Mama Amon
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- Mar 30, 2018
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A challenge of information disorder in the post-truth era: A critical examination of disinformation, misinformation and malinformation related to 53 years of Humanae Vitae since 1968
Pope JOhn Paul VI, the author of of the encyclical entitled "Humanae Vitae" aka "Of Human Life"
Pope JOhn Paul VI, the author of of the encyclical entitled "Humanae Vitae" aka "Of Human Life"
For some reason, under this thread, there emerged a discussion on contraception. The topic under discussion was about whether contraception is intrinsically evil or otherwise.
One commentator, Nundu_Tanzania, who appears to be conversant with moral philosophy, theology and the like, when asked to state some reasons often used to support the claim that "contraception is intrinsically evil," simply responded by suggesting that there is no need for us to discuss them as there are our superiors out there doing the thinking for us.
But allowing another person to think for us means delegating our capacity to think for some reason. That reason was too difficult for me to see quickly.
I believe that, we can and should think of ourselves, by ourselves and for ourselves until when it is necessary for us to outsource competent consultants to think for us, that is, when the matter under discussion is beyond our competences.
In the prsent case, I believe we can think properly about contraception without external assistance. I wish to show an example on how to do this.
My point of departure will be the question: Why was contraception declared by Pope Paul VI in 1968 to be an intrinsically wrong human action, and was he right?
What I shall do and not do in this analysis
But before embarking on this discussion, I propose to say something about what I want to do and what I will not do by distinguishing between the roles of a philosopher and the roles of a theologian.
My work as a philosopher is to be judged on the basis of the cogency of my arguments and of the evidence he marshals. As a philosopher I shall first of all be an acute observer of all that is, and I must do my best to relate it.
I must form my premises, and from these draw my conclusions. My conclusions should be judged entirely based on how well they are contained in his premises. My premises should be open for all other philosophers to criticize.
As a philosopher I do not, and shall not, ask anywone to believe me. I must be able to prove the correctness of my premises and my conclusions, and then only asks others to reason with him.
As opposed to the philosopher, a Christian believer does not have to approach something he believes with the same critical and even skeptical attitude as the philosopher approaches a philosophical conclusion.
The Christian believer holds that somehow the One creative God has revealed himself through the prophets and finally in Jesus Christ. He believes the “something” of his faith solely because Someone has revealed it.
He does not demand proof from God, for to do so would amount to saying that God was not believable on his own word but had to approach us in the same way as any one of the philosophers.
In the classic and still valid definition of theology, the believer simply embraces faith seeking understanding.
The professional theologian differs from the ordinary inquiring believer not in kind but rather by degree and intensity.
He devotes time, perhaps his full time, to the study of his faith. He is aware that whenever someone begins to think about anything, he does so in terms of his own background.
He therefore seeks to learn from the theologians of the past, to filter out that which has a timeless value, and to leave behind that which was only a reflection of the mode of their day. In this analysis, I won't play the role of a theologian. (Kippley 1991:138).
The core teaching of Humanae vitae
In 1968, Pope Paul VI totally banned contraception, which he minimally defined as "any [positive] action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end [in itself] or as a means [to some further end]." (Humanae Vitae 1968, par. 14). This definition arbitrarily excludes natural family planning.
A maximal definition of contraception could have been minimally defined as "any [positive and negative] action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end [in itself] or as a means [to some further end]." This definition includes natural family planning.
Pope Francis addressing the believers
I propose that, the Pope’s argument against contraception has philosophical premises as opposed to theological premises.
Specifically, the Papal teaching against contraception is based on the moral philosophy of natural law. I suggest that, the core teaching is contained in the following text:
"1. ... [T]he recent course of human society and the concomitant changes have provoked new questions... they concern matters intimately connected with the life and happiness of human beings.
"2. This new state of things gives rise to new questions... [which boil down to this one question:] if one were to apply here the so called principle of totality, could it not be accepted that the intention to have a less prolific but more rationally planned family might transform an action which renders natural processes infertile into a licit and provident control of birth?
"Could it not be admitted, in other words, that procreative finality applies to the totality of married life rather than to each single act?
"8. Marriage … is … the wise and provident institution of … husband and wife, [where] through that mutual gift of themselves, which is specific and exclusive to them alone, develop that union of two persons in which they perfect one another … in the generation and rearing of new lives … married … is above all fully human, a compound of sense and spirit…, an act of the free will, …Total … personal friendship in which husband and wife generously share everything, allowing no unreasonable exceptions… faithful and exclusive of all other … until death… Finally, this love is fecund… [since it] contrives to … to bring new life into being.
"11. The Church... teaches that each and every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life .
"12. This particular doctrine often expounded by the magisterium of the Church, is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage act...
"13. … man does not have unlimited dominion over his body in general … [including] his specifically sexual faculties…
"14. … to argue, as a justification for sexual intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive, that a lesser evil is to be preferred to a greater one, or that such intercourse would merge with procreative acts of past and future to form a single entity, and so be qualified by exactly the same moral goodness as these [is to invoke the principle of totality].
"Though [the principle of totality teaches that] it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons,… to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, … even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general.
"Consequently, it is a serious error to think that a whole married life of otherwise normal relations can justify sexual intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive and so intrinsically wrong.
"17. [thus,] this course of action could open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering of moral standards… [, to] reduce [the woman] to being a mere instrument for the satisfaction of [man’s] own desires, … [and] public authorities who care little for the precepts of the moral law… [and decide] to resolve the problems affecting an entire country [by resorting] to the same measures [based on the principle of totality] as are regarded as lawful by married people in the solution of a particular family difficulty…
"[Also,] we must accept that there are certain limits, beyond which it is wrong to go, to the power of man over his own body and its natural functions... These limits are expressly imposed because of the reverence due to the whole human organism and its natural functions, in the light of … a correct understanding of the ‘principle of totality’…”
“18. … It could never be right for [the Church] to declare lawful what is in fact unlawful, since that, by its very nature, is always opposed to the true good of man. In preserving intact the whole moral law of marriage, the Church is convinced that she is contributing to the creation of a truly human civilization.” (Humanae Vitae 1968: 1, 2, 8, 11-14, 17, 18)
From this excerpt, it appears to me that, Humanae Vitae defends the following six claims:
- That, contraception will cause an increase in disrespect for an inseparable link between the unitive significance and procreative significance of human sexuality;
- That, contraception will cause an increase in marital infidelity;
- That, contraception will cause a general degradation of sexual morality that ultimately leads o the redefinition of marriage;
- That, contraception will cause the loss of respect for wives as persons on the part of their husbands, and of women in general on the part of men;
- That, contraception will cause an the decision of some governments to impose population control through contraception, sterilization or abortion on their own people; and
- That, contraception will cause the tendency of persons to wrongly think that they should have an absolute dominion over their own bodies, including their procreative powers.
Further, he claims that, "in order to show that contraception is the wrong thing to do for everybody" the basic argument should therefore be "an argument on the philosophical level."
Based on paragraph number 12 of Humanae Vitae, Rhonheimer argues that, ’Humanae Vitae’ teaches four things:
"First that [natural coitus which is free from a contra-life intervention is a sign that] has two fundamental meanings [where, by reason of its nature as a unitive sign it carries] the meaning of loving union of the spouses ('unitive meaning') and [by reason of its nature as a procreative sign it carries] the meaning of transmission of human life ('procreative meaning').
"Second, that according to the [natural] design of the Creator these two meanings are inseparably connected.
Third, that man on his own initiative may not break this connection.
"And fourth, ‘Humanae Vitae’ affirms that by contraception the connection of these two meanings in fact is broken…
According to Rhonheimer, the first, second and third teacheings jointly form what he called the "inseparability principle," which "must first be rightly understood so as to deal correctly with the last question." Professor Christian Brugger (2018), wrote an article entitled "A Re-reading of Humanae Vitae via the online portal called "The Christian Thing."
Through this article he interpreted the first, second and third claims of the inseparability principle by stating that, they mean to say that: each and every marital sex act is causally "unitive and procreative in type".
Brugger (2018) presents his interpretation this way:
"Marriage is a unitive and procreative type of friendship.
The sexual act that takes its name from that friendship – the marital act – is likewise a unitive and procreative type of act.
"People may engage in all sorts of sexual acts, but only sexual acts that are unitive and procreative in type are conjugal – are marital – acts.
"If the actors in any sexual act reject either or both of the goods of marriage, then the act, whatever else it is, is not a marital type of act.
This follows logically from Pope Paul’s unity/procreation paradigm.
This was of interpreting the inseparability thesis, is more helpful too, as it allows us to reason about the relationship between sex acts which are causally unitive in type and causally procreative in type , on one hand, and those which are causally unitive in token and causally procreative in token, on the other hand.
And based on these interpretive works, my own reading of Humanae Vitae as quoted above, shows that, when the text is fully unpacked, the following two broad arguments are embedded therein:
The argument from the inseparability thesis (Humanae Viate 1-12):
- Marriage is an interpersonal relationship which is unitive and procreative in type.
- Each and every ac of coitus is a unitive sign that points to organic unity between a copulating pair.
- Each and every ac of coitus is a procreative sign that points to organic unity between the father, mother and their biological child.
- Procreative significance is inherent in each and every act of coitus, the latter being a procreative sign.
- Unitive significance is inherent in each and every act of coitus, the latter being a unitive sign.
- There is an inseparable link between the unitive significance and procreative significance of coitus
- Intentionally separating the link between the unitive and procreative significance breaks the natural law.
- Breaking the natural law is a moral evil.
- Contraception breaks the natural law.
- Thus, contraception is a moral evil.
Pope John Paul II
The argument from slippery slope toward wider moral degradation (Humane Vitae 13-18)
1. Although the principle of totality teaches that it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil in order to avoid a greater evil or in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons,… to intend directly something which of its very nature contradicts the moral order, … even though the intention is to protect or promote the welfare of an individual, of a family or of society in general.
2. Promoters of contraception argue that, the totality of married life of otherwise normal relations can justify sexual intercourse which is closed to the transmission of life, since, according to the principle of totality, such contracepted sex acts would merge with past and future uncontracepted sex acts to form a single entity, and so be qualified by exactly the same moral goodness as these.
3. By reason of embracing the principle of totality which violates the moral principle according to which, “it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, to do evil that good may come of it,” contraception is similar to the following human acts: marital infidelity, general lowering of moral standards, reducing the woman to a mere instrument for the satisfaction of man’s own desires, solving national problems by public authorities by resorting to the principle of totality, and controlling the natural functions of human body to the extent of impairing the whole human organism and its natural functions.
4. Thus, the acceptance of contraception will open wide the way for marital infidelity; general lowering of sexual moral standards prohibiting divorce, euthansia, abortion, total acceptance of our-of-wedlock pregnancies, homosexual relations (often abbreviated to D.E.A.T.H); reducing the woman to a mere instrument for the satisfaction of man’s own desires; public authorities solving national problems by resorting to the principle of totality; and controlling the natural functions of human body to the extent of impairing the proper functions of the whole human organism.
5. All of these acts are always opposed to the true good of man and contribute nothing to the creation of a truly human civilization.
6. Thus, contraception should be absolutely banned.
In this argument, Pope Paul VI presents the argument drawn from the principle of totality as entailing the violation of the principle which states that evil may not be done that good might come out of it.
Pope John Paul II
Framing a conceptual framework for understanding the arguments
And given these arguments, it becomes obvious that, we need a conceptual framework by the help of which we can understand and successfully communicate the argument to others.
In light of the terminology used in the above argument, it appears to me that, this framework should include a discussion of the principles of biological principles of conception, etiological principles of action types, action tokens, token-level causes and type-level causes, and semiotic principles relating to signs, signifier and the signified.
The next section attempts to unleash a typical conceptual framework, within the limits of my researched understanding.
Heterosexual preproduction cycle
Sex is a procreative activity. A procreative activity is an activity that causes reproduction bthrough a sexual reproduction cycle. This process has the following steps: gametogenesis, heterophilic attraction, copulation, fertilization, compaction, cavitation, hatching, implantation, organogenesis during gestation, delivery, parenting, and gametogenesis. Only copulation, delivery, and parenting are under human choice. Thus, copulation is a procreative activity or a reproductive activity.
Generally, sexual reproduction cycle is a process of transmitting life from heterosexually complimentary parents to their children. It has at least twelve (12) steps, namely:
- Gametogenesis--The development and production of the male and female germ cells (sperm and ovum) required to form a new individual,
- heterophilic attraction--a mode of sexual cooperation by which an androphilic female is erotically pulled toward a gynephilic male and vice versa,
- sexual foreplay--a process by which opposite sexual partners enhance their sexual arousal through petting, caressing, necking, kissing, rubbing, and the like.
- copulation--the process in which the couple adjust their bodies so that the head of the male’s penis is inside the female’s vagina, and then move in a manner that causes the membrane covering the head of the penis to be stimulated until the male’s orgasm occurs, whereupon the penis becomes limp and intercourse naturally ends,
- fertilization--the process involving the fusion of male and female gametes to form a zygote,
- compaction--the process in which the cells change their shapes and align themselves closely together,
- cavitation--the process in which an inner cavity is formed within the embryo and the embryo differentiates itself into the inner cell mass and the trophoblast,
- hatching--the process by which the embryo emerges from the zona pellucida—the membrane enveloping the ovum that the sperm had to penetrate for fertilization to occur— preparing to begin implantation,
- implantation--the attachment of the fertilized egg or blastocyst to the wall of the uterus at the start of pregnancy,
- organogenesis/gestation--the period of development inside the womb between conception and birth where the embryo's body is differentiated into different organs, and hence the term organogenesis,
- delivery--the process of giving birth,
- parenting--the activity of bringing up a child as a parent, and
- gametogenesis--The development and production of the male and female germ cells (sperm and ovum) required to form a new individual.
Heterogenital complementarity refers to the biological, genital distinction between male and female, where the genitals function properly, capable of engaging in sexual intercourse. It refers to the fact that the male and female genitals (penis and vagina) are oriented to each other and are completed by each other.
On the other hand, reproductive complementarity refers to the ability of a particular male and female to reproduce together.
Thus, apart from heterogenital complimentatarity they also exhibit reproductive complementarity in type since they also perform sex acts which are procreative in type. These acts can become procreative in effect when conducive conditions for conception are present. Also, they may never become procreative in effect when one or both members of the copulating pair is infertile.
And personal complementarity means that heterosexual couples are both able to have a sexual union that includes psychological complementarity and erotic orientation complementarity.
Erotic orientation complementarity means a match with respect to emotional attachment, sexual affection, and sexual desire between two persons having opposite erotic orientations, one having an androphilic orientation and the other having genephylic orientation. It is statistically normal that, men are gynephilically oriented while women and androphilically oriented.
According to Lee and George 2008, given genital complementarity, orientational complimentarity, vaginal-penile inseminatory finality, and absence of human intervention to make a sexual activity infertile in effect, then, a sex act that fulfills the behavioral conditions of procreation, whether or not the nonbehavioral conditions of procreation happen to obtain, and irrespective of whether one or both partners believe that they obtain, differs from anal sex, oral sex, armpit sex, intercrural isex, and mutual masturbation, not only because the latter can never result in reproduction, but based on the more central ground that in the latter the parties engaging in the act do not become organically one, while in the former case, organic unity is facilitated.
To explain why an organic union is important and why homosexual acts cannot establish it, they give the following narrative, which I accept.
In sexual intercourse between a man and a woman, whether married or not, a real organic union is established. An organic action is one in which several bodily parts—tissues, cells, molecules, atoms, and so on—participate. But the subject of the action is the organism as a whole.
For most actions, such as sensation, digestion, walking, and so on, individual male or female organisms are complete units.
The male or female animal organism as a whole unit uses as parts of itself its own organs to perform its actions, but there is no internal orientation of its bodily parts to any larger whole of which the organism is a part with respect to those actions.
However, with respect to the reproductive function, the male and the female are not complete. In reproductive activity the bodily parts of the male and of the female are internally oriented to participating in a single action, coitus, which is biologically oriented to reproduction, though not every act of coitus actually results in reproduction, so that the subject of coitus is the male and the female as a biological unit. Coitus is a unitary action in which the male and the female become one organism.
The two organisms become biologically one but also remain distinct, since they are not dependent on each other in all respects, for example, for survival (as are most parts of a single organism). Also, the teleology of sexual acts belongs to them primarily as groups.
They insist that, the design of the bodies is that some sperm or other join with an ovum. The same is true with individual instances of sexual intercourse.
That is, the functional orientation belongs to acts of sexual intercourse primarily as a group and only indirectly to the individual acts.
The individual act of intercourse is oriented to reproduction as a member of a set of acts of intercourse, some of which will result in reproduction.
However, if one chooses to deprive a particular act of intercourse of its procreative potential, one thereby chooses contrary to the good of procreation.
Of course, not every instance of two entities sharing in an action is an instance of two entities becoming one organism. In this case, however, the potentiality for a specific type of action, reproduction, can be actualized only in cooperation with an individual of the opposite sex.
The reproductive organs are internally oriented toward actuation together with the reproductive organs of the opposite sex.
So, although the sexual organs of the male and the female are not interdependent for the continued life of each organism (as the bodily parts are to each other in a male or female organism) there is a real biological unity.
Also that, strictly speaking, men and women engaging in sexual acts do not choose to reproduce; what they can choose is to fulfill the behavioral conditions of procreation, and they can hope that the nonbehavioral conditions of procreation obtain so that a child will be conceived as a result of their union.
They emphasize that, a sexual act cannot embody a sports community, a scholarly community, or a nonspecific friendship.
The only type of community it can embody is a procreative community, precisely by being part of, consummating, or actualizing it.
Thus, if a man and a woman have not consented to form that type of community, then sexual intercourse between them does not embody or actualize any community.
They add that, infertile couples perform marital acts in the same way fertile couples do, namely, by realizing a biological union in fulfilling the behavioral conditions of procreation.
The fact that the nonbehavioral conditions of procreation happen to obtain or not obtain does not affect or alter the nature of what couples do.
In fulfilling procreation’s behavioral conditions, heterosexual couples realize organic unity whether the nonbehavioral conditions obtain or not.
This difference is significant biologically, they argue. A male and a female animal organism jointly exercise their
reproductive powers when they engage in coitus and become organically one. They don't become organically one only if they actually conceive a child.
To understand why, suppose a male and a female engage in coitus early one evening, but something happens to the female later that prevents a conception from occurring that otherwise would have occurred. This event
cannot retroactively change the nature of the action they performed together.
The act they performed really did fulfill the behavioral conditions of procreation. As such, it united them organically as a single subject of a biological action.
By uniting sexually, they performed the first step in the reproductive process, even though conditions extrinsic to their behavior prevented its completion.
The conditions for a successful conception are not all within the scope of their behavior. Whether a particular act of coitus results in conception depends on conditions extrinsic to the act itself. But whether their action unites them organically cannot depend on something wholly extrinsic to that action.
So, in every act of coitus the man and the woman become organically one. If conception does occur, that may be hours or even days later; and whether they now become one cannot depend on events that occur only later.
One cannot say that the man and the woman unite organically only in those acts of coitus that actually result in conception. In coitus itself—whatever may happen after coitus—the male and the female become biologically united.
Their reproductive organs are actualized, as internally designed, to be a now unitary subject of a single act. So, this biological difference means that in coitus—as opposed to sodomy, whether between same-sex or opposite sex partners, mutual masturbation, etc.—the man and the woman genuinely become one body, one flesh, a biological unit.
The biological unity of spouses is true personal unity because our bodies are part of our personal reality as human beings; we are not incorporeal beings (minds, consciousness, spirits) that merely inhabit and use nonpersonal bodies.
This line of reasoning is good except for two nuances, namely, the fact that evry organism has spatial continuity and temporal continuity as two of its key attributes.
The above discussion does not explain the nature of temporal continuity of the coital organism, one one hand, the nature of its temporal continuity, on the other hand.
It appears that a coital organism has discontinuous temporary continuity akin to a river that dries in summer and starts flowing again in spring. It is a sort of sexual unification cycle akin to a sinusoidal wave which is characterized by crests and troughs.
Heterosexual unification cycle
From above, it follows that, sex is a unitive activity. A unitive activity is an activity that causes unity or union between two or more entities.
According to the Online Collins Dictionary, the word "unitive" is an adjective that means, "(1) tending to unite or capable of uniting" or "(2) characterized by unity";
On the other hand, that dictionary defines "unity" as: "(1) the state or quality of being one, oneness;" or "(2) the act, state, or quality of forming a whole from separate parts"; or "(3) something whole or complete that is composed of separate parts"; or " or "(4) mutual agreement; harmony or concord," among other meanings.
Thus, a unitive activity is a term that has many meanings depending on which universal attribute is used to qualify it. It can mean "tending to unite" a man and woman into parenthood; tending to unite" a man and woman into matrimony; "tending to unite" citizens into one nationality; "and so on.
It can also mean "characterized by unity" of time; "characterized by unity" of space; "characterized by unity" of purpose; and so on. For example, a copulating pair is "characterized by unity" of time, space and purpose. Always the principle of unity must be stated.
From an evolutionary perspective, the ultimate value of sex in relationships is that it leads to reproduction and gene propagation.
But sex has another function in humans and other animals that require biparental care. Specifically, it facilitates pair bonding.
Research directly links sex to pair bonding by indicating that sexual intercourse activates dopamine and neuropeptide receptors such oxytocin and vasopressin in the brain’s reward circuitry that function to condition attachments to sexual partners.
These same neural pathways are linked to sexual arousal and sexual satisfaction, which are directly linked to the maintenance of relationship satisfaction over time. Here, we have both physiological and psychological processes causally interlinked (Meltzer et al 2017: 587)
Meltzer (2017) and his colleagues, conducted a study to look at how might humans remain pair-bonded while engaging in sex acts only intermittently? They explored how long sexual satisfaction would remain elevated following sex.
Their conclusion was that sex partners experience enhanced sexual satisfaction that lingers following sexual activity and that this lingering sexual satisfaction functions to sustain the pair bond. They labeled this phenomenon “a sexual afterglow.”
Their research suggested that sexual satisfaction remains elevated for 48 hours after sex, on average, and that this sexual afterglow functions to promote long term pair bonding. (Meltzer 2017: 596).
Here, the coming to be of an "afterglow" psychologically unites the copulating pair.
Thus, in the former case we have a sex act that is unitive in token, while in the latter case we have a sex act that is unitive in type.
Distinguishing between causes and effects
There is a causal link between the following steps of the sexual reproduction cycle: gametogenesis, heterosexual attraction, coitus, fertilization, conception, gestation, delivery and parenting.
This statement by itself requires us to say something about what a cause is and what it is not.
Pope Fransis emphasizing a certain point
Generally, the word cause is an abstract noun and, like beauty, which has different meanings in different contexts.
First, we have a cause as a regular producer of an effect. Here we may say that, a fact, action or an event of type C caused a fact, action or an event of type E if and only if (a) C was temporally prior to E; (b) C and E are spatially contiguous; and (c) regularly, events of type C cause events of type E.
This is the meaning of a cause when understood in terms of regularity or necessity. (Gallow 2017:10).
The view that all causes must be necessary for their effects is traditionally associated with the germ theory of disease, wherein each disease, for example, tuberculosis, is caused by a specific infectious agent, for example, tubercle bacillus.
Since Galileo and Newton, natural sciences have been rooted in a world view in which complex phenomena can always be reduced to simple, deterministic mechanisms. Strict determinism requires a one to one correspondence between cause and effect; the same cause invariably leads to the same effect, with no role for chance or stochastic variation.
Second, we have a cause as a probable producer of an effect. Here, we may say that, a fact, action or an event C caused a fact, action or an event E if and only if: (a) C is temporally prior to E; (b) there is a fixed causal background context K, which forms the circumstances which are causally relevant to the process in question; and (c) for some fixed causal background context K, the probability of event E given that event C has occurred is greater than the probability of event E given that event C has not occurred.
Here a cause increases that probability or chance that its effect will occur. That is, P(E/(C and K)) > P(E/(not-C and K)). This is the meaning of a cause when understood in terms of probability. (Gallow 2017:27).
For this reason, we may defines “a cause of cancer as a factor that increases the probability that cancer will develop in an individual.”
Under this definition, the occurrence of cancer in an individual may be in part a matter of chance, that is, it is a “stochastic” or “indeterministic” process.
Thus, a probabilistic cause may be neither necessary nor sufficient for disease. However, the definition also does not exclude necessary and sufficient causes; a sufficient cause is simply one that raises the probability of its effect occurring to 1, and a necessary cause raises that probability from 0. Probabilistic causation offers an alternative to the determinism inherent in necessary and sufficient causation.
A probabilistic definition of causation is more inclusive than the sufficient-component cause definition; while necessary and sufficient causes can be described in probabilistic terms, probabilistic causes cannot be described in deterministic language.
Third, we have a cause as a sufficient producer of an effect. Here, we may say that, a fact, action or an event, E, causally depends upon a fact, action or event, C, if and only if, had C occurred, E would have occurred; and, had C not occurred, E wouldn’t have occurred either.
This is the meaning of a cause when understood in terms of counterfactuals. (Gallow 2017:55).
The sufficient-component cause definition improves upon the necessary cause views by admitting causes that are neither specific nor strictly necessary for their effects.
For example, not all diseases can be attributed to a single necessary cause. Cigarette smoke, for example, is not necessary for development of lung cancer.
In fact, some epidemiologists have stated that causes of complex chronic diseases, like cancer and heart disease, tend to fit into the “neither necessary nor sufficient” category.
A sufficient-component cause is made up of a number of components, no one of which is sufficient for the disease on its own.
But when all the components are present, however, a sufficient cause is formed. Because more than one set of components may be sufficient for the same effect, a disease may have multiple causes.
This definition insists that, while in practice scientists and public health practitioners may focus their interest on a particular component of a sufficient cause (such as tobacco advertising), the true cause of a disease, according to this view, is the total assemblage of conditions that are together sufficient for the disease.
Generally, a counterfactual statement draws a contrast between one outcome given certain conditions and another outcome given alternative conditions.
For example, “if an hour ago I had taken two aspirins instead of just a glass of water, my headache would now be gone.” Thus, the causal effect of treatment T, compared to absence of treatment, as the outcome given T minus the outcome given the absence of T. The definition requires a condition that everything else is held constant.
Counterfactuals can be either deterministic or probabilistic. The aspirin counterfactual can read: “If an hour ago I had taken two aspirins instead of just a glass of water, I would be much less likely to still have a headache.”
And fourth, we have a cause as a partial producer, that is, a necessary but not sufficient producer, of an effect. Here, we may say that, a fact, action or an event C caused a distinct event E if and only if there is a chain of a facts, actions or events D1, D2, . . . , Dn such that E causally depends upon Dn, Dn causally depends upon Dn−1, . . . , and D1 causally depends upon C.
This is the meaning of a cause when understood in terms of a process, or chain of events. (Gallow 2017:57).
This type of causes highlights the fact that, there are, in fact, two ways in which a cause can be necessary for some effect: (1) it can be necessary in any set of circumstances (the tubercle bacillus is necessary for any case of tuberculosis) or (2) it can be necessary only in a particular set of circumstances in which no other sufficient causes are present (uranium exposure is not a necessary precursor for lung cancer, but perhaps for a particular non-smoking uranium miner his radiation exposure was necessary for his lung cancer to develop when it did).
In summary, a clear analysis of these definitions shows that, a cause is something that creates or produces an effect. In other words, we may say that, causes affect outcomes or that causes alter outcomes.
In contrast, a non-causal association between A and B does not involve production. It simply happens that, A coincides with B, but A does not produce B.
In light of this definition of a cause as a producer of an effect, we can distinguish between six causes. A necessary-component cause is a condition without which the effect cannot occur. A sufficient-component cause is a condition with which the effect must occur.
Four other different types of causal relations can be derived from these two definitions, namely: necessary and sufficient cause, necessary but not sufficient cause, sufficient but not necessary cause, and neither necessary nor sufficient cause.
Generally, a cause must be specific enough to distinguish causation from mere correlation, but not so narrow as to eliminate apparent causal phenomena from consideration.
Distinguishing between activity types and activity tokens
That having been said, one needs further to understand sex acts which are causally unitive in token as opposed to sex acts which are causally unitive in type, on one hand, and sex acts which are causally procreative in token as opposed to sex acts which are causally procreative in type, on the other hand.
An activity type is a kind of action that is states generally without reference to a particular space, time and agent. For example, running, walking, writing, taking notes, walking to class, having sex.
Examples, are lying, stealing, fornication, adultery, and deception. Activity types are repeatable.
On the other hand, an activity token is a particular action performed by particular person ("the agent") in a particular place at a particular time.
For example, the particular walk you took from bedroom to sitting room today, and the particular activity of reading you are performing right now. Activity tokens are not repeatable.
Distinguishing between causal types and causal tokens
Activities participate in cause and effect relations. Thus, we can speak of causal types and causal tokens just as we speak of activity types and activity tokens.
A causal token is an activity that produces a given effect, at a particular time and specific place, under some causally relevant context.
On the other hand, a causal type needs care to define. Suppose that we events of type C and events of type E. Then, the sentence 'C-in-type event' causes 'E-in-type event' can mean any of the following four possibilities:
- That, for some member c in class C and some member e in class E, member c causes member e; or
- that, for some member c in class C and every member e in class E, member c causes member e; or
- that, for every member c in class C and some member e in class E, member c causes member e; or
- that, for every member c in class C and every member e in class E, member c causes member e.
A token cause explains a particular instance of some event or outcome by the particular instance of a cause. A type cause explains some of the instances of the outcome by the general presence of the cause.
When used in actual data analysis, the methods from the potential outcomes causal inference literature are principally concerned with type causation—that is, of statements of the form “X causes Y."
However, token causation and type causation are not unrelated. Once we have established type causation (X causes Y in general), we know there must be instances of token causation (X in fact caused Y in this particular instance) even if we cannot identify the particular instances.
In such cases, if X causes Y in general, then at least some instances of the outcome Y are explained by X.
Likewise, statements of token causation (X caused Y in these particular cases) imply statements of type causation (X causes Y in general).
Both token causation and type causation offer an explanation of this particular instance of the outcome, or of instances in general, by making reference to the cause of the outcome.
Generally, type causation requires sufficient presence of token causes; that is, there should be enough token events of the cause type that are token causes of token events of the effect type.
From this discussion, we can systematically state the difference between token-level causes and type-level causes.
For example, according to regularity theories of causation, type-level causation is explained as follows: event type C causes event type E if and only if the occurrence of event type C is always followed by the occurrence of event type E , and, the non-occurrence of event type C is always followed by the non-occurrence of event type E.
And token-level causation is explained as follows: A token event c caused a token event e if and only if there are events of type C and events of E such that: (a) c is an event of type C; (b) e is an event of type E; and (c) events of type C cause events of type E.
Distinguishing sex acts that are unitive in type and those which are unitive in token
A sex act is causally unitive in token if it unites a man and a woman either in space, or in time or biologically through fertilization, if the conditions for fertilization obtain.
A sex act is causally unitive in type if it unites a man and a woman in space and in time but fails to unite them biologically through through sex afterglow, since the conditions for sex afterglow did not obtain.
Thus, with respect to unity-causing activities, we need to know that different causal claims operate at different levels. For instance, the claim that smoking is a cause of lung cancer appears to be at a different level as opposed to the claim that Harry’s smoking is a cause of his lung cancer.
There are various ways in which one can distinguish these levels of causality. One way is the generic/single-case distinction.
A causal claim of the form C is a cause of E is generic if at least C or E is generic, i.e., can be instantiated on more than one occasion. Otherwise the claim is single-case.
Thus Mycobacterium Bacillus is a cause of TB is a generic claim, while the Mycobacterium Bacillus in Peter’s lungs caused his TB is single-case.
The generic/single-case distinction is also referred to as the type/token distinction common in philosophy. A token is a particular object while a type is a class of objects or entities.
Distinguishing sex acts that are procreative in type and those which are procreative in token
Against the above theory, we need to say something about the phrase "a sex act that is causally procreative in type" as opposed to "a sex act that is causally procreative in token."
Pope Benedict XVI
A sex act that is procreative in type belongs to the class of acts by which children come into being.
These are vaginal-penile sex acts, which are inseminatory in finality, and which are accompanied by an intention which is open to procreation, that is, which are not accompanied by an intention to prevent conception should circumstances allow.
Not all of sex acts that are causally procreative in type will be procreative in effect. Only those sex acts which are procreative in effect are said to be "causally procreative in token."
There are many reasons to explain why some sex act that are causally procreative in type do not become causally procreative in token.
Specifically, gynecologists such as Koner (2013:186) have confirmed that, eighty percent of the couples achieve conception if they so desire, within one year of having regular intercourse with adequate frequency of 2-3 times per week and especially during the 4-5 fertile days and especially the day of ovulation.
Another 10% will achieve the objective by the end of second year. As such, 10% remain infertile by the end of second year.
Furthermore Koner (2013:186) notes that, conception depends on the fertility potential of both the male and female partner.
The male is directly responsible in about 30–40%, the female in about 40–55% and both are responsible in about 10% cases.
The remaining 10%, is unexplained, in spite of thorough investigations with modern technical know-how.
According to Koner (2013:186), there are many factors which are essential for conception, namely:
- Being above pre-puberty age and below menopause age (age factor).
- Healthy spermatozoa, in terms of a normal sperm count of above 20 million/cubic centimeter, should be deposited high in the vagina at or near the cervix (male factor);
- the spermatozoa should undergo changes (capacitation, acrosome reaction) and acquire motility (cervical factor);
- the motile spermatozoa should ascend through the cervix into the uterine cavity and the fallopian tubes;
- there should be regular ovulation (ovarian factor);
- the fallopian tubes should be patent and the oocyte should be picked up by the fimbriated end of the tube (tubal factor);
- the spermatozoa should fertilize the oocyte at the ampulla of the tube;
- the embryo should reach the uterine cavity after 3–4 days of fertilization;
- the endometrium should be receptive for implantation; and
- the corpus luteum should function adequately.
As far as conception and non-conception are concerned, it can be seen from above, that, a distinction should be made between “action tokens" and "action types," respectively. Here, “action tokens" and "action types" imply "types causes" and “token causes" respectively.
Metaphysical and semiotic relationship between types and tokens
There is a metaphysical and semiotic theory that explains the relation between type causes and token causes, which needs to be visited in order for us to be able to comprehend the inseparability principle as stated in Humanae Vitae (Furner 2019).
Pope Francis (left) and Pope Benedict XVI (right)
The terms “type” and “token” were introduced by the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) in 1906, who was an expert in semiotics--the science of signs.
A sign is simple thing in the real world that represents another complex thing in the real world, within the context of a specific a coding system, where the signifier and the signified converge around a single thought in the human mind.
Thus, the thought, the sign and the signified constitute what philosophers call a semantic triangle. A word is one example of signs.
So, when we communicate we use words as symbols to share our ideas about the things in the real world.
Thus, we have the sign, the signified and the process of signification. A sign can have multiple meanings, in which it is called a polysemic signifier. Against this background, types and tokens can function as symbols.
In fact, this distinction between types and tokens has proven useful in various fields as a model of the supposedly pervasive relationship between repeatable, instantiable, abstract objects such as the single word “the” and their concrete instances such as the numerous individual occurrences of that word on a page.
Consider the sentence, “The world is everything that is the case.” There are eight words, if we are counting word-tokens; and there are six words, if we are counting word-types, since two of those word-types—“the” and “is”—occur twice.
Each word-token stands for, signifies, represents, instantiates, denotes a particular word-type, namely, the type whose essential formal features are shared by the tokens.
Thus, tokens are said to instantiate types; they exemplify, embody, manifest, fall under, belong to types; they are occurrences, in-stances, members of types.
Tokens are treated as individuals, singles, particulars, substances, objects; they are concrete, real, material.
Types, on the other hand, are like sorts, kinds, forms, properties, classes, sets, universals; they’re said to be abstract, ideal, immaterial. The relationship between types and tokens sometimes looks like the kind–individual relationship.
Another example to clarify the type-token distinction is in order: To understand fully the difference between type and token actions, let us next consider the following example: Pat and Albert receive the same book for their respective birthdays.
What is meant by the same book here? It could be that for their birthday, Pat and Albert each receive a different copy of the same book, Cooking for Beginners.
Here, ‘Cooking for Beginners’ is a type of book, and the gift Pat receives – the specific copy – is a token of that book-type. In turn, Albert received a different copy and so a different token of the same book-type for his birthday.
Alternatively, it could be that Pat gave Albert a copy of ‘Cooking for Beginners’ for his birthday and sometime later, on Pat’s birthday, because he had forgotten who had originally given him the book and because he had never read it, Albert gave Pat the book back as a present.
Here, on different occasions, both Albert and Pat receive the same token of the same type of book as a gift.
It could also transpire that, for his birthday, Pat received the same book from five different friends: meaning he receives five tokens of the same type.
Peirce defines tokens as existing objects, as concrete particulars. Generally, if a token t is a token of type T, then the nature of t is determined by the nature of T.
In general, both token and type are said to “signify.” A token is a sign both of the type of which it is an instance, and of the “object” signified by the type.
Applying the type-token semiotic theory to sexual acts
When the semiotic theory of type-token relations is applied to sexual acts, we have the following scenarios:
First, we may have sex acts which are procreative in effect due to the fulfilment of all necessary conditions for conception and sex acts which are not procreative in effect due to the absence of some necessary conditions for procreation.
In the former case we get sex acts which are procreative in token, while the latter case refers to sex acts which are procreative in type. The behavioral conditions are the same in both cases but they differ with respect to circumstances that promote conception.
At a performance level, the procreative in token sex act instantiates and inherits inherit all the properties of the procreative in type sex acts.
That is, penile-vaginal intercourse considered as a "natural kind," is a type of behavior that has evolved to be characteristic of the human species and that employs organs, activities and processes that are all geared toward the natural finality of reproduction. Organs include penis and vagina, activities entail penetration and thrusting, and processes include orgasm and ejaculation.
Given this inheritance relation between type actions and token actions, where token actions are instances of type actions, there is a sort of parent-child link between procreative in token sex acts and procreative in type sex acts.
The process of instantiation simultaneously goes with the process of inheriting key attributes of the type action. Concrete actions which are procreative in token are signs of acts which are procreative in type, which are abstract actions. Thus, procreative token actions signify procreative type actions. I suggest that, paragraph 12 of Humanae Vitae talks of "procreative significance" in this sense.
Secondly, we may have sex acts which are unitive in effect because they are physiologically and psychologically bonding in effect and sex acts which are not unitive in effect because they are not psychologically bonding in effect. Let me explain.
Concrete sex activities which are psychologically unitive in token are signs of activities which are psychologically unitive in type. Thus, unitive token actions signify unitive type actions. I propose that, paragraph 12 of Humanae Vitae talks of "unitive significance" in this sense.
Thus, I conclude that, it is against this semiotic and metaphysical background, that paragraph 12 of Humanae Vitae talks of "unitive significance" and "procreative significance" of a vaginal-penile sex act, which is inseminatory in finality and free from any intention to frustrate its procreative finality, should circumstances allow.
Humanae Vitae says that the two significances are morally inseparable, but provides no explanation as to why that is the case.
A critical examination of Humanae Vitae Arguments
The above conceptual framework clearly shows that, the two broad arguments framed by Pope Paul VI in Humanae Vitae have not yet been analyzed and criticized fully. It is my hypothesis that, they entail disinformation in God's name.
Disinformation is an act of intentionally disseminating false information in order to gain political, social, economic or religious advantage.
According to this definition, an act of defending and sharing an argument which is neither valid nor sound amounts to disinformation.
An act of intentionally formulating arguments which entail fallacies of association, fallacies of origin, and the like, attacking the arguer instead of the argument, equivocation, and the like, all amount to disinformation.
Disinformation is closely associated with misinformation which refers to an act of unknowingly disseminating false information to consumers.
Thus, we still have a duty to reason together about the soundness and validity of the Humanae Vitae Argument against contraception, as summarized above. This is what I propose we should do next as we approach the 53rd anniversary of the encyclical called Humanae Vitae.
REFERENCES
- John F. Kippley, Sex And The Marriage Covenant: A Basis for Morality, Second Edition (San Francisco: Ignatius Press; 1991, p. 138).
- Pope John Paul VI (1968), Humanae Vitae/On Human Life.
- Martin Rhonheimer (1989), Contraception, Sexual Behavior, and Natural Law Philosophical Foundation of the Norm of Humanae Vitae, The Linacre Quarterly: 56.2: 20-57
- Hialal Koner (2013), DC Dutta's Textbook of Gynecology including Contraception, 6th Edition (New Delhi, India: Jaypee Brothers Medical Publishers Ltd, p. 186)
- J. Dmitri Gallow (2017), Seminar Notes for Causality .
- Jonathan Furner (2019), Type-Token Theory and Bibliometrics.
- Christian Brugger (2018), A Re-reading of Humanae Vitae Part II, Christian Thing.
- Andrea L. Meltzer (2017), and six others, Quantifying the Sexual Afterglow: The Lingering Benefits of Sex and Their Implications for Pair-Bonded Relationships, Psychological Science, 28.5: 587–598.
- William Newton (2014), The Side Effects of the Pill: Why the Church Has So Much to Say about Contraception
- William E. May (1983), Common Faith Tract No. 5: Contraception and Catholicism.
- Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, What Male–Female Complementarity Makes Possible: Marriage as a Two-in-one-flesh Union, Theological Studies 69 (2008): 641-662.
Authored by:
Mama Amon,
'Simbawanga' Primary School,
P. O. Box P/Bag,
'Simbawanga'
Change history:
Version 1.0: Dated 02 April 2021--Original text created.
Version 2.0: Dated: 04 April 2021--References isolated from main text and heading refined
Version 3.0: Dated: 08 April 2021--Deontological and teleological arguments separated; the analysis updated in light of the study findings contained in: Andrea L. Meltzer, and six others, Quantifying the Sexual Afterglow: The Lingering Benefits of Sex and Their Implications for Pair-Bonded Relationships, Psychological Science, 28.5(2017): 587–598..
