Mama Amon
JF-Expert Member
- Mar 30, 2018
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“Watu hatutofautiani sana katika uelewa wetu kuhusu vitu gani vinaitwa matendo mabaya; bali, tunatofautiana sana katika utayari na ujasiri wetu wa kuhimiza na kutekeleza matendo mabaya.” –- G.K.Chesterton (1874-1936)
"Ni afadhali mtu mmoja afe kwa ajili ya watu, kuliko taifa lote liangamie”--Kardinali Pengo akimnukuu Kuhani Mkuu wa Wayahudi Kayafa (Yohana 11:50) wakati wa Ibada ya kuliombea Taifa baada ya mauaji ya huko Zanzibar mwaka 2001.
"Kwa nini tusiseme, kama wengine wanavyotusingizia kuwa tunasema, 'Tutende maovu ili wema udhihirike'? Hakika hukumu wanayoipata ni ya haki."--Mt. Paul, Warumi 3:8
KANUNI YA SIASA ZA KAYAFA (Yohana 11:50) ni mzimu unaozidi kujiimarisha nchini Tanzania japo tayari Taifa letu limesherehekea miaka 150 ya Ukristo.
Nani asiyekumbuka kwamba, kila mwaka tunapoadhimisha sikukuu ya Pasaka tunasikiliza enjili ikimtaja Kuhani Mkuu wa Wayahudi, Kayafa, akimhukumu Yesu kwa kusema kwamba "ni afadhali mtu mmoja afe ili kuokoa watu wengi katika Taifa?
Nani amesahau kwamba, huu ni mfano wa kanuni ya jumla isemayo kwamba, malengo mema yanapaswa kuhalalisha mbinu haramu kama alivyofundisha Niccolo Machiaveli wa Italia?
Nani haelewi kwamba, kwa mujibu wa mzimu wa siasa za Kayafa, tunalazimika kusema kwa heri ukardinali , kwa heri uaskofu, kwa heri upadre , kwa heri Ukristo, kwa heri amani, kwa heri haki, kwa heri maendeleo?
Nani amepitwa na uhakika kwamba kwa mujibu wa mzimu wa siasa za Kayafa, tunalazimika kusema kwa heri vyama vya upinzani makini, kwa heri chama tawala makini, kwa heri demokrasia ya kweli, kwa heri uhuru wa kweli?
Uchaguzi wa mwaka 2019 ulikwama kwa sababu ya matumizi ya kanuni ya Siasa za Kayafa yaliyozalisha makosa kadhaa yaliyofanywa na serikali ya CCM.
Kwa mfano, baadhi ya wagombea wa upinzani walinyimwa fomu za uteuzi; waliozipata wakafungiwa nje ya ofisi na kushindwa kuzirejesha; waliozirejesha wakakosa kuteuliwa kwa sababu za uwongo.
Mwisho wa siku, wagombea wa chama tawala pekee wakapitishwa na kuwa viongozi wa serikali za mitaa bila kupitia mchakato wa uchaguzi wa vyama vingi.
Leo tena, katika uchaguzi mkuu wa 2020 kanuni ya Siasa za Kayafa inatumika tena ndani ya CCM. Baadhi ya wapinzani nao wameiga makosa ya CCM na serikali yake yaliyofanyika mwaka 2019. Wanaikumbatia kanuni ya Siasa za Kayafa.
Kupitia chaguzi za ndani ya vyama, kuna watia nia wamenyimwa fomu, waliopewa wakafungiwa nje na kushindwa kuzirudisha; na waliozirudisha majina yao hayakutokea kwenye karatasi za kura za maoni.
Kuna ushahidi wa kutosha kuonyesha kwamba wapinzani wamefanyiana rafu kubwa zaidi kuliko waliyofanyiwa na serikali ya CCM mwaka jana.
Juu ya haya yote, vyombo vya habari vinasema kuwa wamegawiana rushwa ndani na nje ya kumbi za kura.
Taarifa kutoka pande mbalimbali za Tanzania zinaonyesha kuwa, kwa sehemu kubwa, ushetani wa madudu ya uchaguzi umetokea ndani ya vyama vya Chadema na CCM.
Kwa hiyo, kama CCM ni shetani wa kijani, basi Chadema ni shetani mwekundi. Tofauti zao ni rangi tu, kwani katika uovu mwingine wa kutumia mbinu haramu kama njia ya kufanikisha malengo mema (extra-normative operations) wanafanana kwa aina na kutofatiana kwa viwango tu. Hii ni kanuni ya umachiaveli.
Kwa hiyo, kama ilivyotokea mwaka 2019, mtanziko wa kisiasa umewakumba tena wapiga kura wa Tanzania katika uchaguzi mkuu wa 2020. Je, katika mazingira ambamo umachiaveli unaendelea kuwa kanuni ya kisiasa ndani ya kila chama kukubwa cha siasa, na ambapo wapiga kura wanalazimika kushiriki uchaguzi huo, watumie kigezo gani ili kutofautisha kati ya kambi yenye mabaya kidogo, kwa upande mmoja, na kambi yenye mabaya mengi, kwa upande mwingine?
Katika tafakari hii, napenda kuonyesha kuwa wapiga kura wanao wajibu wa kujitenga na vyama vyenye hulka ya umachiaveli kuanzia uchaguzi huu wa 2020. Kwa ajili hii nafanya mambo manne yafuatayo:
- Kwanza, nafafanua nadharia ya kufanya tathmini ya kimaadili;
- Pili, naonyesha jinsi ya kutuimia nadharia hii kutambua kambi ya siasa iliyo na uadilifu mkubwa zaidi;
- Tatu napendekeza jinsi wapiga kura wanavyopaswa kusonga mbele katika uchaguzi mkuu wa 2020;
- Nne, nakosoa mtazamo wa wale wanaopendekeza mbinu haramu kama njia ya kufukuzia wema; na
- Tano nahitimisha mawazo yangu.
Kuna nadharia nyingi za kutathmini uadilifu wa tabia za watu. Baadhi zinasisitiza majukumu, zingine matokeo na pia zipo zinazosisitiza tunu. Mwanazuoni mmoja anasema haya kuhusu nadharia hizi:
"... there are two mainstream groups of [ethical] theories: theories based on duties (deontologism) and theories which stand for evaluating and balancing the consequences of every action (consequentialism, among which utilitarianism is prominent)...
Deontological theories are centered on duties ... which are accepted ... as rationally self-evident...
Utilitarianism focuses on goods obtained as consequences of the action, measured in terms of utility or satisfaction of those who are affected by such consequences and applying an axiomatic principle that an action is ethical when it produces the greatest happiness (satisfaction) for the greatest number...
Virtue ethics, has become quite popular in the last two decades. It focuses on the moral character of the agent and its influence in making correct judgments.. All of these theories have some aspect of truth and present relevant but incomplete aspects regarding ethics in decision-making, namely in the consideration of moral duties and consequences associated with an action and the role of virtues.
There is another theory which is more comprehensive than these, since it includes all of these elements – virtues, duties and consequences – in a consistent way with the principles, values and virtues enumerated in the previous chapter.
In this theory, called the Triple Font of Morality, the intentionality of the decision-maker is central, and this covers both the intention of an end and the election of a means for this end, as well as the consequences and other circumstances. We will discuss it next." (Domenec Mele, Management Ethics: Placing Ethics at the Core of Good Management (New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2012, p. 56-57)
Kwa hiyo, hapa tutajadili nadharia ya vokali tatu za maadili ( Triple Font Theory (TFT) of Morality). Kwa ufupi nadharia hii inaelezwa hivi na mtaalam mmoja:
"The Triple Font of Morality Theory: Every decision entails deliberation and election of an end, and an action chosen as a means to achieve that end. Thus, the will of the decision maker concerns both the end and the means.
In addition, sound deliberation cannot ignore the predictable consequences of the action and other morally relevant situational circumstances. These three elements are fonts or sources to evaluate the morality of a decision or a human act ...
- Intention: morality of purpose or goal for which the decision is taken.
- Action chosen: morality of the action chosen as a means to the end.
- Circumstances: morality of relevant consequent circumstances (predictable consequences of the action) and antecedent circumstances (situational factors)....
The Triple Font of Morality Theory holds that a decision is morally good if, and only if, all of these elements are good... The rationale for the Triple Font of Morality Theory is the following. The intention and the object chosen are two aspects of the single voluntary act of making a decision. It is an internal act of the decision maker which will be materialized when it is put into effect; but, in essence, the action exists already in the decision-maker’s mind from the moment he or she makes the decision.(Ibid. p.57-58).
Hivyo, kwa mujibu wa nadharia hii tunavyo vigezo vikuu vitatu tunavyoweza kuvitumia kupima uadilifu wa matendo yetu. Vipengele hivyo ni mwenendo wa mtendaji, lengo la mtendaji na mazingira ya mtendaji. Yaani, "behaviour, intention and circumstances." (Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company; 1959, chapter 9 on "sources of morality").
Kusudi tuweze kuelewa maneno haya, tuchukue mfano wa fundi saa ili kuona jinsi vipengele hivi vinavyotumika. Fundi saa anafanya kazi ya kuunda saa ya mkononi akiwa ameketi chini ya mti, kila siku, kwa kutumia bisibisi na nyindo ndogo, ili aiuze saa na kupata malipo na kusudi saa umsaidie mnunuzi kuhesabu muda kwa ufanisi.
Kwanza, katika mfano huu, mwenendo wa mtendaji unajidhihirisha kupitia utendaji wa kazi ya kuunda saa, ambapo kazi inafanywa na mtendaji kwa kuhakikisha kuwa saa inakuwa na uwezo wa kuhesabu majira. Mwenendo wa kitendo hiki unajumuisha finali ya kitendo (finis operis/ finis actus) chenyewe, yaani kuhesabu muda. Kwa ujumla, mwenendo wa mtendaji hutoa jawabu kwa swali: kitendo gani kimefanyika?
Kwa mujibu wa wanazuoni, vigezo vifuatavyo vinahusika katika kupima uadilifu wa mwenendo wa mtendaji:
"Some questions that one can consider in evaluating the moral [behavior] are: Does it violate any human rights or any just laws? Does it fulfill contractual duties? Is it in accordance with distributive justice? Is it a disloyal action? Does it contribute to community or promote other ethical values? Are there any better alternatives? Has the ethical issue or problem been properly defined (facts, conflicts of rights, duties, and values)? Who are the stakeholders that may be affected? Is there a possibility for scandal? What is the symbolic potential of the action and perceptions of others?" (Surendra Arjoon, Ethical Decision-Making: A Case for the Triple Font Theory, Journal of Business Ethics 71(2007):395–410, at 398).
Kwa hiyo, suala la kuheshimu haki na majumu ya binadamu linapaswa kujadiliwa kwa umakini tunapokuwa tunatathmini uadilifu wa mwenendo wa kitendo, kwani uvunjaji wa haki yoyote au ukiukwaji wa jukumu lolote huweza kutia dosari katika mwenendo husika.
Na mara nyingi, dosari hiyo hutokea pale mwamuzi anapojikuta katika njia panda ya maamuzi. Katika njiapanda hii, haki na haki, jukumu na jukumu, au haki na jukumu, huweza kugongana. Njia panda za aina hii zinaitwa mitanziko ya kimaadili (moral dilemas).
Mitanziko ya aina hii lazima ipatiwe majawabu kusudi utekelezaji uweze kusonga mbele. Kwa mfano, mgongano wa haki na haki utokeapo, mtendaji huweza kuamua kwamba haki yenye uzito mkubwa itamalaki; na mgongano wa jukumu na jukumu utokeapo, mtendaji huweza kuamua kwamba jukumu lenye uzito mkubwa litamalaki.
Lakini pia, kuna wakati mtanziko hutokea pale mtu mmoja anadai kuwa na haki ya kufanya jambo wakati mtu mwingine anadai kuwa na haki ya kuzuia kufanyika kwa jambo hilo. Pia, kuna wakati watu wawili tofauti hudai kuwa na haki juu ya kitu kile kile kimoja.
Mwanazuoni Austin Fagothey (1959), anasema yafuatayo kuhusu baadhi ya kanuni za kumaliza mitanziko ya aina hii :
We can lay down only a few general norms. Other things being equal, the stronger right or duty can be determined from the following scheme: The subject [of a right entails two rules]: (1) The nobler person: God before man, parents before their children; (2)The closer relationship: closer relatives before remote ones, friends before strangers. The term [of a right entails two rules]: (3)The more common good: world peace before personal comfort, public safety before private gain; (4)The wider social order: the country before the family, the family before the individual. The matter [of a right entails two rules]: (5)The graver matter: the soul before the body, life before property; (6)The greater urgency: fighting a fire before reading a book, saving the living before burying the dead. [And] the title [of a right entails two rules of the thumb]: (7)The higher law: natural law before positive law, inalienable rights before alienable; (8)The clearer title: the certain before the doubtful, paying a debt before giving a gift.
What makes these norms hard to apply is that in concrete cases other things are not equal. One right or duty may appear stronger according to one of the headings listed above, and the opposite right or duty according to another heading. [For example:] (1) A doctor is about to attend divine worship on Sunday when an emergency call comes for an urgent case; God comes before man, but the case cannot be postponed and the man may die. (2) A young man wants to take a college education but has no funds; the mind comes before the body, but if he does not eat he cannot study. (3) A son has been disinherited in a civilly valid will but for dubiously just reasons; the natural law prevails over the positive, but the positive title is clear and the natural one doubtful. (4) In time of war a man is torn between his duty to his country and to his family; the common good prevails over a private good, but his family is related to him more closely than the bulk of the citizens.
For a solution of these and similar apparent conflicts of rights and duties no hard and fast rules can be drawn up. Each case must be taken in its concrete setting and every circumstance carefully weighed. In these matters there is no substitute for common sense, which is another name for the cardinal virtue of prudence. Most cases are settled by working out some proportion or compromise between the various factors and claims, except that the negative duty of never doing anything intrinsically wrong prevails over everything else.(Austin Fagothey, Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition (St. Louis: The C. V. Mosby Company; 1959, chapter 15 on "rights and duties").
Pili, katika mfano huu, kuna lengo la mtendaji au finali ya mtendaji (finis operantis/ finis agentis ). Hapa kuna dhamira ya mtendaji kujipatia kipato kwa kuuza saa aliyoitengeneza. Kwa ujumla, lengo la mtendaji hutoa jawabu kwa swali: kwa nini mtendaji ameamua kufanya kitendo hicho?
Kwa maneno mengine, lengo la mtendaji ni kitendo kinachofanyika ndani ya moyo wa mtu (human will). Hivyo, kitendo cha nje ya moyo kinachotekelezwa na mwili kutokana na maagizo ya dhamira huambikizwa uadilifu wake kutokana na uadilifu wa kitendo cha kwanza kilichofanyika ndani ya dhamira.
Kwa mfano, kama mtu anakusudia kuiba, kwa sababu yoyote ile, lakini, kwa sababu yoyote ile, anashindwa kutekeleza mpango huo wa wizi, basi, kwa mtazamo wa kimaadili tayari anakuwa amekwisha kufanya tendo la wizi moyoni. Tendo la nje ya moyo linapanua ukubwa wa uovu ambao tayari imefanywa kupitia tendo la moyoni.
Kwa hiyo, uadilifu au uhalifu wa kitendo cha mtu unaanzia kwenye kitendo cha moyoni. Na kitendo cha nje ya moyo kunapanua uzito wa uovu huo. Wanazuoni wanasema yafuatayo kuhusu lengo la mtendaji:
"In evaluating the intention, the concept of cooperation in injustice or evil is also considered. ...three ways of direct cooperation in another person’s actions[are identified]: (1) immediate participation (e.g., participating directly in another’s action or giving to the necessary approval), (2) collaboration (e.g., carrying out some mandatory action or contributing information that promotes the action), and (3) omission (e.g., not letting others know, correcting or persuading others when it can be done, and there exists reasonable possibilities for the action to be performed efficaciously, not to impede an illicit action when we have the ability of doing so, not to denounce harmful conduct or immoral behavior, to conceal an immoral action if such concealment effectively influences its accomplishment, or to protect those who act irresponsibly so that they can continue behaving unethically). Cooperation can take two forms: (1) formal and (2) material. Formal cooperation occurs when one not only helps another person to commit an immoral act, but also joins in the other person’s immoral intention. It makes a person fully responsible for whatever is done in the course of an action. Such cooperation is always wrong and cannot be justified under any circumstances. Material cooperation, on the other hand, occurs when one does not intend to take part in another person’s immoral act, but knowingly takes part in the immoral act by some act that is not itself immoral."
Some factors to consider with respect to material cooperation include: (1) the amount of evil that others will be enabled to do by my cooperation, (2) the amount of evil that will happen to one if one refuses to cooperate, (3) the closeness or proximity with which my cooperative act is connected with the evil act of the principal agent, and (4) greater reason is required for indispensable cooperation. A general standard by which to evaluate whether cooperation as an action is formal or material is given by three conditions: (1) if the agent does not will the whole operation, (2) if the agent’s part in the operation is not intrinsically wrong, and (3) if there is proportionate need for cooperation. If these conditions are present, the cooperation may be judged to be material, and so the action of the agent is not immoral. If any of them is lacking, then the cooperation is formal and the agent is morally responsible.
For the third condition, ... the consideration of the following questions [is suggested:] What are the objective reasons for cooperation? Is there an obligation or possibility of obstructing the other person’s action? What is the moral gravity of the other person’s action? What is the proximate cause for the cooperation? Material cooperation if possible ought to be avoided, otherwise prudence suggests that some precaution should be kept in mind: avoid the possibility of scandal; avoid false rationalization or justification of other’s actions; and consider carefully whether cooperation is justified (Ibid. p.398-99)
Wakiandika juu ya uhusiano uliopo kati ya mwenendo wa mtendaji na lengo lake, wanazuoni wanasema kuwa ubaya wa mwenendo wa mtendaji hauwezi kufutwa na wema wa dhamira ya mtendaji. Kwa usahihi, wanasema yafuatayo:
With regards to the relationship between the moral object and the subjective intention, a morally upright intention cannot make a bad action or moral object good (the end does not justify the means), although it can make a good action bad, and a bad action worse. In other words, if the object of an act is evil as well as possessing an evil end or intention, then the malice of the act increases. Finally, an intrinsically evil act cannot be made good by the end sought. Some questions that one can consider in evaluating the intention are: Is honesty the goal that is sought? Could the moral quality of the intention be improved? Can you take pride in your action? Am I being true to myself? Can I reasonably defend this position? (Ibid. p. 400).
Tatu, katika mfano huu, kuna mazingira ya mtendaji. Mazingira haya huweza kugawanywa katika makundi sita yafuatayo, kama tukitumia mtindo wa maswali: WAPI kitendo kimefanyikia? LINI kitendo kimefanyika? KWA VIPI kitendo kimefanyika? KWA NINI kitendo kimefanyika? NANI amefanya kitendo hicho? MADHARA MAKUBWA KIASI GANI yamesababishwa na kitendo hicho?
Katika mfano wetu wa sasa, kitendo kinafanyika chini ya mti, kila siku, kwa kutumia bisibisi na nyundo ndogo; na kama itatengenezwa saa inayohesabu majira sawasawa, kitakuwa kimetendeka kwa ufanisi. Wanazuoni wanasema yafuatayo kuhusu mazingira:
Circumstances of the human act are therefore accidental and are conditions which are outside the essence of a human act, but nonetheless affect it. The classical listing to discern the circumstances of a human act is accomplished by a series of seven questions: (1) circumstance of person – the acting subject (who?) (2) circumstance of quality of the act – the thing done (what?) (3) circumstance of place (where?) (4) circumstance of help or influences (by what aid?) (5) circumstance of intention – immediate reasons (why?) (6) circumstance of mode or manner in which the act is done (how?), and (7) circumstance of time – time affects the morality of the act (when?). The most notable of the circumstances are those of intentions (why?) and the quality of the act (what?), as they are more intimately associated with the human act in question. Both these circumstances should not however be confused with the subjective intention and the moral object, respectively, as the circumstances are additional modifications in the personal intention of the agent or the moral object. Circumstances as such, refer to such considerations as performing an action at the right time, in the right place, in the right manner, with the right person, and so on...
Two types of circumstances can be identified: (1) aggravating circumstances which leave the human act unchanged in its character or species, and merely intensify it, that is, make it better or worse, and (2) specifying circumstances which change the nature of the act, or more precisely introduce a new element into the act (Smith, 1991: Chapter 7). Aggravating circumstances remain accidental and increase or decrease the moral gravity of the act. Specifying circumstances are more than mere accidentals or circumstances; they amalgamate essentially with the act itself. Such circumstances enter into or specify the moral object. (Ibid. p. 399)
Na nne, katika mfano wetu, kuna matokeo ya kitendo, ambayo yanaweza kuwa mema au mabaya, yaliyotarajiwa au yasiyotarajiwa. Wanazuoni wanasema yafuatayo kuhusu matokeo ya kitendo:
Consequences, as are foreseen, follow naturally from the act, and so are an integrated aspect like the act itself. Consequences, like aggravating circumstances, do not of themselves intrinsically change the moral character of the act, but can change the moral gravity of the act, that is, increase or decrease the goodness or malice of the act. Consequences, normally do not affect the moral character or nature of the act except insofar as they are known and will therefore become part of the nature of the act itself...
However, bad consequences, though unintended, are foreseen as following from what is directly intended, and may be reason for forbidding an otherwise moral action. In difficult cases, the Principle of Double Effect (PDE) can be applied.
The PDE states that, given the fulfillment of four conditions, an action with at least one good effect and with one or more bad effects may be legitimately performed.
The four conditions of the PDE are: (1) the action itself must be morally good or at least morally indifferent, (2) the good effect must not be obtained through or by means of the bad effect, (3) the bad effect must not be intended, but rather only tolerated, and (4) there must be a sufficiently serious reason to justify allowing the evil effect.
With regards to integrating the PDE into the general framework of the TFT, note that the first condition is already considered under the moral object and the third condition is considered under the subjective or personal intention.
The PDE is a doctrine that distinguishes between the consequences of what a person intends and those consequences that are unintended but foreseen, and may be applicable in situations where an action results in at least two effects, one good and one evil.(Ibid. p. 400)
Vipengele hivi vitatu --mwenendo, lengo na mazingira-- vyenye kupatikana katika kila kitendo vinaitwa vokali tatu za maadili (three fonts of morality). Na katika uhalisia, tunaweza kuwa na mwenendo mwema au mwenendo mbaya, lengo jema au lengo baya, mazingira mema au mazingira mabaya.
Kwa kuunganisha vokali hizi tatu tunapata kujua matokeo yanayowezekana (possibilities) pale mtu anapoamua kufanya kitenda. Yaani, kila mtu anapoamua kutenda jambo, mojawapo ya matokeo manane linaweza kujitokeza, kama mchanganuo ufuatavyo unavyoonyesha:
Fikiria kwamba, kila tendo la binadamu linaweza kutathminiwa kimaadili kwa kujibu maswali matatu haya:
Mwenendo wa mtendaji unahusisha wema (W) au ubaya (U)? Lengo la mtendaji linahusisha wema (W) au ubaya (U)? Na mazingira ya mtendaji yanahusisha wema (W) au ubaya (U)?
Maswali haya yakijibiwa kwa mpigo tunaweza kupata majubu manane tofauti yafuatayo: (1) WWW, (2) WWU, (3) WUW, (4) WUU, (5) UWW, (6) UWU, (7) UUW na (8) UUU.
Majibu haya yanaweza kugawanywa katika makundi makuu manne yafuatayo.
Mosi, kuna uwezekano wa kufanya tendo adilifu kwa asilimia zote mia, bila doa lolote la ubaya (namba 1). Hapa kuna mwenendo mwema, lengo jema na mazingira mema.
Pili, kuna uwezekano wa kufanya tendo ambalo ni la kihalifu kwa asilimia zote mia (namba 8). Hapa kuna mwenendo mbaya, lengo baya na mazingira mabaya.
Tatu, kuna uwezekano wa kufanya matendo ambayo ni mseto wa wema na ubaya katika ngazi ya mwenendo, lengo au mazingira (namba 2-7). Hapa, tunakuwa tunaongelea uwiano wa wema na ubaya.
Kwa upande mmoja, kuna matendo ambayo ni mabaya katika vomali mbili zozote (66%) na mema kwa vokali moja yoyote (33%).
Kwa upande mwingine, kuna matendo ambayo ni mabaya katika vokali moja yoyote (33%) na mema katika vokali mbili zozote (66%).
Na nne, inawezekana kuwa na mwenendo, lengo na mazingira ambavyo ni vyema kwa pamoja, lakini mazingira husika yakachafuliwa kwa kuwepo na matokeo mawili, moja likiwa ni tokeo la ziada ambalo ni baya, kwa maana kwamba halikukusudiwa na haliepukiki lakini linavumilika.
Basi, kwa sababu hii, wanafalsafa ya maadili wanatofautisha kati ya tokeo lililochaguliwa kwa moyo mkunjufu (direct choice) na tokeo lililochaguliwa kwa shingo upande (indirect choice).
Kuagua tokeo la ziada ambalo ni baya lakini kwa kutumia uchaguzi wa moyo mkunjufu kunahesabiwa kuwa haramu kimaadili. Na kuchagua tokeo la ziada ambalo ni baya lakini kutokana na uchaguzi wa shingo upande kunahesabiwa halali kimaadili.
Lakini, kanuni za kawaida za kimantiki zinaonyesha kuwa, "kitu kitakuwa ni kamilifu kama sehemu zake zote ni kamilifu; kwa maana kwamba, dosari katika sehemu yoyote ya kitu hukifanya kitu husika kuhesabiwa chenye mapungufu." Yaani, "a thing to be good must be wholly so; it is vitiated by any defect."
Kama tukitumia kanuni hii kwenye uzuri wa kimaadili wa kitendo, basi hitimisho ni kwamba, tendo adilifu kwa asilimia zote mia, bila doa lolote la ubaya ni lile ambalo linajumiisha mwenendo mwema, lengo jema na mazingira mema. Ubaya katima mwenendo, au lengo au mazingira unamomonyoa uadilifu wa kitendo na kuzalisha mmomonyoko wa maadili.
Jinsi ya kutathmini ubora wa kambi za kisiasa
Kuna sifa kuu nne za kuvitofautisha vyama vya siasa kwa msingi wa ubora wake. Yaani, ubora wa sera; ubora wa itikadi; ubora wa wagombea katika kushawishi na kunadi sera na itikadi; na uimara wa kitaasisi. Sifa hii ya nne inaiwezesha kambi ya kisiasa husika kusimamia nidhamu ya serikali yake, endapo kambi hiyo itashinda uchaguzi.
Ubora wa sera unatokana na kubuniwa kwa sera zinazogusa sekta zote za maisha ya watu bila kuacha mtu yeyote au kundi lolote nyuma.
Kuna sera kuhusu sekta kama vile afya, makazi na maji; elimu, habari na michezo; ikolojia, uhai na tabianchi; ofisi za uongozi, ujenzi wa imani ya jamii na ufinyanzi wa jamii ya amani; uchumi, miundombinu na teknolojia; pamoja na usalama wa raia na mali zao.
Yaani, tunataka sera za maendeleo zinazokuza na kuhami maslahi ya wote bila ubaguzi unaotokana na vigezo nasibu kama vile dini, kabila, rangi, mbari, jiografia, itikadi na jinsi.
Ubora wa itikadi unatokana na kubuniwa kwa imani ya chama yenye kutuwezesha kutofautisha kati ya ulimwengu wa ukweli na ulimwengu wa uwongo, ulimwengu wa mbinu adilifu na ulimwengu wa mbinu za kihalifu, ulimwengu wa malengo ambayo ni tunu chanya na ulimwengu wa malengo ambayo ni tunu hasi. Yaani "descriptive, normative and evaluative beliefs."
Kuna imani inayohusu ukweli, mbinu na malengo katika sekta kama vile afya, elimu, ikolojia, ofisi za utawala, na uchumi.
Ubora wa wagombea katika kushawishi na kunadi sera na itikadi unatokana na kuwepo kwa wagombea na makampena wenye kuelewa jinsi itikadi na sera za chama husika zinavyogusa matatizo ya wananchi katika mazingira husika.
Na uimara wa kitaasisi ni hali ya kuwepo kwa taratibu za pamoja katika namna ambayo inayokiwezesha chama husika kutekeleza majukumu yake bila kutegemea maagizo binafsi ya viongozi au washauri walio nje ya chama.
Yaani, uimara wa kitaasisi unadhihirika pale ambapo kuna vyombo vya maamuzi vinavyotofautisha mamlaka ya uamuzi dhidi ya mamlaka ya ushauri, vikao rasmi dhidi ya vikao visivyo rasmi, taarifa rasmi dhidi taarifa zisizo rasmi, ukweli dhidi ya tetesi na tuhuma dhidi ya hukumu.
Yaani, katika hatua sita za ukuaji wa taasisi, ambazo ni kuzaliwa, kutambaa, kusimama, kutembea, kukimbia, na hatimaye kufa, ( forming, storming, norming, trusting, performing, and adjourning), chama kinapaswa kuwa kwenye hatua ya nne au kuwa kimeivuka. Bila hivyo tunaweza kupata serikali inayoendesha nchi bila hofu ya kuhojiwa na chama cha siasa kilichoiweka madarakani.
Hivyo, katika kuchagua kambi itakayounda serikali, tunakuwa tumechagua mambo manne kwa mpigo: sera, itikadi, mgombea na chama cha siasa. Na kutokana na uchambuzi wa hapo juu, sasa nitaonyesha kuwa, kuna njia kuu nne zinazoweza kutumika kuitambua kambi ya kisiasa iliyo bora zaidi.
Katika njia ya kwanza, tunaweza kutumia kanuni ya vokali tatu za maadili zisizo na doa lolote la ubaya (unstained three fonts of morality).
Kwa mujibu wa kanuni hii, kila tendo ambalo ni halali kimaadili lazima lijumuishe mwenendo mwema, mazingira mema na lengo jema (yaani good behaviour, good circumstances and good intention).
Matokeo namba (1) katika mchoro hapo juu yanahusika. Hivyo, katika mchoro huu kila tokeo lenye dosari ya hapana (H), ama katika mwenendo au katika lengo au katika mazingira, ni haramu kimaadili.
Kwa kutumia njia hii tutakuwa tumeamua kuchagua kambi ya siasa yenye sifa bora kwa asilimia zote mia, kwa maana kwamba kambi tuliyoichagua ina sera bora zaidi, ina itikadi bora zaidi, ina wagombea bora zaidi, na ina uimara wa kitaasisi ulio bora zaidi.
Pili, tunaweza kutumia kanuni ya kutafuta uwiano wa wema na ubaya unaopatikana katika mazingira yasiyojumuisha matokeo pacha (principle of proportionality coupled with unitary effect scenario).
Wema unaweza kuwa katika mwenendo, mazingira, lengo au katika vokali mbili zozite kati ya vokali matatu. Ni vivyo hivyo kwa ubaya.
Hivyo, hii ni njia ya kuchagua mseto wa wema na ubaya lakini kwa kujitahidi kuhakikisha kuwa wema katika matokeo ya jumla unakuwa miubwa zaidi ubaya.
Kwa mujibu wa mchanganuo wetu hapo juu, hapa tutakuwa tunawianisha wema na ubaya kwa kuchagua matokeo namba 4, 6 na 7 (zenye uovu wa 66% kila moja) na kukataa matokeo namba 2, 3 na 5 (zenye uovu wa 33% kila moja). Pia tutakuwa tunakataa matokeo namba 8 (yenye uovu kwa 100%).
Kwa kutumia njia hii tunaweza kuwa tumeamua kuchagua kambi ya siasa yenye sifa bora kwa asilimia zilizo chini ya mia, kwa maana kwamba kambi tuliyoichagua ina sera bora kwa 66%, itikadi bora kwa 66%, wagombea bora kwa 66%, na uimara wa kitaasisi kwa 66%.
Yaani, hapa tunaweza kuwa tumechagua kambi yenye chembechembe za ubaya kwa kiwango cha 33% na chembechembe za wema kwa kiwango cha 66% (principle of proportionalism /consequentialism).
Hata hivyo, njia hii haina nafasi katika kura za uchaguzi wa kisiasa kwa kuwa katika uchaguzi huu tunachagua mambo manne kwa mpigo: sera, itikadi, mgombea na utaasisi. Yaani, hii sio "unitary effect scenario."
Tatu, tunaweza kutumia kanuni ya kutafuta uwiano wa wema na ubaya katika mazingira yenye matokeo pacha (principle of proportionality coupled with double effect scenario au principle of proportionality coupled with side effects scenario).
Hapa tutakuwa tunatafuta uwiano wa wema na ubaya unaopatokana katika malengo pekee.
Hii ni njia ya kuchagua mseto wa wema na ubaya lakini kwa kujitahidi kuhakikisha kuwa wema katika matokeo ya jumla unazidi ubaya.
Kanuni hii inahusu kitendo ambacho kinazalisha matokeo zaidi ya moja, ambapo tokeo moja lililokusudiwa ni jema, wakati matokeo mengine yanaweza kuwa ni mema au mabaya, japo hayajakusudiwa na mtendaji.
Mtendaji anakuwa anajua kwamba kuna matokeo ya ziada yatafuata baada ya uamuzi wake, lakini sio lengo lake kuu kwamba haya yatokee, japo hayaepukiki.
Hivyo, anayavumilia matokeo haya wakati akifukuzia tokeo moja alilolikusudia moja kwa moja (direct choice). Mtendaji huyu, anakuwa ameyakusudia matokeo hayo mengine kwa njia ya mzunguko (indirect choice).
Kwa mujibu wa kanuni hii, tunaruhusiwa kuchagua kambi ya siasa ambayo sio adilifu katika kila eneo, lakini tunapaswa kufanya hivyo kwa njia ya mzunguko.
Kwa mfano, tuseme, unachagua kambi ya siasa X iliyokiuka taratibu za uchaguzi wa ndani, lakini unaichagua kwa sababu ama ina sera nzuri, au ina mgombea mzuri, au ina uimara mkubwa wa kitaasisi.
Katika mazingira ya kanuni hii, kuchaguliwa kwa kambi inayokiuka kanuni za uchaguzi wake wa ndani ni matokeo ya ziada (side effect), ambayo unayaona, kuyatambua na kuyavumilia, kwa vile vigezo vingine vikivyotimizwa kwa asilimia kubwa vimekuvutia zaidi.
Ni kama ambavyo waswahili husema kuwa "tunafunika kombe ili mwanaharamu apite." Yaani unakubali kuishi na nyoka chumbani kwa imani kwamba, hata kama akikuuma, hakuna shida kwani, sumu yake haina madhara kwako.
Na njia ya nne ni kukataa kupigia kura kambi yenye madoa ya wema na ubaya. Njia hii inaweza kuchukuliwa kwa sababu, hatimaye, kitendo cha kuchagua kambi kwa kutumia kanuni ya uwiano katika mazingira yasiyo na matokeo ya ziada (proportionalism coupled with unitary effect scenario) na kitendo cha kuchagua kambi kwa kutumia kanuni ya uwiano katika mazingira yenye matokeo ya ziada (proportionalism coupled with side effects scenario), vinafanana katika jambo moja: hatimaye, zote ni mbinu za kuisimika kambi ya kisiasa yenye madoa ya wema na ubaya.
Kama hizi ndizo njia nne zilizopo, tuchague njia gani?
Katika njia nne zinazowezekana, kama zilivyojadiliwa hapo juu, napendekeza kuwa, njia ya kutafuta uwiano wa mema na mabaya isitumike kabisa. Njia hii ni batili kwa sababu kuu tatu.
Sababu ya kwanza ni ya kiteolojia. Hapa tunaona kuwa njia hii inakiuka misahafu isemayo kuwa ni makosa kutenda maovu kama njia ya kutafuta matokeo mema (Warumi 3:8). Kanuni hii tuiite kanuni ya umachiaveli.
Kwa mtu ambaye anaamini katika usahihi wa Biblia, aya hii inatosha kumwelekeza kuhusu namna bora ya kuenenda. Lakini, tunajua kuwa umachiaveli ni mbaya, sio kwa sababu Biblia inaupinga, bali Biblia inaupinga umachiaveli kwa sababu ni mbaya. Hivyo, kuna haja ya kupiga hatua moja mbele ili kueleza kifalsafa kwa nini umachiaveli ni mbaya.
Hivyo, sababu ya pili ni ya kifalsafa. Akili ya kibinadamu inatuonyesha kuwa, kama ambavyo mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka, vivyo hivyo, kambi ya kisiasa inayoongozwa na kanuni ya umachiaveli lazima itazalisha serikali inayoongozwa na kanuni ya umachiaveli. Ni hivi:
Kwa kawaida, maneno "malengohuhalalisha mbinu tunazozitumia," yanamaanisha tabia ya kufanya kitendo kibaya ili kufanikisha lengo zuri, na kisha kuhalalisha ubaya wa kitendo kwa kutumia uzuri wa matokeo.
Mfano ni kusema uwongo katika wasifu wako ili upate kazi nzuri yenye kipato kikubwa na kisha kuhalalisha uwongo huo kwa kusema kuwa kipato kikubwa kitakuwezesha kutunza vizuri familia yako.
Mfano mwingine ni kutoa na kuua mimba ya mtoto asiye na hatia ili kulinda uhai wa mama yake. Kusema uwongo na kusigina uhai wa mtu asiye na hatia yote ni matendo haramu kimaadili. Lakini, kutunza familia na kuokoa uhai wa mama ni matendo mema kimaadili. Je, ni wapi tuchore mstari unaotenganisha wema na ubaya?
Kwa ujumla, "mtanziko wa mbinu mbaya na malengo mema" (evil means/good end dilemma) ni kitendawili tunachokutana nacjo kila siku katika maisha yetu, na mara nyingi tunatoa jawabu haramu kimaadili.
Chukulia swali lifuatalo: "Kama ukijikuta katika mazingira ambapo unapaswa kuokoa watu wengi kwa kumwua mtu mmoja asiye na hatia, unaweza kufanya kitendo hicho?
Kama jawabu lako ni ndiyo, unachokubaliana nacho ni mtazamo kwamba, "matokeo mema kimaadili yanaweza kuhalalisha matumizi ya mbinu haramu kimaadili ili kuyazalisha matokeo hayo."
Lakini, huu ni mtazamo haramu kimaadili kwa sababu zifuatazo: Kuna mambo matatu tunayopaswa kuyachunguza kabla ya kujibu swali hilo. Uadilifu wa kitendo, uadilifu wa matokeo yanayotarajiwa, na uadilifu wa dhamira ya mtendaji.
Katika mfano wetu wa sasa, mwenendo wa "kusigina uhai wa mtu" ni jambo haramu kimaadili. Kuokoa watu wengi ni matokeo mema. Na hivyo, kuchagua utekelezaji wa kitendo kitakacholeta matokeo mema ni jambo jema kimaadili. Na kufanya kitendo cha kuchagua kusigina uhai wa "mtu asiye na hatia" ni dhamira ya kuchagua mazingira mabaya kimaadili. Uadilifu wa kweli unakuwepo pale ambapo mwenendo ni mwema, dhamira ni njema na mazingira ni mema.
Kwa hiyo, tunapaswa kutofautisha kati ya maadili yanayosisitiza ukuu wa matokeo ya kitendo (teliological ethics) na maadili yanayosisitiza ukuu wa mwenendo wa kitendo (deontological ethics).
Kwa mujibu wa maadili yanayoongozwa na mwenendo wa kitendo, wema au ubaya wa kitendo hutegemea parameta ziliozomo katika mwenendo wa mtendaji. Katika mtazamo huu, kuua mtu asiye na hatia, kutesa mtu, kuiba, kusema uwongo, na kadhalika, ni matendo yaliyo haramu kila mahali, kila wakati na kwa kila mtendaji.
Na kwa upande mwingine, kwa mujibu wa maadili yanayosisitiza matokeo ya kitendo, wema au ubaya wa kitendo hutegemea parameta ziliozomo katika matokeo yaliyozalishwa na mtendaji.
Kambi hii ya maadili hupendekeza kwa kutumia kizio kinachotuwezesha kupima "manufaa" (utility) yanayoambatana na matokeo husika tunaweza kubaini mbinu yenye "manufaa" makubwa zaidi na kuitekeleza, hata kama utekelezaji huo utazalisha hasara kidogo.
Kwa mujibu wa kambi hii, kanuni kwamba "malengo mema huhalalisha mbinu haramu" ni ruksa. Kwa mtazamo wao, ni halali kuiba ili kuwajengea watoto nyumba nzuri; ni halali kubaka mwanamke ili kumlazimisha atoe siri za ofisini kwake; n.k.
Na sababu ya tatu ni ya kisosiolojia. Ujenzi wa jamii ya amani ni kazi inayofanyika kwa njia ya kufinyanga akili za wanajamii kwa kuwalisha imani ya jamii inayoweza kuzalisha amani. Imani hiyo ninapaswa kuwafundisha watu kukuza na kuhami haki, kwa maana ya kufukuzia mema na kuepuka mabaya.
Lakini, siku zote, mseto wowote wa wema na ubaya hudhoofisha wema na kufifisha ubaya. Ni kama ambavyo, mseto wa rangi nyeupe na rangi nyeusi hudhoofisha weupe na kufifisha weusi. Jamii isiyo na mwangaza kamili juu ya tofauti iliyopo kati ya weupe wa wema na weusi wa ubaya ni jamii ambayo imepoteza mwongozo thabiti kuelekea kwenye furaha, haki na amani.
Kwa hiyo, tukiruhusu kanuni ya umachiaveli kuwa msingi wa utaratibu wa maisha ya jamii zetu, tutakuwa tunajenga imani ya jamii iliyo na harufu ya uhalifu na hatimaye jamii ya amani itatoweka.
Majibu marefu kwa wanaopendekeza mbinu haramu kama njia ya kufukuzia wema
Najua kuwa baadhi ya watu watapendekeza kwamba tutumie njia ya uwiano unaoambatana na matokeo ya ziada (side effect) kuchagua kati ya shetani wa kijani na shetani mwekundi.
Nitaeleza kwa nini watu hawa wanafikiri hii ni njia mwafaka. Lakini, baadaye nitaikataa njia hii kwa hoja, na kisha kupendekeza kwamba tunapaswa kuchagua kambi nyingine mbali na kambi zenye madoa ya wema na ubaya.
Tunafahamishwa kuwa, ubora wa sera, umakini wa itikadi, umahiri wa jukwaa na uimara wa taasisi ni sifa zinazotegemea uwezo wa kibinadamu.
Tunaambiwa kwamba uwezo wa binadamu huweweseka kati ya mpaka wa wema, kwa upande mmoja, na mpaka wa ubaya, kwa upande mwingine, kama ufanyavyo mti unaopulizwa na upepo.
Yaani, tunaamimbiwa kuwa, katika nyakati tofauti, binadamu wengi hujikuta katika mazingira yanayowaweka katika mtanziko unaowalazimisha kutenda dhuluma na kuweka pembeni haki, kuchochea vita badala ya kuhimiza amani , kutunga taratibu na kujiapiza kuzifuata lakini kesho wakazivunja kwa ajili ya kufukuzia kitu wanachokiona kuwa ni maslahi makubwa zaidi ambayo hayawezi kupatikana bila kuvunja taratibu.
Kwa hiyo tunaambiwa kuvumiliana katika uovu ilimradi uovu uwe ni mdogo kuliko wema.
Lakini, kanuni ya kutafuta uwiano wa wema na ubaya ni kanuni isiyokubalika kwa sababu za kifalsa na kiteolojia, japo inajadiliwa na watu wengi.
Kwa mfano, ndani ya Kanisa Katoliki, Askofu Denis Hurley ( 1915–2004) aliita "principle of overriding right," Padre Charles Curran ( 1934 --) aliita "the principle of compromise," Padre Peter Chirico (1927-2016) aliita "the principle of tension," na Profesa Germain Grisez (1929 –2018) aliita kanuni ya maslahi mapana "principle of proportionate good").
Hapa tutatumia uchambuzi wa skofu Denis Hurley kuonyesha tatizo. Hayati Askofu Denis Hurley, wa Durban, Afrika Kusini, alipendekeza kuwa kanuni ya kutafuta uwiano wa mema na mabaya iitwe kanuni ya "haki yenye nguvu ya veto" (principle of overriding right).
Wakosoaji wake, kama vile hayati Germain Grisez (USA) walipenda kuiita kanuni ya maslahi mapana ("principle of proportionate good").
Askofu Hurley alifikia hitimisho hili katikati ya mateso ya ubaguzi wa rangi chini ya mskaburu. Aliibuni kanuni husika baada ya kufikiri kama ifuatavyo:
"...we have no general principle in our moral theology dealing with situations in which right and duty clash. We have quite a number of particular principles. For instance, though killing a man is wrong, we have justified killing in self-defence. The principle here seems to be that the aggressor surrenders his right to life. Though stealing is wrong, we allow a man in grave danger to take the property of another, on the principle that the right to life of the man in danger overrides the other's right to private property. Though mutilation is wrong we justify surgical operation on the principle of totality. Though lying is wrong we justify mental reservation on some principle or other that is not too clear. And finally there is the principle of double effect which allows us to perform an action which has both a good and evil effect, provided the good is proportionate to the evil. By finding a particular principle in each case we escape the imputation that we are allowing the [good] end to justify the [evil] means. There is nothing more frightful than killing a man, yet we have found a principle to justify killing in self-defence. There are less heinous things, like birth-control, obtaining male semen for a medical test, sterilisation of a woman whose life may be threatened by a pregnancy. But in these cases we have found no particular principle to let us off the hook. So we have to stand rigidly by the [good] end not justifying the [evil] means. How is it that we may kill, but we may not do these other things?" (Denis Hurley, "A New Moral Principle: When Right and Duty Clash," Furrow 17 (1966) 619-22, at 619-620)
Baada ya kujiuliza swali hilo, Askofu Hurley aliamua kubuni kanuni mpya ya kimaadili, aliyoifafanua kama ifuatavyo:
"I have a duty to respect the life of another but I have a right to preserve my own Ufe. If someone attacks me, my right to life clashes with my duty to respect the life of my assailant. My right predominates. I have a duty to respect the property of another but I have a right to preserve my life. If my life is in danger, my right to life clashes with my duty to respect the other's property. My right predominates. I have a duty to preserve my bodily integrity but I have a right to preserve my life. If an infected organ threatens my life, there is a clash between duty and right, and the right predominates. I have a duty to tell the truth, but I have a right to keep a secret. The duty clashes with the right and the right predominates. I am faced with the prospect of performing an action which will have both a good effect and an evil effect. I have a right to the good effect, a duty to avoid the evil one. In the clash between right and duty the right predominates. There is a common element running through these cases--a clash between a duty and a right, in which the right predominates. Would we be justified in generalizing this into a principle? Could we say, for instance, that, whenever the exercise of a right involves the infringement of an obligation, the obligation ceases? Clearly this statement needs qualification, for not any right involves the cessation of any obligation. (Ibid. p. 620)
Baada ya tafakari ndefu, Hurley anaendeleza mawazo yake kwa kutaja masharti mawili ya kuiwekea mipaka kanuni yake. Sharti la kwanza ni kama ifuatavyo:
"In the first place there must be some proportion... between good effect and evil effect [which] has always been insisted upon in the application of the principle of double effect. Proportion is equally necessary in the proposed principle we are discussing here. A man, for instance, could not in conscience insist on his right to smoke in a place where he could cause an explosion resulting in death and severe damage to property. So there must be due proportion between the right and the obligation." (ibid. p. 620)
Na sharti la pili ni hili:
"Secondly, it appears that there must be a necessary connection between the exercise of the right and the infringement of the obligation, that is, it must be impossible to exercise the right without infringing the obligation. One may not claim, for instance, that, because one has the right to use a sidewalk, one may push somebody else off it. This necessary connection between the exercise of a right and the infringement of an obligation is essential if we are to respect the principle that the end does not justify the means." (ibid. p. 621)
Hatimaye Hurley anaweka bayana hitimisho lake hivi:
"This principle must remain--the [good] end does not justify the [evil] means. But perhaps we have an equally important principle to balance it and to mollify its rigidities, namely: when the infringement of an obligation is necessarily involved in the exercise of a proportionate right the obligation ceases. I call this the principle of the overriding right...the principle actually throws light on the [the traditional concept of of the intrinsically evil act]. A human act is [intrinsically evil] ... only when the obligation of avoiding it can never be overriden by any right..." (Ibid. p. 621-622)
Baada ya kubuni kanuni hii, Hurley alikumbana na ukosoaji mkubwa toka kwa wanazuoni wenzake. Katika kujibu ukosoaji huo alieleza jinsi kanuni yake inavyopaswa kutumika kwa njia ya mifano kama ifuatavyo:
"The principle of overriding right boils down to this. Situations arise in life when a right clashes with a duty. For instance, when I am attacked, my right to life clashes with my duty to respect the life of another; when I am in dire need, my right to life clashes with my duty to respect the property of another; when an infected organ threatens my life, my right to life clashes with my duty to preserve my bodily integrity; when I am bound by secrecy, my right to preserve the secret may clash with my duty to tell the truth. In all these cases we admit that the right predominates over the duty. This seems to indicate that we need to formulate the general principle underlying these various particular convictions. The formulation I proposed was: "When the infringement of an obligation is necessarily involved in the exercise of a proportionate right, the obligation ceases." I suggested that this principle might be useful in solving the moral problems of contraception, sterilization, and transplantation of organs from living people." (Denis Hurley, In Defense of the Principle Of Overriding Right, Theological Studies 29 (1968)301-309, at 301)
Kiupekee, Askofu Hurley alitoa mfano wa jinsi ya kutumia kanuni yake kwa kurejea maadili ya tendo la ngono ndani ya wanandoa wanaopenda kutumia kingamimba, kama ifuatavyo:
"A principle is a general statement which can serve as a major premise in reasoning. Normally a conclusion cannot be drawn from it without the help of a minor premise, which applies it to a particular area of debate. [For example,] I fully agree that the principle of overriding right cannot provide the conclusion that in certain circumstances [contraception] is lawful, without a minor premise that narrows the general principle down to this particular case.
Let us set it out this way: Major: When the infringement of a duty is necessarily involved in the exercise of a proportionate right, the obligation ceases. Minor: But the sterilization of a married woman for health reasons is the infringement of an obligation to preserve bodily integrity necessary for the exercise of her proportionate right to conjugal union. Therefore the obligation to preserve bodily integrity ceases.
The minor must be proved, and to this end it is necessary to demonstrate (1) that the woman cannot exercise her right to conjugal union without sterilization, and (2) that the right to conjugal union is more important than the duty to preserve the integrity of her generative organs." (ibid, p.304)
Pamoja na ufafanuzi wake mzuri, bado wanazuoni kadhaa walikosoa mtazamo wa Hurley kwa madai kwamba hakuna mizania huru inayoweza kutumika kutafutabuwiano kati ya haki moja na nyingine, haki moja na jukumu jingine, au kati ya jukumu moja na jukumu jingine.
Kwa mfano, kulingana na hayati profesa Grisez (1965), kanuni ya maslahi mapana ("principle of overriding right"), na kanuni baki zinzofanana nayo zinatokana na nadharia ya kimaadili inayokiuka kimakosa maslahi ya msingi ya binadamu ("basic human goods"). Kuhusu jambo hili anasema yafuatayo:
Always and everywhere, human persons have several basic, natural inclinations. People wish to live, to be healthy, and to avoid pain; to play and to enjoy esthetic experiences; to know theoretical truths; to achieve inner harmony and to be true to themselves; to get along with others and to be at peace with God (or what they take to be ultimate). Such inclinations determine the content of the principles of practical reason. For example, in thinking about what to do, people naturally assume that human life is to be preserved.
These principles of practical reason are not deduced by observing one's inclinations. It is logically impossible to derive "ought" from "is." Rather, by direct practical insight, one grasps the human possibilities to which the inclinations point as goods to be promoted and protected by actions. Thus the content of the principles of practical reason is basic. I call this content "basic human goods."
Basic human goods are not particular, well-defined goals. They are aspects of what human persons can be, both as individuals and in communities. One participates in these goods by actions which promote or protect them in particular instances. But no finite set of actions ever exhausts the possibilities of even one of these goods.
No one can deliberately choose to do anything except to promote or protect, directly or indirectly, one or more of the basic human goods (or some aspect of one of them). Morally right and wrong acts alike are for these goods. What, then, is the criterion of morality?
A consequentialist might say that some acts are likely to bring about more of the basic goods and to impede them less than others. He might say that the moral criterion is based on the amount of good an act will bring about. Thus, he might say that the act is right which of the available alternatives is likely to cause the greatest net good.
I say what the consequentialist might say, for there are many varieties of consequentialism. Some consequentialists say that the criterion based on the amount of good applies directly not to acts but to something else which then measures the morality of acts. Most consequentialists hold that an act is right even if it brings about more harm than good, provided there is no better alternative. Some consequential ists hold that good results are morally irrelevant; they say that morality requires only that one cause as little evil as possible.
I am not a consequentialist. I hold that moral right and wrong are determined by the way one chooses (which manifests one's attitude toward the basic human goods), not by the amount of good one expects to bring about. The right way to choose is realistic. But a realist does not ignore those goods which cannot be measured.
Rather, a realist regards the basic human goods as aspects of the flourishing of persons. None of them is the Good Itself (God). But each is an aspect, irreducible to the others, of human full-being. There is nothing beyond these goods by which to direct action. Yet the many basic goods are not one ultimate end.
Even one who chooses in the right way cannot in every act promote every basic good. Nor can he always avoid damaging some participations of the goods. But one who chooses in the right way can make a harmonious set of commitments to the basic goods. These commitments establish p a personal hierarchy of values, a self-constitution. Having established his self-constitution and recognized his limitations, one can promote the goods in accord with his self-constitution, yet respect possibilities to which he is not committed.
On my ethical theory, moral evil consists in making too much of some aspects and participations of a basic human good. If one loves some participations of a good too much, one implicitly sets oneself against wider possibilities. One implicitly confuses the good to which one is excessively committed with the Good Itself. One implicitly prepares to act against a basic good or goods in instances which could be long to the flourishing of other persons or even of oneself.
The primary moral criterion—a realistic way of choosing—generates some guidelines which hold for all areas of life. I call such guidelines "modes of responsibility."
I have already mentioned the first of them: (1) One should shape one's life by a harmonious set of commitments to the basic human goods. The following are other modes of responsibility. (2) One should not act on a preference without a justifying reason; all one's acts should agree with a universalizable norm. (3) One should be ready to cooperate with others, (4) One should not treat any participation of a good as if it were that good. (5) One should not arbitrarily limit one's commitment to a good; the goods always go beyond their actual participations. (6) One should strive for efficiency in the technical sphere. (7) To the extent that one's duties follow from fair social institutions, one ought to do one's duties if one can. (8) One should not choose an action which of itself does nothing but impede or damage a participation of one or more of the basic human goods.
Why would anyone violate the eighth mode of responsibility? One could choose an act which of itself promotes or protects no basic human good only as a means to another act in which some good will be participated. A consequentialist might say that one has a proportionate reason for choosing—that is, is morally justified in choosing—a means which damages a basic good if one's ulterior end is to bring about a greater good.
Since I think morality depends upon the way one chooses , not on the amount of good one expects, I hold that no act which damages or impedes a basic human good can be right unless (at least) some basic human good is promoted pr protected by that very act itself. One may not do evil that good might follow therefrom.
Although one cannot always act for every basic human good, one should never turn directly against any of them. By "turn directly against a good," I mean choose an act which of itself impedes or damages a participation of one or more of the basic human goods for the sake of protecting or promoting another participation of any of them in a distinct act or acts. (Germain Grisez, Against Consequentialism, The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Volume 23 (1978): 21-72).
Grisez (2001) alifafanua zaidi nadharia yake juu ya maslahi ya msingi ya kila binadamu kwa kusema haya pia:
"There is a hierarchy of values: Every basic human good is superior to any instrumental good and to anything considered good precisely as the object of emotional desire. Yet, considered precisely asthe ultimatereasons for acting, the whole set of basic goods does not constitute a hierarchy.24 Rather, as ultimate reasons for acting, they are incommensurable: neither equally good nor more or less good than one another. For, as reasons for which there are no further reasons, the basic human goods are irreducible; and as pertaining to diverse categories, they are good in diverse ways... The incommensurability of the basic goods of diverse categories does imply that one cannot organize one's entire life in view of some prospective realization of a substantive good, such as life or knowledge of truth. No commitment to such a purpose can be relevant to every other choice one might make. Moreover, no upright person supposes that any instantiation or set of instantiations of any substantive good deserves to be given the priority required to organize the whole of life. On the contrary, just as an upright person will freely give up his or her life rather than violate conscience, so such a person will forgo any other instance of a substantive good whenever promoting or protecting it would require n immoral action." (Germain Grisez, Natural Law, God, Religion, and Human Fulfillment, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE, Vol 46(2001):3-36, at 15-16)
Katikakuendeleza mtazamo huu, kina Boyle (1990) pia wanasisitiza kanuni ya kutokuwepo kwa uwezekano wa kutafuta uwiano kati ya haki mbili za binadamu, yaani, ("incomensurability thesis").
Kwa msingi huu, kina Boyle (1990) wanaikosoa kanuni ya "overriding right" kwa kusema kwamba ni kanuni yenye mkanganyiko wa ndani ("internal incoherence") unaomnyima mfanya mamuzi kigezo cha kutofautisha kati ya ubaya na wema. Mkanganyiko huo wanausema hivi:
"We argue that consequentialism is incoherent in that it cannot simultaneously meet the two conditions which it would have to satisfy if it were to work as a method of moral judgment between practical possibilities, the choice of either of which would be rationally motivated. The first of these conditions is that the consequentialist norm—like any other moral norm—provide direction for a person facing two alternatives for a free choice. The second condition—peculiar to consequentialist theories of moral judgment—is that the norm indicate which alternative to choose by identifying it as that promising greater good or less evil. As we regularly emphasize, "greater good" and "less evil" here refer to what is unqualifiedly (or definitely) a greater good and unqualifiedly (or definitely) a lesser evil, not to a good which is greater or an evil which is less only in some specific respect. (The unqualifiedly greater, bythe verylogic of commensuration, includes whatever it is greater than.)...Our argument is that a moral agent cannot possibly have a rational motive for making a choice if deliberation has identified the unqualifiedly greater good, because in that case no reason remains to choose any alternative. McKim and Simpson fail to refute our argument. Joseph Boyle, Germain Grisez & John Finnis, Incoherence and Consequentialism: A Rejoinder, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2):271-277 (1990), at p. 271 , 277)
Ni kwa sababu hizi, profesa Germain Grisez (1983) alisisitiza kwamba:
"One should not be moved by a stronger desire for one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some other instance of an intelligible good. This mode [of responsibility] is violated by one who deliberately brings about something humanly bad, in order to prevent something else bad or to attain something humanly good. In such a case, one is moved to act according to the comparative strength of one’s various desires. Thus one subordinates some possible elements of human fulfillment to others, even though there is no reasonable basis for doing so. In placing a nonrational limit on fulfillment, one proceeds in a way not consistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment." (Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles: The Modes of Responsibility Which Specify the First Principle; Chapter 8, Question H)
Kwa sababu kama hizi, Papa Paul VI pia aliikosoa kanuni ya maslahi mapana ("principle of overriding right") kupitia waraka uitwao Humanae Vitae (1968) kwa kutumia hoja kifuatayo:
“Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it—in other words, [it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons] to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, and which must therefore be judged unworthy of man, even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general (HV, 14)”
Hitimisho na mapendekezo yangu
Kama ambavyo mtoto wa nyoka ni nyoka, vivyo hivyo, chama chenye hulka ya ukandamizaji ndani yake huzaa serikali yenye hulka ya ukandamizaji kwa raia.
Kwa hiyo, ni muhimu kwa wapiga kura kukiepuka chama cha siasa kinachokumbatia kanuni ya umachiaveli na kuchagua chama kinachoheshimu katiba, kanuni nabtaratibu zake, zikiwemo taratibu za uchaguzi wa ndani.
Lakini, kanuni ya maslahi mapana ("principle of overriding right") inawaruhusu tabia ya wapiga kura kutanga tanga kutoka kambi ya haki na kwenda kwenye kambi ya dhuluma, na kisha kurudi kwa katika kambi ya haki inapoonekana kufanya hivyo kuna manufaa makubwa kuliko kutofanya hivyo, wakati hawana kizio huru cha kutafuta uwiano kati ya wema na ubaya.
Lakini, kimaadili tunafundishwa kwamba mbinu mbaya haziwezi kufanikisha malengo mema. Yaani, kukichagua chama, au mgombea au itikadi mbaya hakuwezi kulisaidia Taifa kupata serikali bora. Na katika mazingira tuliyo nayo, kuchagua kambi kwa kutumia kanuni ya uwiano wa wema na ubaya na kuchagua kambi kwa kutumia kanuni ya matokeo pacha yote ni matendo ya kuchagua uovu tu, hatimaye.
Kwa hiyo, kusudi kanuni kwamba "kuchagua mbinu mbaya hakuwezi kusaidia kuleta ufanisi wa lengo zuri" isimame salama tunapaswa kumkataa shetani bila kujali kama ni kijani au mwekundu. Badala yake tunapaswa kufanya juhudi za kutafuta na kuichagua kambi isiyo na madoa ya ushetani na umalaika, yaani, kukataa kambi yenye madoa ya wema na ubaya.
CCM, CHADEMA na vyama baki bado vina nafasi ya kujisahihisha ili wawe vyombo vya amani. Bila hivyo amani katika Tafa letu itakuwa ni ndoto ya mchana.
Namalizia makala hii kwa kutumia nukuu ifuatayo kutoka kwa mwanafalsafa wa Mashariki aitwaye Lao Tzu's:
"If there is to be peace in the world, there must be peace in the nations. If there is to be peace in the nations, there must be peace in the cities. If there is to be peace in the cities, there must be peace between [and within political parties and] neighbors. If there is to be peace [within political parties and] between neighbors, there must be peace in the home. If there is to be peace in the home, there must be peace in the heart."(Source: Ervin Laszlo, CosMos: A Co-creator's Guide to the Whole World (USA: Jude Currivan, 2008), p. 102)
Mjadala uendelee.
(c) Mama Amon,
Sumbawanga,
Tanzania.
Updated: 15 August 2020
