Mama Amon
JF-Expert Member
- Mar 30, 2018
- 2,021
- 2,479
We humans occupy the apex of the pyramid of all entities in the physical world, because of our rationality.
Subject to our natural cognitive limitations, we have the capacity to acquire knowledge from our environment, think logically, set goals, define means of realizing those ends, and implement the means which are only logically related to our goals.
Therefore, compliance with the laws of logic is a standard of human rationality. From this fact, it follows that, to intentionally make claims which violate the laws of logic, is to voluntarily embrace irrationality.
For example, contradictory claims, also known as paradoxes, are statements which appear to be simultaneously true and false at the same time and in the same sense. But, one law of logic states that, no statement can be true and false at the same time and in the same sense.
So, to intentionally embrace contradictions is to make a choice which is contrary to human nature, according to which, we have a duty to pursue the good of logical coherence and avoid the evil of logical incoherence.
Against this background I propose to answer the following questions: what is a logical contradiction and which claims count as one? As a result of logical contradictions, what is the magnitude of epistemological crisis inherent in our worldviews? What should be done to get rid of this epistemological crisis?
I will answer these questions by selectively and critically using the works of three authorities. They are Alvin Plantinga (1974) and his book, "God, Freedom and Evil"; and James Anderson (2007) and his book, "Paradox in Christian Theology"; and Tuomas Tahko (2009) and his article, "The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle."
The meaning of epistemological crisis
In 2020, the former President of the United States, Baraka Obama, was interviewed by Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of "The Atlantic" newspaper.
During the interview, Baraka warned Americans about an "epistemological crisis," that was facing them.
Assuming a free "marketplace of ideas," this is a challenge that arises when people “do not have the capacity to distinguish what’s true from what’s false,” said Obama.
The existence of such a crisis is evidenced by the prevalence of compound sentences that contain true and false claims, variously called "paradoxes," "mysteries," or "contradictions."
For example, "Tanzania is a socialist state and Tanzania is not a socialist state" is a contradiction. Similarly, "Zanzibar is a free state; and Zanzibar is not a free state" is another contradiction.
Because of such epistemological crisis you get one nation, whose people no longer agree on basic questions of absolute facts due to regular disinformation and misinformation. To every key question there are two simultaneous answers: true and false. Objective truth is irrelevant because every segment of the community has its own version of sectarian reality.
It is a nation ruled by relativism, where persons perceive facts differently depending on one's social, political and economic sector. In such a situation, the nation gets polarized, persons asking the same questions and arriving at opposing answers and still embracing both proudly.
But, according to the logical principle of non-contradiction as discussed by Tahko (2009), the same statement cannot be true and false at the same time and in the same sense.
A sentence containing this kind of "confusion" entails “incoherence," either at a logical level or at a metaphysical level or at both levels.
Tahko (2009:32-33) states that, the Law of Non-Contradiction is a metaphysical principle concerning the fundamental structure of reality in the world. It states a restriction that concerns things rather than just propositions.
As such the metaphysical interpretation of the Law of Non-Contradiction amounts to this: the entities of the mind-independent reality are governed by some sort of principles, one of which states that, "the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect."
For instance, a particle cannot both have and not have a charge at the same time, or an object cannot be both green and red all over at the same time. It seems that reality just is such that it conforms to the law of noncontradiction.
According to Obama, "epistemological crisis" is a poison in the free “marketplace of ideas," and therefore a poison to the vitality of political, economic and social systems. This is the case since, an ambivalent answer, in terms of yes and no, cannot form a firm basis of decision making in one’s mind.
Explicit contradictions
According to Plantinga (1974), based on how contradictions are generated in a given set of claims, we can identify three types of contradictions, namely: explicit contradiction, formal contradictions and implicit contradictions.
A set of assertions is explicitly contradictory if and only if at least one member of the set is the direct negation of at least one member of the same set.
The first example is this set of statements: "Africa has 54 countries including Tanzania"; 'therefore, Tanzania is in Africa'; and 'Tanzania is not in Africa'." The second and third statements are contradictory.
The second example is this set of statements: "'A square has four corners; a triangle has three corners'; 'therefore, a triangle is a square'; and a triangle is not a square'". The second and third statements contradict each other.
The third example is this set of statements: "'All Tanzanians speak Kiswahili', 'Juma is a Tanzanian', therefore, 'Juma speaks Kiswahili', 'Juma doesn't speak Kiswahili.'" The third and fourth statements contradict each other.
The fourth example is, "the sun revolves around the earth and the sun does not revolves around the earth."
The fifth example is a set of these sentences: "I love you and I don't love you."
The sixth example is a set of these sentences: "at one time grape wine is a harvest from a grape tree; and at another time wine is the blood of Jesus". But plant cells cannot naturally change into animal cells.
The seventh example is a set of these sentences: "at one time the eucharistic bread is a harvest from a plant called wheat; and at another time the eucharistic bread is a body of Jesus." But plant cells cannot naturally change into animal cells.
The eight example is a set of these sentences: (1) All substantial changes are either generative or annihilative; (2) During mass, the consecration prayer leads to neither generative nor annihilative change in the bread and wine; (3) Thus, there is no visible and real change that occurs via consecration prayer; (4) there is an invisible and real change that occurs via consecration prayer.” The third and fourth claims are contradictory.
The ninth example is a set of these sentences: “The Son assumed a human nature; the Son is God; thus, God assumed a human nature; the Father did not assume a human nature; the Father is God; thus, God did not assume a human nature.” The third and sixth claims are contradictory.
And the tenth example is a set of these sentences: "(1) The paradox of eucharist transubstantiation asserts that, after the consecration prayer, which is administered by the Priest, the body of Jesus Christ, who is in heaven, is truly, really, wholly and substantially present in every consecrated host wherever it may be located on earth; (2) according to physics principles of impenetrability of bodies, no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time; and (3) according to physics principles of the irreplicability of bodies, for any ordinary objects X and Y, if X and Y occupy distinct places at t, then X is distinct from Y."
But, the first statement in this set, explicitly contradicts the second and the third statements.
Formal contradictions
A set of assertions is formally contradictory if and only if at least one member of the set is an indirect negation of at least one member of the same set, where an explicit contradiction can be derived from its members by using the rules of ordinary logical inference only.
The first example is this set of statements: "'All Tanzanians speak Kiswahili', 'Juma is a Tanzanian', 'Juma does not speak Kiswahili.'"
While the third statement says that, "Juma does not speak Kiswahili," the first two statements produce a contradictory conclusion that, "Juma speaks Kiswahili."
The second example is this set of statements: "'A triangle has three corners'; 'a square has four corners'; and 'A triangle is a square.'"
While the third statement says that, "a triangle is a square," the first two statements, produce a contradictory conclusion that, "a triangle is not a square."
The third example is this set of statements: "God is three persons; The Father is one person; and the Father is God.” While the third statement says "The Father is God" the first two statements produce the conclusion that "The Father is not God."
The fourth example is this set of statements: "God is three persons; The Son is One person; and the Son is God.” While the third statement says "The Son is God" the first two statements produce the conclusion that "The Son is not God."
The fifth example is this set of statements: "God is three persons; The Holy Spirit is One person; and the Holy Spirit is God.” While the third statement says "The Holy Spirit is God" the first two statements produce the conclusion that "The Holy Spirit is not God."
The sixth example is this set of statements: "The Father is God; The Son is God; The Holy Spirit is God; and There is one God.” While the third statement says "There is one God" the first three statements produce the conclusion that "There are Three Gods."
The seventh example is this set of statements: "'Boys have chromosomes with an XY format and girls have chromosomes with an XX format'; 'therefore, boys have XY format and male genitalia and girls have XX format and female genitalia'; and 'There is a person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia.'"
While the third statement says that, "There is a person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia," the first two statements, produce the contradictory conclusion that, "No person has XY chromosomes and female genitalia."
The eighth example is this set of statements: "'God is spirit'; and 'God wrote the Torah with his finger.'" From the statement that "God is spirit" it logically follows that, "God has no body."
But, from the statement that "God wrote the Torah with his finger," it logically follows that, "God has a body." The two conclusions that "God has a body" and that "God does not have a body" are contradictory statements.
The ninth example is this set of statements: "God is the creator and ruler of all things, Jesus is God, the Virgin Mary was created and was ruled by God, a pregnant woman rules over her pregnancy, the Virgin Mary was the ruler of God."
While the first three claims produce the conclusion that "God was the ruler of the Virgin Mary," the fifth claim says that "the pregnant Virgin Mary was the ruler of God." This is a contradiction.
Example 10 is this set of statements: "By his nature, God is a spirit without a body, Jesus is God, and Jesus has a body."
While the first two statements produce the conclusion that "Jesus does not have a body," the third statement says that "Jesus has a body." This is a contradiction.
Example 11 is this set of statements: "A self is a center of decisions, God is a self and man is a self, Jesus is God-man by nature, Jesus has one self."
While the first two statements produce the conclusion that "Jesus has two selves," the third statement says that "Jesus has one self." This is a logical fallacy.
Example 12 is this set of sentences: "Juma is married to Jane; and Jane is not married to Juma." But, the first statement implies the conclusion that, "Jane is married to Juma" as well, a conclusion that contradicts the second statement.
Example 13 is the following set of statements: “The Son assumed a human nature; the Son is God; the Father did not assume a human nature; the Father is God.”
The contradiction comes in this way: From the first and second statements, we have the conclusion that “God assumed a human nature”; and from the third and fourth claims, we have the conclusion that, “God did not assume a human nature”. These two conclusions are contradictory.
Implicit contradiction
A set of assertions is implicitly contradictory if and only if at least one member of the set is an indirect negation of at least one member of the same set, where an explicit contradiction or implicit contradiction can be derived from its members by using the rules of ordinary logical inference after adding some necessarily true propositions to it.
The first example is the following set of statements: “The Son assumed a human nature; the Son is God; thus, God assumed a human nature.” This set has neither explicit nor formal contradictions. But, if the set is expanded by adding the following three statements, a contradiction emerges: “the Father did not assume a human nature; the Father is God; thus, God did not assume a human nature.” Now, the third and sixth claims are contradictory.
The second example is the following set of statements: "an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God exists; and physical evil exists.” There is neither explicit nor formal contradiction in these two statements.
But, the contradiction will become clear after adding the following statements which are necessarily true.
"God’s omnipotence allows his to eliminate physical evil; God’s omni-benevolence allows him to desire eliminating physical evil; and God’s omniscience allows him to know how to eliminate physical evil; Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God does not exist.” Now, the sixth claim contradicts the first claim.
Most accurate contradiction resulting from ontologically limited explanation (macrole)
And according to Anderson (2007), if we consider the possibility of eliminating contradiction by revealing a hidden equivocation, then, we get two main types of contradiction: real contradictions and merely apparent contradictions resulting from unarticulated equivocation (macrue). Given that, on my reading of Anderson, a "macrue" has two sub-types, we then get three types of contradictions.
They are merely apparent contradiction resulting from epistemologically limited explanation (macrele), merely apparent contradiction resulting from ambiguous and semantically limited explanation (macrasle), and most accurate contradiction resulting from ontologically limited explanation (macrole).
The most accurate contradiction resulting from ontologically limited explanation (macrole) is a real contradiction that cannot be cured by removing the lexical ambiguity, even after efforts to use all the information that can be gathered with the help of the human mind as it stands today.
It is against the essence of things, it contradicts the being of things, it violates the essence of things, in the world as we know it today.
The first example is this set of statements: “‘There is a circle having a square shape’; and 'no circle is square.'" Ontologically speaking, there is no possible world in which a circle is square.
The second example is this set of statements: "'Man is a plant'; and 'Man is an animal.'" There is no possible world in which man is both a plant and an animal.
And the second example is this set of statements: "the sun revolves around the earth and the sun does not revolve around the earth."
Merely apparent contradiction resulting from ambiguous and semantically limited explanation (macrasle)
A merely apparent contradiction resulting from ambiguous and semantically limited explanation (macrasle) is an apparent contradiction that can be cured by removing the semantic ambiguity, after using the important information gathered with the help of today's human mind.
The first example is this set of statements: "'I am concerned about my wife's health' and 'I am not concerned about my wife's health.'"
This is a contradiction that can be cured if the following information is revealed by the speaker: "'I concerned about my wife's health because I care about her well-being' and 'I am not concerned about my wife's health when she is in the hands of an expert doctor.'" The confusion is erased.
A second example is this set of statements: "'Boys have chromosomes with an XY format and girls have chromosomes with an XX format'; 'therefore, boys have XY format and male genitalia and girls have XX format and female genitalia'; and 'There is a person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia.'"
While the third statement says that, "There is a person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia," the first two statements, produce the contradictory conclusion that, "No person has XY chromosomes and female genitalia."
This is a contradiction that can be cured if the following information is disclosed by the speaker:
Scientifically, "There is a person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia, if they are hermaphrodites" and, "There is no person with XY chromosomes and female genitalia, if they are not hermaphrodites." The confusion is cleared.
A third example is this set of statements: "'One plus one is two' and 'one plus one is ten.'"
But two numeral cannot produce different totals at the same time and under the same numbering system. However, this is a misunderstanding that can be cured if the following information is disclosed by the speaker:
I meant that: "when counting under base ten, one plus one is two'; and ' when counting under under base two, one plus one is ten.'" The confusion is cleared.
Merely apparent contradiction resulting from epistemologically limited explanation (macrele)
A merely apparent contradiction resulting from epistemologically limited explanation (macrele) is an apparent contradiction that cannot be cured by removing the semantic ambiguity, even after using all the information that has been collected and will be collected with the help of the today’s human mind, but there is a possible world in which that evidence is available.
That is, this confusion arises from the hiddenness of additional information that can eliminate the contradiction, if the information is accessed by the human mind.
But, for now, that information cannot be harvested by using the human mind, by using the sensory organs, because the accessibility of this information is beyond the human cognitive closure.
Regarding this type, some of the examples mentioned in the written literature are related to: the nature of God, the incarnation of Jesus, the relation between the soul and the body, and the freedom of the human mind.
The contradiction related to the nature of God reads like this: "God is a spirit; the human mind cannot know whether God exists or not since he cannoy use sensory organs to perceive his presence or absence; and there are humans who know that God exists." The last two statements are contradictory.
The puzzle here is that: how did the knowers recognize God? And even if it is via testimony, how did the witness know that? If it is by reading the writings of a historian, how did the writer know it?
The contradiction related to the incarnation of Jesus reads like this: "Jesus is a divine spirit"; a spirit does not possess a body; and Jesus has a human body.” The paradox here is that: how is it possible for Jesus to have a human body and a divine spirit?
The contradiction related to the relation between the human mind and body reads like this:
"Thoughts do not occupy any space; the body occupies a space with a specific volume; therefore, thoughts cannot interact with the body. But, thoughts guide human bodily actions.”
The paradox here is that: how does it possible for human thoughts to interact with the human body given that the human body is impenetrable?
The paradox contradiction related to the human mind reads like this:
First, the system of the world is a network containing knots of cause and effect, each knot representing an actor or one of the events.
Second, man is part of this network of cause and effect, participating through his decisions and actions he appears to make voluntarily.
Third, and therefore, human freedom of decision is constrained because he is part of a wider network of cause and effect.
But, it seems that, human free will and the deterministic network of causes and effects that surround him listen to each other, to the extent that this system leaves him a level of freedom he uses in his thoughts, decisions and actions.
The paradox here is that: how does it happen that human beings get that freedom? And if they have it, how much is it, given that their minds have a natural epistemological limitation, also known as “cognitive closure”?
And the paradox contradiction related to the divine equality between God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit reads like this:
"'God knows everything; 'Jesus is God and the Holy Spirit is God '; 'Thus, Jesus and the Holy Spirit know everything'; 'Jesus and the Holy Spirit do not know everything according to scriptures'."
The paradox here is that: how is it possible that "Jesus knows everything and Jesus does not know everything"? Similarly, how is it possible that "The Holy Spirit knows everything and the Holy Spirit does not know everything"?
Some responses from theologians
Apologetic theologians and philosophers like Anderson and Plantinga say that all logical contradictions seen in scriptures are not real contradictions, but merely apparent contradictions resulting from the epistemologically limited explanations (macrele) due to human cognitive closure, which can be transcended in some other possible world.
For example, Anderson seems to construct an argument with the following logical structure:
One, all known logical contradictions can be exhaustively classified as either: most accurate contradictions resulting from ontologically limited explanations ("macrole"), or merely apparent contradictions resulting from ambiguous and semantically limited explanations ("macrasle"), or merely apparent contradictions resulting from epistemologically limited explanations ("macrele").
Two, the logical contradictions contained in Scriptures are neither "macrole" nor "macrasle."
And three, and therefore, the logical contradictions contained in scriptures are "macrele," which are rationally affirmed mysteries of faith to be preserved dogmatically.
In Anderson's opinion, tradition teaches rightly that the apparent contradictions in scriptures are due to human cognitive limits that can only be cured if we enter into another possible world, where we have not entered and cannot enter now. They are mysteries of faith to be preserved, he argues (mysterianism).
But, the second premise is false. In scriptures there are statements that can be interpreted using the today's human mind in order to remove some logical contradictions falling under the categories of "macrole" and "macrasle" too, not merely "macrele."
For example, when Jesus was approaching a fig tree he proved that he does not know everything. Also Jesus once said that he, and everyone else, which includes the Holy Spirit, do not know everything, except God the Father alone, who knows everything.
Therefore, the following confusion can be cured, using the evidence from scriptures which are superior to tradition, and the human mind is capable of interpreting that evidence:
That is, "Jesus and the Holy Spirit know everything" and "Jesus and the Holy Spirit do not know everything."
Thus, this fact casts serious doubt on the answers from our theologians regarding the correct method of handling the different types logical contradictions inherent in scriptures.
Summary, conclusion and recommendations
In summary I propose to say the following: Given a set of two statements, P and Q, where Q is the negation of P, that is, Q is not-P, then: The statement that “P and Q” is a contradiction, since no statement can be true at the same time and in the same respect.
In science, philosophy and religion, there are many contradictory statements of this sort. Some are "macroles," others "macrasles," and the rest "macreles," according to the sense in which these three terms have been defined above.
On my view, our apologetic theologians have not yet shown us, the principled criterion by which they distinguish between these three logical contradictions which are simultaneously present in scriptures.
For example, there is no principles justification of the following classification of contradictions, which are both inherent in scriptures:
“The sun revolves around the earth, and the sun does not revolve around the earth (macrole)”, and “Jesus is omniscient and Jesus is not omniscient (macrele).”
Therefore, I hereby call into question the theory of “mysterianism” as proposed by Anderson in relation to “macreles.”
Accordingly, I wish to call upon, neo-scholastics to team up in assisting to clean up our "social doctrines" by eliminating all forms of logical contradictions that can be reasonably cured today.
Specifically, I have three key recommendations. The first is about the socialism-capitalism paradox in Tanzania.
Going by the current union structure, that clearly distinguishes between union and non-union matters,, the claim that "Zanzibar is a free state with respect to non-union matters; and Zanzibar is not a free state with respect to union matters" is no longer a contradiction.
The same approach should be applied to the following socialism-capitalism paradox: "Tanzania is a socialist state and Tanzania is not a socialist state." The question that needs answer is, with respect to which policies is Tanzania socialist and with respect to which policies is Tanzania capitalist? Only when this question is answered the socialism-capitalism paradox will be solved.
The second is about the mystery of the Trinity. If we reasonably agree that, according to scriptures, God “is identical to” Yahweh of the Old Testament; and that, Jesus and the Holy Spirit are similar to God for everything except for their limited omniscience; then, the following 12 theses will eliminate all known Trinitarian contradictions:
(1) God “is identical to” Yaweh; (2) God “is cardinally” one person; (3) The Father “is cardinally” one person; (4) The Son “is cardinally” one person; (5) The Holy Spirit “is cardinally” one person; (6) The Father “is identical to” God; (7) The Son “is similar to” God (8) The Holy Spirit “is similar to” God; (9) The father “is not identical to” the Son; (10) The Son “is not identical to” the Holy Spirit; (11) The Holy Spirit “is not identical to” the Father; (12) God “is cardinally” one substance.
The third recommendation is about the paradox of transubstantiation. This paradox is about, the change of the whole substance of bread into the substance of the Body of Christ and of the whole substance of wine into the substance of the Blood of Christ.
This change is brought about in the eucharistic prayer through the efficacy of the word of Christ and by the action of the Holy Spirit. However, the outward characteristics of bread and wine, that is the eucharistic species, remain unaltered.
This doctrine is not different from spurious and superstitious teachings offered by Pastor Mwamposa in Tanzania.
I suggest that, the feasible solution to this paradox is the following: Instead of interpreting “the verb to be,” namely “is,” to mean “is identical to,” that is, “being as identity”; we should interpret it to mean “being as signification,” that is, interpreting “is,” to mean “is a sign of.”
Accordingly, the words, “this bread is my body” becomes “this bread is a sign of my body”; and the words “this wine is my blood” becomes “this wine is a sign of my blood.”
In effect, the paradox of transubstantiation is reasonably solved, without sacrificing original intentions of the original event as celebrated by Jesus, who said, “do this in memory of me.”
Generally, I suggest that the social institution called "religion" is a tool for promoting and protecting humanity dignity, and its associated duty to pursue truth and avoid error.
But, if religion arbitrarily accepts the doctrine of mysterianism, then, it has surrendered rationality which is the foundation of human dignity, and thus, it has decided to embrace the "ideology of Machiavellianism" to that extent.
This is an ideology according to which, "good ends may justify any means, including evil ones."
Thus, genuine religions should oppose "Machiavelism," because no "good can come from an evil," as St. Paul taught.
Accordingly, a religion that embraces the "ideology of Machiavellianism" loses its moral legitimacy. As such, the season of religious self-sanctification against epistemological crisis is now. Otherwise, the alleged distinction between religion and Tanzania-based Mwamposian superstition will vanish.
References
- Alvin Plantinga (1974), God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans).
- James Anderson (2007), Paradox in Christian Theology: An Analysis of its Presence, Character, and Epistemic Status (Milton, Keynes, U.K.; Waynesboro, Ga.: Paternoster).
- Tuomas E. Tahko (2009), "The Law of Non-Contradiction as a Metaphysical Principle," The Australasian Journal of Logic, 7:32-47.
Swahili version available here: Mtakatifu Paul, ulaghai wa utata wa kimisamiati na umachiavelli
