Prof. Andrew wa UK: Itachukua muda gani kama bomu la nyuklia likirushwa na Russia kufika UK, na itakuwaje kama tukitaka kulitungua

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Profesa Andrew Futter, mhadhiri na mtafiti mwandamizi ktk maswala ya silaha za nyuklia Chuo kikuu cha Leicester, Uingereza, amehojiwa na chombo cha habari MyLondon kuhusu linakuwaje kuwaje shambulio la silaha za kinyuklia ktk mji, na namna gani laweza kudhibitiwa. Profesa Futter akawapigia mfano mbaya (Mungu aepushe) ili waelewe nini kitatokea endapo ikitokea Russia karusha kombora la silaha za nyuklia kwenda Uingereza.

Profesa Futter akasema jambo la kwanza kufahamu ni kuwa kimsingi London hatuna kinga dhidi ya silaha za nyuklia. Hatuna mifumo ya ulinzi wa anga ya kudungua makombora ya balistiki kama yakirushwa na Russia kuja UK.

Profesa Futter akaendelea kusema kuwa hata mifumo ya Ulinzi wa anga ya US na NATO iliyopo ktk base ya kijeshi ya Filingdales kaskazini ya Yorkshire hitaweza kuzuia makombora ya nyuklia toka Russia kwa sababu makombora ya Russia huwa yanakuwa na mfumo wa kutoa makombora dada (countermeasures) ya kuyashambulia makombora yatumwayo na mifumo ya ulinzi wa anga kuyatungua (makombora ya Russia).

Profesa Futter akaendelea kusema kuwa ikitokea kurushwa kombora la silaha ya nyuklia toka Russia tutakuwa na dakika 15 za kujiandaa kujibu shambulizi. Muda huo hautatutosha kufanya chochote kiuhalisia. Maofisa wa serikali watakuwa salama, kwani kuna sehemu zao maalumu za kujificha na kuwakinga na silaha za nyuklia.

Profesa Futter akaendelea kuelezea kuwa Russia inaweza kutuma silaha za nyuklia kwa njia tofauti tofauti zikiwemo kutumia madege maalumu ya kivita (bomber aircraft), nyambizi (submarines) na makombora (missiles). Hivyo shambulio la Russia laweza kuja toka ktk locations nyingi. Wakirusha shambulio toka sehemu ya Kaliningrad, iliyopo juu ya Poland, inaweza kuchukua takribani dakika 20 tu kufika kutua London.

Profesa akaendelea kusema kuwa Makombora ya nyuklia ya Russia yatasababisha maafa makubwa mno kwa sababu vichwa vyake (warheads) vina uzito mkubwa zaidi (kilotani 100 hadi 500) kuliko makombora ya nyuklia yaliyotumika ktk vita ya pili ya Dunia (kilotani 15 hadi 20). Kombora moja la uzani wa kilotani 15 hadi 20 lililotumika ktk vita ya pili ya Dunia liliua takribani watu 200,000. Matokeo ya kombora la Russia yatakuwa mabaya zaidi kulinganishwa na matokeo yaliyoonekana Nagasaki na Hiroshima.

======

March 1, 2022

By Josia Mortimer

Russian President Vladimir Putin is stepping up his rhetoric against the West, putting his nuclear arsenal on “special alert” over the weekend. His dangerous language has made the unlikely prospect of a nuclear attack on NATO allies - including the UK - slightly more likely.

But while the prospect of Vladimir Putin targeting London remains highly remote, what would a nuclear attack on the capital look like and how could it be mitigated? MyLondon spoke to Professor Andrew Futter, a senior University of Leicester academic and leading nuclear weapons expert. He took us through some (worst case) scenarios of Russia attack Britain, just so we’re prepared.

The first and most terrifying lesson is that Prof Futter said: “We aren’t protected, basically." He added: “We don’t have any way to intercept Russian ballistic missiles flying towards the UK.

"We might be able to block bomber aircraft, but much of the Russian nuclear arsenal is based on missiles. We would see missiles coming, we have satellites in North Yorkshire and access to US and NATO early warning systems.”

Can we defend ourselves?​

All this would give us about 15 minutes to prepare for a nuclear strike. Prof Futter added: “It wouldn’t give us time to do anything. Government officials might be ok, there is a bunker under Whitehall and some places VIPs can hide.” I wasn’t particularly reassured on hearing this.

Filingdales, a base in North Yorkshire, sees the UK play host to a US radar missile defence system, which has the ability to track but not intercept missiles. “The nascent US and NATO missile defence systems would have some capability against launches from the Middle East but not Russia,” Prof Futter says
.

While Ronald Reagan’s dream of a “Star Wars” space-based missile defence system never came to full fruition, the US does have a ballistic missile defence system with a site in Europe. But here’s the bad news from Prof Futter who said: “It has virtually zero capability against Russian missiles that can deploy countermeasures.” In other words, some of Russia’s nuclear weapons can strike down missiles that are trying to stop them. Bombs bombing bombs, essentially.

Why aren’t we protected?​

We know that the US has the ability to intercept some nuclear strikes. Britain, on the whole, does not. Why? “One of the reasons is because of a belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, because we believe our Trident system, based on submarines, would be very hard to attack,” Prof Futter says.

The theory is that anyone attacking the UK would run the risk of retaliation and any rational leader wouldn’t do it. And NATO is a nuclear alliance, so any attack on the UK would “almost certainly” involve the US.

But a nuclear deterrent only works if the other person plays the game. Prof Futter continued: “None of us have a crystal ball, but I don't see a nuclear attack on the UK being likely. It would an enormous escalation and suicidal. Putin said he’d raise the alert status, it’s not clear what that means. He has strategic weapons that are on alert already."


Where would a nuclear strike come from - and what would it do?​

Russia could deploys nuclear weapons in a number of ways - including bomber aircraft, submarines and missiles as part of a “strategic triad” of military kit. So any attack could come from a number of locations. Firing from Kaliningrad, just above Poland, however, wouldn’t take very long - roughly 20 minutes from launch before it would strike London.

The impact of a nuclear strike depends on how many weapons are used, the size of the “yield” or explosive power, and where they are detonated. It’s clear that any attack would be “pretty horrible”, Prof Futter says. “It wouldn’t take many nuclear weapons to destroy the UK as a functioning state," he added.

The two nuclear bombs used in the Second World War were around 15-20 kilotons each, leading to approximately 200,000 people dying. Most Russian warheads are believed to be at least 100kt, with some up to 500kt. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be insignificant in comparison,” says Prof Futter.

What would this do to London? The short and obvious answer to this is that a strike on this scale would destroy most of the capital, and kill hundreds of thousands of people. But there are two ways of dropping a nuke.

An “air burst” would see the bomb detonate over the city, which would cover a greater area but with less of an impact (though still enormous). Or Putin might target a missile silo, detonating on the ground with less geographical spread but a greater direct impact. Depending on the size of the blast, it would cover several square miles.

The scale of potential damage is best expressed by this graphic from Nuke Map, based on Google Maps and modelling of a 100 kiloton Russian nuke striking London’s centre.

The inner ring shows that a 100 kiloton "air burst" attack over the Strand would have a fireball radius of 380m. Anything inside that central orange ring would be vaporised, and basically anyone within the green zone would die, NukeMap analysts say. Meanwhile, most buildings would collapse in the next ring, wiping out most of the City of London, Westminster, Mayfair, Elephant and Castle and northern Lambeth.


“It’s not just the amount of things you destroy, it’s the fact you have mass panic, hospitals destroyed, transport doesn’t work, food system is disrupted, information blackout, no access to clean water or power. You have no government, no financial sector. All the things that happened with Covid in the first lockdown would be magnified many times," Prof Futter says.

Threat level​

More likely than an attack on the UK, there is a chance that Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapons might be used against troops or military installations along the NATO Belarus/Ukraine border, Prof Futter says. But that too remains a remote prospect, radiation and fallout would likely impact Russia and Russian supporters in Ukraine, which wouldn’t do Putin any favours.

Instead, his nuclear rhetoric is a signal to NATO to do nothing, given there’s a sword of Damocles hanging over Western countries’ heads. So, should we be worried? “We should be concerned, but there isn’t an obvious way of doing anything different soon. We put our eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence.” Let’s hope Putin isn’t a fan of eggs.

A government spokesperson would not respond to these questions directly, but told MyLondon: “As the Prime Minister has said, Russia’s actions are an attempt to distract from the reality of what is going on in Ukraine.

“What we are seeing is innocent people facing a totally unprovoked act of aggression against them, and in response they’re fighting back with a far greater level of resistance than the Kremlin had bargained for.”

 

The Changing Character of War Centre








Book Review: 2017: War With Russia. An Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command by Andrew Monaghan


BOOK REVIEW: 2017: WAR WITH RUSSIA. AN URGENT WARNING FROM SENIOR MILITARY COMMAND BY ANDREW MONAGHAN
Andrew Monaghan
June 10, 2016
2017: War With Russia. An Urgent Warning from Senior Military Command. General Sir Richard Shirreff. London: Coronet, 2016. Hb. 436pp. ISBN 978-1-473-63222-6

Until 2014 the idea of a Europe “whole, free and at peace” dominated the thinking of Western politicians and officials. Indeed, the notion of state-to-state war in Europe was so unthinkable that it did not feature in the discussion, even in fiction.

European armed forces were reconfigured to address different problems, and, in many cases, they were significantly reduced in size, with high performance and heavy weapons withdrawn or mothballed. The war in Ukraine has deeply shaken that sense of security.

It has generated much concern about Moscow challenging the post-Cold War European architecture and potentially testing NATO’s collective defence by launching an attack on the Baltic States.
Framed as a “future history”, Richard Shirreff’s book is intended as a “wakeup call” for Western leaders, and emphasises the need for NATO to be ready to repel looming further Russian aggression that imperils both the independence of NATO members and existence of NATO.

A retired British Army general, and, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), NATO’s senior European officer until March 2014, the month after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Shirreff certainly reflects on these challenges with vim.

He has written what he calls a “fact-based prediction”, blurring the lines between fiction and war game scenario modelling based on what he knows from his time in service.

In so doing, he echoes General Sir John Hackett’s book, The Third World War, first published in the late 1970s. Indeed, there are other potential comparisons: Hackett published a controversial letter in The Times in 1968 criticising the British government’s apparent lack of concern over the strength of NATO forces in Europe, signing the letter not as a British officer, but as a NATO commander.

Similarly, when he was Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond sought formal action against Shirreff for the latter’s criticisms of defence cuts, though this was not possible since Shirreff was formally a NATO officer rather than a British one.

The mix of fiction and fact certainly lends some advantages to the author, most particularly the ability to air a series of views across a rather wide range of subjects that might have been harder to make in a more formal set of memoires. Thus Shirreff can raise themes that will be familiar to many still in service. But it also means that the book is neither fish nor fowl, and builds in a number of problems.

The fiction fairly rattles along, though it also often clunks, whether because of repetition or because of the nature of many of the characters involved: the women are blond and sporty, the Russians are villains straight from central casting – the president bares his teeth as he smiles, thumps the table, and with ‘eyes cold and voice deadpan’, ‘grins wolfishly’ – replete with canned dialogue.

Nor is Shirreff subtle. If careful readers will detect the passing ghost of Alexander Lebed, there are numerous hints that the 2017 Russian leadership are soviet, even Stalinist: in the book, the Director of the FSB (the Russian security service), is Lavrentiy Pavlovich Merkulov, a nod to Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beria, Stalin’s infamous chief of Soviet Security.

More obvious still are the frequent Hitler and the second world war analogies. On one of the numerous occasions when this analogy is raised, one of the characters even confirms this as a ‘Good analogy’. It is not. It is a cliché that has had all the meaningful informative capacity beaten out of it long ago, and now merely serves to short circuit thinking through emotional overload.

The criticisms of self-serving British and European politicians and officials are also boomed at the same forceful pitch throughout. British Defence Secretary “Everage”, who became rich in business but does not understand his current brief, comes in for particularly severe punishment for implementing the defence cuts which have left the UK and NATO in such a perilous position. But so does Number 10 for being focus group dependent and too attentive to their popularity ratings, and for seeking to include parliament in a decision to go to war. Thus there is ‘precious little proper strategic thinking’ going on in Number 10, apparently, and responses to the crisis are (at least initially) ill thought out and incomplete, with tragic consequences.

Shirreff also trains his fire on the Royal Navy’s new aircraft-less aircraft carriers and some NATO ambassadors. The author’s alter ego often emerges as these points are made, and to ensure they are driven home, they are made in turn by each character group: British generals, American politicians, and even, helpfully, the Russians all pile in to the attack on the capabilities, resilience, intelligence and moral fibre of the UK and NATO.

Some – even much – of this is fair enough. But each of his targets will retort that they have been only moderately served: the senior service that it’s a typical “army view” of the aircraft carriers, and responsibility is more widely shared; politicians that in today’s world, focus groups are an unavoidable element of today’s democratic politics, and, besides, shouldn’t a decision to go to war be taken through parliament?

The risk, therefore, is that the noise of axes being ground – occasionally rather vituperatively – is so loud that it may drown out the perfectly reasonable and important points that Shirreff seeks to make.

And the “fact-based prediction”? Yes, NATO certainly faces many of the challenges that Shirreff describes. And relations between Russia and the West have become competitive and adversarial to the extent that war cannot be excluded – witness Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian jet in late 2015, an act which the Russian prime minister suggested had given Russia the legal grounds to go to war.

These points alone make Shirreff’s message important, again underlined by the further point that the modernisation of the Russian armed forces is well under way. It is reasonable to assume that this will continue, altering the balance of power in European security.

This will become increasingly significant because Moscow has repeatedly and explicitly stated its disagreements with NATO, and its dislike of the way that the current architecture stands. Shirreff’s depiction of the role of the new Russian National Defence Centre is well noted, as is the way he points to new equipment and capabilities, even if the Russian defence industry will have to hurry up to produce sufficiently significant quantities of that equipment to meet his deadline of 2017.

It is perhaps a shame, though, that the reasons for Russia launching a war against NATO are so simplified.
The book’s fact-based scenario nature acts both as a narrative crutch and a prison, and means that developments are often telegraphed early and rather obviously, most notably one big tragedy which feels inevitable almost as soon as it enters the story. It also limits the scope of the book where real flights of imaginative fiction could perhaps have driven the author’s points home more effectively. This raises three points.

First, the scenario Shirreff uses is a (slight) variation of the mainstream one already widely in service in the media (it is very similar to that used by the BBC in a docu-drama in which Shirreff participated about the possibility of war with Russia) and think tanks, one which extrapolates from how the war in Ukraine evolved, which is then packaged and converted into a step-by-step escalation that plays strongly to Western fears.

It is plausible, and certainly a recognisable indication of what many people are thinking about. But it entrenches a degree of intellectual rigidity in what is a dynamic and evolving situation; it emits the faint whiff of preparing to fight the last war.

Indeed, it has a serious downside of perhaps anchoring thinking too strongly to events of early 2014, rather than how they might evolve in 2017. In real life, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valeriy Gerasimov is among those who note the truism that no two wars are the same.

Second, the Russians too easily play to expected form. They are also criticised by for not reading their Clausewitz (p.232). To the contrary, the Russian military leadership are good Clausewitzians, particularly in terms of taking into account the reality of war and its human dimension, perhaps better even than many in Western armed forces. If Shirreff is today’s Hackett, therefore, it is to be hoped that someone will soon also seek to be today’s Ralph Peters.

An American military intelligence analyst, in 1989 Peters published Red Army: A Novel of Tomorrow’s War, a novel that explored such a situation from the Soviet side. This would be particularly useful today as a means of highlighting the large, and growing gulf between the West and Russian in terms how these matters are seen.

At the very least, it is to be hoped that Shirreff may follow further in Hackett’s steps, since the latter produced a second version of his The Third World War, the “untold story”, which included more detail from the Soviet side.

Third, the model scenario has a built in weakness. Though it starts energetically and plausibly enough, the Russians quite quickly begin to run into fairly obvious problems (which begs the question – would they really do it this way?). Furthermore, though the main thrust of the argument is the lack of NATO capacity, in the end the resolution relies on what NATO has – capable thinkers, cyber security, special forces, air forces and small infantry units.

All told, therefore, 2017: War with Russia is a curate’s egg of a book. The central messages that Russia should no longer be treated as a sideshow or distraction, indeed that it is posing an increasingly obvious challenge to the European security architecture, and that warfare is evolving – and that combined, all this needs serious attention – are very important. It is to be hoped that they survive accusations of sensationalism or critiques of style or evidence.

Dr. Andrew Monaghan is a Visiting Fellow at the Changing Character of War Programme. He is also a Senior Research Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, where his work is supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation. He is the author of The New Politics of Russia: Interpreting Change, to be published by Manchester University Press in July 2016.
 
Profesa Andrew Futter, mhadhiri na mtafiti mwandamizi ktk maswala ya silaha za nyuklia Chuo kikuu cha Leicester, Uingereza, amehojiwa na chombo cha habari MyLondon kuhusu linakuwaje kuwaje shambulio la silaha za kinyuklia ktk mji, na namna gani laweza kudhibitiwa. Profesa Futter akawapigia mfano mbaya (Mungu aepushe) ili waelewe nini kitatokea endapo ikitokea Russia karusha kombora la silaha za nyuklia kwenda Uingereza.

Profesa Futter akasema jambo la kwanza kufahamu ni kuwa kimsingi London hatuna kinga dhidi ya silaha za nyuklia. Hatuna mifumo ya ulinzi wa anga ya kudungua makombora ya balistiki kama yakirushwa na Russia kuja UK.

Profesa Futter akaendelea kusema kuwa hata mifumo ya Ulinzi wa anga ya US na NATO iliyopo ktk base ya kijeshi ya Filingdales kaskazini ya Yorkshire hitaweza kuzuia makombora ya nyuklia toka Russia kwa sababu makombora ya Russia huwa yanakuwa na mfumo wa kutoa makombora dada (countermeasures) ya kuyashambulia makombora yatumwayo na mifumo ya ulinzi wa anga kuyatungua (makombora ya Russia).

Profesa Futter akaendelea kusema kuwa ikitokea kurushwa kombora la silaha ya nyuklia toka Russia tutakuwa na dakika 15 za kujiandaa kujibu shambulizi. Muda huo hautatutosha kufanya chochote kiuhalisia. Maofisa wa serikali watakuwa salama, kwani kuna sehemu zao maalumu za kujificha na kuwakinga na silaha za nyuklia.

Profesa Futter akaendelea kuelezea kuwa Russia inaweza kutuma silaha za nyuklia kwa njia tofauti tofauti zikiwemo kutumia madege maalumu ya kivita (bomber aircraft), nyambizi (submarines) na makombora (missiles). Hivyo shambulio la Russia laweza kuja toka ktk locations nyingi. Wakirusha shambulio toka sehemu ya Kaliningrad, iliyopo juu ya Poland, inaweza kuchukua takribani dakika 20 tu kufika kutua London.

Profesa akaendelea kusema kuwa Makombora ya nyuklia ya Russia yatasababisha maafa makubwa mno kwa sababu vichwa vyake (warheads) vina uzito mkubwa zaidi (kilotani 100 hadi 500) kuliko makombora ya nyuklia yaliyotumika ktk vita ya pili ya Dunia (kilotani 15 hadi 20). Kombora moja la uzani wa kilotani 15 hadi 20 lililotumika ktk vita ya pili ya Dunia liliua takribani watu 200,000. Matokeo ya kombora la Russia yatakuwa mabaya zaidi kulinganishwa na matokeo yaliyoonekana Nagasaki na Hiroshima.

======

March 1, 2022

By Josia Mortimer

Russian President Vladimir Putin is stepping up his rhetoric against the West, putting his nuclear arsenal on “special alert” over the weekend. His dangerous language has made the unlikely prospect of a nuclear attack on NATO allies - including the UK - slightly more likely.

But while the prospect of Vladimir Putin targeting London remains highly remote, what would a nuclear attack on the capital look like and how could it be mitigated? MyLondon spoke to Professor Andrew Futter, a senior University of Leicester academic and leading nuclear weapons expert. He took us through some (worst case) scenarios of Russia attack Britain, just so we’re prepared.

The first and most terrifying lesson is that Prof Futter said: “We aren’t protected, basically." He added: “We don’t have any way to intercept Russian ballistic missiles flying towards the UK.

"We might be able to block bomber aircraft, but much of the Russian nuclear arsenal is based on missiles. We would see missiles coming, we have satellites in North Yorkshire and access to US and NATO early warning systems.”

Can we defend ourselves?​

All this would give us about 15 minutes to prepare for a nuclear strike. Prof Futter added: “It wouldn’t give us time to do anything. Government officials might be ok, there is a bunker under Whitehall and some places VIPs can hide.” I wasn’t particularly reassured on hearing this.

Filingdales, a base in North Yorkshire, sees the UK play host to a US radar missile defence system, which has the ability to track but not intercept missiles. “The nascent US and NATO missile defence systems would have some capability against launches from the Middle East but not Russia,” Prof Futter says
.

While Ronald Reagan’s dream of a “Star Wars” space-based missile defence system never came to full fruition, the US does have a ballistic missile defence system with a site in Europe. But here’s the bad news from Prof Futter who said: “It has virtually zero capability against Russian missiles that can deploy countermeasures.” In other words, some of Russia’s nuclear weapons can strike down missiles that are trying to stop them. Bombs bombing bombs, essentially.

Why aren’t we protected?​

We know that the US has the ability to intercept some nuclear strikes. Britain, on the whole, does not. Why? “One of the reasons is because of a belief in the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, because we believe our Trident system, based on submarines, would be very hard to attack,” Prof Futter says.

The theory is that anyone attacking the UK would run the risk of retaliation and any rational leader wouldn’t do it. And NATO is a nuclear alliance, so any attack on the UK would “almost certainly” involve the US.

But a nuclear deterrent only works if the other person plays the game. Prof Futter continued: “None of us have a crystal ball, but I don't see a nuclear attack on the UK being likely. It would an enormous escalation and suicidal. Putin said he’d raise the alert status, it’s not clear what that means. He has strategic weapons that are on alert already."


Where would a nuclear strike come from - and what would it do?​

Russia could deploys nuclear weapons in a number of ways - including bomber aircraft, submarines and missiles as part of a “strategic triad” of military kit. So any attack could come from a number of locations. Firing from Kaliningrad, just above Poland, however, wouldn’t take very long - roughly 20 minutes from launch before it would strike London.

The impact of a nuclear strike depends on how many weapons are used, the size of the “yield” or explosive power, and where they are detonated. It’s clear that any attack would be “pretty horrible”, Prof Futter says. “It wouldn’t take many nuclear weapons to destroy the UK as a functioning state," he added.

The two nuclear bombs used in the Second World War were around 15-20 kilotons each, leading to approximately 200,000 people dying. Most Russian warheads are believed to be at least 100kt, with some up to 500kt. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki would be insignificant in comparison,” says Prof Futter.

What would this do to London? The short and obvious answer to this is that a strike on this scale would destroy most of the capital, and kill hundreds of thousands of people. But there are two ways of dropping a nuke.

An “air burst” would see the bomb detonate over the city, which would cover a greater area but with less of an impact (though still enormous). Or Putin might target a missile silo, detonating on the ground with less geographical spread but a greater direct impact. Depending on the size of the blast, it would cover several square miles.

The scale of potential damage is best expressed by this graphic from Nuke Map, based on Google Maps and modelling of a 100 kiloton Russian nuke striking London’s centre.

The inner ring shows that a 100 kiloton "air burst" attack over the Strand would have a fireball radius of 380m. Anything inside that central orange ring would be vaporised, and basically anyone within the green zone would die, NukeMap analysts say. Meanwhile, most buildings would collapse in the next ring, wiping out most of the City of London, Westminster, Mayfair, Elephant and Castle and northern Lambeth.


“It’s not just the amount of things you destroy, it’s the fact you have mass panic, hospitals destroyed, transport doesn’t work, food system is disrupted, information blackout, no access to clean water or power. You have no government, no financial sector. All the things that happened with Covid in the first lockdown would be magnified many times," Prof Futter says.

Threat level​

More likely than an attack on the UK, there is a chance that Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapons might be used against troops or military installations along the NATO Belarus/Ukraine border, Prof Futter says. But that too remains a remote prospect, radiation and fallout would likely impact Russia and Russian supporters in Ukraine, which wouldn’t do Putin any favours.

Instead, his nuclear rhetoric is a signal to NATO to do nothing, given there’s a sword of Damocles hanging over Western countries’ heads. So, should we be worried? “We should be concerned, but there isn’t an obvious way of doing anything different soon. We put our eggs in the basket of nuclear deterrence.” Let’s hope Putin isn’t a fan of eggs.

A government spokesperson would not respond to these questions directly, but told MyLondon: “As the Prime Minister has said, Russia’s actions are an attempt to distract from the reality of what is going on in Ukraine.

“What we are seeing is innocent people facing a totally unprovoked act of aggression against them, and in response they’re fighting back with a far greater level of resistance than the Kremlin had bargained for.”

Ina maana Russia tu ndio ana nyuklia wengine hawana?

Na nadhani wameshafanya reaearch wamejua uwezo wa hayo makombora,sio kwamba US na UK hawajui.

Wanajua kila kitu
 
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