor Vehicle Surtax Act No.3 of 1994. The act singled out owners of saloon and or station wagon cars and left out persons who own other types of cars whereas the "takrima" provisions have not given a category of persons to be affected by it. The law is for all election candidates and therefore the case is not applicable in the circumstances of this case. The law was not meant to allow a certain class of people to use their class to influence people in order to win the elections. It has been meant to justify genuine expenses and costs used in conducting elections campaigns.

The learned State Attorney also denied that the "takrima" provisions render it impossible to hold someone liable of the offence under section 119(1) because they are an exception to the general rule of treating.

His conclusion is that the "takrima" provisions were not aimed at embracing corruption, nor were they intended to form a disguised form of corruption. His firm view is that the petitioners are facing a problem of interpretation, just like many other persons who think that the "takrima" provisions have extended the normal or traditional

23


hospitality to other corrupt practice provisions of the law. He said the approach is wrong and misleading. The "takrima" provisions relate to section 119(1) only. They are important because it is obvious that during the elections candidates do expend and incur some running costs. Those genuinely incurred costs cannot be held as treating.

Mr. Mwaimu prayed for the dismissal of the petition with costs.

In reply the petitioners advocates denied that the "takrima provisions" are related only to section 119(1) of the National Elections Act. They said section 119(2) excludes from the offences of treating, bribery and illegal practices, what is called normal or ordinary expenses spent in good faith in elections campaigns or in the ordinary course of election process. Treating is found in section 119(1), bribery in 117 and illegal practices in section 118(1). Section 115 defines the offence of corrupt practice to include treating (under section 119(1)), bribery (under section 118) and illegal practice (under section 117).

They conceded that normal expenses incurred for food in elections campaigns team, drinks for member of campaign teams, fuel for motor vehicles used for campaign and bicycles for the members of the campaign team are justified during the election process. They added that they were justified even before the inclusion of the "takrima" provisions in the Elections Act. The problem is that the "takrima" provisions are broad enough to cover both justified and unjustified acts. Their view is that the expression "in the election campaign or in the ordinary course of election process" used in

24


section 119(2) broaden the traditional hospitality and ordinary expenses to include food, drinks, transport, clothes which are offered to members of the public who attend the election campaign or who are residing in the area where the campaign is being conducted. There is nothing in the provisions to exclude costs for offering food to audience attending the meeting or providing transport or transport allowances to people who attend an election campaign, from the exception. The problem is more entangled by the fact that the term traditional hospitality and normal or ordinary expenses have not been defined anywhere in the fret. This leaves room for open interpretation and hence creates an opportunity for illegitimate practices which are for bidden under sections 117,118 and 119(1) of the Act.

It was their further submission that in as long as the cases of Luther Nelson V A.G and Ibrahim Msabaha (supra), Peter Msekalile V Leonard Derefa (supra) and Gillard Joseph Mlaseko and 2 Others V Corona Faida Busongo and Another Csupra) only justified the serving of food, and expenses incurred for transport not to members of public but to members of the campaign team only, the cases are irrelevant and inapplicable in this case.

As regards the argument by the learned State Attorney that the "takrima" provisions were meant to assist the court in determining whether the act was done in good faith or not, the Learned advocates said this argument does not have any leg to stand on because bad

25


motive was one of the ingredients for the offence of corrupt practice even at the pre amendment era. It was from the same provisions that the Court of Appeal was able to put a demarcation line between expenses incurred for members of campaign teams and excluded expenses offered to cover other groups. It is their opinion that the "takrima" provisions were not necessary. They also denied that the cases of the Court of Appeal cited by the learned State Attorney will assist in the construction of the "takrima" provisions because the cases were decided before the "takrima" provisions were introduced into the law.

The Advocates said they are aware that it is one thing to give something in order to influence someone to vote for a candidate and it is another to give something to someone in good faith although the obvious result of the giver is to influence that person to vote for the candidate. They reiterated their earlier position on Article 13(2) of the Constitution which deals with both direct and indirect discrimination. They repeated their prayers in the petition.

Since this is a petition filed in public interest, it was felt that it was important to reproduce the long arguments advanced by each party to this petition. We felt it would be unfair to deal with the petition in a summary form.

Article 13(1) of the Constitution provides for equality before the Law, while Article 13(2) prohibits enactment of law which is discriminatory directly or dismininatory in effect.

26


The Advocates for the petitioners submitted correctly that the expression "discrimination" is defined in Article 13(5) and the Court of Appeal translated it in the case of Julius Ndyanabo (supra) as follows:

" (5) For the purpose of this article the expression "discriminate" means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of the different persons on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, station of life that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior and being subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or prescribed necessary condition, provided that the expression shall not be construes as to prevent the government from taking deliberate steps aimed at solving problems in society."

The Advocates for the petitioners argued that the "takrima" provisions entail a differential treatment of the citizens basing on their station of life in two ways. Firstly, high-income political candidates are treated differently from the low in come political candidates in the election process because the former are placed in a better position to offer traditional hospitality because of their economic status whereas the latter may fail to do so. In this regard the high income candidate stands at a better position to win the

27


elections because of his/her advantageous position which is based on • his/her economic status while the latter is likely to lose because of standing in a different position because of incapacities to offer the same. We agree with this position and we think this is a question of common sense alone.

The second aspect of discrimination is that the "takrima" provisions only apply between voters and political candidates. It does not apply in another category of persons like an applicant of employment and the employer. The "takrima" provisions therefore have the effect of justifying some acts if done in elections campaigns while if done outside the election campaigns they are offensive.

The learned State Attorney stood firm and denied that this is the position.

With great respect to the learned State Attorney we disagree with him that the "takrima" provisions are not discriminatory. They are discriminatory as between high-income earner candidate and low-income earner candidate. The two cannot stand at the same position. The economic status of the high-income earner will place the candidate at an advantageous position to win the elections at the detriment of the low-income candidate who has very little or nothing at all to offer. This we have no doubt in our minds at all.

The "takrima" provisions are also discriminatory because they legalise actions done between a selected category of persons that is

28


political candidates and voters while if the same action is done by other categories of persons standing in a similar relations, those action become offensive. This case is similar to the case of Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo V A.G (supra). The Court of Appeal gave a thorough explanation on the discriminative nature of the provision of section 111(2) and 3 of the National Elections Act 1985. Act N0.4 of 2000 amended the same provisions.

So long is the law is framed in a wray which can result in a differential treatment between the citizens, there cannot be equality before the law in respect of that law. This is what comes out of the "takrima" provisions. Those who have, will be in a position to offer "takrima", those who have not, will not be able to offer "takrima". The resultant effect is a differential treatment between the haves and the have not.

The "takrima" provisions are discriminative in effect. The intention of the doer is therefore irrelevant. In A.A Sisya and 35 Others V The Principle Secretary Ministry of Finance,

(supra) our Brother - Mwalusanya J (as he was said) -

"In the case at hand, it is irrelevant that the government is arguing that the impugned law did not intend to discriminate against the affected group. What is relevant is the fact that the impugned law is discriminatory in effect (indirect discrimination). It is my finding that the said law is discriminatory of the affected group on

29


account of their status of life, as the Republic has failed to show that the discrimination is on account of any other than on account of the status of life of the affected group."

Having found that the "takrima" provisions are discriminatory, the next stage is to examine the restrictions in order to ascertain whether they were necessary. In epaer words we have to test the proportions of the restrictions vis-a-vis the objects intended to be achieved by the restriction, that is the proportionality test.

The advocates for the petitioners submitted that they are aware that fundamental rights can be curtailed because of societal interest under Article 13(5) and 30(2) of the Constitution. However, their view is that the restriction imposed by the "takrima" provision is not proportionate to the object sought to be achieved.

They said they are aware of the restrictions which the government can impose on fundamental rights in public interest under Article 30(2) of the Constitution. Their understanding of the law is that after establishing that a certain law is invalid for violating a basic right, the burden of proof as to the necessity of the limitation for public interests shifts to the Government.

The court was referred to the cases of Julius Ndyanabo (supra) Kukutia Ole Pumbun and Another V Attorney General and Another [1993] T.L.R 159, Young and Webster

30


UK (1982) 4E H.RR.38 and AA Sisya (supra) on the argument that so as to balance between the interests of the public and those of the individuals, various guiding legal mechanisms have been created both domestically and globally to guide the courts in determining whether or not the restrictions of the basic rights are justifiably necessary. The Advocates said that from the decisions cited, in order for the law tending to restrict the basic rights to be legally justifiable, the different treatment must have rationale or reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved and it should not be arbitrary.

An argument was advanced by the Advocates that the restrictions have no rational or reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved because of two reasons. The first one is that the mischief created by allowing some people to use their economic status influence to win elections is more serious than the object sought to be achieved. The second one is that it was not necessary whatsoever to enact the new provisions of subsection (2) and (3) because the provisions of section 119(1) excludes from corrupt offences anything done in good faith as an act of normal hospitality.

Their reasoning is based on the fact that what was offensive in terms of section 119(1) before it was amended was the payment or provisions of the expense of giving or providing food or entertainment with corrupt intention. The giving or receiving of something in good faith did not amount to an offence under section 119(1) of the Act. Corrupt intention, which is bad faith, could not be easily proved by direct evidence; it could in most cases be proved by

31


circumstantial evidence. The offering of gifts by political candidates to the expected voters before election sufficed to draw an inference that the giver thereof had in mind that the recipients of the gifts would vote for him.

Their further submission is that the addition of the new provisions renders it impossible to hold someone liable for the offence under section 119(1) because by expressly providing that subsection (1) wall not catch a person who gives that which is prohibited therein, if the giving is done in good faith, it was another language of saying that the offence cannot be proved by circumstantial evidence. They noted that before the amendment the onus of proving that what was given by a candidate to the voters was a traditional hospitality given in good faith was on the candidate himself and not the Republic. The contrary is now the position because the amendments imposed the burden to prove that what was given by the candidate to the voters is not the normal or traditional hospitality to the Republic. Since the term traditional hospitality and the forms thereof are not defined by the Act, the "takrima" provisions become redundant. Thus the giving of something to the intended voters by a candidate is presumed to be traditional hospitality unless bad motive is proved.

The Advocates said it is not in public interest and it is irrational to justify the limitations of basic rights in the sweeping and controversial expressions as traditional hospitalities. The restrictions are arbitrary because they only justify the giving of something in good

32


faith only during election campaigns without a definition of what amounts to traditional hospitality and the forms thereof. Their opinion is that the law is widely woven as to catch every giving and receiving, not withstanding the influential effect of the same in the election process. Their understanding is that the arbitrariness is also felt by omission in the provision for a mechanism to protect or safeguard the affected. There is no line of demarcation between traditional hospitalities which have the direct effect of influencing the voters to vote for the giver and those that do not. Their conclusion on the first ground of the petition is that the "takrima" provisions do not meet the proportionality test as laid out in various judicial decisions which they cited. The limitation imposed by the "takrima" provisions was more than reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate object.

Apparently the learned State Attorney did not like to address the issue of restrictions on fundamental rights.

The principle of proportionality is well explained by the Court of Appeal in the case of Kukutia Ole Pumbun Vs AG and Another (Supra) and Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo V A.G (supra). In the case of Kukutia Ole Pumbun the Court of

Appeal held that -

" a law which seeks to limit or derogate from the basic right of individual on the ground of public interest, will be saved by Article 30(2) of the constitution of it satisfied two requirements. Firstly, such law must be lawful in the sense that

33


it is not arbitrary. It should make adequate safeguards against arbitrary decisions and provide effective, controls against abuse of those in authority when using the law. Secondly, the limitation imposed must not be more than necessary to achieve the legitimate object. This is also known as the principle of proportionality."

In the case of Julius Ndyanabo, the Court of Appeal added that;

''Fundamental rights are not illimitable. To treat them as being absolute is to invite anarchy in society. Those rights can be limited, but the limitation must not be arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate to any claim of state interest."

Similarly, in Director of Public Prosecution vs Daudi Pete

[1993] TLR 22 the Court of Appeal held that a restriction on fundamental right must serve a legitimate purpose and has to be proportionate.

Our considered view is that the "takrima" provisions were not necessary at all and we entirely support the views expressed by the learned Advocates for the petitioners. The decisions of the Court of Appeal in the cases cited by the learned State Attorney also support our view. We do not see any lawful object which was intended to be achieved by the 'takrima" provisions apart from legalizing corruption in election campaigns. We do not consider this to be a societal

34


interest. As illustrated the "takrima" provisions discriminates between the high-income earner and low-income earner as well as between selected classes of persons with similar functions. We are highly convinced that the provisions of Articles 13(5) and 30(2) were intended to be exercised in the manner in which they were exercised in amending The National Elections Act. The learned Advocates for the petitioners submitted correctly that the restrictions have no rationale or reasonable nexus to the object sought to be achieved. Instead, it has created a serious mischief by allowing high-income earner candidates to use their class to influence voters to win the elections. The "takrima" provisions do not meet the proportionality test.

The second ground of the petition is that's the sections 119(2) and (3) violate the provisions of Articles 21(1) and (2) of the Constitution which guarantee the right to vote and be voted in free and fair election.

It was submitted by the Advocates for the petitioners that the "takrima" provisions violate the provisions of Articles 21(1) and (2) of the Constitution which provide for the right to vote and be voted for in free and fair elections. The basis of their contention is that there cannot be a free and fair election with the "takrima" provisions which justify discrimination based on the candidate's station of life. They adopted their submission given in respect of the first ground. Their opinion is that there cannot be free and fair elections if some of the contestants are, because of their economic well being, afforded an

35


opportunity to win in the election process to the detriment of poor contestants.

They observed that the right to vote and be voted for in free and fair elections is one of the foundations of participatory domecracy. The Head of the Government and State as well as the Parliamentarians are elected through free and fair elections: It is dangerous to have the main law governing such a process to be framed in a way which creates a bush within it for corrupt political candidates to hide themselves. They said the trend in the Tanzania Judiciary just like in other Common Law Countries has been to interprete the Constitution as a living instrument in the light of the present day conditions.

They feel that it was irrational for the government to enact a law restricting the application of the provisions against corrupt practice in such a sweeping clause while corruption is one of the serious problems in Tanzania. In interpreting the "takrima" provisions in the light of Tanzanian environment it is impossible to avoid a conclusion that the "takrima" provisions legalise corruption in the election process.

Finally they said that although the rights conferred by a Articles 13 and 21 of the Constitution are not absolute but are subjected to the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution, there was no reasonable necessity on the part of the Parliament to invoke the limitations under Article 30(2) of the Constitution because the object could be

36


achieved without necessarily enacting such a widely framed enactment which does not set demarcations on applicability.

The learned State Attorney was contented to mention only broadly that the "takrima" provisions are not violative of Article 21(1) of the Constitution. He did not prefer to give reasons.

The discriminative nature of the "takrima" provisions has been exhaustively covered when dealing with the first ground of the petition. It suffices for us to say that since the takrima provisions are discriminative they affect the elections in two ways. Firstly is among the contestants. The elections cannot be free and fair because the high income-earner contestant is the one who is likely to win because of his economic status. He/she stands a better chance to influence the voters. The low-income contestant stands to loose the elections because of his low income which does not allow him/her to influence the elections.

As for the voters their right to vote for a proper candidate of their choice cannot be freely exercised because they will lose that freedom because of being influenced by the "takrima". Their right to vote will be subjected to "takrima". This court has to take judicial notice under Section 58 of the Law of Evidence that the majority of the voters are poor. They are ignorant of their rights as well as their responsibilities. They can be easily manipulated by the so-called normal hospitality ("takrima").

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As correctly submitted by the Advocates for the petitioners the enactment of the "takrima" provisions is a very dangerous approach in the whole process of conducting elections. It amounts to building a culture, which if sustained, will lead this nation to a bad destination. People should get the opportunity to think freely and decide freely and should not be subjected to influences of "takrima". They should also be left to learn that it is their responsibility/duty to elect competent candidates and not those who are able to influence voting by offering "takrima".

As for the invitation by the learned advocates for the court to consider public opinion on the "takrima" provisions, we are afraid to say that it is not an invitation which this court can accept because the court acts on evidence which is on record. The court cannot rely on what the media says as a basis for its decision. Those who gave their opinion were exercising their freedom of expression but they were not giving evidence in court.
As observed earlier, there was no lawful object which had to be achieved by introduction of the "takrima" provisions. Given the serious effects of the "takrima" provisions we cannot allow them to continue being in the statute books.

On the evidence and the submission presented in this court we are satisfied on the standard required that the "takrima" provisions are discriminative and they are violative of Articles 13(1) and 21(1) of the Constitution. They were quite unnecessary. The law as it was

38


before the introduction of the "takrima" provisions was sufficient to enable the court to distinguish expenses inevitable in the election process which did not amount to corrupt practices and those which per se amounted to corrupt practices. The cases cited by the learned Stated Attorney support this view.

The Parliament contravened Article 13(2) of the Constitution by enacting such provisions into the National Elections Act.

Tanzania is a party to various International Human Rights Instruments. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is the core of International Human Rights law, is incorporated in Article 9(f) of our Constitution. Article 7 of the UDHR provides for equality before the Law and bars discrimination. Article 21 of UDHR provides for the right to participate in the government of ones country directly or freely choosen representative.

It is provided in Article 21(3) that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of the government; this shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedure.

Since the "takrima" provisions are violative of Articles 13(1), 13(2), 21(1) and 21(2) of the Constitution we declare the said provisions null and void and we order the same to be struck out of National Elections Act, (Cap 343 R.E.2002), forthwith. However, we

39


have further seen that section 130 (b) and (c) of the National Elections Act give powers to the High Court to allow such acts done in food faith or traditional hospitality to be exception which would otherwise make the acts or omission corrupt or illegal practice. We think this provision may lead to absurdities in the face of what we have declared on sections 119 (2) and (3). So in our view although the petitioners have not specifically prayed for the nullification of this provision we think that it cannot be saved either. We exercise our powers under "any other relief and proceed to declare that section 130 (b) and (c) are also unconstitutional and should be struck out of the statute. This being public interest litigation, there is no order for costs.


N.P.KIMARO,
JUDGE

S.A.MASSATI, JUDGE

JUDGE

KESI YA PILI.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA

AT DAR ES SALAAM



(CORAM: NYALALI, C. J., MAKAME, J. A. AND RAMADHANI, J. A.)



CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 28 OF 1990


THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS…..APPELLANT


AND


DAUDI PETE………………………………………….RESPONDENT

(Appeal from the Ruling of the High Court of
Tanzania at Musoma)


(Mwalusanya, J.)



dated the 20th day of November, 1988 in



Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 80 of 1988



-----------------------------------------------

JUDGEMENT OF THE COURT

=========================

NYALALI, C. J.


This appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions hereinafter called the D.P.P. is one of three constitutional cases which have reached this court ever since Fundamental Rights and Duties embodied in the Constitution of the United Republic in 1984 became enforceable in March, 1988 by virtue of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984 (Act No. 16 of 1984). This case however is the first to be decided by the Court. It concerns the right to bail.



The Respondent, one DAUDI s/o PETE was charged in the District Court of Musoma District at Musoma with the offence of Robbery with violence c/s 285 and 286 of the Penal Code. He was denied bail and remanded into custody on the basis that the offence for which he stood charged was not bailable by virtue of the provisions of section 148(5)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1985, (Act No. 9 of 1985). The Respondent was aggrieved by that decision, and the applied to the High Court at Mwanza for bail. The High Court, Mwalusanya, J. hold that the provisions of section 148(4) and (5) of the Act, which prohibited the granting of bail in certain cases were unconstitutional and therefore null and void. Mwalusanya, J. held that these provisions were violative of several articles of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, which concern Basic Rights, and the Doctrine of Separation of Powers between the Judicature and the Legislature. The High Court therefore granted bail. The D.P.P. was aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, hence this appeal to this Court.



While this appeal was pending before us, the trial in the District Court proceeded and the respondent was acquitted. Apparently and understandably because of this acquittal, the respondent lost interest in the D.P.P.`s appeal. He did not enter appearance before us inspite of our order made under Rule 3(2)(a) of the Rules of the Court for Notice of Hearing to be served upon him by publication in local newspapers. We are indebted however to Professor Mgongo Fimbo, learned Advocate, who agreed to act as AMICUS CURIAE so as to assist the Court to see the other side of the count of this case. We are also grateful to Mr. K. S. Massaba, learned Principal State Attorney, assisted by Mr. Matupa, learned State Attorney, who very ably represented the D.P.P. in this appeal.



The D.P.P. submitted a total of five grounds of appeal, two of which are contained in a Supplementary Memorandum of Appeal filed on 19 June, 1990. The main Memorandum of Appeal has three grounds. The two supplementary grounds of appeal read as follows:



“1. That the Learned Judge seriously misdirected himself in framing for consideration, the issue relating to the constitutionality of the prohibition of bail under Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act.



“2. That the Learned Judge seriously erred in considering the constitutionality of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as a whole while the issue concerned only paragraph (c) of sub-section 5 of the said section”.



The three main grounds of appeal read as follows:



“1. That the Honourable Judge erred in law in holding that by applying normal canons of interpretation, a meaning cannot be attached to section 148(5)(c) of the C.P.A. that fits within the provisions of Articles 30 and 31 of the Union Constitution.



“2. That the Honourable Judge’s interpretation of section 148(5)(c) of the C.P.A. in the light of Article 13(6) of the Union Constitution is bad in law as “hearing” envisaged by the Parliamentarians in the said Article is not the same as “hearing” when the case is before the court for applications such as those of bail under section 148(5) of the C.P.A.



“3. That the Honourable Judge applied wrong canon of statutory interpretation hence his failure to interprete Section 148(5)(c) of the C.P.A. in the light of societal interests vis-à-vis these of a private citizen”.



In his submissions before us regarding the first supplementary ground, Mr. Massaba argued in effect that there was nothing in the pleadings or the submissions made in the course of the proceedings in the High Court which could give rise to the issues of constitutionality of the prohibition of bail under section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Professor Fimbo on the other hand argued the contrary view. Having examined the record of the proceedings of the court below, and bearing in mind that the respondent was a layman, we are satisfied that any reasonable tribunal would find that paragraph 5 and 6 of the affidavit filed in support of the bail application, together with the respondent’s oral submissions made in support of his application, undoubtedly give rise to the issues of constitutionality of the prohibition of bail. Paragraph 5 and 6 of the affidavit state as follows:



“5. My Lord, I agree that section 148(5) C.P.A. prevents the court to grant bail, but in my case the charge was prepared to suit the conditions of section 148(5) and it is not true that a gun was used to take only one cattle while there are many cattle in the kraal of Mr. Maregeri or Issa Magoma.



“6. My Lord this Honourable Court has power to consider and administer justice so that a person cannot be mistreated by the existing law or otherwise. Mr. Maregeri, Mr. Issa Magoma, and the Police have conspired to detain the applicant by means of law without even a reasonable evidence”.



Mr. Massaba`s argument that the respondent in these paragraph is complaining only of victimization by the Police and Mr. Maregeri cannot be sustained in the light of what is stated in the first sentence of paragraph 6. The respondent’s assertion that the High Court has “power to consider and administer justice so that a person cannot be mistreated by the existing law or otherwise” read together with the respondent’s reference to the provisions of section 148(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, clearly shows beyond doubt that the respondent was challenging the constitutionality of the provisions of section 148(5) which prohibit bail.



The relevant parts of the respondent’s submissions as recorded in the High Court reads as follows:



“The law should not be used to victimize citizens. Mr. Maregeri and the O.C.D. are using the law as an instrument of oppression. This offence is purely out of vindictiveness. I am wondering as to whether such cause of action is constitutional. I understand that our Bill of Rights has come into operation. What of it? I thought that we oppressed citizens would be saved by it. If section 148(5) of the C.P.A. condones denying liberty to a citizens for more vindictiveness then I am afraid the Bill of Rights is not worth the paper it is written on”.



We think no stronger words could have been used to raise the constitutional issues than these. In his submission in reply Mr. Muna, Learned State Attorney, who represented the Republic in the High Court, is recorded to have said, inter alia,



“The question of Bill of Rights under Article 13(2) and 15(2) of the Constitution would seem to give the right to liberty to the citizen. But that right has lawfully been curtailed by Parliament.



It is my submissions that section 148 is constitutional which does not go against Article 13(2) and 15(2) of the constitution. I rely on Articles 30 and 31. These are saving the said provisions of section 148 of the C.P.A. So that law of bail in Section 148 is lawful for public interest and on national security grounds”.



In response to the submissions of Mr. Muna, the respondent concluded by saying



“I wish only to add that, if Parliament condones such things as vindictiveness, then I am afraid that, we the down-trodden have no where to run to for our liberty. Parliament cannot have unlimited powers to pass oppressive laws as this one which the State Attorney is keeping defending. It was not the intention of the Legislature to pass laws to oppress Wananchi. That cannot be true in a democratic state like Tanzania”.



There can be no doubt in the mind of any reasonable tribunal that these parts of the submissions made by both sides of the case in the High Court raised issues of constitutionality of the provisions of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act. It follows therefore that the learned trial judge was correct in framing issues relating to the Constitutionality of section 148 and we so find.



Mr. Massaba also made submissions concerning the jurisdiction and procedure of the High Court in the enforcement of the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties enshrined in the Constitution, in view of what the trial judge had said on that point. In his ruling, Mwalusanya, J. stated inter alia:



“A point in limine to be taken is as to whether the Bill of Rights may be enforced when the procedure and rules for conducting such cases by the court are yet to be enacted by the Government as provided in Article 30(4) of the Constitution. Counsel for the Republic did not address me on this point.



My view is stated in the case of Marwa Wambura Magori VS. A. C. (in) High Court Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No. 2 of 1988, and wish to reiterate here that it is not necessary to have such rules in order to enforce the Bill of Rights. The enforcement may be done by application in the form of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Certiorari, Declarations and even by an application for bail as the case at hand”.



Both Mr. Massaba and Professor Fimbo agree with this view of the learned trial judge on this point. Professor Fimbo further informed us that the jurisdiction of the High Court is derived from three sources, two of which exist under Articles 30(3), (4) and 108(1) and (2) of the Constitution, and the third under section 5(2) of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, (Act No. 16 of 1984). According to the official English translation of the Swahili version of the Constitution.



Article 30(3) and (4) reads as follows:



“30(3) where any person alleges that any provision of this Part of this Chapter or any law involving a basic right or duty has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him in any part of the United Republic, he may without prejudice to any other action or remedy lawfully available to him in respect of the same matter, institute proceedings for relief in the High Court.



(4) Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall have and may exercise original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter brought before it in pursuance of this section; and an Act of Parliament may make provisions with respect to”-



a)
the procedure regulating the institution of proceedings under this section;



b)
the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to the hearing of proceedings instituted under this section;



c)
ensuring the more efficient exercise of the powers of the High Court, the protection and enforcement of the basic rights, freedoms and duties in accordance with this Constitution”.



We concur with the learned trial judge that the provisions of sub-articles (3) and (4) of Article 30 sufficiently confer original jurisdiction upon the High Court to entertain proceedings inrespect of actual or threatened violations of the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties may be effected under the procedure and practice that is available in the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the remedy sought.



As to the provisions of Article 108(1) and (2), it is provided therein as follows:



“108 (1) There shall be a High Court of the United Republic (referred to as the “High Court”) which shall have the jurisdiction and powers conferred on it by this Constitution or by any other legislation.



(2)Where it is not expressly stated in this Constitution or in any other legislation that any specific matter shall first be heard and determined by certain court, the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine that matter. In addition the High Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any other matter which in accordance with legal traditions and conventional practices obtaining is ordinarily to be heard and determined by the High Court. Save that, the provisions of this section shall apply subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania as provided for in this Constitution or in any other legislation”.



We agree with Professor Fimbo that under the above cited provisions, the High Court unlimited inherent original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any legal matter unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. However, we concur with Mr. Massaba that since there is a specific provision under the Constitution, that is, Article 30(3) and (4) concerning the enforcement of the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties in question, any proceedings for that purpose must be instituted under that specific article of the Constitution.



With regard to the provisions of section 5(2) of the Constitution (Consequential, Transitional and Temporary Provisions) Act, 1984, it is stated therein that:



“5 (2) Notwithstanding the amendment of the Constitution and, in particular, the justiciability of the provisions relating to basic rights, freedoms and duties, no existing law or any provision in any existing law may, until after three years from the date of the commencement of the Act, be construed by any court in the United Republic as being unconstitutional or otherwise inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution”.



On a proper construction of the above cited provisions, we are, with due respect to Professor Fimbo, unable to accept his learned advice to the effect that the provisions in question create or confer jurisdiction on the High Court to adjudicate upon the constituonality of any law of the land. It is apparent in our view that these provisions deal with the consequences of introducing a justiciable Bill of Rights and Duties into the consequences of introducing a justiciable Bill of Rights and Duties into the Constitution, by providing for a transitional period of grace of three years when the Government could put its own house in order, so to speak, by making appropriate amendments to existing law. That this is so is borne out by the next sub-provisions (3) of section 5 which reads:



“(3) The President may, at any time before the 39th of June, 1985, by order published in the Gazette, make amendments to any existing law as may appear to him

to be necessary or expedient for bringing that law into conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Constitution or for giving effect, or enabling effect to be given to these provisions, and where the President makes an order under this sections in relation to any law which is applicable to Zanzibar as well as to Mainland Tanzania, that order shall have effect so as to amend that law in relation to any persons or matter connected with Zanzibar as well as with Mainland Tanzania inrespect of any matter within the legislative competency of the Parliament of the United Republic notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in the interpretation of Laws and General Clauses Act, 1972”.



Let us now turn to the second supplementary ground of appeal. Mr. Massaba has submitted in effect, in the alternative to the first supplementary ground, that the only issue raised in the High Court concerned the constitutionality of the provisions of paragraph (c) of sub-section (5) of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and that the learned trial judge was therefore wrong in framing issues to cover the whole of section 148. Professor Fimbo on the other had has advised us to the effect that the learned trial judge was correct in framing issues covering the whole of section 148 since paragraph (c) of sub-section (5) is inseparable from the other provisions of section 148.



With due respect to both Counsel, we think there is a common misdirection on their part concerning what the learned trial Judge actually did. There is nothing on the record of the proceedings in the High Court to suggest that the issue were framed on the whole of section 148. What is self-evident is that issues were framed only two sub-sections of sections 148. In a part of his Ruling, the learned trial Judge states:



“Before the application was heard I informed the

State Attorney Mr. Muna, that the application raised matters of great public and Constitutional importance,

as this court had to decide as to the Constitutionality of these provisions which restrict courts of law to grant bail to accused persons. And so the State Attorney was afforded opportunity to prepare himself and was given

by me a list of the issues that needed to be examined closely. The issues framed involved the whole of sub-section (4) and (5) of section 148 of the C.P.A……”.



From the record of the proceedings in the High Court, it is obvious that only the provisions of paragraph (c) of sub-section (5) of section 148 were in issue between the parties. Was the learned trial Judge correct in framing issues to include the provisions of sub-section (4)?



Were these provisions, as Professor Fimbo advises, inseparable from paragraph (c) of sub-section (5) which was in issue?



Let us have a close lock at these provisions as amended by Act. No. 12 of 1987 and 10 of 1989:



“(4) Notwithstanding anything in this section contained, no police officer or court shall, after a person is arrested and while he is awaiting trial or appeal, admit that person to bail if the Director of Public Prosecutions certifies in writing that it is likely that the safety or interests of the Republic would thereby be prejudiced.



“(4A) A certificate, issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions under this section shall take effect from the date it is filed in the court, or notified to the officer in charge of a police station, and shall remain in effect until the proceedings concerned are concluded or the Director of Public Prosecution withdrawals it”.



“(5) A Police officer in charge of a police station, or a court before whom an accused person is brought or appears, shall not admit that person to bail if-



a)
that person is accused of murder or treason;



b)
it appears that the accused person has previously been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding three years;



c)
it appears that the accused person has previously been granted bail by a court and failed to comply with the conditions of the bail or absconded;



d)
the accused person is charged with an offence alleged to have been committed while he was released on bail by a court of law;



e)
the act or any of the acts constituting the offence with which a person is charged consists of a serious assault causing grievious bodily Harm on or threat of violence to another person, or having or possessing a firearm or an explosive;



f)
it appears to the court that it is necessary that the accused person be kept in custody for his own protection;



g)
the offence for which the person is charged involves property whose value exceeds ten million shillings, unless that person pays cash deposit equivalent to half the value of the property, and the rest is secured by execution of a bond; provided that this shall not apply in the case of police bail.”



It seems to us that the following points are obvious. First, the

provisions of sub-section (4) deal with a situation which is entirely different from that covered by the provisions of sub-section (5). Second, each of paragraph (a) to (g) concerns a situation which is entirely different from that dealt with in any of the other paragraphs. It follows therefore that the provisions of paragraph (e) of sub-section (5) are separable from the provisions of paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (f) and (g) of sub-section (5), and also separable from the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act. We find therefore that the learned trial Judge was wrong in framing issues covering the whole of sub-section (4) and sub-section (5) of section 148.



Next we turn to the first main ground of appeal. Mr. Massaba has submitted to the effect that on a proper and true interpretation of the provisions of paragraph (e) of sub-section (5) of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a meaning can be ascertained which fits into the provisions of Article 30(2)(b) of the Constitution, which, according to him, permits the Parliament to enact laws under certain circumstances which are derogative or restrictive of the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties of the human being. It was part of Mr. Massaba`s submission that the provisions of paragraph (e) of sub-section (5) of section 148 which derogate from the basic right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 15 fall within the scope of Article 30(2)(b) of the Constitution, and are therefore constitutionally valid. Without prejudice to this submission, Mr. Massaba also submitted to the effect that the provisions of Article 15(2) of the Constitution permits the enactment of laws such as paragraph (e) of sub-section (5) of section 148.



Professor Fimbo on the other has advised us to hold the contrary view regarding Article 15 and 30 (2) of the Constitution in respect of the provisions of paragraph (e) of sub-section (5) of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act.



Let us first have a close examination of Article 15 of the Constitution. But a word caution first. Since our Constitution is established in the Kiswahili language, we must constantly bear in mind that the controlling version is the Kiswahili one and not the English version. When that is done, it is immediately noticed that the English version of paragraph (b) of sub-article (2) of Article 15 is incorrect in so far as it includes the words “or upon reasonable suspicion of having committed a criminal offence”. Fortunately for us, the case before us does not involve that part of Article 15. We are only concerned with sub-articles (1) and (2) paragraph (a) which state”



“(1) Man`s freedom is inviolable and every person is entitled to his personal freedom.



2)
For the purposes of protecting the right to personal freedom, no person shall be subject to arrest, restriction, detention, exile or deprivation of his liberty in any other manner save in the following cases:-



(a)
in certain circumstances, and subject to a procedure, prescribed by law; or



(b)
………………………… (not applicable).



Mr. Massaba has contended, correctly in our view, that the basic right to personal liberty may be derogated from or restricted within the scope of the exceptions stated under paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article (c) of sub-section (5) of section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, fall squarely within the scope of paragraph (a) above cited. Professor Fimbo has advised us to the contrary.



In our consider opinion, we think there is a need to bear in mind certain basic concepts, principles and characteristics concerning the Bill of Rights and Duties enshrined in our Constitution, in order to interprete the Constitution and the laws of the land properly. First, the Constitution of the United Republic recognizes and guarantees not only basic human rights, but also, unlike most constitutions of countries of West, recognizes and guarantees basic human duties. It seems that the framers of our Constitution realized that the individual human being does not exist or live in isolation, but exists and lives in society. Our Constitution shares this characteristic with the Constitution lives in society. Our Constitution shares this characteristic with the Constitution of India which contains “fundamental Duties” of every citizen of India in PART IVA of the Constitution. There is however a significant difference between our situation and that of India on this point. First, the fundamental or basic duties recognized by our Constitution are attributed to human beings, whereas those under the Indian Constitution of India, fundamental rights are dealt with in a separate part of the Constitution (PART III) and fundamental duties in another separate part (PART IVA). In our situation, both fundamental or basic rights and duties are dealt with in one single part of the Constitution, that is, PART III. This location of basic rights and duties in one single part of the Constitution of the United Republic is both symbolic and significant. It is a symbolism and an expression of a constitutionally recognized co-existence of the individual human being and society, as well as the co-existence of rights and duties of the individual and society.



This view is supported by the principles underlying The African Charter on Human and Peoples` Rights which was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity in 1981 and came into force on 21 October, 1986 after the necessary ratifications. Tanzania signed the Charter on 31 May, 1982 and ratified it on 18 February, 1984. Since our Bill of Rights and Duties was introduced into the Constitution under the Fifth Amendment in February, 1985, that is, slightly over three years after Tanzania signed the Charter, and about a year after ratification, account must be taken of that Charter in interpreting our Bill of rights and Duties.



The preamble to the Charter states:



“The African States members of the Organization of African Unity, parties to the present conviction entitled “African Charter on Human and People’s Rights”,

…………………………………………………………………..

…………………………………………………………………..

Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of human and people’s rights;



Recognizing on the one hand, that fundamental human rights stem from attributes of human beings, which justifies their international protection, and on the other hand that the reality and respect of peoples` rights should necessarily guarantee human rights;



Considering that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone;

…………………………………………………………………



It seems evident in our view that the Bill of Rights and Duties embodied in our Constitution is consistent with the concepts underlying the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as stated in the Preamble to the Charter.



The second important principle or characteristic to be borne in mind when interpreting our Constitution is a corollary of the reality of co-existence of the individual and society, and also the reality of co-existence of rights and duties of the individual on the one hand, and the collective or communitarian rights and duties of society on the other. In effect this co-existence means that the rights and duties of the individual are limited by the rights and duties of society, and vice versa. Thus under Article 29(5) it is stated:



“(5) For the purposes of the better enjoyment by

all persons of the rights and freedoms specified in

this Constitution, every person shall so conduct

himself and his affairs as not to prejudice the rights

and freedom of others or the public interests”.



The same principle or characteristic is reflected in Article 30(1) which states:



“The rights and freedoms whose basic content have been set out in this Constitution shall not be exercised by any person in such a manner as to occasion the infringement or termination of the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest”.



We are aware that such limitations to basic rights and duties are not unique to Tanzania. They are inherent in any society and are to be found in many Constitutions and legal systems. Thus the merits and demerits of any legal system in so far as the question of Human Rights is concerned depend upon the extent to which a particular legal system succeeds or fails to harmonize the basic rights and freedoms of the individual on the one hand, and the collective or communitarian rights and duties of Society on the other.



It is in the light of these consideration that the provisions of Section 148 (5)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act and these of Article 15(2)(a) and Article 30(2)(b) must be construed as to their meaning and effect. We must start with Article 15 which we have already reproduced earlier. As already observed, Mr. Massaba, learned Principal State Attorney, contends that the provisions of section 148(5)(c) which deprive an accused person of his or her personal liberty by prohibiting the grant of bail are constitutionally valid, since such deprivation is done in respect of circumstances and according to a procedure prescribed by law. According to his argument, the requirements of Article 15(2)(a) are fulfilled, since the prescribed circumstances are the offences charged, and the prescribed procedure is implied under the Criminal Procedure Act, in that the accused has opportunity to be heard before he is remanded into custody by the subordinate court. In response to our question whether such procedure is meaningful when it does not affect the outcome in the sense that the accused is bound to be denied bail whatever he may say on his behalf, Mr. Massaba replied to the effect that although such hearing is of no consequence on the issue of denial of bail, it may result in the dismissal of the charge when for instance, such charge discloses no offence known to the law of the land.



Unfortunately, the learned trial Judge did not specifically consider the issue whether the requirements of Article 15(2)(a) are fulfilled by the provisions of section 148(5)(c). What he stated on this point is as follows:



“article 15 of our Constitution provides for Rights to liberty such that no one may be deprived of his freedoms except in accordance with the law. Now section 148 of the C.P.A. derogates from the right to liberty, and so it is ex-facie ultra vires the provisions of Article 15 of the Constitution. It is for the Republic to prove that section 148 of the C.P.A. is saved by Articles 30 and 31 of the Constitution by showing that the statute in question is in the public interest and justifiable on national security grounds. The Republic has to prove on a balance of probabilities”.



It would seem that the learned trial judge is of the view that every statute which derogates from the right to personal liberty “is ex facie ultra vires the provisions of Article 15”. This view is obviously wrong because Article 15 itself provides for derogation under sub-article (2).



On a close examination of Article 15, it is apparent that there are two situations under which a person may be denied or deprived of personal liberty under the same article. For purposes of clarity we repeat the provisions of Articles 15:



“15 (1) Man`s freedom is inviolable and every person is

entitled to his personal freedom.



2)
for the purpose of protecting the right to personal freedom, no person shall be subject to arrest, restriction, detention, exile or deprivation of his liberty in any other manner save in the following cases:-



(a)
in certain circumstances, and subject to a procedure, prescribed by law; or



(b)
in the execution of the sentence or order of a court in respect of which he has been convicted”.



It is obvious from these provisions that a person may be deprived or denied of personal liberty under Article 15 only under the conditions stipulated under paragraphs (a) and (b). In the case before us, it is paragraph (a) which is relevant. That paragraph sanctions the deprivation or denial of liberty under “certain circumstances” and “subject to a procedure”, both of which must be “prescribed by law”.



In our considered opinion, there is no difficulty in finding the “certain circumstances” prescribed by section 148(5)(c) for deprivation or denial of personal liberty through the prohibition of bail. This is provided for in the words underlined hereunder:



“(5) A police officer in charge of a police station, or a court

before whom an accused person is brought or appears shall not admit that person to bail, if –

a)
………………………………………..

b)
………………………………………..

c)
………………………………………..

d)
………………………………………..

e)
the act or any of the acts constituting the offence with

which a person is charged consists of a serious

assault causing grievious harm on or threat of violence

to other person, or of having or possessing a firearm

or an explosive.”



here is however a real problem in finding the requisite prescribed procedure for denying bail to the accused. As already mentioned, Mr. Massaba, learned Principal State Attorney, contends in effect that such procedure is implied under the Criminal Procedure Act in that there is nothing under section 148 which prohibits the court from hearing the accused inrespect of bail before remanding him into custody. With due respect to Mr. Massaba, we are satisfied that he is wrong, and that his error is a result of a misconception as to what amounts to `procedure` in terms of paragraph (a) of Article 15.



From a close examination of sub-article (2) of Article 15, it is apparent that its wording is so emphatically protective of the right to personal liberty that the procedure envisaged under paragraph (a) cannot be anything but a procedure of safeguards by which one may be deprived or denied of personal liberty. In the words of the Supreme Court of India which considered a similar provision in the Indiaa Constitution in the case of MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA (1978) 2 SCR p.621.





“is the prescription of some sort of procedure

enough or must the procedure comply with any

particular requirements? Obviously procedure

cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable”.



We are unable to find under section 148 or lsewhere any prescription for the requisite procedure for denial of bail in terms of paragraph (a) of Article 15(2) of the Constitution of this country. It follows therefore that sections 148(5)(c) of the Act is violative of Article 15(2) of the Constitutions and we so find.



We must now examine whether the provisions of section 148(5) (c) are also violative of Article 13(6)(a) of the Constitution. That article deals with the basic right to be heard before being condemned. It states:



“(6) For the purposes of ensuring equality before the law

the state shall make provisions:



a)
that every person, when his rights and obligations are being determined, be entitled to a fair hearing by the court of law or other body concerned and be guaranteed of the right of appeal or to another legal remedy against the decision of courts of law and other bodies which decide on his rights or interests founded on statutory provisions”.



The learned trial judged in the case before us was of the view an accused person is not given any meaningful opportunity of being heard before he is denied bail under section 148(5)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In our view the provisions of Article 13(6)(a) are really inapplicable to section 148(5)(e). We say so because that part of the Article concerns only situations “when ….. rights and obligations are being determined” and not situations such as under section 148(5)(e) when the court must make a particular order, without discretion.



Next to turn to Article 13(6)(b) of the Constitution to see whether the trial Judge was correct in holding to the effect that the relevant provisions of section 148(5)(e) were violative of that Article. The paragraph reads:



“(6) For the purposes of ensuring equality before the law, the

state shall make provisions:-

(a) ……………………………………. (cited above)

(b) every person charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty”.



This is another Article of which English translation does not correctly reflect the Swahili version, which is the controlling version. The concept contained in the Swahili version is broader than the English translation. A proper translation of the Article should read along the following lines:



“No one charged with a criminal offence shall be

treated like a convict until his guilt is proved”.



On a proper interpretation of section 148(5)(e), we agree with a part of what Msumi, J. stated in the case of REPUBLIC V. PEREGRIN Y. MROPE, Misc. Criminal Cause No. 43 of 1989 (unreported) where he stated, inter alia:



“On the question of unconstitutionality, I am of

the view that Section 148(5)(e) does not contravene

the provision of Article 13(6) (b), …… Denying bail

to accused person does not necessarily amount to treating such a person like a convicted criminal”.



With regard to the provisions of Article 13(4) and (5) which prohibit discriminatory legislation incompatible with the basic right to equality before the law, the learned trial Judge held to the effect that section 148, which prohibited bail for certain offences, was violative of Article 13(4) and (5). In coming to that conclusion, the learned trial Judge was influenced by the meaning of discrimination, as defined by the Court of Appeal of the Cook Islands in the case of Clarke v. Karika (1985) L.R.C. (Const.)732; also by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911) 220 U.S. 61; and the case of Megowan v. Maryland (1961)366 U.S. 420. With due respect to the learned trial Judge, he seems to have misdirected himself on the correct interpretation of `discrimination` as envisaged under Article 13(4) and (5). The term `discriminations` is specifically defined under Sub-article (5) as follows:



“For the purpose of this section the expression “discriminatory” means affording different treatment to different persons attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinion, colour, occupation or creed whereby persons of one such description are subject to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another description are not made subject or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of such description”.



This is another English translation which is incorrect in certain parts. The word ‘occupation’ used therein is not the correct rendering of the Swahili expression “hali yao ya maisha”. We think the correct English translation consistent with the underlying concept should be something like, “ Their status in life”.



Bearing in mind, as we must, this interpretation, we are satisfied that the selective prohibition against bail contained under section 148 (5) ( c ) cannot be said to be discriminatory in terms of the Constitution. This is because the accused persons who are denied bail are so denied on the basis of their actions or conduct.



Finally, we must consider whether the learned trial Judge was correct in holding that the provisions of section 148 were volatize of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers stated under Article 4. After reviewing several decisions by a number of courts in Commonwealth countries, the learned trial Judge concluded:



“ Pursuant to that reasoning, which I adopt, I am of

the view that the fettering or removing of judicial

discretion by the legislature in matters of granting

bail under S. 148 of the C.P.A. is unconstitutional……”.



With due respect the learned trial Judge, we think he came to a wrong conclusion. In our view, the Doctrine of Separation of Powers can be said to be infringed when either the Executive or the Legislature takes over the function of the Judicature involving the interpretation of the laws and the adjudication of rights and duties in disputes either between individual persons or between the state and individual persons. A legislation which prohibits the grant of bail to persons charged with specified offences does not in our view amount to such a take over of judicial functions by the Legislature. Such legislations do exist in several countries o the Commonwealth, such as Zimbabwe and The Gambia, where their constitutional validity has been confirmed in cases like Bull v. Minister of Home Affairs (1987) LRC (Const) p.555 and Attorney General of the Gambia v. Memedou Jobe (1984) A.C. 689 (PC).



In the end however, when all is said and done, we find that the provisions of section 148(5)(e) are violative of Article 15(2)(a) of the Constitution. To the extent that section 148(5)(e) violates the Constitution, it would be null and void in terms of Articles 64(5) of the constitution, unless it is saved by the general derogation clauses, that is, Article 30 and 31, which permit certain derogations from the basic rights of the individual.



Article 30 and 31 states as follows:



“30(1) The rights and freedoms whose basic content have

been set out in this Constitution shall not be exercised by any person in such a manner as to occasion the infringement or termination of the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.



2)
It is hereby declared that no provision contained in this Part of this Constitution, which stipulates the basic human rights, freedoms and duties, shall be construed as invalidating any existing law or prohibiting the enactment of any law or the doing of any lawful act under such law, making provision for-



(a)
ensuring that the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest are not prejudiced by the misuse of the individual rights and freedoms;



(b)
ensuring the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, rural and urban development and utilization of mineral resources or the development or utilization of any other property in such manner as to promote the public benefit;



(c)
ensuring the operations of the judgement or order of court given or made in any civil or criminal proceedings;



(d)
the protection of the reputation, rights and freedoms of others on the private lives of persons involved in any court proceedings, prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information, or the safeguard of the dignity, authority and independence of the courts;



(e)
imposing restrictions, supervision and control over the establishment, management and operation of sections and private companies in the country; or



(f)
enabling any other thing to be done which promotes, enhances or protects the national interest generally.



Article 31:-



31.- (1) Notwithstanding the provision of section

30(2), an Act of parliament shall not be invalid for the reason only that it provides for the taking, during periods of emergency, or in ordinary times in relation to individuals who are believed to be conducting themselves in a manner that endangers or compromises national security, of measures that derogate from the provisions of section 114 and 15 of this Constitution.



2)
No measures referred to in section (1) shall be taken in pursuance of any law during any period or emergency, or in ordinary times in relation to any person, save only to the content to which they are necessary and justifiable for dealing with the situation that exists during the period of emergency or in ordinary times dealing with the situation created by the conduct of the individual in question.



3)
Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize the deprivation of any person of the right to live except in respect of death caused as a result of acts of war.



4)
In this and the following sections of this Part “period of emergency” means any period during which the proclamation of a state of emergency made by the President in the exercise of the power conferred on him by section 32, continues in force”.

The question that arises is whether section 148(5)(e) fits inte the provisions of Article 30 or 31. The learned trial Judge dealt with this aspect of the case and stated:



“Therefore if the Republic wants bail to be denied under the provisions of Article 30 of the Constitution on the ground that the provisions of section 148(4) and (5) of the C.P.A. are in the public interest the said provisions of section 148(4) and (5) of the C.P.A. must pass the proportionality test on a balance of probabilities. Similarly when the Republic wants the court to refuse bail to the accused person under the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution on the ground that the provisions of section 148(4) and (5) were enacted on national security grounds the Republic has to prove and establish that these provision of section 148(4) and (5) of the C.P.A. are necessary and reasonably justifiable. If the Republic overcomes both these two hurdles then only then, may the courts refuse bail, but after affording the accused person opportunity to challenge the Republic’s statements and remarks”.



It is apparent from the above cited paragraph, that the learned trial judge is of the view that the answer to the question whether sections 148(5)(e) fits into the provisions of Article 30 depends upon proof by evidence adduced by the prosecution. With due respect to the learned trial Judge, we do not think that this is a question of evidence at all. On the contrary, it is a question of law. Mr. Massaba correctly confined his submissions to the provisions of Article 30. Obviously, Article 31 is not relevant to the case before us. It is Mr. Massaba`s contention that if section 148(5)(e) is found to fall short of the requirements of Article 15(2)(a), it is nevertheless validated by the provisions of paragraph (b) of Sub-Article (2) of Article 30 of the Constitution.



We accept the proposition that any legislation which falls within the parameters of Article 30 if constitutionally valid, notwithstanding that it may be violative of basic rights of the individual. But, and this is the crucial but, such legislation must fit squarely within the provisions of the Article. Any statute which is so broad as to fall partly within and partly outside the parameters of the Article would not be validated for the reason to be given hereafter. Let us therefore see whether section 148(5)(e) falls fully within paragraph (b) of sub-Article (2) of Article 30.



It is apparent that section 148(5)(e) would be validated if it can be construed as being wholly for “ensuring the interests of defence, public safety, public order” in terms of paragraph (b) of sub-Article (2) of Article 30. Since the objective of the relevant paragraph of the Constitution is the `ensuring` or protection of the “the interests of defence, public safety, public order”, etc, section 148(5)(e) would be saved if the denial of bail is aimed only at accused persons who are capable of being a danger or threat t the interests of defence, public safety or public order.

In our considered opinion the provisions of section 148(5)(e) are so broad that they encompass even accused persons who cannot reasonably be construed to be such a danger in terms of the relevant paragraph of the Constitution. For instance, these provisions cover an accused person who, while defending himself or his property against robbers uses excessive force resulting in the death of one or more of the robbers. They also cover an accused person who finds someone committing adultery with that person’s spouse, and being provoked, seriously assaults and causes grievious bodily harm to the adulterer. Similarly, the provisions also encompass an accused persons who, to the knowledge of everyone, inherits a firearm from his or her parent but forgets to obtain a firearm licence, thereby unwittingly committing the offence of being in possession of a firearm without a licence. Section 148(5)(e) would also cover every person who, though licensed to possess a firearm, forgets to renew his or her licence within the prescribed period. Many mere such examples may be given. None of these persons can reasonably be said to be dangerous.



It is thus plain that the provisions of section 148(5)(e) are so broadly drafted that they are capable of depriving personal liberty not only to persons properly considered to be dangerous, but even to persons who cannot be considered to be dangerous in terms of the meaning of paragraph (b) of sub-Article (2) of Article 30. Such a statutory provision amounts to the Kiswahili proverbial rat-trap which catches both rats and humans, without distinction. A provision of that nature attempts to protect society by endangering society. Section 148(5)(e) is such a provision. It does not therefore fit into Article 30(2)(a) of the Constitution and is consequently null and void.



In the final analysis therefore, but for different reasons, we agree with Mwalusanya, J. that section 148(5)(e) is unconstitutional and is therefore struck out of the statute book of the country. This means that the courts have discretion to grant bail to persons accused of the offences specified under section 148(5)(e) in accordance with the law as it existed before the enactment of section 148(5)(e). This discretion ought always to be exercised judicially by the courts taking into account both the interests of the individual, and the community of which the individual is a part.



Thus we dismiss the appeal. Since the respondent is already a free man, we make no order inrespect of him.









DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this day of 16th May, 1991.




F. L. NYALALI

CHIEF JUSTICE




L. M. MAKAME

JUSTICE OF APPEAL




A. S. L. RAMADHANI

JUSTICE OF APPEAL



I certify that this is a true copy of the original.





F. L. K. WAMBALI

DEPUTY REGISTRAR

KATIKA KESI ZOTE HIZI SUALA LA INHERENT POWER LIMEJADILIWA,NA PIA ZOTE ZILIISHIA KUTANGAZA KUWA SHERIA HIZO ZINAPINGANA NA KATIBA NA HIVYO KWA MAZINGIRA YAKE NI BATILI NA KUZIFUTA SHERIA HIZO MARA MOJA

 

[Kuhani]

Augustoons, Unazunguka mbali mno.

Ibara ya 30 (5) inasema kwamba kama Mahakama ikiwamua kwamba sheria fulani inapingana na Katiba, basi hiyo sheria isitangazwe batili papo hapo, ila iendelee kufanya kazi mpaka Serikali itakapoibadilisha katika muda uliopangwa na Mahakama. Itakuwaje?

Katiba si ndio sheria Mama ya nchi. Sasa kuna mantiki gani kuwa na sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba ? Simple as that.

Tukaja kaona, kwa vidhibiti ulivyotuwekea hapa, katika kesi ya Takrima Jaji alitangaza sheria ni batili papo hapo, baada ya kuiona iko kinyume na Katiba.

Sasa hapo imekuwaje? Kapata wapi tena hizo nguvu Jaji? Tulipokuwa watoto, tulikuwa tunaimba wimbo unasema “itakuwaje Jaji, itakuwaje Jaji?”

Sasa katika kujadili hilo swali, ndio ukanza kwenda kureeeefu kueleza mambo ya “nguvu za asili” za mahakama kuhusiana na maswala ya Jurisdiction na jinsi sheria zetu zilivyotoka India mwaka wa ishirini.

Katika masuala ya katiba na haki za msingi za watu mahakama ina mamlaka ya pekee na ya asili(exclusive and inherent jurisdiction).Uwezo au mamlaka haya hautokani na katiba wala sheria yoyote kama nilivyosema ni uwezo wa asili ambao mahakama ina wivu sana mara uwezo huu unapotaka kuondolewa.

kwa sheria inayoitwa The Judicature and Aplication of Laws Ordinace(JALO).JALO hili ndilo lililoleta sheria hapa Tanzania zikitokea uinereza kupitia India…

Nikakwambia hicho kitu inherent powers sijawahi kukisikia kama ulivyokieleza hapa. Majaji hawawezi kuwa na nguvu za kujiamulia mambo kinyume na Katiba kutoka kwa mamlaka ya Waingereza na Wahindi wa mwaka ishirini.

Hakipo. Hakuna kitu kama hicho.

Mahakama na nguvu zake zote zinatoka kwenye Katiba na Sheria zilizopo. Hicho kitu unachokiita “inherent power” ni original jurisdiction, yani nguvu ya Mahakama kusikiliza kesi yeyote ambayo haijatengewa mahakama nyingine kwenye sheria. Unachokiita “inherent power” sio mamlaka ya kujiamulia mambo kiajabu ajabu ambayo hawajapewa Kikatiba. Unachanganya jurisdiction na Judicial Review (yani nguvu ya Mahakama kutafsiri sheria na kuitangaza batili, kama inakiuka Katiba. Katika kesi ulizoweka hapa, Jaji Nyalali anaelezea hicho unacho kiita “iinherent power” kama ifuatavyo:

“We agree with Professor Fimbo that under the above cited provisions [Ibara ya 108], the High Court unlimited inherent original jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any legal matter unless there is express statutory provision to the contrary. However, we concur with Mr. Massaba that since there is a specific provision under the Constitution, that is, Article 30(3) and (4) concerning the enforcement of the Basic Rights, Freedoms and Duties in question, any proceedings for that purpose must be instituted under that specific article of the Constitution.

Hapo hawaongelei nguvu za Majaji kutangua sheria ambayo ni kinyume cha Katiba. Wanaongelea jurisdiction - nguvu ya Mahakama kusikiliza kesi. Sisi hapa tunajiuliza kitu kingine: inakuje Ibara ya 30 (5) inainyima Mahakama nguvu ya kutangua sheria iliyoiona batili, na swali la pili, kama wanaweza kutangua, wameipata wapi hiyo nguvu kama Ibara ya 30 (5) haisemi? Hatuongelei maswala ya Jurisdiction hapa – nguvu ya mahakama kusikiliza kesi. Unachanganya ma ishu.

 

[Kuhani]

Kuhusu ubatili wa sheria zilizo kinyume na Katiba, bado unajichanganya changanya. Ulisema

...Baada ya kuona kuwa mahakama inatangaza sheria nyingi kukinzana na katiba na hivyo ni batili(unconstitutional and therefore null and void),serikali ilishituka na kuamua kukianyiamarekebsho kifungu cha 30 cha katiba kwa kuongeza ibara (5) ili kubana uhuru wa mahakama…”

… 1. Je,mahakama ikisema sheria Fulani ni batili na kinyume cha katiba kwa mujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) sheria hiyo inatenguka mara moja?

Jibu hapa ni ndiyo,sheria hiyo inatenguka mara moja,kwani neon batili maana yake kwa kiingereza void na kwa tafsiri ya kisheria void maana yakeni sawa sawa na hicho kitu hakikuwepo vile

Halafu, halafu unakuja kujikanyaga:

3. Kama mahakama inasema sheria Fulani ni kinyume cha katiba ni kwa msingi gani sheria hiyo inaendelea kutumika

Sheria hiyo inaendelea kutumika kwa misingi ya ibara ya 30(5) ya katiba ambapo kama sheria inapingana na katiba basi sheria hiyo kama haikutamkwa kuwa ni batili(void) itakuwa ni batilifu(voidable).Kitu kinapokuwa voidable au batilifu,ni halali bado ila kinawezwa kuepukwa kwa kutangazwa void kwa chaguo la upande wowote(ie. It may be avoided at the option of either parties).Either parties hapa ni serikali na mahakama,iwapo mahakama imeipa muda serikali kuirekebisha hiyo sheria,sheria hiyo itakuwa batilifu(voidable) hadi ule muda upite ndipo itakuwa batili(void).

Unachanganya madawa hapo. Ibara ya 30 (5) haiongelei batilifu v/s batili, na voidable v/s void au Vodafon!

Kuna neno moja tu, “batili.”

Swali liko pale pale: 1 ) Kwa nini sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba sio batili, kama ambavyo Ibara 30 (5) inasema?
2) Kama Jaji anaweza kutangaza ni batili, amepata wapi hizo nguvu kama Ibara 30 (5) inakataa?

“Inherent powers” sio jibu!

Nchi hii ni ya Kikatiba na Kisheria.

“Nguvu za Asili” zimekaa ki-Mugabe Mugabe, kama sio ki-Profesa Maji Marefu!

 

[Augustoons]

Kuhusu ubatili wa sheria zilizo kinyume na Katiba, bado unajichanganya changanya. Ulisema



Halafu, halafu unakuja kujikanyaga:



Unachanganya madawa hapo. Ibara ya 30 (5) haiongelei batilifu v/s batili, na voidable v/s void au Vodafon!

Kuna neno moja tu, "batili."

Swali liko pale pale: 1 ) Kwa nini sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba sio batili, kama ambavyo Ibara 30 (5) inasema?
2) Kama Jaji anaweza kutangaza ni batili, amepata wapi hizo nguvu kama Ibara 30 (5) inakataa?

"Inherent powers" sio jibu!

Nchi hii ni ya Kikatiba na Kisheria.

"Nguvu za Asili" zimekaa ki-Mugabe Mugabe, kama sio ki-Profesa Maji Marefu!

Bwana Kuhani nashukuru sana kwa mchango wako ambao kwa sasa nauona kuwa katika mjadala huu hauna lengo la kuelimishana bali ni kubishana kwa kitu ambacho tayari nimekwisha kifafanua na kimekwisha fafanuliwa na mahakama katika maamuzi mbalimbali.Ningekuwepo karibu na maktaba ya mahakama kuu au ya chuo kikuu udsm basi ningeweza kukuletea specific cases on specific issues hata hivyo naamini nimejitahidi sana kufafanua suala hilo na kujibu maswali yote ya mwanakijiji kiufasaha katika makala yangu,kiasi mtu yeyote ambaye ni mweledi wa sheria hawezi kushindwa kulielewa hili,japo nakiri kumweleza layman wa profession hii ya sheria ni kazi ngumu sana kuelewa na wengine hapa sio walimu na huenda hatuna kipaji cha ualimu kiasi cha kujua methodology gani itumike kumuelekeza mtu aelewe.

Hata hivyo nakiri kuwa unaweza tu kumwelekeza mtu anayetaka kuelewa akaelewa lakini sio yule anayetaka mbishane ili mwisho wa siku apatikane mshindi.Hapa mimi sikuwa na najadili kwa minajili ya kushindana kwani hakuna hata zawadi iliyoahidiwa hapa,wala siko hapa kumdanganya mtu kwani niliyoeleza hapo ndio legal position,na kwakuwa legal definition ya mambo au terma za kisheria ni tofauti na definition za layman or common man's understanding,naomba nikuache tu na conclusion zako zozote kuhusu hiyo ibara kwa mambo nitakayoyandika leo.Kama utapata maana nyingine ya hiyo ibara basi naomba utuwekee hapa,ukiwa na majibu ya maswali hayo yaliyoibuliwa na wanajamvi mbalimbali,ambao kwa majibu yangu wengi wamekwisha elewa.

Zaidi ya hayo naelewa hapa jf wapo wanasheria au wanazuoni wa taaluma hii ya sheria ambao kwa nafasi hii naomba na wao wasaidie kufafanua haya niliyoyasema kama sio ndiyo legal position.Ukumbuke toka mwanzo nimekwambia "I agree to disagree",kwa kuwa umeamua kudissent hadi mwisho there is nothing i can do to convince or make you understand,so far huo ndio msimamo wako toka awali.

Nachoweza kukushauri ni kama ifuatavyo,nenda muulize any qualified lawyer kuhusu hayo maswali ikiwezekana hata mwanafunzi wa mwaka wa kwanza tu wa constitutional law atakuwa na majibu,kama hilo halitakushawishi,bado unaweza kumface judge yeyote wa mahakma kuu privately akakueleza maana ya hizo provision kwa mujibu wa mahakama,naamini jaji kama maadam Kimaro,Makaramba,na wengineo wataweza kukusaidia au alternatively,peleka kesi mahakama mkuu pale inayohusu interpretation ya hiyo ibara ukiomba declaratory orders ya legal position ya hiyo ibara labda hili litasaidia zaid kwa wewe kuelewa.

Zaidi ya hapo nazidi kusisitiza kuwa isome vizuri tena taratibu hiyo ibara ya 30(5) uilewe vizuri.Msimamo wangu ni kwamba uwezo wa mahakama kufuta sheria haukuondolewa kabisa baada ya marekebishoya katiba yaliyoingiza hiyo ibara ya 30(5).Na ndio maana kama utakuwa na kumbukumbu jaribu kutafakari ni lini ibara ya 30(5) iliingizwa katika katiba?ni kwa mabadiliko ya zamani sana kama sikosei mabadiliko ya 11 ya katiba maka ya 1990s lakini bado mahakama imeendelea kutumika uwezo wake kufuta sheria au kuipa muda serikali.Kama uwezo huo ungekuwa umeondolewa kwa mahakama basi mahakama katika hiyo kesi ya TAKRIMA isingeweza kufuta vile vipengele vya sheria ya uchaguzi vilivyokuwa vinaruhusu takrima bila kuwa na mamlaka ya kufanya hivyo.Hivyo nsisitiza kuwa mamlaka hayo ni inherent na yamesisitizwa tu katika katiba kwa ibara mbalimbali.Kwa maana hiyo kwa kujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) mahakama inao uwezo wa ama kutamka kuwa sheria fulani ni batili au kutoitamka kuwa batili na badaye yake kuipa muda serikali kuifanyia mabadiliko sheria hiyo.Sheria hiyo ambayo serikali imepewa muda wa kuibadili bado ikuwa halali japo inaendelea kupingana na katiba,na ndio maana hata tume ya nyalali ilishapoint out sheria 40 ambazo bado zinatumika hadi leo kuwa zinapingana na katiba,mojawapo ikiwa ni ile ya kifo na ile ya prevention and detention lakini sheria hizi bado zinatumika ni halali japokuwa zinapingana na katiba,huo ndiyo msingi wa argument yangu kuwa si kila sheria inayopingana na katiba lazima iwe batili(void).

Kwa kukuelewesha zaidi suala la kutamka sheria fulani kuwa batili au la?ni la uhuru wa mahakama ni mahakama peke yake ndio inao uwezo wa kutamka hivyo kulingana na vigezo vyake inavyoviona yenyewe na madhara ya sheria hiyo.Ndio maana wewe kuhani na mke wako leo mnaweza mkaachana,ninyi mkatreat kuachana huko kama ni talaka,sawa in fact hiyo itakuwa talaka si mmeamua kuachana na kugawana vitu,si mume na mke tena?lakini kisheria ninyi hamjaachana hata mkae mbalimbali miaka 10 kisheria mtahesabika bado ni mume na mke kwa kuwa kisheria ni mahakama peke yake ndiyo yenye uwezo wa kutoa talaka.Vivyo hivyo kwa sheria zinazopingana na katiba,ni mahakama tu ndio yenye uwezo wa kuzibatilisha sheria hizo au kuzifanya ziendelee kutumika hadi pale serikali itakapozibadilisha au muda uliowekwa kwisha.

Swali liko pale pale: 1 ) Kwa nini sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba sio batili, kama ambavyo Ibara 30 (5) inasema?
2) Kama Jaji anaweza kutangaza ni batili, amepata wapi hizo nguvu kama Ibara 30 (5) inakataa

Narudia tena ibara ya 30(5) haizikatazi mahakama kutangaza sheria fulani kuwa batili. Na ukisoma ibara ya 64(5) ya katiba[najua itakuchanganya zaidi] lakini ndiyo inayofafanua kuw

endapo sheria
nyingine yoyote itakiuka masharti yaliyomo katika Katiba hii,
Katiba ndiyo itakuwa na nguvu, na sheria hiyo nyingine, kwa kiasi
inachokiuka Katiba itakuwa batili.

Sasa ndio maana nakwambia kwa mujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) sio kila sheria inayopingana na katiba lazima iwe batili.Kama tungefuata maneno ya ibara ya 64(5) hizo sheria zote zilizotajwa na tume ya jaji nyalali zingekuwa batili hata kabla ya kupelekwa mahakamani.Lakini sio hivyo zipo hadi leo na hazijafutwa,hadi mahakama iseme kupitia kesi iliyoletwa mahakamani kuwa sheria fulani pamoja na kuwa kinyume na katiba ni (a) batili au (b) sio batili hadi pale itakaporekebishwa au muda uliowekwa na mahakama upite.Hata hivyo ibara hiyo ya 64(5) haisemi kuwa mahakama ndio itazifuta au kuipa mahakama uwezo wa kuifuta.Effect yake inaonekana kama vile sheria hiyo itaanguka yenyewe.Kwa maana hiyo hutopata mahala popote katika katiba panapoipa specifically mahakama nguvu ya kufuta sheria ambazo ni batili,isipokuwa kupitia inherent power zake.
Hivyo basi hata kesho kesi nyingine ya kikatiba ikija mahakamani?mahakama hailazimishwi na mtu yeyote inaweze ikaifuta hiyo sheria mara moja au ikaamua kuipa muda serikali kuirekebisha.LAKINI PIA UNATAKIWA KUTAMBUA KWAMBA:-Serikali haifurahishwi sana na kitendo cha mahakama kufuta sheria zake kwa kutangaza batili na ndio maana ilitunga hicho kiibara ndogo cha tano ili walau ipewe muda wa kuirekebisha kuliko kudhalilika kwa kufutwa kwa sheria zake na mahakama.Ingekuwa ni amri yake peke yake serikali ingependa hata kesho iiondolee kabisa mahakama huu uwezo wa kufuta sheria.Kwani kama unavyouliza wewe kuwa uwezo huu mahakama imepata wapi,hata wabunge kule dodoma wameshahoji mara nyingi juu ya uwezo huu wa mahakama kufuta sheria zilizotungwa na bunge,wakati hapohapo bunge lina claim kuwa lenyewe ni sovereign kwa hiyolinaweza kulegislate kwenye kitu chochote.Hizi inherent power zipo pale kwajili pia ya kuwezesha checks and balances.Kabla ya kuingizwa hiyo ibara ya 30(5) katika katiba mahakama kwa kutumia uwezo wake na kwa kuzingatia ibara ya 64(5) ilikuwa inazifuta hizo sheria mara moja lakini toka kuingizwa kwa ibara hii mahakama imekuwa careful katika kufuta sheria,kuna wakati inazifuta kuna wakati haizifuti.Kwa nini?inategemeana na kila kesi.

Kuhusu inherent power,hapo naomba nikuulize wewe je,unaelewaje,ibara ya 108 inaposema legal traditions?hizo legal traditions ni zipi?.

 

[Kuhani]

"...Msimamo wangu ni kwamba uwezo wa mahakama kufuta sheria haukuondolewa kabisa baada ya marekebishoya katiba yaliyoingiza hiyo ibara ya 30(5)."

Msimamo wako hautusaidii bila legal substantiation. Tunajaribu kutafuta msimamo wa sheria na nchi.

"...Sheria hiyo ambayo serikali imepewa muda wa kuibadili bado ikuwa halali japo inaendelea kupingana na katiba,na ndio maana hata tume ya nyalali ilishapoint out sheria 40 ambazo bado zinatumika hadi leo kuwa zinapingana na katiba,mojawapo ikiwa ni ile ya kifo na ile ya prevention and detention lakini sheria hizi bado zinatumika ni halali japokuwa zinapingana na katiba,huo ndiyo msingi wa argument yangu kuwa si kila sheria inayopingana na katiba lazima iwe batili(void)."

Tume ya Nyalali haikutangaza, haikuamua -haikuwa na uwezo wa kuiamulia Nchi - jambo lolote kuhusu uhalali wa kitu chochote kile. Tume ya mapendekezo sio Mahakama yenye mamlaka. Umepotosha!

"Narudia tena ibara ya 30(5) haizikatazi mahakama kutangaza sheria fulani kuwa batili...."

Unachokirudia hapo sio swali linaloulizwa: Inakuwaje ibara ya 30 (5) inaruhusu sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba iendelee kutumika?

"Sasa ndio maana nakwambia kwa mujibu wa ibara ya 30(5) sio kila sheria inayopingana na katiba lazima iwe batili."

Itakuwaje?

Ibara ya 64 (5), inasema sheria yeyote itakayokuwa kinyume na Katiba ni batili. Katiba ni Supreme. Kipengele hiki wengine wanakiita Supremacy Clause.

Sasa utakuwaje na sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba ikaendelea kutumika?

"Kama tungefuata maneno ya ibara ya 64(5) hizo sheria zote zilizotajwa na tume ya jaji nyalali zingekuwa batili hata kabla ya kupelekwa mahakamani. Lakini sio hivyo zipo hadi leo na hazijafutwa..."

Uchambuzi kutumia maoni ya tume ya Nyalali ni upotoshaji kama nilivyoeleza pale juu.

"Hata hivyo ibara hiyo ya 64(5) haisemi kuwa mahakama ndio itazifuta au kuipa mahakama uwezo wa kuifuta.Effect yake inaonekana kama vile sheria hiyo itaanguka yenyewe.Kwa maana hiyo hutopata mahala popote katika katiba panapoipa specifically mahakama nguvu ya kufuta sheria ambazo ni batili,isipokuwa kupitia inherent power zake."

Unazunguka mti wa mbuyu.

Kama sheria iliyo kinyume na Katiba "itaanguka yenyewe," kwa nini Ibara ya 30 (5) inasema hiyo sheria iendelee kutumika?

".... toka kuingizwa kwa ibara hii mahakama imekuwa careful katika kufuta sheria,kuna wakati inazifuta kuna wakati haizifuti.Kwa nini?inategemeana na kila kesi. "

Sio kweli.

Huwezi kusema sheria inayopingana na Katiba itafutwa au kutokufutwa kutegemeana na kesi. Mahakama imeshaamua kwamba sheria ni kinyume cha Katiba. Uamuzi umeshatoka kuhusu uhalali wa sheria. Sasa itategemea kesi vipi tena?

Tunarudi kule kule:

Ibara ya 64 (5): Sheria ambayo inapingana na Katiba ni batili .

Ibara ya 30 (5): Sheria ambayo Mahakama imeona ni batili inaweza kuendelea kutumika mpaka Serikali itakapoirekebisha katika muda uliopangwa na Mahakama.

Walioandiaka hivi vitu kwenye Katiba ya Nchi walikuwa wanafikiria nini?

Utatumiaje sheria ambayo ni batili?

Batili maana yake nini?

 

[Nyani Ngabu]

"...msimamo Wangu Ni Kwamba Uwezo Wa Mahakama Kufuta Sheria Haukuondolewa Kabisa Baada Ya Marekebishoya Katiba Yaliyoingiza Hiyo Ibara Ya 30(5)."

Msimamo Wako Hautusaidii Bila Legal Substantiation. Tunajaribu Kutafuta Msimamo Wa Sheria Na Nchi.

"...sheria Hiyo Ambayo Serikali Imepewa Muda Wa Kuibadili Bado Ikuwa Halali Japo Inaendelea Kupingana Na Katiba,na Ndio Maana Hata Tume Ya Nyalali Ilishapoint Out Sheria 40 Ambazo Bado Zinatumika Hadi Leo Kuwa Zinapingana Na Katiba,mojawapo Ikiwa Ni Ile Ya Kifo Na Ile Ya Prevention And Detention Lakini Sheria Hizi Bado Zinatumika Ni Halali Japokuwa Zinapingana Na Katiba,huo Ndiyo Msingi Wa Argument Yangu Kuwa Si Kila Sheria Inayopingana Na Katiba Lazima Iwe Batili(void)."

Tume Ya Nyalali Haikutangaza, Haikuamua -haikuwa Na Uwezo Wa Kuiamulia Nchi - Jambo Lolote Kuhusu Uhalali Wa Kitu Chochote Kile. Tume Ya Mapendekezo Sio Mahakama Yenye Mamlaka. Umepotosha!

"narudia Tena Ibara Ya 30(5) Haizikatazi Mahakama Kutangaza Sheria Fulani Kuwa Batili...."

Unachokirudia Hapo Sio Swali Linaloulizwa: Inakuwaje Ibara Ya 30 (5) Inaruhusu Sheria Ambayo Ni Kinyume Na Katiba Iendelee Kutumika?

"sasa Ndio Maana Nakwambia Kwa Mujibu Wa Ibara Ya 30(5) Sio Kila Sheria Inayopingana Na Katiba Lazima Iwe Batili."

Itakuwaje?

Ibara Ya 64 (5), Inasema Sheria Yeyote Itakayokuwa Kinyume Na Katiba Ni Batili. Katiba Ni Supreme. Kipengele Hiki Wengine Wanakiita Supremacy Clause.

Sasa Utakuwaje Na Sheria Ambayo Ni Kinyume Na Katiba Ikaendelea Kutumika?

"kama Tungefuata Maneno Ya Ibara Ya 64(5) Hizo Sheria Zote Zilizotajwa Na Tume Ya Jaji Nyalali Zingekuwa Batili Hata Kabla Ya Kupelekwa Mahakamani. Lakini Sio Hivyo Zipo Hadi Leo Na Hazijafutwa..."

Uchambuzi Kutumia Maoni Ya Tume Ya Nyalali Ni Upotoshaji Kama Nilivyoeleza Pale Juu.

"hata Hivyo Ibara Hiyo Ya 64(5) Haisemi Kuwa Mahakama Ndio Itazifuta Au Kuipa Mahakama Uwezo Wa Kuifuta.effect Yake Inaonekana Kama Vile Sheria Hiyo Itaanguka Yenyewe.kwa Maana Hiyo Hutopata Mahala Popote Katika Katiba Panapoipa Specifically Mahakama Nguvu Ya Kufuta Sheria Ambazo Ni Batili,isipokuwa Kupitia Inherent Power Zake."

Unazunguka Mti Wa Mbuyu.

Kama Sheria Iliyo Kinyume Na Katiba "itaanguka Yenyewe," Kwa Nini Ibara Ya 30 (5) Inasema Hiyo Sheria Iendelee Kutumika?

".... Toka Kuingizwa Kwa Ibara Hii Mahakama Imekuwa Careful Katika Kufuta Sheria,kuna Wakati Inazifuta Kuna Wakati Haizifuti.kwa Nini?inategemeana Na Kila Kesi. "

Sio Kweli.

Huwezi Kusema Sheria Inayopingana Na Katiba Itafutwa Au Kutokufutwa Kutegemeana Na Kesi. Mahakama Imeshaamua Kwamba Sheria Ni Kinyume Cha Katiba. Uamuzi Umeshatoka Kuhusu Uhalali Wa Sheria. Sasa Itategemea Kesi Vipi Tena?

Tunarudi Kule Kule:

ibara Ya 64 (5): Sheria Ambayo Inapingana Na Katiba Ni Batili .

ibara Ya 30 (5): Sheria Ambayo Mahakama Imeona Ni Batili Inaweza Kuendelea Kutumika Mpaka Serikali Itakapoirekebisha Katika Muda Uliopangwa Na Mahakama.

Walioandiaka Hivi Vitu Kwenye Katiba Ya Nchi Walikuwa Wanafikiria Nini?

Utatumiaje Sheria Ambayo Ni Batili?

Batili Maana Yake Nini?

ni Wapi Nilisema Kuwa Mimi Ni Jf Mtandao?

 

[Augustoons]

Ibara ya 64 (5): Sheria ambayo inapingana na Katiba ni batili .

Ibara ya 30 (5): Sheria ambayo Mahakama imeona ni batili inaweza kuendelea kutumika mpaka Serikali itakapoirekebisha katika muda uliopangwa na Mahakama.

Walioandiaka hivi vitu kwenye Katiba ya Nchi walikuwa wanafikiria nini?

Utatumiaje sheria ambayo ni batili?

Batili maana yake nini?


Kaka Kuhani eeh,
Asante sana kwa mara nyingine nilishasema kuwa katika mjadala huu natangazwa kushindwa kati yako na mimi,kama kulikuwa na mashindano yoyote,ila kwa wale waliotaka kuelimika naamini wameshaelimika.Sifahamu ni kitu gani ulichotaka kusikia toka kwangu hujasikia.Nadhani nimesema yote yanatosha.La msingi hapa ni kusubiri kutoka kwako kutuambia ni kwanini hiyo ibara ya 64(5) inatangaza waziwazi tena bila qualification kuwa sheria yoyote iliyotungwa na bunge inayopingana na katiba inakuwa batili,wakati ibara ya 30(5) inaleta conflict of laws kwa kusema tena badala ya kutangaza batili basi serikali ipewe muda.Maswali hayo hapo juu na mengineyo nadhani ni vema ukaiuliza serikali iliyofanya hiyo ibara ya 30(5) miaka takribani 15 iliyopita toka sasa, na bado mahakama katika kesi ya takrima ikafuta sheria ya uchaguzi bila kuipa muda serikali.Ndio kusema mahakama iliiidharau serikali?au sijui haikuiona hiyo ibara ya 30(5) inayosema serikali ipewe muda,maana hukumu ya kesi ya Takrima ambayo nilibahatika mkuwa mwanajopo la wanasheria ilitoka mwaka 2006.

Kwa hayo machache namalizia kwa kusema kwa uelewa wangu na authorities zote nilizokupa naishia hapo.Ila nitafurahi kupokea majibu toka kwako na summary ya legal arguments za hiyo ibara.

 

[Mag3]

Ibara ya 64 (5): Sheria ambayo inapingana na Katiba ni batili .

Ibara ya 30 (5): Sheria ambayo Mahakama imeona ni batili inaweza kuendelea kutumika mpaka Serikali itakapoirekebisha katika muda uliopangwa na Mahakama.

Walioandiaka hivi vitu kwenye Katiba ya Nchi walikuwa wanafikiria nini?

Utatumiaje sheria ambayo ni batili?

Batili maana yake nini?



Kaka Kuhani eeh,
Asante sana kwa mara nyingine nilishasema kuwa katika mjadala huu natangazwa kushindwa kati yako na mimi,kama kulikuwa na mashindano yoyote,ila kwa wale waliotaka kuelimika naamini wameshaelimika.Sifahamu ni kitu gani ulichotaka kusikia toka kwangu hujasikia.Nadhani nimesema yote yanatosha.La msingi hapa ni kusubiri kutoka kwako kutuambia ni kwanini hiyo ibara ya 64(5) inatangaza waziwazi tena bila qualification kuwa sheria yoyote iliyotungwa na bunge inayopingana na katiba inakuwa batili,wakati ibara ya 30(5) inaleta conflict of laws kwa kusema tena badala ya kutangaza batili basi serikali ipewe muda.Maswali hayo hapo juu na mengineyo nadhani ni vema ukaiuliza serikali iliyofanya hiyo ibara ya 30(5) miaka takribani 15 iliyopita toka sasa, na bado mahakama katika kesi ya takrima ikafuta sheria ya uchaguzi bila kuipa muda serikali.Ndio kusema mahakama iliiidharau serikali?au sijui haikuiona hiyo ibara ya 30(5) inayosema serikali ipewe muda,maana hukumu ya kesi ya Takrima ambayo nilibahatika mkuwa mwanajopo la wanasheria ilitoka mwaka 2006.

Kwa hayo machache namalizia kwa kusema kwa uelewa wangu na authorities zote nilizokupa naishia hapo.Ila nitafurahi kupokea majibu toka kwako na summary ya legal arguments za hiyo ibara.

Mimi nashukuru kwa somo ninalolipata kwenye huu mjadala na nasema asanteni na mjadala uendelee.

Kwa mara ya kwanza naanza kufunguka macho na kushuhudia jinsi bunge la jamhuri ya Tanzania linavyoweza kujadili na kupitisha mambo muhimu ya taifa bila umakini wa kutosha.

Pili naanza kuwa na wasiwasi na uwezo/umakini wa mahakama katika kusikiliza na kusimamia utawala wa kisheria iwapo katika kutafsiri sheria unajitokeza utata kama tunavyoshuhudia hapo juu.

Mwisho naomba tuzidi kuelemishana katika haya maswala na huu mjadala uzidi kuendelea bila jazba wala mshikemshike. Ni darasa hili.

 

[Augustoons]

Mimi nashukuru kwa somo ninalolipata kwenye huu mjadala na nasema asanteni na mjadala uendelee.

Kwa mara ya kwanza naanza kufunguka macho na kushuhudia jinsi bunge la jamhuri ya Tanzania linavyoweza kujadili na kupitisha mambo muhimu ya taifa bila umakini wa kutosha.

Pili naanza kuwa na wasiwasi na uwezo/umakini wa mahakama katika kusikiliza na kusimamia utawala wa kisheria iwapo katika kutafsiri sheria unajitokeza utata kama tunavyoshuhudia hapo juu.

Mwisho naomba tuzidi kuelemishana katika haya maswala na huu mjadala uzidi kuendelea bila jazba wala mshikemshike. Ni darasa hili.

Tungeweza kuendelea na mjadala,lakini ukion mwenzio hathamini mchango wako kila unalolisema anaona kama vile unaongopa utafanyaje?hata umwambie jua linatokea mashariki na kuzama magharibi bado atabisha tu kwa kuwa lengo lake si kuelewa ila ni kubishana kusiko na maana.Hatushangai haya kwani hata darasani wapo watu ambao wakiona mtu fulani anajibu maswali sana wanaanza kuwa na wivu na kutafuta visa vya hapa na pale,either wakuvizie wakupige kuwa unajidai au akuloge. These kind of people are there.

Angalia wewe ulivyosoma mjadala mzima na kuelewa,pamoja na kuwa kuna shemu huna uhakika nazo,umeacknowledge kwanza tulichojadili na kupromote majadiliano zaidi.Hilo ndilo linalotakiwa.Unaposema unatofautiana na mtu katika hoja fulani basi inakuwa vema kutoa hoja mbadala,ilihata third party akija aweze kutofautisha hoja hizo na kuzitolea maamuzi,lakini kama wewe kila mtu akitoa hoja unasema uwongo uwongo tuuuuuu hadi mwisho tukuelewe vipi?Haipendezi,haya mambo ya kikatiba na sheria sio siasa ni elimu and is documented so kuargue on a political point of view si sahihi kabisa.

Asante kwa mawazo na changamoto zako

 

[George Jinasa]

Mimi naomba kunena kidogo kuhusiana na hukumu ya mahakama ya rufaa juu ya mgombea binafsi. Mmoja kati ya wachangiaji anasema serikali walitakiwa kukata rufani toka mwaka 1995 kama hawakuridhishwa na maamuzi ya mahakama kuu ya wakati ule. Ni sahihi. Lakini tujiulize serikali kweli haikukubaliana na uamuzi huo? Nionavyo mimi kimantiki ya uamuzi wenyewe na sheria kama ilivyokuwa wakati huo, serikali ilikubaliana na uamuzi wa mahakama kuu.

Nasema hivyo kwa sababu tofauti na uamuzi wa mahakama kuu wa mwaka 2009, uamuzi wa awali ulifanyika kwa kulinganisha vifungu vya sheria ya uchaguzi na vile vya katiba ya jamhuri. Mahakama iliridhika kwamba kifungu kilichokuwemo katika sheria ya uchaguzi kilichotaka mgombea ubunge na uraisi atoke katika chama cha siasa kilichosajiliwa, kilikinzana na kifungu cha katika kinachotoa uhuru wa kuchagua na kuchaguliwa. Kwa mujibu wa kifungu cha 30 cha katiba mahakama ilikuwa na uwezo wa kutamka kwamba kifungu cha sheria ya uchaguzi kilikuwa ni haramu kwa kukinzana na katiba.

Serikali walichofanya ni kupitisha mswaada wa mabadiliko ya katiba ambao baada ya kubalikiwa na bunge na raisi, masharti kwamba mgombea ubunge, uraisi na udiwani lazima atoke katika chama cha siasa, yakawa ni sehemu ya katiba. Ni kwa mantiki hiyo ndio maana kesi ya mwaka 2009 ilijikita katika ukinzani kati ya katiba yenyewe. Suala lilikuwa je mahakama inauwezo wa kutamka kwamba kifungu cha katiba ni haramu? Mahakama kuu baada ya kupitia matamko ya kimahakama kutoka pande mbalimbali za duniani, ilijiridhisha kwamba mahakama ikiwa ni chombo kilichoanzishwa na katiba kama lilivyo bunge, haina uwezo wa kutamka kwamba mama yake ni haramu.

Mahakama iliona kwamba wenye uwezo wa kuamua kama kifungu cha katiba hakifai au la ni wananchi wenyewe. Kwa maana nyingine mahakama ilikuwa inasema kwamba suala la kama katiba ni nzuri au mbaya sio suala la kisheria bali ni suala la kisiasa ambalo linaweza kuamuliwa kisiasa kwa njia ya kura au kwa njia ya wabunge kama wawakilishi wa wananchi kupigania mabadiliko.

Nase

 

[George Jinasa]

Hukumu ya mgombea binafsi inaonekana katika rangi yake halisi sasa ambapo mjadala wa mabadiliko ya katiba imeshika kasi. Moja kati ya mapungufu watu wanayoyaona katika katiba yetu ni hili la kutaka mgombea atoke katika chama. Lakini, nina wasiwasi, kutikana na mijadala ya katiba inayoendelea kama vyama vya siasa, vikiwemo vya upinzani, vingependa mgombea binafsi ache. Nukta hiyo ilijitokeza vizuri katika kongamano la katiba UDSM wiki mbili zilizopita wakati Bwana Ulimwengu akichambua hoja ya moja ya magwiji wa siasa za upinzani nchini, Mh. Mabere Marando.

Japo umhimu wa mgombea binafsi katika demokrasia ni vigumu kutoonekana, lakini kitu mhimu zaidi siku zote katika demokrasia ni matakwa ya watu wengi. Je watu wengi wangependa mgombea binafsi awepo? Wangependa awepo katika nafasi zote za kisiasa kuanzia mjumbe wa serikali za mitaa hadi Raisi? Kutakuwa na taratibu gani kuhakikisha kwamba nafasi ya ugombea binafsi katika nafasi zote za kisiasa haiathiri uwepo wa vyama vya siasa? Kutakuwa na mbinu gani za kuwaratibu wanasiasa binafsi kuhakikisha kwamba shughuli zao za kisiasa, wao wenyewe na washirika wao, zinaendana na sheria za nchi? Ni vizuri pia wataalamu wetu wakatwalii katika himaya zingine zenye utaratibu huu ili kupata uzoefu.

 

[George Jinasa]

Labda niongezee kwa kujenga hoja zaidi. Sheria fulani inapobainishwa na kutamkwa na mahakama kwamba ni batili, inahesabika kuwa batili kuanzia lini? Je ni wakati ilipotungwa au wakati ilipongunduliwa na kutamkwa kuwa batili? Kama ni wakati ilipotungwa je inakuwaje kwa mfano, kwa watu waliofungwa wakati sheria hiyo haijagundulika na kutamkwa kuwa batili? Wataachiwa mara moja? Na kama wakiachiwa watalipwa fidia kwa kipindi walichotumikia kifungo kinachotokana na sheria batili?

Nikirudi katika Ibara tajwa hapo juu, ni kweli mahakama ikitamka sheria ni batili inapaswa kuonekana na kuchukuliwa hivyo. Kwa kipindi inavyochukuliwa hivyo kunakuwa hamna sheria? Je mahakama inaweza kutengeneza sheria mubadala ikatumika hadi hapo sheria halali itakapotungwa? Kikanuni, kazi ya kutunga sheria ni kazi ya Bunge. Yawezekana ndio maana Mahakam inatowa nafasi kwa bunge kutekelezwa wajibu wake kwa usahihi ndani ya muda husika na wakishindwa inaibatilisha sheria hiyo moja kwa moja.


Ni mhimu hapa kugusia kwamba maumuzi ya mahakama yapo ya aina nyingi. Yapo maamuzi ambayo yanatoa hukumu zinazofunga na zinaweza kutekelezwa moja kwa moja. Pia yapo maamuzi ya kimatamko tu (declaratory decisions) ambayo yanatamka tu kwamba kitu fulani sio sahihi bali hayatowi amri moja kwa moja inayoweza kutekelezeka. Ibara ya 35 inasura mbili. Mosi, inaipa mahakama, kama mfasiri wa sheria kutoa uamuzi wa kitamko kwamba sheria fulani ya Bunge ni haramu. Pili, kwa makusudi mazima ya kujenga pengine mahusiano mazuri kati ya Mahakama na Bunge, inaipa mahakama uwezo wa kushauri ama kutoa maelekezo kwa Bunge kufanya marekebisho kwa muda fulani. Kama yakifanyika sheria inarekebishwa bila kuwepo muingiliano kati ya Bunge na Mahakama. Kama yasiporekebishwa, Katiba, kwa hali ya ulazima katika kulinda haki za watu, inaweka kanuni ya kuifanya sheria hiyo kuwa automatically batili. Sio kwamba imefanywa batili na mahakama, bali imekuwa batili kwa operation ya sheria yenyewe. Ngoja nisimame kwanza hapa

 

[George Jinasa]

Augustoons, Unazunguka mbali mno.

Ibara ya 30 (5) inasema kwamba kama Mahakama ikiwamua kwamba sheria fulani inapingana na Katiba, basi hiyo sheria isitangazwe batili papo hapo, ila iendelee kufanya kazi mpaka Serikali itakapoibadilisha katika muda uliopangwa na Mahakama. Itakuwaje?

Katiba si ndio sheria Mama ya nchi. Sasa kuna mantiki gani kuwa na sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba ? Simple as that.

Tukaja kaona, kwa vidhibiti ulivyotuwekea hapa, katika kesi ya Takrima Jaji alitangaza sheria ni batili papo hapo, baada ya kuiona iko kinyume na Katiba.

Sasa hapo imekuwaje? Kapata wapi tena hizo nguvu Jaji? Tulipokuwa watoto, tulikuwa tunaimba wimbo unasema “itakuwaje Jaji, itakuwaje Jaji?”

Sasa katika kujadili hilo swali, ndio ukanza kwenda kureeeefu kueleza mambo ya “nguvu za asili” za mahakama kuhusiana na maswala ya Jurisdiction na jinsi sheria zetu zilivyotoka India mwaka wa ishirini.



Nikakwambia hicho kitu inherent powers sijawahi kukisikia kama ulivyokieleza hapa. Majaji hawawezi kuwa na nguvu za kujiamulia mambo kinyume na Katiba kutoka kwa mamlaka ya Waingereza na Wahindi wa mwaka ishirini.

Hakipo. Hakuna kitu kama hicho.

Mahakama na nguvu zake zote zinatoka kwenye Katiba na Sheria zilizopo. Hicho kitu unachokiita “inherent power” ni original jurisdiction, yani nguvu ya Mahakama kusikiliza kesi yeyote ambayo haijatengewa mahakama nyingine kwenye sheria. Unachokiita “inherent power” sio mamlaka ya kujiamulia mambo kiajabu ajabu ambayo hawajapewa Kikatiba. Unachanganya jurisdiction na Judicial Review (yani nguvu ya Mahakama kutafsiri sheria na kuitangaza batili, kama inakiuka Katiba. Katika kesi ulizoweka hapa, Jaji Nyalali anaelezea hicho unacho kiita “iinherent power” kama ifuatavyo:



Hapo hawaongelei nguvu za Majaji kutangua sheria ambayo ni kinyume cha Katiba. Wanaongelea jurisdiction - nguvu ya Mahakama kusikiliza kesi. Sisi hapa tunajiuliza kitu kingine: inakuje Ibara ya 30 (5) inainyima Mahakama nguvu ya kutangua sheria iliyoiona batili, na swali la pili, kama wanaweza kutangua, wameipata wapi hiyo nguvu kama Ibara ya 30 (5) haisemi? Hatuongelei maswala ya Jurisdiction hapa – nguvu ya mahakama kusikiliza kesi. Unachanganya ma ishu.

Japo Katiba nayo ni sherai, hapa kuna haja ya kutofautisha kati ya sheria na Katiba. Kinachozungumziwa katika Ibara ya 30(5) ambacho Mahakama Kuu inaweza kukubatilisha, kwa uelewa wangu ni Sheria ya kawaida ya Bunge na sio Katiba. Mantiki ya maudhui ya kifungu hicho ilikuwa ni kuzitiisha sheria zote za Bunge kwa misingi ya haki za binaadamu iliyomo katika Katiba. Kwamba uhalali wa sheria yoyote ya Bunge utategemeana na kutokinzana na misingi ya haki za binaadamu iliyomo katika katiba.

Kwa maoni yangu, sio sahihi hata kidogo kutumia ibara ya 30 kubatilisha kifungu chochote cha Katiba. Mahakama inachoweza kufanya katika kazi yake ya ufasilina wa sheria ni kutamka kwamba kifungu fulani cha Katiba kinakinzana na kifungu kingine na sio kubatilisha kifungu hicho. Maana katika katiba ya sasa tuliyonayo vifungu vyote vya katiba vina hadhi sawa. Hamna kifungu chenye hadhi zaidi ya kifungu kingingine. Labda katika katiba mpya tutake kuwepo msonge wa kihadhi katika vifungu vya katiba, kiasi kwamba pakiwepo tofauti kati ya kifungu say kilichopo katika haki za msingi na vifungu vingine, kifungu cha haki za msingi kiprevail

 

[George Jinasa]

Kuhusu ubatili wa sheria zilizo kinyume na Katiba, bado unajichanganya changanya. Ulisema



Halafu, halafu unakuja kujikanyaga:



Unachanganya madawa hapo. Ibara ya 30 (5) haiongelei batilifu v/s batili, na voidable v/s void au Vodafon!

Kuna neno moja tu, "batili."

Swali liko pale pale: 1 ) Kwa nini sheria ambayo ni kinyume na Katiba sio batili, kama ambavyo Ibara 30 (5) inasema?
2) Kama Jaji anaweza kutangaza ni batili, amepata wapi hizo nguvu kama Ibara 30 (5) inakataa?

"Inherent powers" sio jibu!

Nchi hii ni ya Kikatiba na Kisheria.

"Nguvu za Asili" zimekaa ki-Mugabe Mugabe, kama sio ki-Profesa Maji Marefu!

Kuna vyanzo viwili ndani ya Katiba ambavyo kwavyo uhalali wa sheria ya Bunge unaweza kupimwa. Ukiondoa kifungu cha 30 (5) ambacho ni mahusisi kwa vifungu vya Haki za Msingi, kuna kifungu cha 64 ambacho ni cha ujumla. Kwa mujibu wa kifungu hiki, sheria yoyote ambayo inakinzana na Katiba inakuwa batili kwa kiwango kile kile cha ukinzani. Hapo ubatili wa sheria hiyo ni automatic. Mahakama inachofanya ni kuutamka tu

 

[moshingi]

Dear Mwanakijiji...
Nampongeza Lizy kwa namna ambavyo amekuwa makini katika mjadala uliouleta...! Hakika ameonesha tabia za kisomi.
Hata kama mahakama ikitangaza kuwa sheria fulani ni uncostitutional haiwezekani eti isiendelee kutumika kuanzia wakati huohuo
Field ya sheria haiwezi kubaki vacum, vinginevyo utakaribisha impunity,na ni hatari sana kwa uwepo wa taifa. Hiyo ndiyo busara ya
Ibara unayoilalamikia. Hata hivyo, nadhani twende mbali zaidi, mahakama ichukue hatua ya kuwaita na kujieleza mbele yake
ama AG ama Waziri wa Sheria ama Spika wa Bunge ili ikibainika yule ambaye amechelewesha kwa makusudi au uzembe mabadiliko
yaliyoamuriwa na mahakama aadhibiwe kwa kosa la contempt of the court. Majaji wetu waelewe kuwa MAHAKAMA haitaheshimiwa
endapo hawatachukua hatua za kulinda heshima yao.
Contempt of the court ni kosa pekee ambalo mahakama ndiyo imekosewa, inashitaki na kutoa hukumu. Hii ndiyo fimbo maridhawa ambayo mahakama yaweza kulazimisha kutekelezwa kwa hukumu zake.

 

[George Jinasa]

Dear Mwanakijiji...
Nampongeza Lizy kwa namna ambavyo amekuwa makini katika mjadala uliouleta...! Hakika ameonesha tabia za kisomi.
Hata kama mahakama ikitangaza kuwa sheria fulani ni uncostitutional haiwezekani eti isiendelee kutumika kuanzia wakati huohuo
Field ya sheria haiwezi kubaki vacum, vinginevyo utakaribisha impunity,na ni hatari sana kwa uwepo wa taifa. Hiyo ndiyo busara ya
Ibara unayoilalamikia. Hata hivyo, nadhani twende mbali zaidi, mahakama ichukue hatua ya kuwaita na kujieleza mbele yake
ama AG ama Waziri wa Sheria ama Spika wa Bunge ili ikibainika yule ambaye amechelewesha kwa makusudi au uzembe mabadiliko
yaliyoamuriwa na mahakama aadhibiwe kwa kosa la contempt of the court. Majaji wetu waelewe kuwa MAHAKAMA haitaheshimiwa
endapo hawatachukua hatua za kulinda heshima yao.
Contempt of the court ni kosa pekee ambalo mahakama ndiyo imekosewa, inashitaki na kutoa hukumu. Hii ndiyo fimbo maridhawa ambayo mahakama yaweza kulazimisha kutekelezwa kwa hukumu zake.

Mawazo yako mazuri saaana. Ila tatizo linaweza kujitokeza katika kanuni ya mgawanyo wa mamlaka kati ya nyombo vikuu vitatu vya dola. Utaona kwamba kazi ya Mahakama ni kutafsiri sheria na kufaanya maamuzi. Utekelezaji wa sheria unasimamiwa na Serikaali Kuu. Kwamba mahakama ikishehukumu mtu kifungo cha miaka mitatu, jukumu la kuhakikisha kwamba mhukumiwa anafungwa sio tena la Mahakama bali serikali kuu. Kwa mtizamo wangu ni hivyo hivyo katika kutangaza sheria fulani kuwa haramu