Very NiceNew Kipevu Oil Terminal
▲ Culverts for connecting the underwater pipelines to onshore facilities
Assume?!! Is this a new word you just learnt? Looks like you're desperately trying to use it?Not Mombasa alone, Uhuru's work on infrastructure can be seen in the entire country. I'm trying to assume how Kenya would have looked like if he had this mentality right away from 2013. Im also trying to assume how Kenya would look like if he didn't tolerate corruption.
Better late than never?!Not Mombasa alone, Uhuru's work on infrastructure can be seen in the entire country. I'm trying to assume how Kenya would have looked like if he had this mentality right away from 2013. Im also trying to assume how Kenya would look like if he didn't tolerate corruption.
Hii article iko na makosa kadhaa, sijui huyo alieiandika kama ana ueleo wowote kuhusu mambo ya shipping, inaonekana ilikua mara yake ya kwanza.... Nitaonyesha hayo makosa nikinukuu aya kutoka hio article.Lamu Port: Kenya's Transshipment Hub Risks Becoming a White Elephant
Lamu Port under construction (LAPSSET Corridor Program)
BY NJIRAINI MUCHIRA04-26-2021 10:47:47
The Kenyan government faces a hard decision over whether to encourage shipping lines to make use of the new Lamu Port, which is set for commissioning in June. If traffic shifts to Lamu, the government risks failure to generate enough revenue from its main gateway facility, Mombasa Port.
After years of delay, Kenya is preparing to open Lamu Port for business on June 15. The port's commissioning marks the completion of the first three berths at a cost of $367 million, but industry experts warn that the facility risks becoming a white elephant.
"Lamu port is at the risk of becoming a white elephant because I don’t know who is going to use it come June. Factors against its viability are many and unless Kenya negotiates with Ethiopia, the facility will not achieve its purpose," said Wycliffe Wanda, the executive officer of the Kenya International Freight and Warehousing Association.
To start with, the government is grappling with the tough choice of pushing business to Lamu Port, a decision that would mean decline in revenues for Mombasa Port. The ripple effects could include an inability to generate enough revenue to repay the Chinese loans that were used to construct Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project.
Mombasa port is the main source of business for SGR, because 40 percent of the port's cargo is required to be transported on the line to the hinterlands - mainly the Nairobi and Naivasha inland container depots.
Another challenge facing the Lamu Port is waning interest by Ethiopia and South Sudan, the two countries that were expected to be the main source of transshipment business for the facility. The port is a key part of the wider Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, which is being implemented at a total cost of $24 billion.
Landlocked Ethiopia, which mainly uses the port of Djibouti, has shifted its interest from the Lamu Port to the Somaliland port of Berbera, where it is partnering with DP World to build a regional trade hub for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has since acquired a 19 percent stake in the Berbera Port project, and DP World is investing $442 million to expand and increase its capacity by 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) per year.
Ethiopia is also seeking a stake in Eritrea Port following the cessation of hostilities between the two neighbors.
Despite Lamu Port's design as a transshipment hub, transit cargo in Kenya remains minimal, with the port of Mombasa handling about 120,000 TEU in 2018 and 210,000 TEU in 2019 out of a total of 1.3 million TEUs. This means the facility may struggle to attract business.
Threats of insecurity - particularly from the terrorist group al-Shabaab - and delays in completion of road networks are other factors that could see Lamu Port become an expensive but idle facility. Last week, the Kenya National Highway Authority awarded a $166 million contract to China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) to implement two key road projects that are central to making the port feasible. CCCC is also constructing the port.
Additional challenges facing Kenya’s crude oil project - including construction of a pipeline to Lamu Port - mean that it might take years before the country can start utilizing the facility in exporting its crude resources to the international markets.
Conceived in 2012, Lamu Port was originally designed to be a massive $3 billion project that would be implemented over a 16 year period. As envisioned, it would have a total of 32 berths and a total capacity of 24 million tonnes of cargo per year.
Though shipping lines like Maersk and Express have indicated a desire to direct some cargo to the new facility, Lamu Port faces many challenges ahead and its future is still uncertain.
The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.
Lamu Port: Kenya's Transshipment Hub Risks Becoming a White Elephant
The Kenyan government faces a hard decision over whether to encourage shipping lines to make use of...www.maritime-executive.com
Hii ni simple logic! Bandari ya Mombasa iko chini ya KPA, Bandari ya Lamu pia iko chini ya KPA, Faida ya Lamu port na faida ya Mombasa port zote ni faida ya KPA ambaye ndo mmiliki wa bandari zote mbili, kwahivyo hata kama Lamu port itapunguza mizigo inayoenda Mombasa port, bado faida ya Lamu ni faida ya KPA. Infact Lamu port ita complement Msa port badala ya kushindana na Lamu port kwa kupunguza msongamano wa mizigo pale bandarini Mombasa, hii itawezesha Msa port kusafirisha mizigo yake haraka zaidi kuliko sasa.To start with, the government is grappling with the tough choice of pushing business to Lamu Port, a decision that would mean decline in revenues for Mombasa Port. The ripple effects could include an inability to generate enough revenue to repay the Chinese loans that were used to construct Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project.
Landlocked Ethiopia, which mainly uses the port of Djibouti, has shifted its interest from the Lamu Port to the Somaliland port of Berbera, where it is partnering with DP World to build a regional trade hub for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has since acquired a 19 percent stake in the Berbera Port project, and DP World is investing $442 million to expand and increase its capacity by 500,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU) per year.
Another challenge facing the Lamu Port is waning interest by Ethiopia and South Sudan, the two countries that were expected to be the main source of transshipment business for the facility. The port is a key part of the wider Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, which is being implemented at a total cost of $24 billion.
Key drivers that’ll clinch top value for Lamu Port
WEDNESDAY MAY 05 2021
Police officers patrol at the Lamu Port following the arrival of the first batch of equipment on April 28, 2021. PHOTO | KEVIN ODIT | NMG
By GEORGE WACHIRA
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SUMMARY
- The Lapsset corridor project was to be implemented over time and had many components which include Lamu port, highways, railway, crude oil and products pipelines, a refinery, Lamu and Isiolo metropolis, both with airports.
- It is important to note that a contract for Lamu/Garissa highway construction was awarded last month, for indeed a port without hinterland connections to feed and evacuate the port would make it a lame project.
I recall the day in August 2011, at KICC, when President Mwai Kibaki received the Lapsset (Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor) feasibility report from the consultants in the presence of the Cabinet, principal secretaries, and heads of agencies relevant to the project. I was in the consultants’ team, specifically handling the refinery component of the study.
After the presentations, the President replied in a simple but firm language - “It is a good report, and we accept it. All relevant ministries and agencies should implement their sections. And the Prime Minister’s office will co-ordinate overall implementation”. He had instructed the Treasury to ring-fence the proceeds from the sale of Grand Regency Hotel as seed money for the Lapsset project, which was immediately institutionalised with an Authority and a Board. In 2012, the project launch was done at Lamu attended by regional heads of State.
For President Kibaki, Lapsset was a “must-do” project to open northern Kenya to socio-economic development, anchored in brief that transport infrastructure will stimulate trade, urbanisation, and open contacts with the rest of Kenya.
This would simultaneously address insecurity challenges associated with northern Kenya. I am sure the retired President will be all smiles when the first phase of Lamu Port is officially commissioned next month.
The Lapsset corridor project was to be implemented over time and had many components which include Lamu port, highways, railway, crude oil and products pipelines, a refinery, Lamu and Isiolo metropolis, both with airports.
It is important to note that a contract for Lamu/Garissa highway construction was awarded last month, for indeed a port without hinterland connections to feed and evacuate the port would make it a lame project.
It is important for Lamu port growth that the highway is further extended to Isiolo and subsequently to Lokichar town to link with Eldoret/Juba highway which was the original Lapsset highway plan. When this highway system is complete, Lamu port will become a strong transit option for South Sudan goods.
Since 2011 a lot has changed in Kenya and in the region, significantly altering the original scope and shape of Lapsset corridor projects. The assumption that after independence South Sudan would transit its crude oil exports via Kenya failed to materialise as the country opted to maintain northwards transit links through Sudan. This significantly weakened justification for a crude oil export pipeline through Kenya and a refinery at Lamu. However, later discovery of oil in Turkana reinstated justification for the pipeline, but not the refinery.
Further, assumptions on landlocked Ethiopia weakened when the country subsequently invested in an SGR linking the country to a substantially modernised Djibouti Port. Ethiopia also made peace with Eritrea, making it possible to use the nearby ports of Assab and Massawa. These developments have made Ethiopia less inclined on Lamu transit options. However, use of Lamu by southern parts of Ethiopia remains a strong opportunity.
How to maximise utilisation of the three new berths at Lamu is the immediate challenge. The Lapsset report included a section on exports of livestock from Lamu port, and grounds were earmarked for holding and quarantining animals ahead of shipment. This project can be operationalised to benefit northern Kenya herders, including southern Ethiopia. This can be a quick win project with significant socio-economic value addition for the pastoralist communities.
Since 2012, Lamu county has experienced increased economic activities with many new jobs and skills transfer to the local communities, which is what the Lapsset project was meant to achieve.
The planned Isiolo metropolis has also been in full readiness waiting for Lapsset infrastructure to crisscross the town. A new airport is, however, already in place. Yes, there has been a lot of expectations and waiting all along the corridor.
Let me try to summarise key success drivers for the new Lamu port. The livestock export project can be a clear early winner and should be coordinated jointly with the pastoralist counties of Lamu, Tana River and Garissa.
Secondly, a through highway to Lokichar will clinch largest value for the Port. Thirdly, curbing insecurity in northern Kenya should be a top priority for accelerated growth of the Lapsset corridor.
I find it weird that this abuse is easily accepted hereHaya, manyang'au ghafla wanajipiga piga kifuani..