Mapokezi ya Nyerere huko Uingereza

Interview with Julius Nyerere

Notes on a conversation with Nyerere at State House, Dar-es-Salaam, on August 10, 1963, were made by Professor Gwendolen M. Carter of Smith College, USA

Both interviewer and interviewee are deceased. This is a cleaned-up and edited version of a transcript which Gail Gerhart acquired from Thomas Karis many years ago. It does not appear on the Karis-Carter microfilms, but may be in the hardcopy of the collection at Northwestern University library, in the Melville J. Herskovits Africana collection.

Julius Nyerere Julius K. Nyerere (1922-1999) was the first president of Tanzania (known as Tanganyika until 1964). He served as prime minister and then as president from independence in December 1961 until his retirement in 1985, except for a brief period shortly after independence when he stepped down temporarily to work on the revitalization of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the country's ruling party.

In May 1963 the Organization of African Unity was founded, and Tanzania became the headquarters of the Committee of Nine, an OAU body formed to coordinate assistance to liberation movements in African countries which had not yet achieved independence from colonial rule.

These notes on a conversation with Nyerere at State House, Dar-es-Salaam, on August 10, 1963, were made by Professor Gwendolen M. Carter of Smith College, USA. [Nyerere looks older and much more serious than I had remembered him. He still laughs frequently and whole-heartedly, but he assumes a very serious look the rest of the time. Presidential aide Joan Wicken took notes in shorthand. We sat on either side of his desk across from Nyerere who looks across the room to the gardens and the sea beyond. My last visit had been before independence in December 1961. Since then, Nyerere had temporarily resigned the presidency for a brief period to build up TANU separately from the state. He felt he had not succeeded in this and it was still a problem. He spoke of the inter-relationship of party and government and of the problem that former party leaders now were lost to the party because they were in government.]

I switched fairly quickly to the problem of South Africa. I put it in two terms: the problem of achieving change within South Africa itself and the problem of the division between the ANC and PAC.

He picked up the latter point first and said that he had put pressure on the two groups to form the common front. That was before Tanganyika's independence. Pressure had been put on the two in London also.

The common front was established for some time, but then it broke up.

He felt that the differences between the two groups were very considerable. He believed there was "a deep hatred" for each other. He felt there was less division over the alignment with communists maintained by the ANC than over tactics, that is that the PAC felt the demonstrations organized by the ANC were useless and the PAC felt more violent methods must be used.

He agreed that one of the values of the ANC was its experience and he stressed also the maturity of its leadership, although, at the same time, he felt that there were some leaders who were rather "slippery" and out for themselves. He also felt that the ANC could benefit from some of the PAC's fervor.

On the Committee of Nine, he said that all the money would henceforth be channeled through this group and thus the earlier danger of some African states backing the ANC and others backing the PAC would be avoided. In some situations, money would be given to that group, even if it was the only one there, which seemed best to serve the purposes of overthrowing the regime. In other instances, they hope to encourage a common activity. Perhaps they were coming closer to this.

He spoke of the recognition of [Holden] Roberto's group by Cyrille Adoula in the Congo as giving the Committee a surprise. The sub-committee of Six had gone to see the two rival Angolan groups, both of which had been represented in Dar at the time of the meeting of the Committee of Nine, and had endorsed Roberto also. He seemed a little surprised about his.

He did not speak about [Eduardo] Mondlane. On the question of approach, he felt that the Portuguese were not a serious problem. They were "weak." Also he was convinced—and he mentioned two soldiers who had spoken to him recently and whom he was sure were genuine—that the members of the Portuguese army did not trust each other, not knowing who was for the regime and who was against it.

He felt that the Portuguese territories were too dispersed and that the regime at home was too weak for serious resistance. He mentioned the fact of the Salazar speech that evening.

On Southern Rhodesia he felt that no action needed to be taken at this time. Joan had questioned me about the relative strength of [Ndabaningi] Sithole and [Joshua] Nkomo and it seemed fairly clear that the Tanganyikans back Sithole. Obviously, as we had been told elsewhere, Southern Rhodesia is not looked on as a difficult situation to solve.

South Africa, he declared, was a difficult problem in Africa. It would not be possible to move against South Africa forcefully until after Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories had come under African control.

He agreed that there was a very intense feeling about South Africa and spoke of it as "a block to African unity."

On his discussions with [US President John] Kennedy, he was particularly interesting. He had gone to the United States particularly to discuss South Africa and the Portuguese territories. I did not ask him, and he did not mention, whether he went as the agent of the Committee of Nine or not. What he had in mind when he went was to tell Kennedy that if the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany united to tell South Africa that it must change its policy, he was convinced that the South Africans would.

He found Kennedy "radical" in his approach. Kennedy believes that apartheid is "a religion." He has had someone from Mississippi "quote the Bible" to him [regarding race].

Kennedy believes that only an "internal explosion" can change the situation. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk is more legalistic than Kennedy and the latter seemed to feel that perhaps events in South Africa would be necessary in order to convince Rusk of the necessity of intervention.

Nyerere had become convinced about the advantage of an oil boycott in America itself where the idea was first broached to him. He is now busy selling it. Also he felt that South West Africa and the International Court decision might offer an opening for American action. He had not discussed this with Kennedy, but he felt that the American approach was a legalistic one and that it would be an advantage to have a legal decision on which to act.

When I asked him what he felt one should try to persuade the United States to do, he said, "push to the maximum of action that can be achieved." At the moment, the total arms boycott is the maximum, but perhaps there will be more that can be done.

Keep up the pressure as one sees what can be added. There is no use pressing for too much, e.g. expulsion from the United Nations or a total boycott. One must work for what is feasible, but keep up the pressure. I asked whether it would be better to lay off South Africa until after the Portuguese territories and Southern Rhodesia had been settled, but he did not think so. He reiterated that it was important to have the maximum amount of pressure exerted.
 
Interview

Julius Nyerere Former President, the United Republic of Tanzania

This interview was conducted jointly by Margaret A. Novicki, editor of Africa Report, and Bob Boorstin, reporter for The New York Times, during President Nyerere's visit to New York in late September 1985 to address the United Nations General Assembly.

Africa Report, November – December 1985

A month before handing over power to his successor, Julius Nyerere reflected on the disappointments and triumphs of his 24 years as president of Tanzania. In a candid discussion with Africa Report, Mwalimu reveals his unwavering commitment to socialism and to a free and united Africa as he prepares to play a new role in his country's future.


"I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent."

"We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else."

Africa Report:
During the period shortly after independence, many people looked very hopefully at Tanzania's efforts to implement African socialism. But in recent years, many have held up Tanzania as the example of the "failure of African socialism."

Nyerere: As the "unique failure!"

Africa Report: In light of your recent comments on privatizing the sisal estates, some have even gone so far as to suggest that perhaps you are abandoning some of your socialist economic principles. Given your experiences over the last 24 years, how appropriate has socialism been as a philosophy for Tanzania's economic development, and in hindsight what might you have done differently?

Nyerere: That's a very small question! It can be answered, or at least an attempt can be made to answer it. As far as socialism is concerned, there is nothing that we would not do in the same way. We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else. If possible, I would simply strengthen our re-commitment to socialism.

But in the course of building socialism—and especially in a poor, underdeveloped country—naturally you are groping in the dark. You make some decisions that are right and others that are not. So there are certain decisions in the actual attempt to implement our programs of socialism which I think I could have looked at differently if I was starting over again; for instance, the example I gave when I was talking about privatization. I think we rightly decided to put the sisal industry, which was the biggest industry in Tanzania, in the public hands. Actually, I think we had no choice, because the private owners of the estates were not investing at all because the price had gone down.

In spite of our ideology, we had no choice but to take over. But we did not have the management capacity—how could Tanzania have had the management capacity in 1967? We didn't have much industry in Tanzania. Whenever we established an industry, or even in terms of the little ones which we nationalized, we were aware of our own lack of management capacity.

Sometimes we asked the capitalist owner of the industry we had nationalized to go into partnership with us, or we signed a management agreement with them.

It takes money from us, but what can you do if you are going to establish an industry that you can't manage? You buy management. We are so import-dependent that we import even the management ability. In the case of sisal, somehow we assumed that we could just manage, because it was farming. We went wrong, and we haven't done very well. If I were to do it again, we would pay more attention to management. And we may have had actually to hire management from outside. We did not do it.

But we are committed to socialism. I don't believe myself that the answer is to privatize. Some of those farms that are not doing well may have to be privatized. But what we really ought to do is to pay attention to the problem of management, because that is a skill we have not developed. We now have first-class doctors, first-class teachers, first-class engineers, and so forth, but we didn't think that management was a skill we lacked. If I was starting again in the actual implementation, I'd be looking at various areas and asking, do we have the management capacity there?

We're better organized now than we were in 1967. So the problem is not socialism. The problem is the process of implementing socialism. Socialism lias served us very well. In a poor country like Tanzania, if we had not opted for socialism, we would have had some chaos. Even our critics cannot avoid saying, "That country has the highest rate of literacy in Africa." It wasn't the highest when we took over—it was one of the lowest. Eighty-five percent of our people are literate. When we started, 85 percent were illiterate. We have universal primary education. When we took over, we had 400,000 children in primary schools and primary school education was four years. We now have 5.5 million children in primary schools. Every child can go to school and primary education is seven years. This is a tremendous achievement.

Our health service is one of the best on the continent. We are poor and sometimes our health dispensaries don't have all the drugs that are needed because we don't make the drugs, we import them. Even for some of the drugs which we make locally, we must import some of the raw materials. So it's a problem. If you don't have the foreign exchange, you don't get the raw materials. But even our critics always refer to this, even if they end up by saying that we are a total failure. But how they explain our success in the social services if socialism has failed in Tanzania, I don't know.

We are a very united country, one of the stablest countries on the continent, or even in the Third World. How have we achieved that?

We are a poor country. Poverty is destabilizing. How is it that poverty has failed to destabilize Tanzania? And there was not a lack of efforts—people did try to exploit poverty to destabilize Tanzania. How did they fail? Because socialism has given hope to our people.

Africa Report: A lot of commentators are saying that socialism is on the decline in many African nations and that they are turning toward more mixed economies. Do you agree?

Nyerere: Most economies in the world are mixed. It depends upon the emphasis. The British economy is a mixed economy and even the American economy has some public sector. The question is where you put the emphasis, on the private sector or the public sector? Our economy is a mixed economy, but our emphasis is on the public sector.

There may be some Afncan countries which went for socialism and didn't think there was any place for private enterprise in their system, but they're discovering that that was a mistake. There is a place, especially during the transition, and perhaps not only during the transition, as Eastern European countries are finding now.

There are key areas which ought to be public, but there are some areas which don't have to be public and to try and make them public is to make socialism very difficult because the scale of activities sometimes can be too small. Agriculture is one of them.

So it is possible that a number of African countries which, in the rhetoric about socialism, had neglected the important role that can be played by private enterprise, are now paying attention to that transition. But when those who are basically opposed to socialism in Africa or the Third World see that, they say that Africa is abandoning socialism. That is not true. Certainly we have not abandoned socialism.

Africa Report: Your running battle with the IMF is well-known. Nevertheless, over the last year or so you have adopted some of the IMF's prescriptives such as devaluation, higher producer prices, and a reduction in the number of parastatals. Are these moves in your view consistent with your vision of socialism? To what extent has the IMF been successful in imposing what you've been resisting all along?

Nyerere: Had they actually imposed what we had been resisting, by now we would have an agreement with them! We have no agreement with them. Naturally, life is tough for our people. We can't fool our people that somehow life is going to be easy. Life is going to be very tough. We are bound to go through a very difficult period, but what is the purpose of the sacrifice? Is the purpose of the sacrifice to establish some kind of capitalist system? Abandon our goals? Or to buy us time in order to continue with our objectives?

We oppose devaluation—but not on some socialist grounds. At present there are 18 Tanzanian shillings to the dollar. When we started the debate with the IMF some six years ago, it was 8 shillings to the dollar, but now they want 35. There is no socialist value of the Tanzanian shilling in relation to the dollar. It could be 100 shillings to the dollar, it does not matter. The problem is that I want to see the effect of devaluation at that time on our people, what it will mean. With the IMF, it is not simply devaluation; they will say: "Devalue, remove subsidies, and don't increase wages."

We devalued last year. At one time, we removed subsidies. But it was our own program and we put up the minimum wage. If it was an IMF program, we would not have been able to put up the minimum wage.

When I have discussed with the IMF over these years, I have said I'm very pleased that the IMF has discovered the African peasant, because there was a time when we used to talk about the African peasant and these fellows didn't know what we were talking about. Today, the IMF comes and tells me: "You must pay a good price to peasants." I feel with that we've made some wonderful converts!

There is never an argument between ourselves and the IMF about paying the peasants a good price. No problem. I want to pay the peasants a good price. What is the debate we had recently with the IMF? They come to us and say: "Give the peasant a very good price." We say: "What is a good price in your estimation?" They say: "Give them a 40 percent increase in real terms." Well, I'm not an economist, so I have to find out from the economists what this means. And they explain to me. And I said that cannot be done. It simply cannot be done. It's ridiculous. How can we?

Our country is a peasant country. Most of our people are peasants. When you say give the peasants an increase of 40 percent in real terms, that means a transfer of resources from one sector of Tanzania to the other. It's real wealth you are transferring. Agriculture is the major sector of the country. I love that sector. I've been working for that sector all the time. But how do you transfer this? It's really nonsensical. It cannot be done at all. And we discover what they're really doing—their eye is not on the peasant farmer, their eye is on the Tanzanian shilling. If you agree to increase the price paid to the farmer at this fantastic rate of 40 percent in real terms—and our inflation is very high, about 30-35 percent—that means increasing the prices by 70 or 75 percent. If you do that, where do you get the money? How do you do it? You devalue the shilling! Massive devaluation! But a massive devaluation in Tanzania raises costs and inflation.

We are an import-dependent country. We import everything. Devaluation in Tanzania does not help us to export. It simply makes imports very expensive. We don't import luxuries. We don't! We have cut down our imports and we import only what is absolutely necessary. And then you make it as expensive as possible, by decree. So we have taken some very tough measures. But our own tough measures are unsatisfactory to the IMF and therefore we have no agreement with the IMF.

Africa Report: Do you think there's a hope for an agreement?

Nyerere: No. I do want an agreement with the IMF. I'll tell you why I want an agreement with the IMF. There are two very good reasons. Government revenues are very bad. Reagan has a deficit. We have a deficit, too. The IMF is worried about our deficit, although our deficit doesn't cause anybody any trouble except us in Tanzania. They're not really worried about Reagan's deficit. Because we don't have the foreign exchange to buy the spare parts and the raw materials for our factories, our factories are running at 30, 40, 50 percent of capacity. We get a lot of revenue from sales taxes, from what is produced by the factories. If I can get the money to import the things we need for the factories so that they can run at 60, 70, 80 percent, the government deficit will be wiped out in no time at all. Well, I want to do that. I would like to get that deficit wiped out. That's one reason—any government would want to do that.

The second reason is obvious. We argue about the prices of the commodities which the peasants produce. And we think there's no debate; we want to put up the price. But having put up the price, what does the peasant do with that money if there zr -•) goods in the shops? The real incentive is not the paper money, but goods in the shops. If I had an agreement with the IMF and I was able to get the resources that enable us to import the things we need, there'd be goods in the shops and a tremendous incentive for the peasant.

Those are two of the objectives I would like to achieve. The trouble is the price I would have to pay for them. The price I would pay for them if I sign an agreement with the IMF would be riots in the streets of Dar es Salaam!

Africa Report: How long do you give the white regime in South Africa? How many more years do think it will last? And do you think that it's inevitable that liberation in South Africa will lead to a socialist government there?

Nyerere: I don't know how long it's going to take before we see the end of apartheid. The apartheid authorities there have all the machineries of oppression. From the surface they look very strong—they have the police, they have the army, and basically they have the economy which can keep them in power for a long, long time. They appear determined to stay in power. So if you look at it purely from the outside, you see that these people can stay for a long time. The African opposition inside can organize the masses, but they have no fire power. The government has the monopoly on fire power. These young men and women who defy the state have nothing except their courage and when you see that kind of confrontation you say, how can they do anything? These people can go on for a long time.

I don't know how long it's going to take. But I say again, you cannot be sure when you look at the structures. Do you have termites in the United States? Sometimes you look at a structure from the outside and it looks solid. But internally, the termites have been eating. And you don't need [hurricane] Gloria to get rid of the building! Some determined push will bring the structure down.

The people are now putting that structure to the test. For decades, we haven't seen this kind of pressure mounting from the inside and from the outside. Even Reagan eventually had to yield to popular pressures here that he must do something—not this constructive engagement business, but really some pressure to see if we can end apartheid with less violence.

I've watched some of these people on television defending the system, and I must admit, I've not seen it defended with conviction. I can see Bishop Tutu speaking with absolute conviction. Seeing Botha on television, he puts on a brave face, but I can't see that it's coming from his inside. I've seen some of the real right-wingers who speak with tremendous conviction. But these people in power now, I don't know whether they believe in what they are doing. It's possible at one time they did. There are lots of whites in South Africa— most of them English-speaking—who have accepted the system because it was producing the goods. It was protecting their wealth, their standard of living, and so forth. That's why they supported it, not because they believed in it as a philosophy. Some of them are ashamed of it as a philosophy. But it protects their high standard of living. When it ceases to be a protector of their high standard of living, it's beginning to be a threat. How long can it go on? I don't know. I cannot really answer your question.

It's not inevitable [that a change of government will bring socialism] and, let's remember, they are not working for socialism. The ANC is working for the end of apartheid. South Africa has one of the oldest communist parties—it's one of the few African countries with a communist party. They have a small communist party, which works with the ANC because they are opposed to apartheid and they have ideas that when the country eventually becomes independent, certainly they will want to work for socialism or for communism. But the ANC and the masses of the people basically are working against apartheid.

And quite frankly, whatever the rhetoric, I don't believe that post-apartheid is going to be a socialist South Africa. It's not going to be that way. How socialist is Zimbabwe? It serves Botha to say, "We are protecting this country against socialism, communism and so forth, and when the country becomes independent, it is going to go socialist." Actually, I don't believe it. For instance, in the case of Mozambique, what went socialist, what they nationalized, was what had been abandoned by the Portuguese settlers. They abandoned factories, farms, buildings, and those—the abandoned ones—were nationalized. They never nationalized anything which had not been abandoned. What has Mugabe nationalized? He has bought off some farmers—he's actually paid them against his principles in order to make land available to the people. What have they nationalized? I think the ANC will nationalize what will be abandoned. I can't see them nationalizing something viable, on-going. They will find it extremely difficult to interfere with that. South Africa will become Africa's first welfare state, not a socialist state.

Africa Report: What would you say to those who maintain that mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa will cause the neighboring states to suffer first and therefore they shouldn't be imposed?

Nyerere: Sanctions will hurt. They are bound to hurt. They are intended to hurt. Your people are resisting sanctions because correctly they see that they will hurt—they will hurt some businesspeople here. The British are resisting sanctions because they are the biggest investors in South Africa, because they realize sanctions will hurt. They will hurt British interests. And that's why Mrs. Thatcher is resisting, because it will hurt. So if sanctions are likely to hurt businesspeople here and in Britain, sanctions are bound to hurt businesspeople in South Africa. They will also hurt the African states. Sanctions will hurt the frontline states. We had a meeting in Arusha and we discussed this.

We had sanctions against Rhodesia, and while the Portuguese were still occupying Mozambique, they helped Rhodesia to break the sanctions until Frelimo won and Frelimo applied sanctions. They hurt Mozambique very much. They were almost sanctions against Mozambique. But Mozambique is better off now with independent Zimbabwe than if it had not helped and had allowed Rhodesia to continue.

So we have discussed sanctions, they will have an impact, they will hurt some of these countries. A few days ago before I came here, we had another meeting of the frontline states and we discussed sanctions and there was again unanimous agreement of all of us that sanctions will hurt, but sanctions must be applied because sanctions will end apartheid much quicker. And if people are concerned about the hurt that sanctions might cause to the frontline states, they should consider what to do to reduce the impact of sanctions on the frontline states.

Africa Report: The Reagan administration continues to uphold its policy of constructive engagement although it appears that it has failed in its objective to reduce regional tensions. What steps would you like to see the Reagan administration take at this point in time and how do you perceive their policy?

Nyerere: The Reagan administration was very polite when it came into power. It sent Dr. Crocker to our part of the world to explain this new policy of constructive engagement. I'm sure they believed in it, that you can bring about change to the South Africans if you are nice to them. We said, "They will use you if you are nice to them." These people want to cling to power, it is a racist country, these are racist policies, they will cling to power. And if you simply verbally say to them, "We don't' like your policies, please change," they will be very happy that a superpower is condemning them verbally, but otherwise they are accepting it. It won't hurt them at all, they will just stay. But they thought differently.

Dr. Crocker was here this morning, and I said, 'You did four years, lost, what have you? Four years of constructive engagement, nothing! You are in the second year of the second term, nothing! Nothing to show for constructive engagement!1 But the threat of sanctions is very different. Over the last few months, the threat of sanctions is at least producing promises. The South Africans are producing promises of virtually ending the bantustan idea, giving citizenship to those from whom they should never have taken it away, and so forth. The threat of sanctions. . .now these people call it active constructive engagement! We did warn, "The South Africans are very tough, they will use you, they will not want to get out of Namibia, they will not want to change apartheid. The international community will have to work with the internal forces against apartheid to put tremendous pressure on South Africa to change." They said, "No, be nice."

And this blessed idea that the South Africans are the defenders of Western civilization there! Really, how can the U. S. accept the idea that racist South Africa is a defender of Western civilization? What kind of civilization? And the nonsense that they are fighting against communism! Where are these communists in Africa? We have 51 African states, how many of them are communist? This blessed idea that this huge country wants to protect Africa against communism! These African countries cannot protect themselves against communism? Where are these communists in Africa?

They mention Angola. . . they just refuse to admit how the Cubans got into Angola in the first place and why now they must remain there—because Reagan will not accept the implementation of resolution 435. These people came determined to get the Cubans out of Angola and their policies are such as to make it absolutely certain that the Cubans will not leave Angola. How can a big nation behave like that? If they don't want Cubans in Angola, fine, that's their policy, it's their own business. But why then don't they follow policies which will help the Cubans to leave Angola? Because these it looks to me like a policy which had either been actually announced or was supposed to have been announced by Kissinger; "Let's turn Angola into Cuba's Vietnam. Let them stay."

These policies to me are not policies which will help Cubans to leave Angola, but stay there. Well, if that is the policy, it's working. But if these policies are intended to get the Cubans out of Angola, no! The Cubans went there in 1975 because South Africa invaded Angola, because the U.S. panicked, they thought the little communist party of Portugal was taking over Portugal, they linked that communist party with the MPLA, they thought they'd jump in quickly and prevent communism from taking over Angola, and they joined the South Africans. And that's how the Cubans got there.

Africa Report: Do you think the U. S. is doing anything right in its Africa policy?

Nyerere: They did a tremendous job in helping us with the famine. They have been extremely generous with Africa. They have not bothered about ideology. There are some phrases that this government cannot help the communists in Africa, but overall, they have done extremely well in helping famine-stricken Africa. But they went wrong the moment they began to refuse to see African struggle as a struggle for self-determination, when they began to see it purely in terms of the East-West conflict. The whole thing went wrong there. And they don't want us to say it. And I say, look why do you want to be fooled by Africa? I don't help your great country if I fool them.

They should know what we think. We want our continent to be free. We don't want to sell our country to the Soviet Union. How much influence does the Soviet Union have in Africa? Where? And where they are, the United States is keeping them there. So I say these things, and when I say them, it's as if I create them. But I don't create them. I say to them, we want to be free. We really believed in the United States, a democratic country, a powerful country which fears nothing from Africa. I believe the United States really should be the ally of Africa. It is not, because they think somehow we want to embrace the Soviet Union! What do we want to embrace the Soviet Union for?

These are superpowers, they want to divide the world among themselves. Africa is in the sphere of influence of the West. My problem is the Western world. We are not in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. This powerful country, instead of seeing our problem of apartheid as a problem of apartheid— that African people cannot love apartheid—they want us to see apartheid through Moscow. How can we see apartheid through Moscow? If the Soviets give arms to the ANC, is it expected that I would denounce them? Supposing your country arms apartheid, and the Soviet Union arms the ANC, I am expected to denounce the Soviet Union? Why? And intelligent people here say, "Why don't you denounce the Soviet Union?" On what? I can denounce them on Afghanistan, we do. But on Namibia? How can I denounce the Soviet Union on Namibia? Or on apartheid? And I am expected to do that. If I do that, I am a dishonest fool!

Where we feel the Soviet Union is acting wrongly with regard to the interests of the Third World, we don't fear, we say so. We are not under the influence of the Soviet Union. We are never afraid to speak freely. But our problems in Africa at present come from the Western world which is led by your country. We shouldn't say so?

Africa Report: With all these problems, why are you stepping down now when so much remains to be done?

Nyerere: I leave it to the young. I'm not saying enough is enough, but I am simply stepping out. I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent. It is my life, but I can change the stages. I don't have to remain at the same stage.

Africa Report: What do you plan on doing in your retirement?

Nyerere: I remain the chairman of my party. That's how I started. When I started the freedom of my country, 1 was not head of state, so I don't really have to continue the fight as head of state. That job can be done by others. I've done it for 24 years. It is plenty. They say, "Mr. President, but you are still young. . ." I say yes, if I were starting today, I'd be elected this year at the age of 63 and at the end of 10 years, I'd be younger than Reagan! But it is not a problem of my age.

I've been there for 24 years and the priority really for this young country is establishing a system, which I think we've done reasonably well. We are a reasonably stable country, united, with clarity of what we want. But it is a young country and we want to establish a system that can work, and I want to participate in establishing the system that can work. We are changing the top leadership. It's a change that needs to be made and we are making it. In our case, we are a single party. It is an important change in this country from one head of state who has been leading the country for the last 24 years to another. It is perceived as being important. And it is important because that change must be made, but not in policies, because we are a single party. Our policies are determined by the party and carried out by the government.

Africa Report: Is there room for another party in Tanzania?

Nyerere: No, not yet. It will come when we have achieved what the United States has achieved, when you have two major parties and both of them are conservative! That's a kind of single-party system, so the basic capitalist system is not being challenged at all! It's a pleasure, I wish I had that kind of system. We'll get there.

Africa Report: So you expect your successor to follow in the same path as your policies?

Nyerere: He will not come with his own policies. I didn't have my own policies. I have helped in the definition of those policies. He will carry out party policies. But he is the head of state, he is going to be the leader of the government. And a government is a government—its style of doing things, its appointments, its emphases are not likely to be my kind of emphases. People matter even if they are all socialists, because they determine the emphases. So style might change, emphases might change, but the policy will remain the same. Even the rhetoric might change!

Africa Report: Your country has been very involved in Uganda's political affairs for some time, but the country still seems to be very unstable. What are the prospects for stability in Uganda?

Nyerere: I don't know. We had hoped that a new era of stability had been established. I don't know what is going to happen, because at present, as we understand it, the new government very correctly asked all Ugandan citizens who were exiles to come back. That is correct because it is a method of building stability. As long as you have large numbers of refugees outside the country opposed to the system, that does not help. So they decided correctly to say to all refugees to please come back and forget the past.

But to say that is one thing. To get ex-Amin soldiers back into the army and in positions of responsibility, that's a very different thing. That is not going to help stability. That I understand is happening and that is a worry. That is a worry to the people of Uganda and to its neighbors. That is not an element of stability, it is an element of almost permanent instability and as I understand it, President Moi is working very hard to reconcile the government and the main guerrilla group there led by Mr. Museveni to get everybody to look at this new problem of instability that can come if Amin's former soldiers are allowed in the army, because their record is well-known. I think that is one of the problems that President Moi is asking both the government and the opposition to address themselves to. I hope he succeeds.

Africa Report: What would you like to have remembered as the greatest achievement of your presidency and what was your biggest disappointment?

Nyerere: My greatest success is also my greatest disappointment. We have established a nation—Tanzania—that is some achievement. Stable, united, proud, with immense clarity of what it wants to do, committed to the liberation of our continent. It has played an immense role—poor as it is—in the liberation of our continent and it will continue playing it. So that is what I think is our greatest achievement. But it is also our failure.

I never wanted a Tanzania. I really did not believe that these African colonies should establish different sovereignties. They are artificial creations, all of them. And I thought Africa should use the opportunity of decolonization to build more viable units. One of the most viable units we had was the East African area which had been under the same administration under the British. And the infrastructure was there, the system of administration was there, the language was there, both English and Swahili, and we could have established a more viable single state there.

If you are going to give yourself to building a new nation, you could just as well give yourself to building that nation than building a smaller one. In that I failed, and in the whole movement of African unity, in spite of the fact that we have the Organization of African Unity, unique in the world, which gives us some voice. Without the OAU, I don't know what voice the African countries would have. It helps us, it keeps the vision of possible unity and cooperation. But that's not really what we are working for.

What we really wanted is a united Africa. We haven't achieved it. But perhaps it would have been ridiculous to think that we could achieve it in these 20 years. The agenda is long and some items of that agenda must be taken up by the young generation in Africa. There is tremendous awareness in Africa of the weaknesses and the potential, and the young generation must take over.
 

The philosopher king


A new biography of Tanzania's first president, Julius Nyerere,
reveals a complicated legacy.

An interview with Issa Shivji

Interviewed by Monique Bedasse


Julius Nyerere was one of the most important leaders of the twentieth century. Tanzania (Tanganyika) gained independence from Britain in 1961 and Nyerere, known as Baba wa taifa (father of the nation), became its first president.

Under Nyerere’s leadership, the state declared ujamaa (African socialism) as its postcolonial path forward and signaled its intention to build a society based on human equality and dignity.

His commitment to nonalignment in the midst of cold war tensions and his support of African liberation movements garnered the attention of many around the world.

Even after he stepped down in 1985, Nyerere continued to hold remarkable influence over Tanzanian politics.

Today, twenty-one years after his death, his contested legacy continues to loom large in the nation, as his presence in the discussions surrounding the upcoming elections attests.

In early 2020, Tanzanian publishing house, Mkuki Na Nyota, released the three-part biography, Development as Rebellion: A Biography of Julius Nyerere. Penned by Saida Yahya-Othman, Ng’wanza Kamata and Issa Shivji, the books offer an impressively nuanced examination of a man who has been, in the words of the authors, “revered and demonized in equal measure.”

Yahya-Othman is a retired professor of English Linguistics who taught at the University of Dar es Salaam, Kamata is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Dar es Salaam and Shivji is a retired Professor of Public Law and the first holder of the Julius Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-African Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam.

A detailed exploration of Nyerere’s personal and political lives, this is also a multifaceted history of Tanzania and the political context in which its first and most influential leader emerged.

Monique Bedasse had a brief conversation with Issa Shivji about his installment of the biography, Rebellion Without Rebels. Professor Shivji took on this biography after decades of thinking and writing about Nyerere and Tanzanian politics more broadly.

MB: What motivated you and your co-authors to write this biography?

IS:
It is a long story but I’ll cut it short.

Even while Mwalimu [Swahili for “teacher;” how Nyerere is generally referred to in Tanzania] was still alive, I used to say half-jocularly that when the philosopher-king ceases to be a king—meaning he has left power—I’d like to do his biography. It never came to pass.

Meanwhile, Mwalimu passed on in 1999. Between 2008 and 2013, I was the Mwalimu Nyerere Chair in Pan-African Studies at the University of Dar es Salaam under which, together with my co-authors—Professor Saida-Yahya Othman and Dr Ng’wanza Kamata—we organized many intellectual activities around Mwalimu’s ideas generally and his perspective on Pan-Africanism specifically. In the process we learnt that our younger generation knew very little about Mwalimu and his times. Unrelenting criticism, albeit subtle, of Mwalimu’s policies of Ujamaa and its alleged failure during the two decades of neo-liberalism had taken its toll.

Our youth had a very lop-sided view of their recent political history. A more nuanced story of Tanzania under Nyerere and his uncompromising stand on nationalism against the constant onslaught of neo-colonial forces needed to be told.

Five years of working together also brought the three of us closer. Fortunately, at the time, the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology under its Director General Dr. Hassan Mshinda was amenable to consider our application for funding. Thus was born the Nyerere biography project.

After some six to seven years of extensive research and writing, the three-volume biography was finally published in March 2020 by a leading local publisher Mkuki na Nyota.

MB: One of the strengths of this biography is that you force the reader to confront conflicting accounts of particular histories. An example of this is your treatment of the contested circumstances that led to Edwin Mtei’s resignation after the International Monetary Fund’s mission visited Dar es Salaam in 1979. Not only does this make for an engaging read, but it also ensures that we never lose sight of the fact that Nyerere and the other members of the Tanzanian government with whom he worked were fully human. Furthermore, it reminds us that the IMF’s visit is connected to both the larger story of the “transition from socialism to neo-liberalism” in Tanzania within a global context, and to the local history of contestation within the government. You bring together a vast array of sources to provide us with such complexity. Tell me about the research process for this book.

IS:
Hunh! Monique, it is like you read our minds.

Yes, we wanted to tell a story which was both human and social. The widespread belief that Mwalimu always got his way was simply not true. Mwalimu’s ideas were contested and there was the ubiquitous struggle, class struggle if you like, like in any other society.

As for the research process, it was rather unconventional. We did exactly what we warn our PhD’s not to do. We entered the field without any pre-conceived ideas or hypothesis or even a research plan. The only guiding principle we agreed on was that in telling the man’s story we must also tell the story of his country and society; that we should desist from projecting Mwalimu as the hero and, broadly, we should apply the method of historical materialism.

I leave it to the readers to assess how far we succeeded. With the wisdom of hindsight, for me personally, I think we succeeded pretty well in our first two objectives, but I am not sure if we equally succeeded in consistently applying the method of historical materialism.

I must say our research was very extensive and intense. We spent considerable time in the United Kingdom combing the UK archives but also visiting several university libraries and conducting interviews. We did over 100 interviews. Thankfully the retired leaders of the ruling party (CCM) and the state were very co-operative.

We also were lucky to get access to the CCM archives and Mwalimu’s personal State House files kept at Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation.

At the end of the process we found that we had collected piles of material and it was a challenge how to synthesize and analyze without falling into the trap of not being able to separate wheat from the chaff.

Having said that, I must also underscore that we did not always eschew details where we felt that they needed to be recorded for future generations. It is the details, I believe, which helped us to bring out Mwalimu as human rather than some abstract political actor.

MB: You write that “what is specific to Nyerere’s idea of equality is that it is inseparable by definition from the idea of utubest translated as “human dignity” or “humanness.” You also argue that at the end of his career, “he could rightly take pride” in having successfully made this the basis of the nation he worked to build. I have long thought about Nyerere’s use of the word “dignity “and its meaning for postcolonial nations and for non-European peoples in particular. Would you please say more about that?

IS:
I’m absolutely wedded to the idea of human dignity and Mwalimu in his splendid language clarified this idea to me—it ceased to be a cliché and became a fundamental concept around which the idea of equality is woven.

We, therefore, argued that Nyerere’s idea of equality which has been around for at least a thousand years is fundamentally different from the liberal – bourgeois – idea of equality. For the latter, equality resolves itself in equal rights.

For Nyerere, the essence of equality is dignity or humanity which cannot be captured by the notion of rights. Excuse me but I never tire of quoting Mwalimu’s beautiful poem on equality; in particular the following two stanzas. I quote it first in Kiswahili, then in translation:

Watu ni sawa nasema, zingatia neno "watu”,
Siwapimi kwa vilema, ambavyo ni udhia tu,
Siwafanidi kwa wema, ambao ni tabia tu,
Lakini watu ni watu, mawalii na wagema.


Niseme maji ni maji, pengine utaelewa,
Ya kunywa ya mfereji, na yanayoogelewa,
Ya umande na theluji, ya mvua, mito, maziwa,
Asili yake ni hewa, hayapitani umaji.


I say people are equal, note the word “people”,
I don’t judge them by their disability, which is only a bother,
I don’t compare them by their goodness, which is only a habit,
People are people, holy men and (palm-)wine tappers alike.

If I say water is water, you may understand,
Water to drink, water to shower,
Of dew and snow, of rain, rivers, lakes,
Its ancestry is in air; it does not deviate from its wateriness.


"Humanness" is the “wateriness” of people. In a concomitant article he wrote on human equality, he explained it thus:

Human beings are equal in their humanity. Juma and Mwajuma do not differ in their humanity. In all other matters, Juma and Mwajuma are not equal, but in their humanity, they do not differ an iota. Neither you, nor me, not anybody else, nor God can make Juma to be more of a human being than Mwajuma or Mwajuma to be more of a human being than Juma. God can do what you and me and our fellow beings cannot do—God can create Juma and can make Mwajuma to be a different creature better or worse than a human being, but God cannot make Juma or Mwajuma to be better or worse human beings than other human beings; God can neither reduce nor increase their humanity.


What more can I say? Let me venture to suggest, though, that I think Nyerere’s concept of equality possibly gives us an anchor to construct an alternative discourse from the liberal discourse of equality and rights which is so hegemonic and yet it is so inadequate for postcolonial peoples to locate themselves in.

MB: After stepping down from the presidency, Nyerere spent the time between February 1986 and August 1987 traveling to different regions in an effort to recharge the party. In responding to complaints from the people about the failures of the party leadership, Nyerere reflected on the past and deduced that the leaders lacked the “same fire and fight” of their predecessors. As he saw it, “during the struggle for independence, the party was fighting for freedom and knew its enemy. It was united in its objective and mission.” As your analysis suggests, the question of “who is the enemy?” is an important one. Are you implying that Nyerere would have avoided certain challenges had he sought to answer that question at various points as the political terrain in Tanzania evolved?

IS:
It is a valid question but, frankly, answering it would be indulging in hypothetical history. What we can say is “what happened” rather than “what could have happened if …!”

Were choices available at strategic conjunctures? Yes, they were. Why was this and not the other course of action chosen?

Well, that can be explained only partly by the constraints of circumstances. The individual actor does make choices given his or her own outlook and social interests that he, consciously or otherwise, represents. The driving force for Nyerere was nation-building which demanded unity and which resulted in suppressing diversity or what he believed to be dissipating forces. So, in spite of formulating a beautiful phrase “development as rebellion”, the title of the biography, he could not tolerate rebels who pointed towards a different course of action at strategic junctures. This is captured in the title of book three of the biography: Rebellion without Rebels.

MB: You end the book with a question: “Was Julius Nyerere more of Plato’s Philosopher Ruler than Machiavelli’s Prince?” Many authors attempt to resolve such an analytical problem; to tell us in more pointed terms how we should remember a particular historical figure. Why did you decide to end with a query?

IS:
We wrote this biography with utmost respect for our readers guided by the dictum, “People think.” People are capable of resolving the query in their own way—we have provided sufficient material and analysis. But, more importantly, the query underlines the oft-repeated observation that great persons in history are enigmatic. Enigma is the stuff of which greatness is made. Let me end by quoting from our preface to the biography:

Our biography of Nyerere is grounded in the history of people’s struggles in which Nyerere, the man, was immersed and from which his greatness emerged. Our narrative does not shy away from recounting controversies surrounding Nyerere the man, or providing a reasoned critique, occasionally severe, of Nyerere the politician. All this does not detract from his greatness. Controversies and critiques constitute the stuff of which great men and women of history are made.


About the interviewee:

Issa Shivji is Director of the Nyerere Resource Centre at the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology in Dar es Salaam.

About the interviewer:

Dr. Monique Bedasse is an award-winning historian based in the departments of history, and African and African American studies at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.


 




Nyerere, The Soul Of Tanzania

Dauti Kahura

The Elephant, 10 March 2017

Nairobi, Kenya – Three months before the end of the last millennium, Africa’s arguably greatest leader-president breathed his last in a big city hospital, far away from the peasants who held him in awe and whom he loved to banter with so much.

On October 14, 1999, Africa woke to the sad news of the demise of Julius Kambarage Nyerere. He was 77, a tender age considering that his beloved mother died at the ripe old age of 100-plus years. His elder brother Wanzagi had died at the age of 86 and his maternal uncle died at the age of 96 years.

The founder-president of the Republic of Tanzania died at St Thomas Hospital in central London. He had been diagnosed with a rare terminal illness — lymphatic leukaemia — a disease that is primarily caused by persistent multiplication of the white blood cells in the blood.

The course of the disease is very slow, but towards the end, is one of extreme discomfort. It is probable Nyerere suffered great pain as he lay in his bed. To date, the ailment has no cure.

Given his stature as a revered retired president that when he died, Nyerere –who is fondly remembered as Mwalimu, the Teacher, a name he carried with “aristocratic dignity”– evoked difficult and mixed reactions from friend and foe. Those who loved Nyerere praised him unconditionally, those who disdained him were less than effusive in their eulogies and assessments of his life and career. “Nyerere was the soul of Tanzania,” a Tanzanian journalist once told me, “in life and in death.”

But one thing is unanimously agreed upon even among his harshest critics and most ardent admirers: He was an ordinary man who was not a kleptomaniac.

Kleptomania seems to have become the byword for current African presidents. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma is reeling from exhaustively documented exposure of corruption by him and his cronies, so much so that the ruling ANC party veterans recently told him to his face: “You have brought shame to our organisation and to our country for (your) own indiscretions and blatant actions of corruption and collusion with forces who do not care about our people and our country.”

Suffice it to say, even the magnanimously forgiving first president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, would not have kept silent in the face of the swamp of corruption his party, the ANC, which prides itself as a liberation movement, now finds itself deeply mired in.

CORRUPTION: A RUNAWAY SUCCESS
In South Africa, much like our own country Kenya, state corruption has paradoxically been a runaway success, to the consternation of the citizenry. A couple of weeks ago, President Uhuru Kenyatta gathered a motley group of senior state aficionados at State House to tackle the destructive institutional corruption that threatens to tear apart his Jubilee coalition government. Fulminating about state corruption, Uhuru cast himself as a helpless victim, a man more sinned against than sinning, blamed everyone but himself and his office. Never in the political history of post-independent Kenya has corruption posed so real a threat to the very existence of the nation-state, 50-plus years after gaining Independence from the British colonialists.

The great function of history is to help us understand the present. More than ever before, what historical lessons can we draw from Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere’s 23 years at the helm of Tanzania’s political leadership and 15 years as a ‘president-at-large’?

Indeed, the spectre of Nyerere still haunts a continent in dire need of a political role model. Nyerere’s sometimes contradictory political life offers a glimpse of a man who deftly avoided being sucked into the vortex of corruption into which political establishments across the continent were already being drawn.

What made Nyerere famous? What was it about him that set him apart from other African presidents of his time? Above everything else, what was his contribution to the development of leadership in Africa?

Try as we might, almost two decades since his demise, Africa is yet to get a political leader who can match the moral probity and rectitude of Nyerere (barring, of course, the Black Pimpernel Nelson Mandela).

Nyerere encapsulated a moral leadership and political morality that eschewed all forms of corruption: Institutional corruption, moral corruption, state corruption, private corruption, public corruption. Throughout his presidency and post-presidency, Nyerere argued against all forms of corruption, saying corruption erodes a society’s social mores and unravels the ties that hold a nation together.

As early as 1967, the year he formulated the controversial Arusha Declaration, Nyerere was quoted by the then ruling party TANU newspaper Uhuru as saying: “In the running of the nation, the people should not look at their leaders as saints and prophets.” Already wary of the sway the political elite held over the citizens, he cautioned them against sycophancy, warning that it would derail the development of the young country.

Thomas Molony, the Edinburgh academic and author of Nyerere: The Early Years, published by James Currey in 2014, recounts the heady days when the young and idealistic Nyerere was consumed with the enterprise of nation-building. An austere Nyerere had set himself the task of moulding and steering Tanganyika (later to be united with the Spice Islands of Pemba and Zanzibar into the united Republic of Tanzania) into a country of self-respecting and conscientious people.

Writes Molony: “Nyerere would speak to intellectuals in their language, but more significantly, he could articulate the frustrations of the Africans in their own language that they understood. He once told the British Labour Party and the British Left that Africans were natural socialists.”

At Edinburgh University in the late 1940s, Nyerere distinguished himself as a great thinker and baffled his white tutors and fellow students with his formidable intellect. As an MA student, he voraciously consumed Jean Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, T.H Green’s Principles of Political Organisation, among other moral and political philosophical writings. It was also at Edinburgh that Nyerere came into contact with the Fabian Society, under whose influence he later developed his Ujamaa philosophy, based on Fabian socialism.

Back at home and after becoming the first Tanganyika president, Nyerere was quick to remind the great powers (the USA, former colonial powers Germany and the British and the former USSR) that while they were busy racing to get to the moon, the African was trying to get to the village. Thanks to his great charisma and unceasing efforts, Tanzania’s 120 ethnic communities are till today still knit together as one people on a continent riven with ethnic hatred that has routinely led to internecine warfare.

A devout Catholic, Nyerere once proclaimed he carried two bibles, wherever he went: The Christian Bible and the ‘Ujamaa Bible’ — the Arusha Declaration document (Azimio la Arusha) that nationalised everything from bakeries to banks save for Catholic Church institutions. It is to his everlasting credit too that during his presidency, religious tensions were unheard of.

In a nostalgic moment, Nyerere in 1994 recounted how even after the country had officially done away with the Azimio la Arusha manifesto in 1990, he still kept his Ujamaa Bible. ‘I can tell you with all sincerity that I have re-read it again and again and I have not found anything wrong with it,’ said a sombre Nyerere

Like his contemporary Leopold Sedar Senghor, the founder-president of Senegal who was also a Catholic, Nyerere too oversaw the emergence of an independent country whose population was slightly more Islamic than Christian. And so Tanzania, like Senegal, has not been threatened by the religious schisms that are wreaking havoc in many African states.

Once, addressing an episcopal conference of Tanzanian Catholic bishops, Nyerere admonished them when he said: “Hakuna dini Tanzania, Hakuna. (There is no Tanzanian religion, none.)” Then, he travelled to Zanzibar and repeated the same to the imams. He kept reminding religious leaders that they had the onerous task of respecting each other’s faiths and keeping peace among their followers. “Nyerere is a Catholic, but he cannot force his religion on others,” he reminded the bishops and imams alike.

A decade after he had left office in 1984, Nyerere was so upset by the creeping corruption under his successor president Ali Hassan Mwinyi that in 1995 he thundered in despair: ‘Ikulu inanuka rushwa. (State House is reeking of corruption.)’ Apparently taking a pot-shot at Mwinyi, he said in exasperation: ‘Ikulu ni mahala patakatifu…siyo mahala pa biashara. (State House is a sacrosanct precinct…not a place of commerce.)’

Nyerere went further to remark, in public: ‘State House has been turned into a bazaar where Indian businessmen broker deals.’

Trevor Grundy, a British journalist who worked in Dar es Salaam in the early years of the Nyerere administration, reminisces about an ascetic and strict Nyerere who was yet decent and humble. A father of five sons and two daughters, it was inconceivable to hear of Nyerere’s children being involved in state malpractices. Nyerere himself once stated how he had read the riot act to his children and family and friends, warning them that state affairs and filial relations were two distinct and separate dominions.

A great man who attracted many ‘haters’ (Ian Smith, leader of Rhodesia before it become modern Zimbabwe, once described him as an ‘evil genius’), Nyerere, like any other mortal being, was not without his foibles. The veteran East African journalist Ahmed Rajab opined after the death of Nyerere, ‘He was a great leader who made great mistakes.’

Those mistakes included the monumental failure of the much touted Ujamaa policy. Still, it was a fiasco that the late Prof Ali Mazrui affectionately described as an ‘heroic failure.’

Still, Nyerere had the humility to at least concede failure and before abdicating power, he offered an apology and regretted the impoverishment and suffering that the policy had caused his people.

I met Nyerere the philosopher-king twice in Tanzania. On both occasions, I observed at first hand as the master and ‘servant politician’ did what he knew best: Enchanting the wananchi with his magic wand. Ever the sharp-witted conversationalist, I also saw him hold his own among university lecturers, laughing easily and heartily and mingling easily with the literati.

WHO IS THE GREATEST PRESIDENT OF THEM ALL?

Today, many people are wont to compare Nelson Mandela and Julius Nyerere — and rightly so. Between them they ask: Who was the greater hero? There is no doubt in my mind that Mandela is the best leader-president Africa has ever produced (and will produce perhaps in the next 100 years). Nyerere, on the other hand, is the greatest thinker-president (partly because of making great mistakes) that Africa produced in the last millennium.

Mandela will forever be remembered for spending a third of his life in Boer jails and surviving to assume the presidency of the Rainbow Nation. He will also be politically canonised by an adoring global community, for respecting power and quitting it for good once his first five-year term ended.

Nyerere will go down in history as a great man, who like Mandela was incorruptible, yet whose noble ideas oftentimes were frustrated by forces beyond his control. The Catholics may want to canonise him, but unless they have not re-read his premonition of 1967 in which he talked of creating saints out of ordinary mortals, the Catholics are warned that this is not the best way to honour the pithy short man from Butiama.

Three years ago in Nairobi, I engaged Fr Carole Houle, one of Nyerere’s confessors, about the whole debate on canonisation of Nyerere. He laughed and dismissed my views. Once the superior general of the New York-based Maryknoll Fathers in East Africa, Fr Houle spent 20 years in Musoma, where his congregation oversaw the Musoma diocese, one of whose more famous parishes was Butiama, the rural home of Nyerere.

As a pan Africanist, Nyerere like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal, Kenneth Kaunda and Gamal Abdel Nasser was ahead of his times. He dreamed of East Africa as a federation and hoped that the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda would form one country, because as he correctly observed, the three countries were colonial constructs.

Ever the busy scholar, Nyerere had completed translating Plato’s Republic into the Kiswahili language and even edited it on his sick bed (sadly,the manuscript is yet to be published.) It was the same Nyerere who, in his spare time as president, translated two of Shakespeare’s plays: Julius Caesar and Merchants of Venice into Kiswahili.

As the people of Africa grapple with tin pot dictators and insatiable presidents who plunder state coffers with the help of their children, family members and robber baron friends, let us remind them that Nyerere, for all his shortcomings, did not steal from his people.

On a continent suffering from a dearth of politics of integrity, Nyerere continues to shine on us as a beacon of rationality and princely leadership.


Dauti Kahura is a senior writer for The Elephant.


3 comments:

Vivianne Okel:

I would much rather Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. Although Tata's contribution to the struggle was immense, Tata made some very huge mistakes which will all come out to be examined in the fullness of time. These are my grievances:

a) First of all, when he came out of prison, he had 44 MILLION RANDS in his account!

South African millionaires and billionaires queued up to curry favour, they did this by giving Tata money.

Every ANC politician with clout went off in search of business sponsors. That was the quickest way to move up into the world. South Africans love glamour and have a taste for the finer things in life, no one wanted to be left behind.

Subsequently, I find myself shaking my head in disbelief when I see people frothing at the mouth when they speak of the Zuma-Gupta alliance. The Mandelas pocketed quite a bit of dosh from the business fraternity but people just choose not to talk about (it).

b) Tata treated uMam Winnie very badly. When he emerged from prison it's almost like he expected her not to have a political opinion. I will never forget this one occassion, Zindzi documents how during the CODESA talks, the discussions dragged on into the night and Tata sent uMam Winnie a note requesting a change of clothes. I'm left to wonder how this man thought that uMama didn't deserve a place at the negotiation table! She had earned it, the voices of the women deserved to be heard too. But no! She was limited to step and fetch.

To this day few cannot understand how Tata forgave the Boers but failed to reconcile with uMam Winnie. Tata could hold a grudge as evidenced by the fact (that) he didn't leave her a single red kobo in his will! He was banged up in jail, left her with two children, she was fired from various jobs despite this she still found ways to ensure that the children were somehow fed, clothed and educated, including the children from his 1st wife and yet, he left nothing for uMam Winnie in his will.

Furthermore, the Kraal (home) he bequeathed the Mandela Foundation was in essence uMam Winnie's home. In the Xhosa culture, each wife must have her house. When Tata was about to be released, uMam Winnie approached the Thembu King Buyelekhaya. It was King Buyelekhaya.who apportioned her that land. Tata was steeped in African culture and he as a lawyer, he should have known not to defraud uMam Winnie of her land. Even in death, his house is constantly at loggerheads as evidenced by all the drama we saw play out between his daughter Makaziwe and his grandson Mandla!

c) Tata had massive authority over the ANC but he did little to cure the ANC of the malaise of impunity and corruption that had infested the organisation during the years in exile. The Truth and Reconciliation exercise was a farce but because the Pretoria Regime and the West didn't want the world to know the full extent of what happened ( The US, the UK and Israel had been complicit in certain things). The ANC as well had its own secrets RE: Camp Quattro. So they colluded and did a piss poor job. The masses were encouraged to forgive and forget but that didn't serve to pull them out of poverty. I too would forgive and forget if I had traded my 4 by 4 cell for a mansion in Sandton ( one of the most affluent surburbs in the world).

Under his leadership, the ANC sidelined all the other groups which contributed to the struggle- AZAPO, PAC, BCM. They could only speak of Steve Biko in the context of the ANC...in actuality Bantu Biko was PAC he came into the struggle via his older brother Khanya who was PAC. But let the ANC tell it! ANC became front and centre, other leaders were marginalised Mandela was deified... in a nutshell that is how the ANC took on a larger than life mantle, turned into a monster and began to devour her people. Now, no one knows how to cure it of its ills!

Lastly but most importantly, many are now of the opinion that Tata sold out at the CODESA talks. That he left with half a loaf of bread if anything at all. And they are not wrong as illustrated by the gap between the rich and the poor, the land issue remains begging etc. Fire brands like Peter Mogaba, u Mam Winnie spoke up about this they argued that the CODESA talks were too rushed, that the Boers were underselling the ANC but the ANC led by Tata Nelson Mandela refused to hear. 23 years later et voila!!!!

South Africa gained independence after 53 African countries, they had a blue print, there was no reason why they were going to make the same mistakes committed all over the continent...but here we are.

And that is before we even discuss the xenophobia! Many a struggle movement found a home in Tanzania- ANC, PAC AZAPO ( From South Africa) FRELIMO (Mozambique) etc. As poor and impoverished as the Tanzanians were, they curved out land in Morogoro and gave it to the children of Azania to set camp as they fought to reclaim their land. In Nigeria, every civil servant's salary was subjected to a small deduction and this money was forwarded to the anti-apartheid movement. Jacob Zuma travelled on a Somali passport. And exiled Miriam Makeba obtained travel papers via the assistance of the Kenyan Trade Unionist Tom Mboya. South Africans in exiled were dotted all over Africa – Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Lesotho Botswana. Now we read of Africans subjected to xenophobic attacks in South Africa. How is it that the ANC forgot to tell South Africans of the years in exile and those who looked after them?

I dare say the rot in South Africa set in on Tata's watch. No disrespect. Just the cold hard truth. I'll take Mwalimu Nyerere any day. Mwalimu had control over his country and his family which is less than I can say for Tata.


Jahrateng Skabelli:

NYERERE FOREVER! Swahili Nation Tanzania. Beautiful people. I hope our Kenyan decadence will not infect them....


jon njuguna:


Beautiful write up- I love the statement 'he did not steal from his people '. We thank GOD for President Nyerere.















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According to CCM ya leo, Mwalimu alipenda sana kujikomba kwa MABEBERU sijui kwa nini hasa.
 
CCM chukueni hii toka kwa Mwalimu itawasaidia....

" We in Tanzania cannot sensibly isolate ourselves from financial centers of the world........" BY J.K.Nyerere
 
nyerere_with_people_jhk9zn[1].jpg
 
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