Tuangalie tathmini ya mageuzi ya Tanzania tangu mwaka 1992 na wapi tulipofikia (CMI)

[Mbase1970]

Ni vizuri kuisoma hii report imeelezea mambo mengi sana.
1 Introduction

The climax of democratic consolidation on the African Continent has,
generally speaking, taken place in the de-jure transitions from single party
rule, where incumbent regimes monopolised nearly every facet of political and
economic life, to a system of plural politics where alternative parties were
legally permitted to organise and challenge the existing political order. For
many of the incumbent parties on the continent as well as international
donors, multiparty elections were and still are considered to be the clearest
expression of a ‘new’ liberal political order and the pinnacle of democratic
decision-making. However, the majority of those that follow and conduct
research on the African political scene point out that the emergence of
opposition political parties and multiparty elections is an insufficient measure
of democracy, whereby most African states appear to be in the midst of a
stalled transition.
In Kenya for example, Daniel Arap Moi’s approval of the adoption of
multiparty politics in 1991, and the subsequent elections in 1992 was
unsuccessful in overturning the incumbent Kenya African National Union
(KANU). Furthermore, the opposition parties themselves appeared unable to
maintain any significant degree of internal cohesion, as the main opposition
organisation, the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), split into
FORD-Kenya led by Oginga Odinga and FORD-Asili led by Kenneth Matiba.
The Multiparty experience in Zambia was considerably different, yet equally
problematic in several respects. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy
(MMD), after defeating President Kaunda and the incumbent United National
Independence Party (UNIP) in 1991, experienced massive defections and
fragmentation. More importantly, in a manner resembling the experiences
under UNIP, the MMD itself has resorted to repressive measures in
implementing unpopular World Bank and IMF structural adjustment
programs (Ihonvbere 1996).
The adoption of plural politics in Tanzania in 1992 and the subsequent
multiparty elections in 1995 never generated a united opposition front similar
to the early stages of FORD in Kenya and the MMD in Zambia. Generally
speaking, aside from a few failed attempts at forming united fronts, opposition
politics in Tanzania remains relatively fragmented, weak, and seemingly
disorganised. In short, similar to the experiences in Kenya and Zambia,
multiparty politics in Tanzania appears to be strikingly absent of strong
opposition parties capable of driving the consolidation of democracy in a
forward direction.
This article focuses most of its attention on the five main Tanzanian
opposition parties that have operated in varying capacities since the early
1990s. Specifically, this article seeks to describe the institutionalisation of the
five main Tanzania opposition parties, primarily focusing on trends in
institutional building as well as the main factors that appear to limit
institutional development.







2 Defining the Model
While the roles and importance of political parties in developing democracies
might be subject to controversial debates in academic circles, this article
understands that contesting elections and winning political offices are one of
the most direct and legitimate links between the state and society. On a
theoretical level, these links serve as one, perhaps the most important method
that the electorate has in influencing the direction of government policy.
Political parties themselves can be seen as organisations that rally together to
contest elections and express common agendas, with the immediate goal of
winning political positions in the government. In their attempts in effecting
government policy parties can be seen as channelling the forces of social
cleavages, whether class, religious, or ethnic based, through mutually accepted
institutions for cleavage mediation, such as legislative assemblies. The
capacities in parties serving as links between state and society will largely
depend on their ability in operating as institutions.
As institutions, parties are generally understood as being stable and durable
expressions of particular social cleavages, whose existence in the political
environment is both taken-for-granted and path dependent in the sense that
past platform and ideological statements constrain future platform
possibilities. Indeed, such an understanding is unequivocally suggestive of the
fact that institutionalisation processes are subject to the constraints of time.
Therefor, an analysis of the institutional developments of the Tanzanian
opposition parties must be sensitive to their relatively adolescent nature.
Figure 1: Dimensions of Party Institutionalisation
Attitudinal Structural
Internal Order (1) Value Infusion (2) Organisational Strength
External Order (3) Reification (4) Party Autonomy

Source: Randall & Svåsand 1999: 9
The institutionalisation model used in this article was designed by Lars
Svåsand and Vicky Randall, and consists of the four institutional dimensions
depicted in figure 1, capturing most of what has already been stated about
party institutionalisation. The model includes two dimensions that concern
issues related to internal party values and structures: value infusion and
organisational strength, and two dimensions that relate to values and
structures in external environment: party autonomy and reification.
Institutional developments within these four dimensions contributes to the
development of party stability, longevity, and overall party
institutionalisation.
The first dimension in the Randall-Svåsand model is value infusion, which


describes the strength of the affiliations that party members and supporters
have with their respective parties. As the authors of the model point out, value
infusion is partially determined by a party’s affiliation with some form of
social base as well as the strength of the affiliations between party members
and party leaders. In this article, the analysis of the Tanzanian opposition
parties therefor, focuses on the relationships between party supporters and
party platforms, including social, religious, and tribal relationships. In this
respect, “the more the party members and supporters identify with the party
as an expressive phenomenon, and the higher the degree of voter loyalty, the
more institutionalised [the party] is” (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 9). The
assumption here is that, as expressions of social cleavages, party platforms will
reflect the interests of particular groups of supporters; party membership is
based on an identification with party platforms.
Equally important for the forthcoming analysis, in parties where leader loyalty
is strong, the ultimate weakening of the identity between party members and
their respective parties may prevail. All other things equal, parties with strong
links with members and supporters will be institutionally stronger than parties
where members are more fluid and have weak party loyalties.
The second dimension of party institutionalisation is found in cell 2 in figure
one, labelled as organisational strength. At the formative stage of party

construction, certain organisational arrangements are laid out, either formally
or informally, such as methods of task execution, internal factional mediation,
and decision-making, as well as the structuring of the internal composition of
the organisation in the form of committees and administrative agencies. Over
time, procedural stability will likely set in as parties acquire certain types of
organisational traditions or routines in how they conduct decision-making and
task executing procedures; the parties themselves will develop a more
systematic structure and seemingly automatic methods of making decisions
and executing tasks. The nature of these routines will likely be shaped by the
degree to which methods of decision-making, conflict resolution, and task
execution are defined in party statutes (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 12-17).
The analysis of organisational strength in this article pays particular attention
to the development and institutionalisation of methods of task execution and
decision-making. Of special importance for the forthcoming analysis are the
presence and operations of party decision-making and executing organs from
the national level all the way down to the grassroots. Aside from the
functioning of party organisations, the analysis below will also focus on the
intensity of unmediated party factions as signs of poorly defined methods of
decision-making and conflict resolution as well as a contribution to further
organisational decay. Equally important, the forthcoming analysis also focuses
on the availability o financial resource as a component to organisational
development.
Political parties do not operate in a vacuum. They effect and are effected by
the external environment in which they operate. Randall and Svåsand’s model
captures two external dimensions of party institutionalisation. The first is
referred to as reification: “the extent to which a political party becomes


installed in the popular imagery and as a factor shaping the behaviour of
political actors” (Randall & Svåsand 1999: 21). A party that is reified in the





minds of the electorate possesses certain symbolic traits, mostly revolving
around the policies or ideologies it claims to represent as well as its overall
behaviour in the party system. As an institution, the names of a party, when
pronounced, read or heard, signifies or symbolises a certain historical product
of the party's platform and past performance. In the minds of the electorate,
the party is placed on an abstract continuum where the party's platform,
ideology, and constituencies are compared with those of other parties.
The reification analysis in this article briefly focuses on some of the key factors
that are understood as effecting the disposition of the electorate’s attitudes
regarding these five opposition parties. These factors include (1) the general
perceptions toward multiparty democracy and the incumbent regime, (2)
opposition participation in parliament, and (3) the performance of the
opposition parties during election campaigns. The reification assumption is
that parties with a well-established image in the electorate are more likely to
operate as institutions than parties with no established image. It is also
assumed that parties symbolising popular issues, unity, and energy are more
likely to possess long-run viability than parties symbolising disunity,
corruption, and stagnation (Randall & Svåsand).
The final dimension depicted in figure 1 is labelled as party autonomy and is


the least straightforward concept in the Randall & Svåsand model. On one
level, party autonomy is a condition where the party itself is “not at the
mercy” of any one particular extra-party organisation (Randall & Svåsand
1999: 9). Phrased differently, party autonomy seeks to define the degree to
which a party’s existence depends on the existence of any one particular extraparty
organisation.
Extra-party organisations may consist of NGOs, interest groups, other
political parties, as well as the state itself. The potential exists for parties to be
formed by extra-party organisations, or over time, can grow to be dominated
by an extra-party organisation. Where extra-party organisations are the
sources for party legitimacy, party autonomy is said to be constrained as the
party itself is nothing more than an operational appendage of a higher power;
it is seen as an expendable tool whose potential for stability and adaptability
are functions of the dictates from the higher organisation.
On another level, the autonomy of a party will be constrained if the chief
source of party legitimacy rests in the hands of a few party leaders. This aspect
of party autonomy, while not exclusively in the external environment as
portrayed in figure 1, is detrimentally important for party autonomy. Without
accounting for the possibility of party personalisation for example, it might be
erroneously concluded that a particular party is sufficiently autonomous,
when in reality, the source of party stability, legitimacy, and the allegiance of
the party members rests in the hands of one or a few party leaders rather than
in the hands of a distinct party institution (Randall & Svåsand 1999). The
party autonomy analysis of the Tanzanian Opposition parties will focus on
various aspects that potentially limit party autonomy, such as the
monopolisation of party contributions by extra-party organisations or party
leaders and trends in power personalisation.
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3 Background to Multiparty Transition
For all practical purposes, Tanzania up to 1992, was governed as a one-party
state for nearly thirty-years. Single party rule in Tanzania, comparatively
speaking, was more democratic in nature than many other single-party
regimes in Africa. For the most part, regular elections have been held every
five years since 1965 and the airing of complaints against the state or
TANU/CCM was at least tolerated to some degree. However, compared to
KANU in Kenya or UNIP in Zambia, the single-party regime in Tanzania
monopolised politics in such a way that left no political space outside the
TANU/CCM party apparatus. While citizen complaints would be heard,
alternative views that seemed to counter the justifications and legitimacy of
single-party rule and socialism were generally not well received with the CCM.
In this sense, single-party rule promoted a legacy of political apathy and fear
against expressing opposition (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992).
Even regularised elections were to a large degree meaningless in outcome.
Although voters had power in changing who held political positions, they had
no real ability in effecting policy output since all political candidates were
from TANU/CCM, thus homogeneous in outlook. In effect, politics became a
contest of personalities rather than policies or platforms, further eroding
government transparency and accountability and increasing apathy as many
voters regarded acts of voting as a waste of time (Mmuya & Chaligha 1992).
In relation to personality, struggles for political power did not occur on a
horizontal level, i.e. between parties and polices. Instead, political struggles
occurred within TANU/CCM in a vertical fashion where personalities and
patronage were more important virtues than ideas and merit (Mmuya &
Chaligha 1992: 6). As this article unfolds, we will see the possible influence
that these colonial and one-party legacies have on today’s opposition parties in
the Tanzanian multiparty system.
The push for the adoption of multiparty politics in Tanzania was the result of
domestic forces as well as forces in the international environment. On the
international level, the collapse of the one-party states in Eastern Europe
prompted the questioning of the future of the Tanzanian one-party state on
the part of several long-time leaders of the incumbent party, the Chama Cha
Mapinduzi (CCM), including Julius Nyerere. At the same time, pressures from
international financial lenders such as the IMF and World Bank mounted as
aid conditionalities expanded from the economic structural adjustment sphere
into the realm of ‘good governance’, including the adoption of plural politics
and the observance of human rights.
Equally important for the drive toward multiparty politics were the swelling
pressures from the domestic environment. A particularly crucial group that
spearheaded the domestic drive towards the adoption of multiparty politics
were the urban elites who increasingly looked upon the political game as
better structured under a system whereby competitive politics did not
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necessarily involve vertical struggles within the CCM itself. Many of these
elites, after the official adoption of multiparty politics in the summer of 1992,
were found leading most of the emerging opposition parties. Among the most
prominent of these leaders were individuals such as Edwin Mtei, formally a
finance minister, Bank of Tanzania Governor, and a director in the
International Monetary fund, latter constructed and lead the Party for
Democracy and Development (CHADEMA); Mabere Marando, formally a
government security agent and civil rights lawyer who eventually became the
chief architect of the National Convention for Construction and Reform party
(NCCR-Mageuzi); Chief Said Fundikira, the first minister of Justice of
independent Tanzania prior to resigning from his position in 1963 in protest
to the obvious prospects of one-party rule by TANU. Fundikira would later
form his own party, the Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD). Other
prominent personalities included James Mapalala, a popular human rights
advocate that eventually helped create the Chama Cha Wananchi (CCW)
before the party merged with a Zanzibar party called KAMAHURU, lead by
Khamis Mloo, to form the Civic United Front (CUF).
By the 1995 national elections, other prominent opposition leaders emerged
by either breaking away from existing opposition parties or defecting from the
CCM to the opposition ranks. With out a doubt, the most popular opposition
figure today – Augustine Mrema, former Minister of Labour, grudgingly
defected from the incumbent regime into the NCCR-Mageuzi’s Chairman
position, subsequently propelling the party into the most prominent
opposition status. John Cheyo, a prominent business man from the Bariadi
district in Shinyanga, emerged out of the UMD to form his own party, the
United Democratic Party (UDP).
Table 1: Results of the 1994 Local Elections

Party Number of
Candidate
Fielded by Each
Party
Number of
Seats
Percentage of
Successful
Candidates
Percentage
of Total
CCM 2409 2327 96,60 % 96,72 %
CHADEMA 478 22 4,60 % 0,91 %
CUF 332 21 6,33 % 0,87 %
UMD 170 3 1,76 % 0,12 %
UDP 153 16 10,46 % 0,67 %
TADEA 52 2 3,85 % 0,08 %
TLP 41 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
PONA 39 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
NCCR-M 32 15 46,88 % 0,62 %
TPP 27 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
NRA 22 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
NLD 19 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
UPDP 12 0 0,00 % 0,00 %
3786 2406 63,55 % 100,00 %
Source: National Electoral Commission 1994: 1997
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Indeed, the elite nature of the opposition movement in Tanzania is reflected by
the social composition of the founders and leaders of these opposition parties.
As Mmuya and Chaligha conclude, the Tanzanian opposition parties as well
as the multiparty system are “the product of legislation rather than the spirit
of a movement” and are “by and large socially engineered from the top”
(Mmuya & Chaligha 1994: 47).
The lack of popular protests and movements within the apex of the drive for
multiparty politics was reflected in the almost catastrophic performance of the
opposition parties in the 1994 local elections, where the 12 opposition parties
secured a paltry 3,3 percent of the district council seats, as evident in table 1.
Tables 2 and 3 reveal that by the 1995 general elections, opposition support
appeared to pick up pace as five of the opposition parties secured 20,1 percent
of the parliamentary seats with an impressive 40,8 percent of the votes cast.
Table 3 shows the impressive performance of Mrema in the 1995 presidential
race, himself a large factor contributing to the gains in opposition support
since 1994, particularly evident in the large number of votes cast for the
NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995.
Table 2: Results of the 1995 Parliamentary Elections

Party Percentage of
Votes
Total Seats
Chama Cha Mapinduzi 59,22 219
NCCR-Mageuzi 21,83 19
CHADEMA 6,16 28
Civic United Front 5,02 4
United Democratic Party 3,32 4
Others 4,5 0
Total 100 274
Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45-46
Table 3: Results of the 1995 Presidential Elections

Candidate Number of
Votes
Percentage
of Votes
Benjamin Mkapa (CCM) 4 026 422 61,8
Augustine Mrema (NCCR-M) 1 808 616 27,8
Prof. Ibrahim Lipumba (CUF) 418 973 6,4
John Cheyo (UDP) 258 734 4,0
Source: National Electoral Commission 1997: 45
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4 Party Institutionalisation in Tanzania
4.1 Value Infusion
Five of the main opposition parties are examined in this article: the NCCRMageuzi,
United Democratic Party (UDP), CHADEMA, Civic United Front
(CUF), and the Tanzanian Labour Party (TLP). All of the parties, except the
TLP, are parliamentary parties, as indicated in table 2. Thanks to the
overwhelmingly popular Augustine Mrema leading the party since his
defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi in early 1999, the TLP can rightfully
expect to gain parliamentary seats in the upcoming national elections.
The bulk of this value infusion section consists of two specific tasks: (1)
identifying particular cleavages that potentially identify with each party, (2)
defining the affiliations between party leaders and party members that
potentially contribute to the weakening of member-party affiliations. The
achievement of the first task is complicated by the fact that none of the
opposition parties appear to espouse any clear party ideology, a trend
acknowledged by numerous authors. Rwekaza S. Mukandala sites that the
“current [Tanzanian] movements consciously eschew formal ideologies”…and
have failed to articulate “a world view” (1995: 31-33). All of the parties claim
to espouse narrowly different interpretations of social democracy and
capitalism. All five parties recognise the importance of indigenisation or, as
backed by the UDP, preferential treatment for Tanzanian businesses, and the
eradication of government corruption. In short, based on the level of platform
articulation and variation, if the leaders from all five of these parties convened
to discuss appropriate government policy, the dialogue would likely be
overwhelmingly free from divergent opinions. Perhaps the best expression of
the seemingly homogeneous nature of the opposition ideologies was best
exemplified by Augustine Mrema during his defection from the CCM to the
NCCR-Mageuzi about six months prior to the general elections, when
publicly stating that the he believed the policies of the CCM to be superb, he
simply had differences with some of the party leaders (Sundet 1996: 29).
While lacking well-defined ideologies and platforms, at the same time, the
parties have articulated a certain degree of policy priority within their
platforms, where all five examined in this article appear to differ on a nominal
level. For example, CHADEMA and the UDP emphasise economic reforms
over all other issues and have the most conservative welfare state outlook. For
CHADEMA, the focus is on financial reforms and for the UDP it is the
redefinition of property rights. The NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP on the other
hand both place heavy emphasis on agriculture development and the
development of a capitalist welfare state. It is also the heavier responsibilities
of the welfare state within their platforms that makes the NCCR-Mageuzi and
the TLP fall to the left of centre on the political spectrum. The Civic United
Front naturally focuses much of its attention on the Union question and the
Human Rights abuses by the Zanzibar CCM and appears to occupy a position
in the centre of the political spectrum.
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Table 4: Occupation of Founding Members

Occupation NCCR-M CHADEMA CUF UMD
Peasant/Farmer 58,7 % 35,0 % 45,0 % 47,5 %
Public Servant x x x x
Private Business 29,5 % 50,1 % 26,1 % 52,2 %
Politician/Other 11,7 % 15,0 % 28,9 % 0,4 %
n = 1703 2000 3000 2000
Mean Median
Peasant/Farmer 46,6 % 46,3 %
Public Servant x
Private Business 39,5 % 39,8 %
Politician/Other 14,0 % 13,3 %
Source: Mmuya and Chaligha 1994: 49
In this article, it is understood that the potential for value infusion between the
party and its members and supporters is highest when there is some
congruence between party platform and the social composition of the party
members. In relation to their platform emphasis, there does appear to be some
differences between each party in the social composition of their respective
supporters. Table 4 lists the occupation of founding members of some of the
more prominent opposition parties in 1994. Evidence suggests that for
CHADEMA, it is businessmen and women that predominately contribute to
the party rank and file. For the UDP, although not listed in table 4, other
evidence indicates that the major party supporters are middle class
professionals and businesspersons (Maliyamkono 1995). The NCCR-Mageuzi
at one time appeared to have the broadest membership base, including the
underprivileged in both the rural and urban areas, lawyers, university
students, lecturers, professors, and urban professionals. By far, the largest
supporters for the NCCR-Mageuzi, when compared to the other parties, are
rural farmers, peasants and the youths, strongly coinciding with the platform
emphasis of the party (Mmuya & Chaligha 1994). Due to the large number of
members that crossed over with Mrema in 1999, it is likely that the social
composition of the NCCR-Mageuzi support is reflected in the social
composition of the TLP supporter today. One might also speculate that many
of those that have traditionally supported Mrema during his presidential bid,
support the TLP today, including a mix of urban professionals, youths, and
rural and urban poor (Maliyamkono 1995).
Issues revolving around religion play an important factor in Tanzanian
politics, although parties are prohibited from advancing the causes of one
religion over another, as dictated under section 9.2(a) of the 1992 Political
Parties Act. Nevertheless, religion has been evoked in varying level,
particularly evident during political campaigns. For example, in the Iringa
Urban constituency, voters were encouraged to vote for the NCCR-Mageuzi
candidate rather than the CCM Muslim parliamentary candidate (Omari (A)
1997: 59). In the Temeke by-election, Mrema kept close company with a
Sheikh in order to appeal to the large Muslim population in the Temeke
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constituency, even though Mrema himself is a Roman Catholic (Maliyamkono
1997: 12-15). CUF mobilised support by appealing to Muslims on both
Zanzibar and the Mainland (Omari (A) 1997: 62), by far the most dominant
religion on the Isles. All-in-all, aside from the overwhelmingly large number of
Muslims within the CUF rank and file, it is unclear the extent to which
religion serves as a solid basis for opposition support.
Although strictly prohibited by the Political Parties Act, evidence suggests that
each of these five parties aggregates support based on ethnic considerations,
and may provide additional strengths for value infusion. Figure 2 graphically
depicts the support that each region contributed to the CCM, CHADEMA,
CUF, UDP and the NCCR-Mageuzi. The Kilimanjaro and Mara regions are
heavily dominated by the NCCR-Mageuzi and coincides with the ethnic and
regional origins of the top party leaders in 1995. The Kilimanjaro region is
also highly supportive of CHADEMA, a party said to be dominated by the
ethnic Chagga, predominately found in Kilimanjaro and Arusha (Moore 1996:
589). The UDP is perhaps the clearest case of a party where support is almost
totally dominated by two regions, both of which are mostly composed of
ethnic Sukuma, coinciding with the ethnic background of the party leader
John Cheyo. Indeed, as indicated in figure 2, over 65 percent of the UDP’s
support in the 1995 parliamentary elections originated in Shinyanga and
Mwanza. Finally, the regional concentration of CUF’s support is
predominately restricted to the Pemba portion of Zanzibar, an area which
contributed to nearly 30 percent of CUF’s support while consisting of less than
two percent of the voting population in the 1995 parliamentary elections.
Although CUF’s support on Pemba is tied to considerations of ethnicity,
support for the party is also tied to the particular historical experiences of
Zanzibar politics, too lengthy for discussion in this article.
Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Party Support in the 1995 Parliamentary Elections
Source: Mmuya 1997
0 %
10 %
20 %
30 %
40 %
50 %
60 %
70 %
80 %
90 %
(NW) Kagera
(NW) Mwanza
(NC) Mara
(NC) Shinyanga
(NC) Arusha
(NE) Kilimanajaro
(WC) Kigoma
(WC) Rukwa
(WC) Tabora
(C) Singida
(C) Dodoma
(EC) Tanga
(EC) Coastal
(EC) Dar es Salaam
(SW) Mbeya
(SC) Iringa
(SC) Morogoro
(SC) Ruvuma
(SE) Lindi
(SE) Mtwara
(I) Unjuga N
(I) Unjuga S
(I) Urban W
(I) Pemba N
(I) Pemba S
Region
Percentage Support
CCM
NCCR-M
CHADEMA
UDP
CUF
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A closer look at the election data reveals that regionally concentrated support
is also suggestive of the fact that affiliations may have as much to do with the
relationships between party leaders and party members as they do with parties
and party members. Indeed, each regional stronghold for each party coincides
with the home regions of the top party brass. Comparing the support for the
NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections to that in the 1995 national
elections for example, indicates that the party’s sheer vote volume in
Kilimanjaro was largely the result of Mrema’s popularity. Being a native of the
Kilimanjaro Region as well as an ethnic Chagga, all of the constituencies
within the region that heavily contributed to his presidential votes as well as
the votes for the party in the parliamentary race, were weak supporters for the
NCCR-Mageuzi in the 1994 local elections. In fact, the only party to win
district council seats in the 1994 local elections was CHADEMA. Instead,
nearly 75 percent of the seats won by the NCCR-Mageuzi in 1994 were in
Kagera and Mara, coinciding with the home regions of Prince Bagenda and
Marando, the two top party leaders prior to Mrema’s defection from the
CCM.
Similar trends are noticeable in the loyalty that Bariadi contributed to the UDP
in 1994 and 1995. Of the UDP’s 16 victories in the 1994 local elections, 12
occurred in the Bariadi District. Figure 3 indicates that this trend was
duplicated in the 1995 parliamentary and presidential elections.
Leader loyalty is even more obvious where key party leaders defect from one
party to another, taking the bulk of the party members with them. Mass
defections are most clear in Mrema's defection from the NCCR-Mageuzi to
the TLP and Cheyo's earlier defection from the UMD that spawned the
foundation of the UDP.
Therefore, while evidence suggests that party affiliations appear to loosely
coincide with particular social status or ethnic interests, a large portion of
these affiliations are likely defined by the relationships between party leaders
and party members, having at least two broad implications for value infusion.
First, strong links between party leaders and members weakens the ties that
members have with their respective parties. Thus, when leaders shift from one
party to the next, most members follow the leader not the party, reducing the
stability of the party and its prospects for institutional development. Secondly,
where clientele networks prevail and are structured on charisma or quid pro
quo transactions, the party leaders themselves have few incentives in
articulating coherent platforms or ideologies since such formulations do not
serve as the basis for affiliation or loyalty. In this respect these networks are
not about promoting groups interests per se. They are more about promoting
the particularised interests of key patrons and their particular clients.
Professor Samuel Mushi from the University of Dar es Salaam best qualifies
these two shortcomings by pointing out that “The imbalance between
personalities and party programmes in opposition parties, whose leaders are
said to be larger than the parties is a major stumbling block for the maturity
and institutionalisation of the parties” (Guardian 08.08.98).
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Figure 3. 1995 Parliamentary and Presidential Results in Shinyanga
4.2 Organisational Strength
The effects that organisational strength has on party institutionalisation seems
straight forward: How can these five opposition parties develop into viable
parties without some form of organisational capacity by which to conduct
party operations.
The analysis of the organisational strength of these five parties occurs on two
distinct levels. On one level, the organisational strength of a party is dictated
by a party’s degree of penetration into the local level, allowing a greater and
more targeted capacity for mobilisation, recruitment, campaigning, and voter
education. On this level and in comparison to the CCM, none of these parties
appear to have an adequate level of penetration except in a few select regions
considered to be their respective strongholds. Perhaps only the NCCRMageuzi,
in the past, began to intensively develop their organisational
presence at the grassroots levels. As for party institutionalisation, the lack of a
grassroots penetration detrimentally effects the ability for these parties in
strengthening its relations to local level party supporters and reduces their
ability in communicating to the electorate, thus weakening their value infusion
and reification potential.
A second level of analysis for organisational strength concerns the structuring
and functioning of party decision-making and executing organs. According to
Source: Mmuya 1997
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Shinyanga Urban
Solwa
Kishapu
Bariadi East
Bariadi West
Meatu
Kisesa
Kahama
Bukome
Msalala
Maswa
Const. Percentage Votes
CCM UDP CHADEMA NCCR-M Others
Source: Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee: 1997
0 % 20 % 40 % 60 % 80 % 100 %
Shinyanga Urban
Solwa
Kishapu
Bariadi East
Bariadi West
Meatu
Kisesa
Kahama
Bukome
Msalala
Maswa
Const. Percentage Votes
Mrema Mkapa Lipumba Cheyo
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the Randall-Svåsand model of party institutionalisation, parties having
adequately defined and adhered to methods of decision-making and task
executing are more likely to develop organisational stability than parties
where methods of decision-making are constantly up for grabs, thus being
vulnerable to personal power ambitions and factionalism.
Figure 4. Party Organisational Structure
Decision Organ Executing
Organ
National Level
Layout duplicated at the
Regional Level
District Level
Ward Level
Branch Level
Cell
Source: Mmuya 1998
The formal organisational arrangements of each of the five parties resembles
the organisational layout in figure 4. In reality, the lack of adequate finances
paired with weakly defined procedural arrangements contributes to significant
redefinitions of who and which organs conduct party decision-making. In all
five parties, important policies are oftentimes conceived, drafted, and adopted
within the executing organs, involving little or no inputs from the decisionmaking
organs. In addition, these weakly defined organisational arrangements,
in some cases, have proven ineffective in mediating the highly
personalised nature of party faction, resulting in further organisational
deterioration. The conflicts within the NCCR-Mageuzi, between former
Chairman Mrema and former Secretary General Mabere Marando that ended
in Mrema’s defection to the TLP, serve as a good example of the destruction
caused by unmediated cleavages (Mmuya 1998). Ultimately, due to these
personalised and unmediated cleavages, the party was reduced from a status as
one of the most promising opposition organisations to a party with a highly
questionable future. The parties that have exhibited organisational unity tend
to be small in size where challenges over leadership power remains minimal.
Perhaps the only two parties that have exhibited some degree of procedural
National Congress
National Executive Committee
Central Committee
Secretariat
National Chairperson
Vice Chairperson
Secretary General
Department Heads
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stability paired with larger amounts of power sharing among party leaders are
CHADEMA and CUF.
In sum, without sufficient organisational strength and coherence, it will be
difficult for these parties to recruit and mobilise local level support. In
addition, the lack of adequately defined and adhered to decision-making
procedure renders these five parties more vulnerable to personal power
struggles, consequences of which were evident in the destruction of the
NCCR-Mageuzi.
4.3 Reification
On par with what was discussed earlier, reification is the degree to which a
political party becomes taken for granted as an integral component of the
party system. The party name and symbols become commonly associated with
certain values, ideologies, and practices, whether good or bad in nature. The
focus of this section therefor, is on the values, ideologies, and practices that
Tanzanians associate with the major opposition parties and the efforts that
these parties have made in bolstering their image in the electorate.
A survey conducted in 1994 revealed that around 50 percent of the population
in Tanzania did not have any knowledge of the new political parties. In
addition, the survey itself consisted of a sample of 46 percent urban,
supposedly the most informed citizens. While there is little doubt that
opposition party awareness has increased since 1994, there are other findings
from this survey that appear more threatening to the ability of these
opposition parties in establishing a positive popular image. A wide number of
those interviewed in the survey indicated that they were unable to differentiate
between the arguments proposed by the opposition parties with those
proposed by the ruling party. Whatever the cause of this perceived lack of
policy differentiation, the important fact is that these parties are unable to
present themselves to the electorate as clear alternatives to the CCM (Ngware
1996).
Equally troublesome for party reification are the large number of opinions
that thought the opposition parties were “fragile, disorganised, [lacking]
leadership, resources and policies” and were unable in effectively challenging
the CCM (Ngware 1996: 21).
These opinions may have been partially overturned by the relatively high level
of parliamentary participation on the part of some of the opposition parties
since the 1995 elections. While remaining outside the shadow cabinet (filled
by the UDP and CUF), the NCCR-Mageuzi remained the de-facto opposition
leader in Parliament up until early 1997, when the Marando-Mrema conflict
rendered the party to a state of paralysis (Mmuya 1998). Afterwards, the UDP
essentially took over as the de-facto opposition leader for Mainland issues,
while CUF continued to express its interests over the Isles. Today,
parliamentary activity is widely reported in the print media, where at least
every few days articles are seen describing opposition parliamentary debate.
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Elections and campaigns serve as an opportunity for parties to market their
policies and gauge the electorate’s attitude regarding these policies. In nearly
every respect, none of these opposition parties have managed to fully capitalise
on the use of election campaigns as vehicles for marketing party platforms.
Instead, campaign tactics in by-elections and during the 1995 national
elections emphasised personalities over parties and the CCM’s track record
over alternative policies (Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee 1997). In
some cases, parties were represented by two different candidates each carrying
different party flags and symbols within the same constituency, an act that
probably portrayed disunity and promoted confusion among the electorate
(Limbu 1997). Perhaps the largest series of by-election blunders took place in
1997 in the Maketa, Muleba, and Arusha constituencies. In the Maketa and
Muleba by-elections, the NCCR-Mageuzi was unable to field candidates
simply because the two party factions were unable to agree on a common
candidate. The Arusha by-election would have been a certain victory for the
NCCR-Mageuzi had the two factions agreed to field Nyerere’s son,
Makongoro Nyerere, instead compromising on a weaker candidate. (National
Electoral Commission 1997). All-in-all, due to these internal squabbles over
by-election candidates, the NCCR-Mageuzi was seriously discredited.
Party practices and efforts aside, reification is also influenced by the general
attitudes that the electorate has regarding multiparty politics. Affirmative
attitudes toward multiparty politics are more likely to generate acceptance of
the new opposition parties than attitudes of pessimism. Yet, as indicated in
table 5, the 1991 Presidential Commission on multiparty change revealed that
over 77 percent of the Tanzanians wanted to continue with the single party
system (Presidential Commission Vol. 1). Gero Erdmann’s 1994 survey data is
relatively consistent with the findings of the Presidential Commission. While
55 percent of the urban sample supported multiparty change, the rural sample,
representing the largest population segment, gave the same support at only 43
percent. In the same survey, only 35 percent believed that multiparty politics
would strengthen democracy. Instead, the majority believed that multiparty
politics would strengthen tribalism, weaken national unity, and will contribute
nothing to the development of the country (Erdmann 1995: 9 -10).
Table 5: Continuation of the Single Party System

Yes No
Tanzania Mainland 79,7 % 19,0 %
Tanzania Zanzibar 56,4 % 43,0 %
Tanzania Total 77,2 % 21,5 %
Source: Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty Systems Vol. 1 199: 69
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Table 6: Possible effects of the Multiparty System

The multiparty system Rural Urban Total
Is a threat to national unity 68,4 % 54,1 % 61,8 %
Will strengthen tribalism & factionalism 67,1 % 51,9 % 60,1 %
Is hopeless 62,5 % 45,5 % 54,7 %
Will strengthen democracy 29,1 % 42,0 % 35,0 %
Source: Erdmann 1994: 10
In the final analysis, there is a strong likelihood that the attitudes regarding
these five parties remains largely pessimistic today. While parliamentary
participation is strong, particularly on the part of the UDP, it is unlikely that
such participation is well followed outside the urban areas. By far, the state
owned Radio Tanzania, often accused of CCM favouritism, is the most widely
used media source in the country (Ngware 1996), and may be unlikely to
grant credit to the opposition performance in parliament. Furthermore, the
inadequacies of election campaigns have failed in articulating party platforms
and policies that could enable a stronger basis for party reification. Finally,
positive party reification is significantly challenged by the persistence of high
levels of pessimism toward the effects of multiparty politics altogether,
pessimism continually exploited by CCM propaganda.
4.4 Party Autonomy
Based on the discussion in the reification section above, since the adoption of
multiparty politics in Tanzania was met with considerable scepticism, one
might suspect that the domestic drive for multiparty change originated from
political elites rather than grassroots mass movements. While some of the
founding members of these parties may have had common origins, the
founding leaders of these parties were almost unanimously urban elites
possessing a substantial access to financial resources. The elite nature of the
construction of these five parties, coupled with the organisational legacies of
the CCM and the one-party state, has powerful impacts on the functioning of
these parties today. Specifically, all of the parties discussed in this thesis, to a
varying degree resemble what one might call elite parties, where a handful of
political elites construct, finance, and manage their own political organisations
for the purposes of acquiring political power. On an even more narrow level,
one might attribute some of these parties as entrepreneur parties, where
foundation and construction processes are carried out by one elite.
The subject of this final empirical section concerns the degree to which that
these five parties, as political organisations, are distinctly autonomous entities
from extra-party organisations or a handful of party elites or party
entrepreneurs. In short, parties that rely on one extra-party organisation or a
few party leaders will “be less institutionalised than [parties] in which the
preservation of the organisation is not at the mercy of such factors” (Randall
& Svåsand 1999: 9).
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There are several specific issues that concern the party autonomy of these five
opposition parties. The first issue concerns the fact that all of the parties were
funded and founded by either one individual party entrepreneur or a handful
of party elites. In the UDP, party formation took place under the sole initiative
of the current party leader, in what appears to be a private business venture
under the authority of one party entrepreneur. In other cases, such as the
NCCR-Mageuzi and the TLP, parties were originally formed by a group of
elites, and over time became plagued by personal rivalries and claim staking,
ultimately becoming “susceptible to attempts at building cults of personality”
based on charisma and/or patronage (Olukoshi 1998: 30). Still, other cases,
such as CHADEMA and to a lesser extent CUF reflect situations where parties
were formed by groups of political and/or business elites and have managed to
thwart attempts at party personalisation, but nonetheless remain heavily
dependent on a small group of elite party leaders.
A second issue related to party autonomy strictly concerns the primary
revenue sources that each party depends on. In some respects, financial
dependence appears to rely on monopolised sources rather than a broad array
of contributors. Of course, some of the ‘narrowness’ in party contributions
relates to the narrow cleavages that some of these parties represent. Yet,
representing narrowly defined cleavages does not totally explain the apparent
dependence that each of these parties have on private business donations.
While CHADEMA and to a lesser extent the UDP were founded largely by
and financed from the business sector, all of the parties have come to be
heavily dependent on private business donations of some form. This same
trend is reflected in the CCM itself as it is forced to make ‘behind the scenes’
concessions to businesses in exchange for financial and electoral support. The
opposition’s reliance on the business sector is perplexed by the fact that the
CCM is able to monopolise these concessions through exclusive access to the
state, thus placing the incumbent regime at a strategically superior position for
attracting business affiliates. In short, over reliance on financial support from
the business sector has the potential of contributing to party instability should
these sponsors shift their loyalties elsewhere, such as to the CCM.
Another detrimental issue for party autonomy is the cases indicating that party
contributions are not channelled to the parties for organisational or
membership development in general. Instead, as evidenced by the personal
financial support lured by Mrema, a number of the private donations are
allocated directly to specific party leaders in hopes of enhancing their position
in the party and the electorate (Mmuya 1998). There is the likelihood that
these trends at some level are expressed in all of the opposition parties in the
form of personal alliance relationships. For party autonomy, personal alliances
are relationships that take place outside the party itself (Randall & Svåsand
1999: 17), elevating the role of the party leaders, possibly to the point that
party survival is dependent upon the party leader and his personal alliances.
The monopolisation and/or personalisation of party contributions are
compounded by the inability of these parties in deriving substantial portions
of their party finances from party membership fees due to the sheer level of
poverty found in Tanzania. In addition, the parties are unable to offset the
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reliance on business finances by linking up with the relatively vibrant forces in
civil society due to the Societies Ordinance Act that essentially prevents the
existence of such co-operation. All in all, this situation contributes to the
weakening of party autonomy by pushing party dependence into the hands of
the most financially endowed organisations and individuals, most of which are
found in the business sector.
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5 Conclusions
Judging from the discussion thus far, one might conclude that each of these
five parties are significantly unstable or exhibit vast vulnerability to destabilising
effects and are thus institutionally weak. Such a statement is
supported by at least three pieces of evidence. First, all of these parties, to a
varying degree, appear to be synonymous with their respective party leaders,
most evident in the TLP, with the charismatic populist Augustine Mrema, and
the UDP, with the well financed John Cheyo. With the seemingly strong
affiliations between the party leaders and their respective supporters, as
discussed under value infusion, coupled with the over-dependence on the
personal finances of the party leaders, as discussed under party autonomy,
party stability is simply a function of the stability of their party leaders.
The blurring of the distinction between party leaders and the parties
themselves is compounded by the second factor limiting party stability.
Specifically, each party, to a varying degree, appears lacking in adequately
defined or adhered to methods of decision-making or conflict resolution, a fact
pointed out by some of the party leaders themselves. All of these parties were
essentially formed and organised based on informal methods of decisionmaking,
yet rendered almost useless as party membership grew and more
complex issues found their way into leadership circles (Mmuya 1998: 98). In
the final analysis, weakly defined organisational procedures offers almost no
ability in constraining personal power ambitions and party factionalism,
further eroding party stability, as evident in the NCCR-Mageuzi.
A third key factor that limits the stability of these five parties is the fact that
all of them have yet to become institutions symbolising specific ideologies or
platforms outside their ability in criticising the incumbent regime, as identified
under reification and value infusion. As C. K. Omari points out:
“The major problem for many opposition parties in Tanzania is
that the candidates specialise in criticisms but fail to move to the
next stage, i.e. the campaign and policy formation phase” ((B)
1997: 83).
The values, symbols, and images that have been associated with these five
opposition parties thus far appears to partially reflect the underlying symbols
and values that have been associated with the Tanzanian multiparty system in
general, as evident by the Nyalali Commission, Erdmann, and Ngware studies.
In sum, parties that have not come to symbols positive and stable values have
a questionable long-term viability, particularly when faced by a thoroughly
entrenched incumbent regime such as the CCM.
Yet, it would be a vicious mistake to conclude that all five of these parties
offer no hope in developing institutional stability in the future. Such a
statement is clearly supported by four trends that have developed over the past
several years. The first aspect concerns the strength in value infusion between
parties and their supporters. While the empirical analysis suggests that party
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platforms and ideologies are weak and that the strength of the links between
party members and parties are weakened by the strength of the affiliations
between party members and party leaders, evidence also indicates that there
were obvious trends in the social background of some of the party supporters,
particularly obvious in CHADEMA, CUF, and at least at one time in the
NCCR-Mageuzi. In the NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA in particular, the
dominant social sector within each party appears to reflect the primary
emphasis within each party platform (agricultural emphasis for the NCCRMageuzi
and business for CHADEMA). In CHADEMA the current party rank
and file are overwhelmingly drawn from the small business and cash crop
sectors and, over time, may develop into a traditional affiliation base within
the party, even if the basis for these affiliations today are between leaders and
members. Even in the UDP, evidence suggests that party membership is largely
drawn on ethnic lines and may offer a strong basis for party support in the
future, eventually forming a core support group for the party itself. In this
particular case however, this eventuality will depend on the party leader’s
willingness to remain in politics; without John Cheyo the UDP would likely
cease to exist.
A second positive trend observed in Tanzanian opposition politics is that the
opposition parties, despite their unwillingness in focusing on platforms, has
largely succeeded in helping to politicise issues related to corruption and
transparency. John Cheyo and Augustine Mrema have been the two most
audible voices in attacking the CCM over the loss of revenues and
transparency due to the corruption disease. On a theoretical level, by
politicising corruption, a probable product of patron-client relations within
the neopatrimonial state itself, erodes the basis by which the CCM maintains
support and legitimacy with their respective clients, potentially pushing their
support into the opposition camp. During the 1995 presidential campaigns,
Mrema made painstaking efforts in politicising the unethical practices in the
government and the CCM. Naturally, the current President, Benjamin Mkapa,
afraid of defeat in the 1995 presidential race, began to focus much of his
campaign attention on corruption as well. In fact, his seemingly clean political
record was one of the reasons why he was chosen as a CCM presidential
candidate in the first place. Therefor, while the opposition parties may be
electorally and institutionally weak, they have managed to force the CCM and
the government to address issues of corruption and transparency and may
bolster their image as an effective challenge to the incumbent regime.
Efforts in politicising issues and events have also been carried out by some of
the parliamentary opposition parties. As alluded to in the reification section
evidence suggests that these parties are beginning to play a type of watchdog
in the Parliament and have successfully politicised opposition objections to
CCM legislation, particularly in relation to the recent legislation that allows
the presidential candidates to win elections with simple majority. Today,
rarely does a week go by without seeing a newspaper article discussing
Cheyo’s objections and alternatives to CCM legislation in parliament. As was
indicated under reification, parliamentary participation is a clear method for
establishing a party track record as well as assisting in platform articulation.
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Another positive sign that may assist in the institutionalisation of these parties
and the consolidation of multiparty democracy in general is the active role
that some parties are beginning to play in grassroots education in participation
and democracy. Electoral participation is particularly important in periods of
transition because it allows individuals at the grassroots level the chance in
helping shape new political institutions and government policy rather than
leaving the task to political elites. In particular, CHADEMA’s women’s wing
is heavily active in organising neighbourhood meetings for educating people
on their rights and duties within the new multiparty system. Attendees are
encouraged to participate in elections, civic organisations, and party activities
(Interview 28.10.99). Similar activities were observed in the youth wing of the
NCCR-Mageuzi (Interview 22.10.99). These types of activities help strengthen
the local level presence of the parties while, at the same time, promoting a
participatory atmosphere at the grassroots level.
At this point in time it is safe to suggest that all five of these parties are, to a
varying degree, institutionally weak. Perhaps CHADEMA and CUF, do to the
relatively stable nature of these parties, paired with a less personalised power
arrangement offer a clearer prospect for further institutionalisation and
stability. The current arrangement with respect the UDP and the TLP on the
other hand, greatly depends on the desires of their respective party leaders,
rendering these two parties as highly susceptible to de-stabilising effects. Due
to the party’s questionable future the NCCR-Mageuzi today should be seen as
an example of the effects of the destruction and instability that can result from
factional fighting and power personalisation.
However, compared with the TLP, CHADEMA’s support is relatively limited
and small in number. In this respect, if Mrema is willing to ride his political
career out in the TLP, over time, the party may develop into a stable and
durable political party, potentially eclipsing its smaller rivals. An equally
important aspect for party institutionalisation concerns the future of CUF, a
party not only divided between a Mainland faction and a faction representing
the Isles, but also between those CUF members on Zanzibar who support the
Union between the Island and the Mainland and those that want to see the
formation of an independent Zanzibar. If given the power to govern, this
division has a tremendous potential for tearing CUF into two, apparently
incompatible camps. All-in-all, while Tanzania may formally exist as a
multiparty system, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds the future existence
of these new parties that have emerged to challenge the legitimacy of the
CCM’s single-party rule.
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6 Literature List
Erdmann, Gero. Guided Democratisation: Political Perceptions and Attitudes in
Tanzania. Africa discussion Papers No.11, Breman. 1995.
Guardian, the. 8 August 1998, “Personalities Larger than Parties Says Varsity
Academic”. Ng’wanakilala, Fumbuka.
Ihonvbere, Julius O. economic crisis, Civil Society and Democratisation: The Case
of Zambia. African World Press, Inc., United States. 1996.
Interview. 22.10.99, NCCR-Mageuzi National Headquarters, Dar es Salaam.
Interview. 28.10.99, CHADEMA National Headquarters, Dar es Salaam.
Limbu, Festus. Experiences of Campaigning for a Parliamentary Seat. In Omari,
C.K. The Right to Choose a Leader: Reflection on the 1995 Tanzanian
General Elections. Dar es Salaam University Press, Tanzania. 1997: Chapter 5.
Maliyamkono, T. L. The Race for the Presidency: The first Multiparty Democracy
in Tanzania. Tema Publishers Company LTD., Dar es Salaam. 1995.
--- Tanzania on the Move. Tema Publishers Company, Ltd., Dar es Salaam. 1997.
Mmuya, Max and Chaligha, Amon. Towards Multiparty Politics in Tanzania. Dar es
Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1992.
--- Political Parties and Democracy in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam University Press,
Tanzania. 1994.
Mmuya, Max. Government and Political Parties in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam
University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1997.
--- Political Parties in Eclipse: Crises and Cleavages in Political Parties. Friedrich
Ebert Stiftung, Dar es Salaam. 1998.
Moore, Sally Falk. Post-Socialist Micro-Politics: Kilimanjaro, 1993. In “Africa:
Journal of the International African Institute”. Vol. 66 No. 4. 1996: 587-605.
Mukandala, Rwekaza S. Ideological Challenges of the Transition to Pluralism. In
Reflections on the Transition to Democracy in Tanzania. REDET, Dar es
Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1995: Chapter 4.
National Electoral Commission. Local Government Election Results. Unpublished
Document. 1994.
--- The Report of the National Electoral Commission for the Period From 14th
January, 1993 to 13th January, 1998. NEC. 1997.
Ngware, Suleiman. Local Government and Multipartism in Tanzania: Empirical
Findings. Unpublished Work. 1996.
Olukoshi, Adebayo O. Economic Crisis, Multipartyism, and Opposition Politics in
Contemporary Africa. In Olukoshi, Adebayo (Ed). The Politics of Opposition
in Contemporary Africa. Nordiska Afrikainsititutet, Stockholm. 1998: Chapter
1.
Omari, C. K. (A) Factors Which Influence Voters. In Omari, C. K. (Ed.). The Right
to Choose a Leader: Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian General Elections. Dar
es Salaam University Press, Dar es Salaam. 1997: Chapter 3.
--- (B) The Campaign Trail. In Omari, C. K. (Ed.). The Right to Choose a Leader:
Reflections on the 1995 Tanzanian General Elections. Dar es Salaam
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Randall, Vicky & Svåsand, Lars. Workshop on Democracy in the Third World:
What Should be Done? ECPR Joint session of Workshops, Mannheim,
Germany March 26-31, 1999.
Sundet, Geir (Ed). Democracy in Transition: The 1995 Elections in Tanzania.
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Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee. The 1995 Elections in Tanzania. Dar es
Salaam. 1997.
Summary
ISSN 0805-505X
ISBN 82-90584--63-6
In 1992, legislation formally ended the nearly 30 year domination
of the one-party state in Tanzania, part of a democratisation
wave that appeared to sweep through Africa in the
late 80s and early 90s. In Tanzania by 1993, there were a
total of 51 parties formally registered or in the process of
registering. Today, this fragmentation has been reduced to 13
legally registered political parties.
This article, as an abstract from an MPA thesis, focuses on
the institutionalisation of the five main opposition parties
that have emerged since 1992: the NCCR-Mageuzi,
CHADEMA, CUF, UDP, and TLP. Specifically, through the
use of a four dimensional party institutionalisation model,
this article discusses some of the key factors that limit these
five parties in operating as stable institutions in a political
environment still dominated by the incumbent regime, the
Chama Cha Mapinduzi.