Wapelelzi (majasusi) wa kimarekani wakamatwa iran na lebanon huenda wakauliwa huko

Herbalist Dr MziziMkavu

JF-Expert Member
Feb 3, 2009
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Exclusive: CIA Spies Caught, Fear Execution in Middle East

In a significant failure for the United States in the Mideast, more than a dozen spies working for the CIA in Iran and Lebanon have been caught and the U.S. government fears they will be or have been executed, according to four current and former U.S. officials with connections to the intelligence community. The spies were paid informants recruited by the CIA for two distinct espionage rings targeting Iran and the Beirut-based Hezbollah organization, considered by the U.S. to be a terror group backed by Iran.

"Espionage is a risky business," a U.S. official briefed on the developments told ABC News, confirming the loss of the unspecified number of spies over the last six months.

"Many risks lead to wins, but some result in occasional setbacks," the official said.
Robert Baer, a former senior CIA officer who worked against Hezbollah while stationed in Beirut in the 1980's, said Hezbollah typically executes individuals suspected of or caught spying.

"If they were genuine spies, spying against Hezbollah, I don't think we'll ever see them again," he said. "These guys are very, very vicious and unforgiving."

Other current and former officials said the discovery of the two U.S. spy rings occurred separately, but amounted to a setback of significant proportions in efforts to track the activities of the Iranian nuclear program and the intentions of Hezbollah against Israel.

"Remember, this group was responsible for killing more Americans than any other terrorist group before 9/11," said a U.S. official. Attacks on the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 killed more than 300 people, including almost 260 Americans.
The U.S. official, speaking for the record but without attribution, gave grudging credit to the efforts of Iran and Hezbollah to detect and expose U.S. and Israeli espionage.

"Collecting sensitive information on adversaries who are aggressively trying to uncover spies in their midst will always be fraught with risk," said the U.S. official briefed on the spy ring bust.
But others inside the American intelligence community say sloppy "tradecraft" -- the method of covert operations -- by the CIA is also to blame for the disruption of the vital spy networks.

In Beirut, two Hezbollah double agents pretended to go to work for the CIA. Hezbollah then learned of the restaurant where multiple CIA officers were meeting with several agents, according to the four current and former officials briefed on the case. The CIA used the codeword "PIZZA" when discussing where to meet with the agents, according to U.S. officials. Two former officials describe the location as a Beirut Pizza Hut. A current US official denied that CIA officers met their agents at Pizza Hut.

From there, Hezbollah's internal security arm identified at least a dozen informants, and the identities of several CIA case officers.
Hezbollah then began to "roll up" much of the CIA's network against the terror group, the officials said.

One former senior intelligence official told ABC News that CIA officers ignored warnings that the operation could be compromised by using the same location for meetings with multiple assets.
"We were lazy and the CIA is now flying blind against Hezbollah," the former official said.

CIA Spies Caught in Iran

At about the same time that Hezbollah was identifying the CIA network in Lebanon, Iranian intelligence agents discovered a secret internet communication method used by CIA-paid assets in Iran.

The CIA has yet to determine precisely how many of its assets were compromised in Iran, but the number could be in the dozens, according to one current and one former U.S. intelligence official.
The exposure of the two spy networks was first announced in widely ignored televised statements by Iranian and Hezbollah

leaders. U.S. officials tell ABC News that much of what was broadcast was, in fact, true.
Hezbollah's leader, Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, announced in June of this year that two high-ranking members of Hezbollah had been exposed as CIA spies, leading U.S. officials to conclude that the entire network inside Hezbollah had been compromised.

In Iran, intelligence minister Heidar Moslehi announced in May that more than 30 U.S. and Israeli spies had been discovered and an Iranian television program, which acts as a front for Iran's government, showed images of internet sites used by the U.S. for secret communication with the spies.

U.S. officials said the Iranian television program showed pictures of people who were not U.S. assets, but the program's video of the websites used by the CIA was accurate.
Some former U.S. intelligence officials say the developments are the result of a lack of professionalism in the U.S. intelligence community.

"We've lost the tradition of espionage," said one former official who still consults for the U.S. intelligence community. "Officers take short cuts and no one is held accountable," he said.
But at the CIA, officials say such risks come with the territory.
"Hezbollah is an extremely complicated enemy," said a U.S. official. "It's a determined terrorist group, a powerful political player, a mighty military and an accomplished intelligence operation, formidable and ruthless. No one underestimates its capabilities."

"If you lose an asset, one source, that's normally a setback in espionage," said Robert Baer, who was considered an expert on Hezbollah.
"But when you lose your entire station, either in Tehran or Beirut, that's a catastrophe, that just shouldn't be. And the only way that ever happens is when you're mishandling sources."

Source: Exclusive: CIA Spies Caught, Fear Execution in Middle East - Yahoo!
 
Hizbollah kui penetrate ni ngumu sana,halafu wale wana jeshi kubwa sana na silaha nyingi mno wamezichimbia.

Hizbolah ni dangerous kuliko hata Iran kwa Israel
 
Hizbollah kui penetrate ni ngumu sana,halafu wale wana jeshi kubwa sana na silaha nyingi mno wamezichimbia.

Hizbolah ni dangerous kuliko hata Iran kwa Israe
Ni kweli lakini Hizbolah ni Magorila wakati IRAN ni Serikali kwa hiyo ni vitu viwili Tofauti. ingawa hao Hizbollah wanasaidia na Serikali ya IRAN, pia unaweza kusema kuwa Hizbollah ni IRAN na IRAN pia ndio hao hao Hizbullah.
 
Ni kweli lakini Hizbolah ni Magorila wakati IRAN ni Serikali kwa hiyo ni vitu viwili Tofauti. ingawa hao Hizbollah wanasaidia na Serikali ya IRAN, pia unaweza kusema kuwa Hizbollah ni IRAN na IRAN pia ndio hao hao Hizbullah.
Hizbolah hawana haja ya kupigana kama serikali na hapo ndipo even more problems arises...Ni guerillas kama ulivyosema lakini well equiped more than Govt itself.

Hapo Lebanon walikubali tu yaishe na kufanya nao kazi,lakini shida ni kwamba wame penetrate all over the govt institutions hadi jeshi and even within the spying apparutus.

Na hapo bado wana jeshi lao na pia wana stock piles nyingi mno za silaha.

Huwa wanazirundika na kazi yao kubwa ni kuchimba mahandaki, kure cruit more fighters na kuwatrain,sometimes back and forth from Iran and Syria...

So kadri wanavyopewa muda,the only way kuwashinda mwishowe it will be nothing other than Neuclear.

Kwenye ile vita ya mwaka 2006 around july, waliwapelekesha sana Israel na waliwarudisha nyuma licha ya kwamba mission yao ilikuwa ni kwenda kuwa flush out.

Kila wakienda hawaoni watu lakini ni habari tu za wanajeshi wa Israel kuuwawa na tanks zao kuwa disabled,wakiona tundu la handaki wanapiga bomu lakini kumbe ni network kubwa sana iliyoko underground and well organised na ni kama wamewazunguka! Pia walikuwa waki dissapear na majeruhi wao kupitia hizo underground network, na hawakuwa hata na ma tanks kama hao IDF.

Wakarudisha majeshi.

Sasa hiyo itakuwa iliwapa kichwa sana na kwa sasa watakuwa wamejizatiti even more!
 
Unakumbuka Mwaka 2002 au mwaka 2000 Wa Israil walipotolewa South Lebanon? Wa Hezbollah wana nguvu na hawaogopi kufa n afikira zao kuwa hata kama wakifa wanakwenda peponi wanavyofikiria wao huwa wakipigana na Israil wanapigania Jihadi kwa hiyo Mmarekani asijaribu kwenda kule Lebanon yatampata makubwa kuliko hivi sasa yanayompata Marekani huko Afghanistan.
 
Unakumbuka Mwaka 2002 au mwaka 2000 Wa Israil walipotolewa South Lebanon? Wa Hezbollah wana nguvu na hawaogopi kufa n afikira zao kuwa hata kama wakifa wanakwenda peponi wanavyofikiria wao huwa wakipigana na Israil wanapigania Jihadi kwa hiyo Mmarekani asijaribu kwenda kule Lebanon yatampata makubwa kuliko hivi sasa yanayompata Marekani huko Afghanistan.
Sikumbuki hivyo vya 2002,ila nakumbuka kabisa vile vya 2007 sometimes july.

Na ilianza na ambush ya Hizbolah maeneo ya mpakani na Israel ambapo kulikuwa na patrol,waliwauwa wanajeshi kadhaa wa Israel na kuwateka wawili kama sikosei.

Israel wakatangaza full war,katika harakati za kutaka kuwa rescue hao wawili,tano wengine wakauwawa.

Israel ikajiingiza kwenye vita na kushambulia Lebanon yote,na hapo kukawa na lawama kuwa Hizbolah si serikali ya Lebanon na kwahiyo ku attack infrastructures ni shambulizi kwa taifa...Hivyo unaweza kuona how they pose more threat just simply kwasababu wao si serikali!

Israel walizidiwa hadi wakatumia cluster bombs ambazo ni illegal!

Mwishowe kulikuwa na seaze fire,na kulikuwepo na resolution ya kui disarm Hezbolah kwa kutumia serikali ya Lebanon pamoja na UNIF ambao ni United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon ambao wote wamegwaya kuwa dissarm Hezbolah...Warusi nao waligoma kuwaweka Hezbolah kwenye list ya terrorist organizations.

Ni mwaka 2008 ndipo mabaki ya wale wanajeshi wa Israel yalirudishwa na Hizbolah kama mojawapo ya makubaliano ya kubadilishana wafungwa.
 
Sikumbuki hivyo vya 2002,ila nakumbuka kabisa vile vya 2007 sometimes july.

Na ilianza na ambush ya Hizbolah maeneo ya mpakani na Israel ambapo kulikuwa na patrol,waliwauwa wanajeshi kadhaa wa Israel na kuwateka wawili kama sikosei.

Israel wakatangaza full war,katika harakati za kutaka kuwa rescue hao wawili,tano wengine wakauwawa.

Israel ikajiingiza kwenye vita na kushambulia Lebanon yote,na hapo kukawa na lawama kuwa Hizbolah si serikali ya Lebanon na kwahiyo ku attack infrastructures ni shambulizi kwa taifa...Hivyo unaweza kuona how they pose more threat just simply kwasababu wao si serikali!

Israel walizidiwa hadi wakatumia cluster bombs ambazo ni illegal!

Mwishowe kulikuwa na seaze fire,na kulikuwepo na resolution ya kui disarm Hezbolah kwa kutumia serikali ya Lebanon pamoja na UNIF ambao ni United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon ambao wote wamegwaya kuwa dissarm Hezbolah...Warusi nao waligoma kuwaweka Hezbolah kwenye list ya terrorist organizations.

Ni mwaka 2008 ndipo mabaki ya wale wanajeshi wa Israel yalirudishwa na Hizbolah kama mojawapo ya makubaliano ya kubadilishana wafungwa.
Huu ndio Ushahidi wangu hebu soma hapa chini

Why did Israel withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000?


General Reference (not clearly pro or con)
Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern and United States History at the University of New South Wales and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of Modern Middle East, Medieval Europe and Judaic Studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, wrote in their 2002 fourth edition of A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, that:
"[Israeli Prime Minister] Barak's election promise [in 1999] to leave [the security zone in southern] Lebanon within a year had been one of the main reasons for his victory, and although Israel would have preferred to pull out of Lebanon after reaching a peace deal with Syria [who had been in control over all of northern and central Lebanon, including all of Beirut and as far south as Sidon since 1990], there was growing consensus on both sides of the political divide for a unilateral withdrawal. Even Ariel Sharon, one of the architects of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 said that the withdrawal should start immediately.

On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet pledged a withdrawal from Lebanon by July. The Israeli decision surprised and alarmed the Arab states, depriving Syria of its main pressure point against Israel...

Before dawn on Wednesday, May 24 [2000], six weeks before they planned to shut down the buffer zone, Israeli troops abandoned Beaufort Castle and their few remaining outposts in Lebanon, bringing home their last troops without suffering any casualties."


2002 - Ian J. Bickerton, PhD
Carla L. Klausner, PhD

lebanonsouth20002.jpg


Map created using information from the United Nations




Benny Morris, PhD, Professor of History at Ben-Gurion University, in his 2001 book Righteous Victims, wrote:
"In spring 1999, during his campaign for the premiership, Barak had promised that Israel would withdraw its troops from the Security Zone back to the international frontier 'within a year.' After taking office, he began to speak of 'July 2000' as the deadline. He hoped that the withdrawal would be a part of a general peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon, which would include a Syrian guarantee of the security of northern Israel and, perhaps, a deployment of Syrian troops in South Lebanon. But the deadlock in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks had gradually persuaded Barak that the withdrawal from the Zone would most probably be unilateral and without agreement either with Syria or Lebanon. The IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] General Staff opposed a withdrawal without an agreement; but on March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously endorsed a withdrawal by July, 'with or without an agreement,' back to the international frontier...

On the night of May 23-24, in a well-orchestrated operation, backed by columns of heavy Merkava tanks and helicopter gunships, the last Israeli troops pulled out under sporadic Hizbullah fire."


2001 - Benny Morris, PhD

The UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) website contained the following account of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon (accessed Dec. 18, 2003):
"Israeli Withdrawal
On 17 April 2000, the Secretary-General received formal notification from the Government of Israel that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 'in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)'. He [Kofi Annan] was further informed that in so doing the Government of Israel intended 'to cooperate fully with the United Nations'. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of this notification on the same day, stating that he had initiated preparations to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities under those resolutions. On 20 April [2000], the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's decision to initiate those preparations.
As a first step, the Secretary-General sent his Special Envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway), together with the Force Commander of UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] and a team of experts, to meet with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and concerned Member States in the region, including Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The delegation also met with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the League of Arab States. During the mission, United Nations cartographic, legal and military experts examined the technical issues that would need to be addressed in the context of the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). Parallel to that mission, which took place between 26 April and 9 May 2000, the Secretary-General consulted with interested Member States, including those contributing troops to UNIFIL.
Starting on 16 May, much sooner than anticipated, IDF/DFF [Israeli Defense Forces / Lebanese de facto Forces] began to vacate its positions, amid exchange of fire. Beginning on 21 May [2000], large crowds of Lebanese, accompanied by armed elements, entered villages in the Israeli-controlled area, and IDF/DFF vacated their position in great haste. At the same time, a large number of the de facto forces, together with their families, crossed into Israel. Others surrendered to the Lebanese authorities. Within a few days, those forces had completely disbanded. On 25 May [2000], the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General that Israel had redeployed its forces in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).
The requirements and tasks related to the implementation of those resolutions in the new circumstances were outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May and endorsed by the Security Council on 23 May.
Withdrawal Confirmed
From 24 May to 7 June, the Special Envoy travelled to Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to follow up on the implementation of the Secretary-General's 22 May report. The United Nations cartographer and his team, assisted by UNIFIL, worked on the ground to identify a line to be adopted for the practical purposes of confirming the Israeli withdrawal. While this was not a formal border demarcation, the aim was to identify a line on the ground conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, based on the best available cartographic and other documentary evidence.
The work was completed on 7 June. A map showing the withdrawal line was formally transmitted by the Force Commander of UNIFIL to his Lebanese and Israeli counterparts. Notwithstanding their reservations about the line, the Governments of Israel and Lebanon confirmed that identifying this line was solely the responsibility of the United Nations and that they would respect the line as identified. On 8 June [2000], UNIFIL teams commenced the work of verifying the Israeli withdrawal behind the line.

On 16 June [2000], the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in his report of 22 May 2000 -- namely, Israel had completed the withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the United Nations."

source: Why did Israel withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000? - Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - ProCon.org
 
Huu ndio Ushahidi wangu hebu soma hapa chini

Why did Israel withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000?


General Reference (not clearly pro or con)

Ian J. Bickerton, PhD, Associate Professor of Middle Eastern and United States History at the University of New South Wales and Carla L. Klausner, PhD, Professor of Modern Middle East, Medieval Europe and Judaic Studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas City, wrote in their 2002 fourth edition of A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, that:
"[Israeli Prime Minister] Barak's election promise [in 1999] to leave [the security zone in southern] Lebanon within a year had been one of the main reasons for his victory, and although Israel would have preferred to pull out of Lebanon after reaching a peace deal with Syria [who had been in control over all of northern and central Lebanon, including all of Beirut and as far south as Sidon since 1990], there was growing consensus on both sides of the political divide for a unilateral withdrawal. Even Ariel Sharon, one of the architects of Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 said that the withdrawal should start immediately.

On March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet pledged a withdrawal from Lebanon by July. The Israeli decision surprised and alarmed the Arab states, depriving Syria of its main pressure point against Israel...

Before dawn on Wednesday, May 24 [2000], six weeks before they planned to shut down the buffer zone, Israeli troops abandoned Beaufort Castle and their few remaining outposts in Lebanon, bringing home their last troops without suffering any casualties."


2002 - Ian J. Bickerton, PhD
Carla L. Klausner, PhD

lebanonsouth20002.jpg


Map created using information from the United Nations




Benny Morris, PhD, Professor of History at Ben-Gurion University, in his 2001 book Righteous Victims, wrote:
"In spring 1999, during his campaign for the premiership, Barak had promised that Israel would withdraw its troops from the Security Zone back to the international frontier 'within a year.' After taking office, he began to speak of 'July 2000' as the deadline. He hoped that the withdrawal would be a part of a general peace agreement with Syria and Lebanon, which would include a Syrian guarantee of the security of northern Israel and, perhaps, a deployment of Syrian troops in South Lebanon. But the deadlock in the Israeli-Syrian peace talks had gradually persuaded Barak that the withdrawal from the Zone would most probably be unilateral and without agreement either with Syria or Lebanon. The IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] General Staff opposed a withdrawal without an agreement; but on March 5, 2000, the Israeli cabinet unanimously endorsed a withdrawal by July, 'with or without an agreement,' back to the international frontier...

On the night of May 23-24, in a well-orchestrated operation, backed by columns of heavy Merkava tanks and helicopter gunships, the last Israeli troops pulled out under sporadic Hizbullah fire."


2001 - Benny Morris, PhD

The UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon) website contained the following account of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon (accessed Dec. 18, 2003):
"Israeli Withdrawal
On 17 April 2000, the Secretary-General received formal notification from the Government of Israel that it would withdraw its forces from Lebanon by July 2000 'in full accordance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)'. He [Kofi Annan] was further informed that in so doing the Government of Israel intended 'to cooperate fully with the United Nations'. The Secretary-General informed the Security Council of this notification on the same day, stating that he had initiated preparations to enable the United Nations to carry out its responsibilities under those resolutions. On 20 April [2000], the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's decision to initiate those preparations.
As a first step, the Secretary-General sent his Special Envoy, Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway), together with the Force Commander of UNIFIL [United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon] and a team of experts, to meet with the Governments of Israel and Lebanon and concerned Member States in the region, including Egypt, Jordan and the Syrian Arab Republic. The delegation also met with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the League of Arab States. During the mission, United Nations cartographic, legal and military experts examined the technical issues that would need to be addressed in the context of the implementation of resolution 425 (1978). Parallel to that mission, which took place between 26 April and 9 May 2000, the Secretary-General consulted with interested Member States, including those contributing troops to UNIFIL.
Starting on 16 May, much sooner than anticipated, IDF/DFF [Israeli Defense Forces / Lebanese de facto Forces] began to vacate its positions, amid exchange of fire. Beginning on 21 May [2000], large crowds of Lebanese, accompanied by armed elements, entered villages in the Israeli-controlled area, and IDF/DFF vacated their position in great haste. At the same time, a large number of the de facto forces, together with their families, crossed into Israel. Others surrendered to the Lebanese authorities. Within a few days, those forces had completely disbanded. On 25 May [2000], the Government of Israel notified the Secretary-General that Israel had redeployed its forces in compliance with Security Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978).
The requirements and tasks related to the implementation of those resolutions in the new circumstances were outlined in the Secretary-General's report of 22 May and endorsed by the Security Council on 23 May.
Withdrawal Confirmed
From 24 May to 7 June, the Special Envoy travelled to Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to follow up on the implementation of the Secretary-General's 22 May report. The United Nations cartographer and his team, assisted by UNIFIL, worked on the ground to identify a line to be adopted for the practical purposes of confirming the Israeli withdrawal. While this was not a formal border demarcation, the aim was to identify a line on the ground conforming to the internationally recognized boundaries of Lebanon, based on the best available cartographic and other documentary evidence.
The work was completed on 7 June. A map showing the withdrawal line was formally transmitted by the Force Commander of UNIFIL to his Lebanese and Israeli counterparts. Notwithstanding their reservations about the line, the Governments of Israel and Lebanon confirmed that identifying this line was solely the responsibility of the United Nations and that they would respect the line as identified. On 8 June [2000], UNIFIL teams commenced the work of verifying the Israeli withdrawal behind the line.

On 16 June [2000], the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) and met the requirements defined in his report of 22 May 2000 -- namely, Israel had completed the withdrawal in conformity with the line identified by the United Nations."

source: Why did Israel withdraw from South Lebanon in 2000? - Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - ProCon.org
Mkuu,
Sikuwa nina doubt kwamba vimetokea,ila ni kwamba sikuwa na kumbukumbu sahihi kuhusu vita hivyo kama ilivyo kwa hivyo vya 2007 kwasababu nilikuwa na muda wa kufuatilia all the news etc.
 
Mkuu,
Sikuwa nina doubt kwamba vimetokea,ila ni kwamba sikuwa na kumbukumbu sahihi kuhusu vita hivyo kama ilivyo kwa hivyo vya 2007 kwasababu nilikuwa na muda wa kufuatilia all the news etc.
Ok kwa mawazo yako itakuwaje mwisho wake huko Lebanon na IRAN je Marekani ataweza kubadilisha uongozi wa IRAN na kuiuwa Hezbollah? Unasemaje kwa mawazo yako? What is Next?
 
Hizbollah kui penetrate ni ngumu sana,halafu wale wana jeshi kubwa sana na silaha nyingi mno wamezichimbia.

Hizbolah ni dangerous kuliko hata Iran kwa Israe

Wacha fixi mangi. Sasa kama silaha zimechimbiwa unajuaje kama wanazo nyingi? Hao Hizbollah inaweza kuwa ni mikwara tuu hawana lolote.
 
Wacha fixi mangi. Sasa kama silaha zimechimbiwa unajuaje kama wanazo nyingi? Hao Hizbollah inaweza kuwa ni mikwara tuu hawana lolote.
Kwanini wasiwe nazo nyingi na wakati hakuna anayewazuia kuzichimbia since they have been doing it for decades?

Ukwapi wewe?
 
Bush kwenda Iraki kume shift middle east balance of power in magnificient ways.

Kwanza Iran imekuwa empowered through proxies ie Iraki and Lebanon/Hezbolah.

Ile sababu ya kumsapoti Saddam ili ku balnce power vs Iran/Shiite, wali iscrap,and therefore lazima watakuwa na a different mission endapo wanajuwa kwa hakika kuwa wamewapa Iran nguvu kubwa zaidi mara baada ya kuivamia Iraki.

Kama ni a well calculated move,basi tutegemee vita kubwa sana siku za usoni.
 
Wacha fixi mangi. Sasa kama silaha zimechimbiwa unajuaje kama wanazo nyingi? Hao Hizbollah inaweza kuwa ni mikwara tuu hawana lolote.
Huyo Nasrallah mwenyewe unawezakuta ni CIA agent wa kichinichini. Dunia ya leo usimwamini yoyote. Tutapigizana kelele hapa jamvini na kumaliza nguvu zetu kumbe kuna yanayotendeka behind the scenes ambayo ukiyashuhudia utabaki kuwa bubu
 
Huyo Nasrallah mwenyewe unawezakuta ni CIA agent wa kichinichini. Dunia ya leo usimwamini yoyote. Tutapigizana kelele hapa jamvini na kumaliza nguvu zetu kumbe kuna yanayotendeka behind the scenes ambayo ukiyashuhudia utabaki kuwa bubu
Mku there is no way and no any possibility that Nasaralah could be CIA...Thats a BIG naaw!
 
kuna kitabu kinaitwa "son of hamas"...., mwenye nafasi akisome.., kina mtiririko mzuri sana wa ujasusi uliokubuhu..,

In short mtoto wa mmoja wa waanzilishi wa hamas.., alitongozwa hadi akakubali kuwa spy wa mossad, ni story ndefu ila inaweka wazi jinsi dunia ya ujasusi ilivyo risky

They say, "its a dog eat dog game"..., "whenever u become lazy, u die"
 
Ujasusi sio game rahisi sana na kusema ukweli pande zote zina majeruhi wengi sana. Nilikuwa nasoma story ya MI6 recently, na nilichojifunza, ni ukweli kwamba ujasusi ni kazi ya kujitoa mhanga. So those who fall in the wrong hands know it.
 
Mku there is no way and no any possibility that Nasaralah could be CIA...Thats a BIG naaw!

Yap,
Hata mimi naamini kuwa Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah siyo CIA kwa hoja kuwa lau angelikuwa CIA asingewaumbua viongozi wa juu wa Hesbollah kuwa ni CIA & Mossad agents.
images
 
Yap,
Hata mimi naamini kuwa Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah siyo CIA kwa hoja kuwa lau angelikuwa CIA asingewaumbua viongozi wa juu wa Hesbollah kuwa ni CIA & Mossad agents.
images
Ameshawapa sana maumivu Israel na there is no way akawa CIA...

The reason hawawezi kumfikia ni the same reason hawawezi kumfikia Muqtada Al Sadr, yani wamejichimbia katikati ya maelfu ya supporters na kumpata itabidi mufanye mauwaji ya karne!

Tena yeye ni even harder to get provided pia na geographical location aliyopo, issue si yeye kuwa CIA, wanaoona hivyo ni wale wenye ushabiki.
 
Ok kwa mawazo yako itakuwaje mwisho wake huko Lebanon na IRAN je Marekani ataweza kubadilisha uongozi wa IRAN na kuiuwa Hezbollah? Unasemaje kwa mawazo yako? What is Next?
Wakijaribu hilo with a full resolve,consequently there might be a 3rd world war.

Ni issue ambayo imegawanyika kwasababu the chain goes all the way to Israel.

Any move ni lazima wahakikishe kuwa Isarel will be fully protected.

Kwa upande mwingine,Hezbolah ni mwiba na pia wao siyo serikali, njia ambayo Israel wamekuwa wakilipa kisasi kwa Hezbolah ni kwa ku attack infrustructure za serikali ya Lebanon na maeneo ya raia ili kuwakomesha na kuwafanya serikali na wananchi waigeuke Hezbolah,na baadhi ya maeneo ya Lebanon civil war lazima itafumuka tena.

Ofcourse the world will be divided on the issue na US itabidi watafute coalition.

Mrusi yuko kule toka kitambo,naona sasa hivi keshagunduwa kuwa US wako kwenye race tofauti na ile waliyokuwa nayo ya silaha kipindi kile cha vita baridi...

Sasa nasikia kasogeza meli yake ya kivita maeneo hayo karibu na Syria,inawezekana ni kulinda interest zao kwasababu hawataki kuporwa everything, sasa kama they will seriously defend ama watanegotiate hao kama wazungu,it remains to be seen.

Kwasababu pia vita itakuwa tied to Palestine cause, basi there will be consequences al over the world na pengine mashambulizi ya kigaidi everywhere, it is a move that needs precision and perfect calculations within a short period of time...Na kuwamaliza hao kwa muda mfupi si kazi rahisi.
 
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