Hoshea
JF-Expert Member
- Jan 24, 2012
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Dar es Salaam. As the nation
commemorates the 15th anniversary of the
death of founding president Mwalimu
Julius Kambarage Nyerere, fresh details
have emerged on how the globally
acknowledged statesman built an eight-
year-long case as a curtain raiser to the
war against General Idi Amin Dada ? one
of Africa?s most brutal dictators.
Some analysts had touted a presumed
western conspiracy against Tanzania,
which had distinguished itself as a socialist
country and one of the staunchest
supporters of the southern African
liberation struggle?a stance that angered
some western allies, including Britain.
There was then the Algerian dimension,
whose leader had left a will in which he
stressed that, if a war were to break out
between Uganda and Tanzania, his
government should stand by Mwalimu
Nyerere at any cost.
There was also the case of two managing
editors who were sacked over writing an
editorial condemning Tanzania?s enemy,
which angered Mwalimu Nyerere.
The Tanzanian president was playing his
diplomatic cards carefully ahead of the
war with Uganda.
Tanzania?s neighbours didn?t condemn
Amin for claiming that part of Tanzania?s
territory was Uganda?s, and it
subsequently transpired that they were
covertly supporting Amin in his sinister
mission.
Whoever finally sits down to write the
history of the Kagera war, his or her work
would be incomplete without establishing
why the world, including Tanzania?s
neighbours, refused to condemn General
Idi Amin?s invasion of the Kagera Salient
on January 30, 1978, despite an
impassioned appeal by President Julius
Nyerere to the international community to
do so.
Getting to the bottom of why the world
behaved the way it did, may perhaps help
to answer a number of questions which
include, among others, how Tanzania
presently views relations with other
countries, including its own neighbours.
For one month, Mwalimu appealed to the
world to condemn the invasion ? an act of
blatant aggression but there was no
response, Tanzania?s neighbour to the
north, Kenya, being among those who
were adamant.
?We don?t need their assistance in dealing
with the invader. What we simply want is
for them to condemn the invasion. That?s
all we need,? Mwalimu remarked.
In fact, if there is anything that inspired
Mwalimu and his tough military
commanders on the need to not only
drive out General Amin?s troops from
Kagera Salient, but also to pursue the
Ugandan leader inside his own country, it
was the queer conduct of the international
community.
Going through a well-documented book,
?War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin?
by former BBC/Reuters Correspondent,
Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, it took
hardly a week for Tanzanian troops to
recapture the Kagera Salient from
Ugandan troops who fled in disarray,
leaving behind their heavy weapons.
It was apparent, then, that Tanzania did
not need a long period of preparations for
the mission. It?s apparent, furthermore,
that, Tanzania?s military success taught
Amin and his ragtag army of illiterate and
semi literate army officers at large hard
lessons never to repeat their mischief ? if,
and a big IF, indeed, they were in the
mood to learn !
However, it was due to the international
community?s queer diplomatic conduct
which finally convinced Mwalimu to
prepare his country for taking out General
Idi Amin from power and that explains
Tanzania?s long preparation for the war.
Mwalimu?s decision was prompted by the
discovery that, General Amin enjoyed
massive support not only from the West
and Israel, which had encouraged him to
topple President Milton Obote (while the
latter was attending a Commonwealth
summit in Singapore), but also from his
neighbours? Kenya in particular.
General Amin also enjoyed much support
from the oil rich Saudi Arabia kingdom
and Libya?s Colonel Muammar Gaddaffi
who bankrolled his military hardware
needs.
The Tanzanian reckoned that, given that
scenario, subduing the bully General was
the logical option; else, he would continue
to harass Tanzanians.
Apart from Saudi Arabia and Libya other
countries that supported General Amin
were Britain, Israel, US, Kenya, the then
Soviet Union, France, Pakistan and the
then Communist East Germany.
However, of all Amin supporters, perhaps
none pained Mwalimu more than the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
which offered weapons and fighters.
Interestingly, even after discovering the
Palestinian stance, Mwalimu didn?t
complain publicly, but, on the contrary,
sustained Tanzania?s support for the
entity?s struggle against Israel for
nationhood.
The Palestinians had stabbed the back of
the man who, unlike other wavering
African leaders, had supported them to the
hilt to the very end.
Mwalimu?s decision to keep quiet about
the role of the Palestinians in the war
appears to have been dictated by his
desire to focus on General Amin rather
than widen the conflict by bringing in
those who supported his enemy.
Mwalimu did the same thing when he
fired the first Managing Editor of the
government-owned English daily, Daily
News , Ms Frene Ginwala, a South
African. She had sanctioned an editorial
that described then Sudanese President
Jaafar Numeiry as ?a butcher?, over the
latter?s execution of young communist
army officers who had tried to overthrow
him in an aborted coup.
According to the paper?s Chief
Photographer, Mr Adarsh Nayar who now
lives in Britain, the editorial had been
written by Mr Richard Gott, an avowed
communist who was Ms Ginwala?s special
assistant.
Mr Gott was later arrested in London and
charged by the British government of
spying for the then Soviet Union.
Like his stance on the Palestinians,
Mwalimu fired Ginwala because he did not
want to create a rift with the Sudanese
leader who had just signed an agreement
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that brought to
an end the war between the Arab, Muslim
north and the Christian south of the
country.
Colonel Numeiry who had, with four other
army officers, come to power in a 1969
military coup against the civilian
government of Ismail al-Azhari, had had
problems with President Milton Obote,
accusing the latter of supporting the South
Sudan Liberation Movement?Anyanya
guerrillas.
However, when General Amin came to
power in January 1970, he endeared
himself to Colonel Numeiry by cutting
assistance to the Anyanya guerrillas in the
southern part of the country.
Mwalimu knew that the Sudanese leader
was closer to General Amin, after what the
latter had done to the Sudan strongman,
but, being a visionary leader and
strategist, he did not want the semi-official
government paper to strain the relations
between Sudan and Tanzania. He decided
to sack Ginwala to avoid any diplomatic
fallout between the two countries.
Later, as part of Mwalimu?s further
attempts to bring Numeiry to his fold and
isolate General Amin in the process, in
1973 he invited the Sudanese leader to
Tanzania to officially open what was then
known as the Saba Saba International
Trade Fair.
After the event, Numeiry and his host
attended a friendly soccer match between
Taifa Stars and their Ethiopian
counterparts at the Uhuru Stadium, in
which the latter were beaten 3-0.
All Taifa Stars goals were scored by former
Cosmopolitan striker, Jumanne Masimenti
who later joined Simba Sports Club.
Mid-way the historic match however,
Ethiopian players became temperamental
and started attacking Tanzanian players.
Happily, the match continued without
further incidents.
Mwalimu?s objective to bring Numeiry
closer to him and isolate General Amin
had finally paid off.
Ms Frene Ginwala refuses to leave
Mwalimu!
Twenty four years later in 1995, the love-
hate relationship between Mwalimu and
Ms Ginwala continued unabated.
The setting was made possible when Ms
Ginwala became the first Speaker of the
South African Parliament after the
country?s first democratic elections in
April 1994.
This was after Mzee Nelson Mandela had
been elected the first President of the
black majority-led South African
government.
Mwalimu came face to face with his
former editor after President Mandela had
officially invited him to South Africa to,
among other things, visit and address the
South African Parliament in Cape Town.
When Mwalimu, accompanied by Mama
Maria, was ushered into the South African
Parliament, it was Ms Ginwala?s turn to
introduce Mwalimu to Members of the
South African Parliament.
Gaddafi offers money in exchange to POW
After the end of the Kagera War, Colonel
Gaddafi tried to offer money to the
Tanzanian government in exchange for
hundreds of his captured soldiers that
included Palestinians?prisoners of war
(POWs).
Mwalimu, however, turned down the offer
and handed over the now obese Libyan
soldiers who had been well fed during
their captivity to the Libyan leader.
Mwalimu stated categorically that he
wouldn?t trade human beings in exchange
for money or oil. During the post-war
period, Tanzania faced an acute shortage
of oil, and this hampered the economy
acutely; yet, Mwalimu wouldn?t stoop low
to endorse such a transaction.
Western media embedded to Ugandan
dictator
What compounded the situation for
Mwalimu and by extension, Tanzania?s
problems at the time was that even
international media appeared to be siding
with General Amin despite the Uganda
government?s human rights violations.
For instance, a few weeks after Ugandan
troops had partly destroyed the bridge that
linked the rest of the region with the
Kagera Salient by using an explosions
expert from Uganda?s Kilembe Mines,
Newsweek wrote the following:
?Given the size and speed with which the
Kagera River flows under the now
destroyed bridge, it would be very difficult
for Tanzania to repair the bridge and
make it strong enough for transporting
their troops and heavy armour across the
bridge in readiness against Ugandan
troops as they don?t have the technology to
do that kind of work.?
Throughout the months as the Tanzania
government made preparations for
flushing out the invaders, international
media went to town, throwing cold water
on the country?s efforts to dislodge
General Amin?s troops from the Kagera
Salient.
A helping hand from a dying leader
However, if there is anything that helped
the government in knowing its true
friends, then it was the very thing that had
angered the Tanzania government and its
people, namely, General Amin?s invasion.
A famous proverb goes: ?For every dark
cloud, there is a silver lining.? Algeria?s
President, Colonel Houri Bomediene, was
bed-ridden, fighting for his life against
cancer.
The revolutionary Algerian leader was a
bosom friend of Mwalimu who had helped
Tanzania and other Frontline States in
their efforts to assist liberation
movements in southern Africa.
But, despite the suffering the Algerian
leader was nursing on his deathbed, he
had left a will to his successors to assist
Tanzania in the war against General Amin
to the end ?and that is exactly what the
Algerian government did!
Algeria?s military and other assistance to
Tanzania would later lead Mwalimu to
transfer to another institution, the
newspaper?s Managing Editor, Mr
Ferdinand Ruhinda, over an editorial
whose thrust was that, Arabs were arming
General Amin.
The editorial angered Mwalimu because
Arab countries that assisted General Amin
were Libya and Saudi Arabia while
Algeria, another Arab country had been
one of Tanzania?s strongest ally in the
war.
The Algerian government continued to
supply Tanzania with weapons and other
assistance well after the end of the Uganda
war in May 1979.
Mwalimu dispatched a seasoned diplomat
and trusted confidant, Mr Benjamin
Mkapa to Algiers, to thank the Algerian
government for its gestures.
British and Israeli regime in bed with Amin
In their book, Tony Avirgan and Martha
Honey give their reasons why while the
West, and in particular, Britain and Israel,
pushed General Amin into overthrowing
his Commander-in-Chief, Dr Milton Obote,
who had created a lot of enemies even
within his own country that included,
among others, his deliberate reduction of
the powers of the Baganda and other
Ugandan kingdoms.
The two American journalists also show, in
their book, how both Britain and Israel
benefited from Uganda.
Politically, journalists say both Britain and
Israel were not happy with Dr Obote?s
introduction of socialist leaning policies
that included what came to be known as
the Common Man?s Charter.
They say Britain feared that such policies
could finally lead to the expulsion of
Asians from Uganda.
Interestingly, they say, it is the very thing
that the British government had feared
that General Amin later implemented not
long after seizing power!
The other thing that forced the West, and
in particular, Britain and Israel, into
pushing General Amin to invade
Tanzania, the authors say, was more or
less the same thing that had made them
push General Amin into overthrowing
President Obote, namely, Tanzania?s
socialist economic policies.
It?s important to note that by 1978, the
Tanzanian economy had started to pick up
and some of us were able, during this time,
to see brand new motor vehicles in Dar es
Salaam?s motor showrooms.
Proprietors of the showrooms would not
have imported brand new vehicles if there
had not been customers.
Therefore the mere presence of such toys
in the Tanzanian market reflected not only
the improvement of earnings by the
country?s middle class but also its steady
growth as a class.
The collapse of the EAC
It is also important to note that barely a
year previously, in June 1977, the East
African Community had collapsed.
The implication of this meant that Kenya
had problems bringing in industrial and
other products mostly owned British firms
such as Uniliver.
Initially those who were ill-disposed
towards Tanzania and its socialist policies
thought that the collapse of the Community
would further impoverish Tanzania.
Therefore Tanzania?s growing economy
coupled with the country?s involvement in
helping armed liberation movements in
southern Africa was certainly not going to
be tolerated by the West.
Interestingly, Tony Avirgan and Martha
Honey touch very lightly, in their book,
Tanzania?s involvement in the liberation
struggle of countries in southern Africa as
being one of the main reasons behind the
West?s decision to egg on General Amin to
invade Tanzania in order to divert the
country?s attention from the liberation
struggle in southern Africa.
Reading their book, the authors don?t seem
to have concrete evidence on their
southern Africa liberation theory.
However, the answer to the question
revolving around the southern Africa?s
liberation struggle as a factor is to be
found in what happened, immediately
Ugandan troops invaded the Kagera
Salient.
Accordingly ?War in Uganda?, after the
invasion, Tanzania had itself said that it
had only one brigade (a brigade has
between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers), that
was battle ready.
The other country?s four brigades located
in other parts of the country were not
battle prepared as they had not been
involved in major training.
The brigade in question was located in
southern Tanzania, in Songea, under the
command of a youthful Brigadier General
and former airforce pilot, James Luhanga.
The Brigade had just completed three-
month gruelling training that had
included a route march from Songea to
Mbeya.
According to well-informed sources in
Tanzania?s military circles at the time, the
preparation of Brigadier General
Luhanga?s brigade was not an accident,
but a deliberate move.
According to a very senior medical army
doctor at the time, the brigade was
apparently prepared so that it could later
be sent to Namibia to join the country?s
Swapo guerrillas.
The latter had already made significant
headway in the struggle for a final push
against the then apartheid South African
troops that were propping up Namibia
racist government?s troops against the
guerrillas.
It should be recalled that barely three
years previously , in 1975, South African
troops were within 60 kilometres out of
Angola?s capital, Luanda, as they fought
side by side with three different rebel
factions, namely, Unita guerrillas led by Dr
Jonas Savimbi, FNLA rebels led by Zairean
President Mobutu Sese Seko?s brother-in-
law, Mr Holden Roberto and hundreds of
mercenaries in an attempt, to overthrow
the newly formed Angola?s government led
by Dr Augustinho Neto.
This was the time Ethiopia was under the
leadership of Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam (presently living in exile in
Zimbabwe) who had finally found his
footing in the country after deposing two
powerful army generals he had himself
installed, General Andom and General
Teferi Benti.
During the time, Colonel Mengistu had just
led his country to a military success after
the Ethiopian army?s heavy fighting
against Somali troops in the Jijiga Desert
in the eastern part of the country as the
former fought in the quest for what was
then referred to as the Greater Somalia.
Meanwhile, Cuban troops that had just
helped the Ethiopian government in
overcoming Somali forces in the Jijiga
Desert War were still in the country.
With the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), hesitant as always, to provide
military assistance to the Angolan
government, Dr Neto now appealed for
military assistance from the Cuban
government, and the nearest Cuban
soldiers in the region were still in
Ethiopia.
Although Cuban troops were barely a few
hours flight from Ethiopia, the problem
was how to send them to Angola in time to
stem off the South African troops led
assault that was expected to take place any
time against the Angolan city of Luanda.
At this point, Dr Neto, now turned to his
friends and the country he had had both
his wife and education, the Soviet Union,
for assistance in providing him with
planes which could airlift Cuban troops to
his country.
And within 12 hours, heavy duty Tupolov
transport carriers were airborne with
Cuban troops on their way to Angola
where they would stage the battle to save
Luanda and Angola from South African
troops led offensive.
The rest is of course history, for the South
African led offensive that had earned its
troops the name of ?flying South African
forces? by both Time and Newsweek
magazines barely a few days back, were
trounced.
However, the two magazines should
actually be credited for being bold enough
to carry pictures of South African tanks
and armoured personnel carriers running
back to Namibia where they had come
from.
After the sound defeat of the South African
troops by the youthful Cubans, apartheid
South Africa would never be the same.
After the South African troops? defeat,
Namibia was now one of the three
remaining enclaves in the region, which
once liberated, southern Africa will now
remain with two countries yet to be
liberated, namely, apartheid South Africa
and Southern Rhodesia, which would in
1980 get its independence and become
known as Zimbabwe under Zanu-PF led
government of President Robert Mugabe.
Mozambique on the other hand, had
already been liberated and was now
under the Frelimo ruling party under
President Samora Machel.
It is important to understand the
foregoing scenarios in order to
understand why Tony Avirgan and
Martha Honey write, in their book, that
General Amin did not act alone when he
ordered his troops to invade the Kagera
Salient.
The General?s attempts to divert the
attention of his enemies within the army
dovetailed well with the West?s desire to
divert Tanzania?s attention from
supporting the armed liberation struggle
in southern Africa.
Mwalimu?s role as chess master (he was
also an avid lover of the Swahili bao or
mancala game which has remote
similarities with the way chess is played)
in the framework of Southern African
Liberation Chess Board was not lost on the
West and the new man in apartheid South
Africa who had just taken over from
President John Vorster, namely, Frederick
De Klerk.
The last apartheid leader who shared the
Nobel Peace Prize with President Nelson
Mandela, would a few years later be
appointed by the ?West? to serve as a
midwife in delivering his country to the
international community through, among
others, the scrapping off of apartheid, the
unbanning of the African National
Congress and the release of its President,
Mzee Nelson Mandela.
Perhaps no one echoed the West?s
conspiracy theory in the invasion of the
Kagera Salient by General Amin?s troops
more than a statement made by
Mwalimu?s own Press Secretary and
former Daily News Managing Editor, Mr
Sammy Mdee.
Tony Avirgan quotes Mr Mdee on their
book?s Preface as saying: ?We?re not going
to let the British get away with this.?
Mr Mdee was responding to Tony
Avirgan?s question on the efficacy of a
Radio Tanzania news item, in its early
morning bulletin, that said Ugandan
troops had invaded the Kagera Salient.
commemorates the 15th anniversary of the
death of founding president Mwalimu
Julius Kambarage Nyerere, fresh details
have emerged on how the globally
acknowledged statesman built an eight-
year-long case as a curtain raiser to the
war against General Idi Amin Dada ? one
of Africa?s most brutal dictators.
Some analysts had touted a presumed
western conspiracy against Tanzania,
which had distinguished itself as a socialist
country and one of the staunchest
supporters of the southern African
liberation struggle?a stance that angered
some western allies, including Britain.
There was then the Algerian dimension,
whose leader had left a will in which he
stressed that, if a war were to break out
between Uganda and Tanzania, his
government should stand by Mwalimu
Nyerere at any cost.
There was also the case of two managing
editors who were sacked over writing an
editorial condemning Tanzania?s enemy,
which angered Mwalimu Nyerere.
The Tanzanian president was playing his
diplomatic cards carefully ahead of the
war with Uganda.
Tanzania?s neighbours didn?t condemn
Amin for claiming that part of Tanzania?s
territory was Uganda?s, and it
subsequently transpired that they were
covertly supporting Amin in his sinister
mission.
Whoever finally sits down to write the
history of the Kagera war, his or her work
would be incomplete without establishing
why the world, including Tanzania?s
neighbours, refused to condemn General
Idi Amin?s invasion of the Kagera Salient
on January 30, 1978, despite an
impassioned appeal by President Julius
Nyerere to the international community to
do so.
Getting to the bottom of why the world
behaved the way it did, may perhaps help
to answer a number of questions which
include, among others, how Tanzania
presently views relations with other
countries, including its own neighbours.
For one month, Mwalimu appealed to the
world to condemn the invasion ? an act of
blatant aggression but there was no
response, Tanzania?s neighbour to the
north, Kenya, being among those who
were adamant.
?We don?t need their assistance in dealing
with the invader. What we simply want is
for them to condemn the invasion. That?s
all we need,? Mwalimu remarked.
In fact, if there is anything that inspired
Mwalimu and his tough military
commanders on the need to not only
drive out General Amin?s troops from
Kagera Salient, but also to pursue the
Ugandan leader inside his own country, it
was the queer conduct of the international
community.
Going through a well-documented book,
?War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin?
by former BBC/Reuters Correspondent,
Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, it took
hardly a week for Tanzanian troops to
recapture the Kagera Salient from
Ugandan troops who fled in disarray,
leaving behind their heavy weapons.
It was apparent, then, that Tanzania did
not need a long period of preparations for
the mission. It?s apparent, furthermore,
that, Tanzania?s military success taught
Amin and his ragtag army of illiterate and
semi literate army officers at large hard
lessons never to repeat their mischief ? if,
and a big IF, indeed, they were in the
mood to learn !
However, it was due to the international
community?s queer diplomatic conduct
which finally convinced Mwalimu to
prepare his country for taking out General
Idi Amin from power and that explains
Tanzania?s long preparation for the war.
Mwalimu?s decision was prompted by the
discovery that, General Amin enjoyed
massive support not only from the West
and Israel, which had encouraged him to
topple President Milton Obote (while the
latter was attending a Commonwealth
summit in Singapore), but also from his
neighbours? Kenya in particular.
General Amin also enjoyed much support
from the oil rich Saudi Arabia kingdom
and Libya?s Colonel Muammar Gaddaffi
who bankrolled his military hardware
needs.
The Tanzanian reckoned that, given that
scenario, subduing the bully General was
the logical option; else, he would continue
to harass Tanzanians.
Apart from Saudi Arabia and Libya other
countries that supported General Amin
were Britain, Israel, US, Kenya, the then
Soviet Union, France, Pakistan and the
then Communist East Germany.
However, of all Amin supporters, perhaps
none pained Mwalimu more than the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
which offered weapons and fighters.
Interestingly, even after discovering the
Palestinian stance, Mwalimu didn?t
complain publicly, but, on the contrary,
sustained Tanzania?s support for the
entity?s struggle against Israel for
nationhood.
The Palestinians had stabbed the back of
the man who, unlike other wavering
African leaders, had supported them to the
hilt to the very end.
Mwalimu?s decision to keep quiet about
the role of the Palestinians in the war
appears to have been dictated by his
desire to focus on General Amin rather
than widen the conflict by bringing in
those who supported his enemy.
Mwalimu did the same thing when he
fired the first Managing Editor of the
government-owned English daily, Daily
News , Ms Frene Ginwala, a South
African. She had sanctioned an editorial
that described then Sudanese President
Jaafar Numeiry as ?a butcher?, over the
latter?s execution of young communist
army officers who had tried to overthrow
him in an aborted coup.
According to the paper?s Chief
Photographer, Mr Adarsh Nayar who now
lives in Britain, the editorial had been
written by Mr Richard Gott, an avowed
communist who was Ms Ginwala?s special
assistant.
Mr Gott was later arrested in London and
charged by the British government of
spying for the then Soviet Union.
Like his stance on the Palestinians,
Mwalimu fired Ginwala because he did not
want to create a rift with the Sudanese
leader who had just signed an agreement
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia that brought to
an end the war between the Arab, Muslim
north and the Christian south of the
country.
Colonel Numeiry who had, with four other
army officers, come to power in a 1969
military coup against the civilian
government of Ismail al-Azhari, had had
problems with President Milton Obote,
accusing the latter of supporting the South
Sudan Liberation Movement?Anyanya
guerrillas.
However, when General Amin came to
power in January 1970, he endeared
himself to Colonel Numeiry by cutting
assistance to the Anyanya guerrillas in the
southern part of the country.
Mwalimu knew that the Sudanese leader
was closer to General Amin, after what the
latter had done to the Sudan strongman,
but, being a visionary leader and
strategist, he did not want the semi-official
government paper to strain the relations
between Sudan and Tanzania. He decided
to sack Ginwala to avoid any diplomatic
fallout between the two countries.
Later, as part of Mwalimu?s further
attempts to bring Numeiry to his fold and
isolate General Amin in the process, in
1973 he invited the Sudanese leader to
Tanzania to officially open what was then
known as the Saba Saba International
Trade Fair.
After the event, Numeiry and his host
attended a friendly soccer match between
Taifa Stars and their Ethiopian
counterparts at the Uhuru Stadium, in
which the latter were beaten 3-0.
All Taifa Stars goals were scored by former
Cosmopolitan striker, Jumanne Masimenti
who later joined Simba Sports Club.
Mid-way the historic match however,
Ethiopian players became temperamental
and started attacking Tanzanian players.
Happily, the match continued without
further incidents.
Mwalimu?s objective to bring Numeiry
closer to him and isolate General Amin
had finally paid off.
Ms Frene Ginwala refuses to leave
Mwalimu!
Twenty four years later in 1995, the love-
hate relationship between Mwalimu and
Ms Ginwala continued unabated.
The setting was made possible when Ms
Ginwala became the first Speaker of the
South African Parliament after the
country?s first democratic elections in
April 1994.
This was after Mzee Nelson Mandela had
been elected the first President of the
black majority-led South African
government.
Mwalimu came face to face with his
former editor after President Mandela had
officially invited him to South Africa to,
among other things, visit and address the
South African Parliament in Cape Town.
When Mwalimu, accompanied by Mama
Maria, was ushered into the South African
Parliament, it was Ms Ginwala?s turn to
introduce Mwalimu to Members of the
South African Parliament.
Gaddafi offers money in exchange to POW
After the end of the Kagera War, Colonel
Gaddafi tried to offer money to the
Tanzanian government in exchange for
hundreds of his captured soldiers that
included Palestinians?prisoners of war
(POWs).
Mwalimu, however, turned down the offer
and handed over the now obese Libyan
soldiers who had been well fed during
their captivity to the Libyan leader.
Mwalimu stated categorically that he
wouldn?t trade human beings in exchange
for money or oil. During the post-war
period, Tanzania faced an acute shortage
of oil, and this hampered the economy
acutely; yet, Mwalimu wouldn?t stoop low
to endorse such a transaction.
Western media embedded to Ugandan
dictator
What compounded the situation for
Mwalimu and by extension, Tanzania?s
problems at the time was that even
international media appeared to be siding
with General Amin despite the Uganda
government?s human rights violations.
For instance, a few weeks after Ugandan
troops had partly destroyed the bridge that
linked the rest of the region with the
Kagera Salient by using an explosions
expert from Uganda?s Kilembe Mines,
Newsweek wrote the following:
?Given the size and speed with which the
Kagera River flows under the now
destroyed bridge, it would be very difficult
for Tanzania to repair the bridge and
make it strong enough for transporting
their troops and heavy armour across the
bridge in readiness against Ugandan
troops as they don?t have the technology to
do that kind of work.?
Throughout the months as the Tanzania
government made preparations for
flushing out the invaders, international
media went to town, throwing cold water
on the country?s efforts to dislodge
General Amin?s troops from the Kagera
Salient.
A helping hand from a dying leader
However, if there is anything that helped
the government in knowing its true
friends, then it was the very thing that had
angered the Tanzania government and its
people, namely, General Amin?s invasion.
A famous proverb goes: ?For every dark
cloud, there is a silver lining.? Algeria?s
President, Colonel Houri Bomediene, was
bed-ridden, fighting for his life against
cancer.
The revolutionary Algerian leader was a
bosom friend of Mwalimu who had helped
Tanzania and other Frontline States in
their efforts to assist liberation
movements in southern Africa.
But, despite the suffering the Algerian
leader was nursing on his deathbed, he
had left a will to his successors to assist
Tanzania in the war against General Amin
to the end ?and that is exactly what the
Algerian government did!
Algeria?s military and other assistance to
Tanzania would later lead Mwalimu to
transfer to another institution, the
newspaper?s Managing Editor, Mr
Ferdinand Ruhinda, over an editorial
whose thrust was that, Arabs were arming
General Amin.
The editorial angered Mwalimu because
Arab countries that assisted General Amin
were Libya and Saudi Arabia while
Algeria, another Arab country had been
one of Tanzania?s strongest ally in the
war.
The Algerian government continued to
supply Tanzania with weapons and other
assistance well after the end of the Uganda
war in May 1979.
Mwalimu dispatched a seasoned diplomat
and trusted confidant, Mr Benjamin
Mkapa to Algiers, to thank the Algerian
government for its gestures.
British and Israeli regime in bed with Amin
In their book, Tony Avirgan and Martha
Honey give their reasons why while the
West, and in particular, Britain and Israel,
pushed General Amin into overthrowing
his Commander-in-Chief, Dr Milton Obote,
who had created a lot of enemies even
within his own country that included,
among others, his deliberate reduction of
the powers of the Baganda and other
Ugandan kingdoms.
The two American journalists also show, in
their book, how both Britain and Israel
benefited from Uganda.
Politically, journalists say both Britain and
Israel were not happy with Dr Obote?s
introduction of socialist leaning policies
that included what came to be known as
the Common Man?s Charter.
They say Britain feared that such policies
could finally lead to the expulsion of
Asians from Uganda.
Interestingly, they say, it is the very thing
that the British government had feared
that General Amin later implemented not
long after seizing power!
The other thing that forced the West, and
in particular, Britain and Israel, into
pushing General Amin to invade
Tanzania, the authors say, was more or
less the same thing that had made them
push General Amin into overthrowing
President Obote, namely, Tanzania?s
socialist economic policies.
It?s important to note that by 1978, the
Tanzanian economy had started to pick up
and some of us were able, during this time,
to see brand new motor vehicles in Dar es
Salaam?s motor showrooms.
Proprietors of the showrooms would not
have imported brand new vehicles if there
had not been customers.
Therefore the mere presence of such toys
in the Tanzanian market reflected not only
the improvement of earnings by the
country?s middle class but also its steady
growth as a class.
The collapse of the EAC
It is also important to note that barely a
year previously, in June 1977, the East
African Community had collapsed.
The implication of this meant that Kenya
had problems bringing in industrial and
other products mostly owned British firms
such as Uniliver.
Initially those who were ill-disposed
towards Tanzania and its socialist policies
thought that the collapse of the Community
would further impoverish Tanzania.
Therefore Tanzania?s growing economy
coupled with the country?s involvement in
helping armed liberation movements in
southern Africa was certainly not going to
be tolerated by the West.
Interestingly, Tony Avirgan and Martha
Honey touch very lightly, in their book,
Tanzania?s involvement in the liberation
struggle of countries in southern Africa as
being one of the main reasons behind the
West?s decision to egg on General Amin to
invade Tanzania in order to divert the
country?s attention from the liberation
struggle in southern Africa.
Reading their book, the authors don?t seem
to have concrete evidence on their
southern Africa liberation theory.
However, the answer to the question
revolving around the southern Africa?s
liberation struggle as a factor is to be
found in what happened, immediately
Ugandan troops invaded the Kagera
Salient.
Accordingly ?War in Uganda?, after the
invasion, Tanzania had itself said that it
had only one brigade (a brigade has
between 4,000 and 5,000 soldiers), that
was battle ready.
The other country?s four brigades located
in other parts of the country were not
battle prepared as they had not been
involved in major training.
The brigade in question was located in
southern Tanzania, in Songea, under the
command of a youthful Brigadier General
and former airforce pilot, James Luhanga.
The Brigade had just completed three-
month gruelling training that had
included a route march from Songea to
Mbeya.
According to well-informed sources in
Tanzania?s military circles at the time, the
preparation of Brigadier General
Luhanga?s brigade was not an accident,
but a deliberate move.
According to a very senior medical army
doctor at the time, the brigade was
apparently prepared so that it could later
be sent to Namibia to join the country?s
Swapo guerrillas.
The latter had already made significant
headway in the struggle for a final push
against the then apartheid South African
troops that were propping up Namibia
racist government?s troops against the
guerrillas.
It should be recalled that barely three
years previously , in 1975, South African
troops were within 60 kilometres out of
Angola?s capital, Luanda, as they fought
side by side with three different rebel
factions, namely, Unita guerrillas led by Dr
Jonas Savimbi, FNLA rebels led by Zairean
President Mobutu Sese Seko?s brother-in-
law, Mr Holden Roberto and hundreds of
mercenaries in an attempt, to overthrow
the newly formed Angola?s government led
by Dr Augustinho Neto.
This was the time Ethiopia was under the
leadership of Colonel Mengistu Haile
Mariam (presently living in exile in
Zimbabwe) who had finally found his
footing in the country after deposing two
powerful army generals he had himself
installed, General Andom and General
Teferi Benti.
During the time, Colonel Mengistu had just
led his country to a military success after
the Ethiopian army?s heavy fighting
against Somali troops in the Jijiga Desert
in the eastern part of the country as the
former fought in the quest for what was
then referred to as the Greater Somalia.
Meanwhile, Cuban troops that had just
helped the Ethiopian government in
overcoming Somali forces in the Jijiga
Desert War were still in the country.
With the Organisation of African Unity
(OAU), hesitant as always, to provide
military assistance to the Angolan
government, Dr Neto now appealed for
military assistance from the Cuban
government, and the nearest Cuban
soldiers in the region were still in
Ethiopia.
Although Cuban troops were barely a few
hours flight from Ethiopia, the problem
was how to send them to Angola in time to
stem off the South African troops led
assault that was expected to take place any
time against the Angolan city of Luanda.
At this point, Dr Neto, now turned to his
friends and the country he had had both
his wife and education, the Soviet Union,
for assistance in providing him with
planes which could airlift Cuban troops to
his country.
And within 12 hours, heavy duty Tupolov
transport carriers were airborne with
Cuban troops on their way to Angola
where they would stage the battle to save
Luanda and Angola from South African
troops led offensive.
The rest is of course history, for the South
African led offensive that had earned its
troops the name of ?flying South African
forces? by both Time and Newsweek
magazines barely a few days back, were
trounced.
However, the two magazines should
actually be credited for being bold enough
to carry pictures of South African tanks
and armoured personnel carriers running
back to Namibia where they had come
from.
After the sound defeat of the South African
troops by the youthful Cubans, apartheid
South Africa would never be the same.
After the South African troops? defeat,
Namibia was now one of the three
remaining enclaves in the region, which
once liberated, southern Africa will now
remain with two countries yet to be
liberated, namely, apartheid South Africa
and Southern Rhodesia, which would in
1980 get its independence and become
known as Zimbabwe under Zanu-PF led
government of President Robert Mugabe.
Mozambique on the other hand, had
already been liberated and was now
under the Frelimo ruling party under
President Samora Machel.
It is important to understand the
foregoing scenarios in order to
understand why Tony Avirgan and
Martha Honey write, in their book, that
General Amin did not act alone when he
ordered his troops to invade the Kagera
Salient.
The General?s attempts to divert the
attention of his enemies within the army
dovetailed well with the West?s desire to
divert Tanzania?s attention from
supporting the armed liberation struggle
in southern Africa.
Mwalimu?s role as chess master (he was
also an avid lover of the Swahili bao or
mancala game which has remote
similarities with the way chess is played)
in the framework of Southern African
Liberation Chess Board was not lost on the
West and the new man in apartheid South
Africa who had just taken over from
President John Vorster, namely, Frederick
De Klerk.
The last apartheid leader who shared the
Nobel Peace Prize with President Nelson
Mandela, would a few years later be
appointed by the ?West? to serve as a
midwife in delivering his country to the
international community through, among
others, the scrapping off of apartheid, the
unbanning of the African National
Congress and the release of its President,
Mzee Nelson Mandela.
Perhaps no one echoed the West?s
conspiracy theory in the invasion of the
Kagera Salient by General Amin?s troops
more than a statement made by
Mwalimu?s own Press Secretary and
former Daily News Managing Editor, Mr
Sammy Mdee.
Tony Avirgan quotes Mr Mdee on their
book?s Preface as saying: ?We?re not going
to let the British get away with this.?
Mr Mdee was responding to Tony
Avirgan?s question on the efficacy of a
Radio Tanzania news item, in its early
morning bulletin, that said Ugandan
troops had invaded the Kagera Salient.
