Kenya’s security forces losing the battle for Somali hearts and mind

[Askari Kanzu]

Kenya’s security forces losing the battle for Somali hearts and mind


By RASNA WARAH

I am glad that Charles Onyango-Obbo had the gumption to ask the “elephant-in-the room” question in hisreport on military actions in Somalia published in the EastAfrican last week:
When does the Kenya Defence Force plan to capture the Al Shabaab-controlled city of Kismayu?

Ever since Operation Linda Nchi started in October last year, Kenyans have been regaled with stories from the frontline about successful battles against Al Shabaab.

But now, six months later, many Kenyans’ sense of pride in our defence forces is beginning to wane as they wonder whether the whole operation was not just a very expensive and ill-conceived show of bravado and whether the ultimate prize, Kismayu, is achievable.

We were told the KDF was in Somalia for the long haul and that it would not abandon the Somali people before rooting out Al Shabaab.

Yet, as the term of the Transitional Federal Government expires in August this year, questions are being raised about how long our defence forces can justify their stay in southern Somalia, and whether after being re-hatted as African Union forces, they still aim to take Kismayu.

Some things are also not adding up. Kenyans were told that Operation Linda Nchi was a reaction against a spate of kidnappings by terrorists at the coast.

Yet, when Judith Tebbutt, a British national, was released in March this year, news reports (and Tebbutt herself) described her kidnappers as pirates, not terrorists.

Did the government make up the Al Shabaab story to lend urgency to the incursion?

Meanwhile, reports about human rights abuses against Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees by the Kenyan police have further eroded the credibility of those we have entrusted to protect and defend us.

A report by Human Rights Watch documents cases of rape, attempted sexual assault, beatings, arbitrary detention, extortion, looting and destruction of property in the towns of Garissa, Mandera and Wajir and in the Dadaab refugee camp.

These abuses were apparently retaliation against grenade and improvised explosive device attacks targeting both security forces and civilians in November and December last year in the towns and in the camp.

Human Rights Watch says that after the attacks, large numbers of ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees were rounded up and subjected to severe mistreatment.

Security forces also allegedly robbed many of their victims. One refugee was not only robbed of two mobile phones and Sh5,000, but had to pay a bribe of Sh7,500 to be released. He didn’t file a police report because he did not believe he would get justice.

According to the watchdog organisation, not only do the violent and indiscriminate responses of the security forces constitute serious human rights violations, the abuses are also alienating Kenyans of Somali origin at the very moment when they most need the trust and confidence of the local populations in order to identify the militants behind the attacks.

The Kenya Government has apparently promised to investigate these abuses, but no police or security officers have been charged, disciplined or otherwise held accountable.

The Ministry of Defence has taken some steps by forming an ad hoc board of inquiry, but it is not clear what will be done if the reports of abuse are confirmed.

This is an unfortunate development given that the KDF is fast losing the battle for Somali hearts and minds due to what now appears to be an un-focused military strategy.

I was among those Kenyans who believed that the country held the moral high ground when it took the decision to protect its northern neighbour from the clutches of Al Shabaab. Now I am not so sure.

It appears that the military decision to take Kismayu was politically and economically motivated, and coincided with the Kenya-supported Azania project, which itself is fraught with difficulties.

Some analysts believe that the kind of federalism advocated by Kenya and the UN-sponsored road-map for Somalia could further fragment the country and cause more instability in the long term.

BRASNA WARAH
rasna.warah@gmail.com
This article was first published in the Daily Nation

 

[kshaka]

How about Somalis (and Al-Shabaab's apologist, not least on this forum) start worrying about our hearts and minds.? After all, they are the one's who pose a problem to the rest of us, no? Maybe they are the one's who are alienating us and they certainly need our trust and confidence more than we need theirs!

 

[Askari Kanzu]

How about Somalis (and Al-Shabaab's apologist, not least on this forum) start worrying about our hearts and minds.? After all, they are the one's who pose a problem to the rest of us, no? Maybe they are the one's who are alienating us and they certainly need our trust and confidence more than we need theirs!

Tarishi hauawi
- a Swahili saying.

Direct your grievances to the author of the article, Rasna Warah. There is an e-mail provided at the end of the article. That would be a proper way to lodge your complaints cum frustrations!

 

[kshaka]

Tarishi hauawi
- a Swahili saying.

Direct your grievances to the author of the article, Rasna Warah. There is an e-mail provided at the end of the article. That would be a proper way to lodge your complaints cum frustrations!

I'm not at all frustrated, just airing my opinion. Isn't that why you introduced this article here...so that we could opine on it?

 

[Askari Kanzu]

I'm not at all frustrated, just airing my opinion. Isn't that why you introduced this article here...so that we could opine on it?

Ok, I somehow thought you sounded a bit paranoid when you alluded to some Al-Shaabab apologists in this forum!

 

[Bantugbro]

What is KDF still doing in the outskirts of Kismayu they should go back home....:lol: and protect their borders from within....

 

[mwathai]

Kenya's security forces losing the battle for Somali hearts and mind


By RASNA WARAH

I am glad that Charles Onyango-Obbo had the gumption to ask the "elephant-in-the room" question in hisreport on military actions in Somalia published in the EastAfrican last week:
When does the Kenya Defence Force plan to capture the Al Shabaab-controlled city of Kismayu?

Ever since Operation Linda Nchi started in October last year, Kenyans have been regaled with stories from the frontline about successful battles against Al Shabaab.

But now, six months later, many Kenyans' sense of pride in our defence forces is beginning to wane as they wonder whether the whole operation was not just a very expensive and ill-conceived show of bravado and whether the ultimate prize, Kismayu, is achievable.

We were told the KDF was in Somalia for the long haul and that it would not abandon the Somali people before rooting out Al Shabaab.

Yet, as the term of the Transitional Federal Government expires in August this year, questions are being raised about how long our defence forces can justify their stay in southern Somalia, and whether after being re-hatted as African Union forces, they still aim to take Kismayu.

Some things are also not adding up. Kenyans were told that Operation Linda Nchi was a reaction against a spate of kidnappings by terrorists at the coast.

Yet, when Judith Tebbutt, a British national, was released in March this year, news reports (and Tebbutt herself) described her kidnappers as pirates, not terrorists.

Did the government make up the Al Shabaab story to lend urgency to the incursion?

Meanwhile, reports about human rights abuses against Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees by the Kenyan police have further eroded the credibility of those we have entrusted to protect and defend us.

A report by Human Rights Watch documents cases of rape, attempted sexual assault, beatings, arbitrary detention, extortion, looting and destruction of property in the towns of Garissa, Mandera and Wajir and in the Dadaab refugee camp.

These abuses were apparently retaliation against grenade and improvised explosive device attacks targeting both security forces and civilians in November and December last year in the towns and in the camp.

Human Rights Watch says that after the attacks, large numbers of ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees were rounded up and subjected to severe mistreatment.

Security forces also allegedly robbed many of their victims. One refugee was not only robbed of two mobile phones and Sh5,000, but had to pay a bribe of Sh7,500 to be released. He didn't file a police report because he did not believe he would get justice.

According to the watchdog organisation, not only do the violent and indiscriminate responses of the security forces constitute serious human rights violations, the abuses are also alienating Kenyans of Somali origin at the very moment when they most need the trust and confidence of the local populations in order to identify the militants behind the attacks.

The Kenya Government has apparently promised to investigate these abuses, but no police or security officers have been charged, disciplined or otherwise held accountable.

The Ministry of Defence has taken some steps by forming an ad hoc board of inquiry, but it is not clear what will be done if the reports of abuse are confirmed.

This is an unfortunate development given that the KDF is fast losing the battle for Somali hearts and minds due to what now appears to be an un-focused military strategy.

I was among those Kenyans who believed that the country held the moral high ground when it took the decision to protect its northern neighbour from the clutches of Al Shabaab. Now I am not so sure.

It appears that the military decision to take Kismayu was politically and economically motivated, and coincided with the Kenya-supported Azania project, which itself is fraught with difficulties.

Some analysts believe that the kind of federalism advocated by Kenya and the UN-sponsored road-map for Somalia could further fragment the country and cause more instability in the long term.

BRASNA WARAH
rasna.warah@gmail.com
This article was first published in the Daily Nation

Does the author know the difference between KDF operating inside Somalia and the Kenyan Police operating on kenyan soil. The offences she alleges are committed by Kenya police inside an the KDF be losing the battle for the hearts of Somalis living in Somalia. Agreed, we don't the kind info we used to get when KDF was operating under its own command. Re-hatting it as part of the Au force has chnaged afew things including its own targets.

 

[tomilay]

Askari wants munung'uniko without interference.
/

I'm not at all frustrated, just airing my opinion. Isn't that why you introduced this article here...so that we could opine on it?

 

[Askari Kanzu]

Askari wants munung'uniko without interference.
/

It seems such a long time you last mentioned Askari!

 

[Lonestriker]

Does the author know the difference between KDF operating inside Somalia and the Kenyan Police operating on kenyan soil. The offences she alleges are committed by Kenya police inside an the KDF be losing the battle for the hearts of Somalis living in Somalia. Agreed, we don't the kind info we used to get when KDF was operating under its own command. Re-hatting it as part of the Au force has chnaged afew things including its own targets.

Whether it's inside or outside,it is still the same KDF...it is basically tied to one thing.

 

[Lonestriker]

Based on what Col.Oguna was yapping KDF has failed to capture Kismayu.Unfortunately when we tried to point out weaknesses in the kenyan invasion we branded haters and even xenophobic.How do you explain a situation where a colonel boasting that they are going to capture Kismayu in two weeks time and yet six months later Kismayu has not been captured....So much for blind patriotism!

 

[livefire]

let the military/paramilitary units have a rest...(maisha shwari)...war is a business hence u dont rush to terminate your source of revenue plus the UN/AU money hasnt started flowing till late may when KDF signs a MOU with concerned parties and financiers. Ask Uganda why they are never in a hurry, free training ground plus everything comes cost free. At present KDF advancement is limited to their own terms, MIC guys to call the shots soon after the KDF/UN sign the amisom MOU later this month.

 

[kshaka]

Based on what Col.Oguna was yapping KDF has failed to capture Kismayu.Unfortunately when we tried to point out weaknesses in the kenyan invasion we branded haters and even xenophobic.How do you explain a situation where a colonel boasting that they are going to capture Kismayu in two weeks time and yet six months later Kismayu has not been captured....So much for blind patriotism!

Look, I know you guys are really looking forward to seeing Kenya lose...all we are saying is that maybe you should keep the champagne on ice for a while longer, it hasn't happened yet and in fact, may never happen.

FYI, it's taken AMISOM 5 years to push AS out of Mogadishu. Now, Kismayu is their HQ...do the maths

 

[livefire]

Look, I know you guys are really looking forward to seeing Kenya lose...all we are saying is that maybe you should keep the champagne on ice for a while longer, it hasn't happened yet and in fact, may never happen.

FYI, it's taken AMISOM 5 years to push AS out of Mogadishu. Now, Kismayu is their HQ...do the maths

you are telling them alot....they forget Uganda was contained in a 20 by 20 area for 5+ years before they made a breakthrough out of mogadishu which was only after KDFs inclusion in the somalia foray. If not, uganda would be in Mogadishu resting as they were accustomed and it worked for them....they saw the need to modernise.lol. Ethiopia not wanting to be outdone hurriedly deployed its forces in a clobbering marching contest. KDF are infact ahead of time, let the nay sayers eat hot potatoes.

 

[Askari Kanzu]

you are telling them alot....they forget Uganda was contained in a 20 by 20 area for 5+ years before they made a breakthrough out of mogadishu which was only after KDFs inclusion in the somalia foray. If not, uganda would be in Mogadishu resting as they were accustomed and it worked for them....they saw the need to modernise.lol. Ethiopia not wanting to be outdone hurriedly deployed its forces in a clobbering marching contest. KDF are infact ahead of time, let the nay sayers eat hot potatoes.

this fatalistic and almost apologetic language is in sharp contrast to the nationalistic outbursts that characterized those early days of operation lindanchi, and which caused us (in this forum) sleepless nights, to say the least.

Tulisema mpaka tukachoka, lakini hamkutaka kusikia.

Asiyesikia la mkuu huvunjika guu! (methali ya wahenga)

 

[kshaka]

Now, let's hear what an actuall military analyst has to say;

May 20, 2012: As the Kenyan military incursion continues in Somalia, many Kenyans have begun asking the government to tell them how long the conflict will last. The questions echo similar ones Ethiopians asked as the Ethiopian invasion in 2006, led to a prolonged three-year struggle with Somali militant Islamist militias.
At the moment, the majority of the Kenyan people still seem to agree that their government had to do something about the cross-border attacks by Al Shabaab terrorists in 2011, and militant Islamist trouble-making in Kenya (three examples: kidnapping tourists, harassing aid organizations, and trying to get Kenyan Muslims to launch a revolt). In October 2011, the government did do something, in a major way. Kenyan military and paramilitary police units have crossed international borders before, in either hot pursuit operations (usually pursuing cattle raiders) or raiding base camps (usually of tribal raiders). The Somali incursion was not a raid but a full-fledged, extended offensive military operation by the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF, Kenyan Army). Kenya supported its ground forces with air and naval forces. Moreover, it was the first such offensive operation by Kenyan military forces since the country became independent. The government insisted that defending Kenya's territorial integrity was the strategic objective of Operation Linda Nchi (Swahili for Operation Protect the Nation). To achieve that strategic objective the KDF had two military operational objectives: drive Al Shabaab away from the Kenya-Somalia border region and, in the process, significantly damage (if not destroy) the militant Islamist organization's military capabilities in southern Somalia. The real strategic triumph would be to translate Al Shabaab's loss of territory and military damage into a fatal political defeat for Al Shabaab.
As the KDF entered the fray in the Somalia's south, Ethiopia launched its own Somalia incursion in November 2011. Pro-Somali government militia fighters (ie, supporters of the Somalia Transitional National Government, TNG, also called the Transitional Federal Government) were soon operating with Ethiopian forces. Al Shabaab, already battling African Union forces in the Mogadishu region, now faced two new axes of attack. Various militant Islamist groups (Islamic Courts Union then Al Shabaab) had been fencing with Ethiopian forces in central and south-central Somalia since the official Ethiopian military withdrawal in January 2009 (what supposedly ended the 2006 war). However, the Kenyan operation was threatening what had been an Al Shabaab rear area (and certainly a comparatively safe area).
Eventually we will learn just how closely specific Kenyan combat operations in the south were coordinated with the Ethiopian/pro-TNG coalition combat operations in central and south-central Somalia. There is no doubt that coordination has occurred at the campaign level.
Ethiopia (seeking to avoid another extended stay in Somalia) has said it will withdraw most of its forces, as AU peacekeepers assume the area protection and security mission. AU peacekeeping forces have begun backfilling in the areas from which Ethiopian/pro-TNG forces have driven Al Shabaab Islamist fighters. So far, no AU peacekeepers have backfilled behind the KDF.
Kenyan forces in Somalia are supposed to eventually become part of the AU peacekeeping force. Though that strikes many as a good political move (East African nations support it, the AU supports it), some analysts are wondering if re-hatting Kenyan forces will commit Kenya to an even longer military presence in Somalia. See the emerging political problem? If Kenyan forces provide their own backfill and an insurgency erupts critics (and then the political opposition) will scream quagmire. And they already are.
Critics also point to Kismayo. Last fall the Kenyan military made it clear that the Somali seaport of Kismayo was a key objective. Al Shabaab used it as a communications and supply link to Yemen and Eritrea. It is also a pirate haven, which is no surprise, since Al Shabaab maintains close ties with Somali pirates. When Kenyan forces took Ras Kamboni in October 2011, the government said that Kismayo would be next. A mission accomplished moment? It is now late May 2012, and Al Shabaab still controls Kismayo. Incursion critics ask why Kismayo remains in Al Shabaab's hands. Failure to seize Kismayo has become a political problem. Is the KDF reluctant or incompetent?
Earlier this year Kenyan military officials suggested that the KDF was being methodical, not reluctant. A direct attack on Kismayo runs the risk of degenerating into a huge and bloody urban street battle. To avoid that the KDF said it sought political dialog with various Somali clans in the Kismayo area. Last month a statement attributed to senior government officials (no names) indicated that Kenyan Army officers were in fact working with several clans and clan militias (yes, they often have different agendas as well as rivalries) to reach a consensus on policing the Kismayo region.
Cynics suggested that the Kenyans were delaying an assault on Kismayo until Ethiopian forces could participate in the attack. The cynics have a case. A senior Ethiopian officer serving in Somalia was quoted this week as saying that Ethiopian forces had fulfilled their mission in Somalia and that Ethiopian forces might help liberate Kismayo. He also told the press he wondered why Kenyan forces had not yet taken Kismayo and indicated that they were supposed to attack it when Ethiopian forces were attacking Baidoa in February. This is another public signal that Kenya and Ethiopia are coordinating their military campaigns. Kenya certainly had the ground and air combat power to attack Kismayo then and still has the power.
The Ethiopians would likely add a substantial armored punch to an assault on Kismayo, and from a Kenyan military and political perspective that would be worth waiting for. The Ethiopians might accuse the Kenyans of failing to meet their commitment or, worse, letting Ethiopians do the bleeding. That could lead to political friction between two nations that increasingly see themselves as allies and economic partners.
But to dismiss out of hand the methodical approach the KDF leaders claim they are pursuing is a mistake. So here's a scenario: the Kenyans have re-considered their operations in southern Somalia in light of their strategic goal of securing territorial integrity. Real security requires a stable, peaceful political relationship with the people of southern Somalia. So the KDF wants to begin building that political relationship on the ground in Somalia.
Several of Kenya's international allies (the U.S., Ethiopia, Britain, and Australia) have special forces personnel trained to facilitate these tricky political discussions and security operations. The Kenyans have their own cadre of personnel with a track record for conducting successful multi-tribal and inter-clan negotiations in neighboring nations. Kenyans helped resolve several violent Dinka-Nuer tribal disputes in southern Sudan, prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended Sudan's north-south civil war.
The Kismayo region political-military (pol-mil) effort posited in this scenario utilizes political skills employed in the southern Sudan peacemaking mission. Both have very detailed intelligence requirements. Detailed really means detailed, which is one reason the process takes time. For example, the personal ambitions and histories of individual local leaders always affect the process. Talks can end (or never start) and agreements can unravel because Clan Leader X just despises Clan Leader Y. (Why does X despise Y? Negotiators need to know. They might need to seek an agreement between Clan Y and Clan Z first because Clan Leader X trusts Clan Leader Z.)
Kenya was the impartial mediator in Sudan. Not so in Somalia. In the Kismayo region Kenyans are heavily armed outsiders with a definite, self-serving political-security agenda. The KDF wants the people of the Kismayo region to treat Al Shabaab as their occupier and the KDF as their ally. That may seem like a long shot goal but day by day Al Shabaab is losing territory to the AU and TNG, and the southerners are aware of that.
The KDF has been training militiamen from Ras Kamboni (sometimes referred to as the Ras Kamboni fighters). Arming, training, and supplying these militiamen serve immediate security purposes. Paying them creates political goodwill. These militiamen could play a role in an attack on Kismayo. They could also play a role in politically stabilizing the city and the region. Arming, training, supplying, and paying Ras Kamboni fighters certainly demonstrates that good relations with Kenya has its rewards.
The KDF has shown that it is willing to use force to protect Kenya. It is also demonstrating that it is willing to use force to protect Kenya's friends.
A TNG victory will be more durable (and Kenya's military effort in Somalia more effective) if the southern clans are prepared to assume a positive security role in their region. The peace would be even more durable if the clans participate in Al Shabaab's final defeat. The Ethiopians, however, may argue that the time to pursue nice-nice politics will come after Kismayo falls. (Austin Bay).

Ethiopia: Wars On Many Fronts

Basically, the Ethiopians want us to reprise their failed strategy from 2006 and the AS cheerleaders here seem to think that it's a failure for Kenya not to do so. Why would you jump into a hole after you've seen your neighbour falling into it?

If you guys have read your Clausewitz (doubtful, I know), you'll have come across the, now well worn, adage that war is a continuation of politic by other means. Doing the fighting without taking care of the politics as the Ethiopians are doing and some here seem to expect is a recipe for failure...Kenya is doing its politics; sit back, watch and learn!

 

[livefire]

this fatalistic and almost apologetic language is in sharp contrast to the nationalistic outbursts that characterized those early days of operation lindanchi, and which caused us (in this forum) sleepless nights, to say the least.

Tulisema mpaka tukachoka, lakini hamkutaka kusikia.

Asiyesikia la mkuu huvunjika guu! (methali ya wahenga)

dude!!!!....i thought i was through with you. Nothing has changed in KDF's theater so take your methalis and tuck safely in a dictionary, kamusi or wherever it came from. KDF still posses the lethal posturing.....only waiting on UN's approval, (MOU)... a bankers cheque to go blitzkering on al kebab.

 

[Askari Kanzu]

dude!!!!....i thought i was through with you. Nothing has changed in KDF's theater so take your methalis and tuck safely in a dictionary, kamusi or wherever it came from. KDF still posses the lethal posturing.....only waiting on UN's approval, (MOU)... a bankers cheque to go blitzkering on al kebab.

wewe livefire acha kukurupuka. I do not need a dictionary to write Swahili proverbs. what you are saying about KDF is tantamount to chest-thumping; insipid and sapless. time will tell!

 

[BabuK]

I believe in scientific warfare backed up with hightec proactive reconnaissance that completely dismantles/destroys enemy positions and power to attack,ambush or counter-attack. AU/KDF need to sit down togather to review their combat plan if they are to succeed against Alshabab otherwise their wrath will come down heavily on Kenyan soil or who ever they see as an aggressor or traitor!!!

 

[Lonestriker]

Look, I know you guys are really looking forward to seeing Kenya lose...all we are saying is that maybe you should keep the champagne on ice for a while longer, it hasn't happened yet and in fact, may never happen.

FYI, it's taken AMISOM 5 years to push AS out of Mogadishu. Now, Kismayu is their HQ...do the maths

Ujinga ndio huu!Can't you see beyond you nose since it seems anyone who question anything kenyan is against Kenya.What about all those Kenyans who were against the war from the beginning?What of the many international military experts who were skeptical of your tactics,the manner of invasion,the timing...many of the reasons have turned to be true.It is high time you learn to attack the message and not the messenger thou I know it is hard since you come from an environment where politics is centered on attacking the player and not going after the ball.
Why should I re-do the Maths?Don't you think Col Oguna and bunches like you ought to have done the Maths when your were busy yapping about taking Kismayu in two weeks time back then in early November...Hesabu ngumu!