Je wayajua Mahusiano ya Tanzania na Kisiwa cha Jersey

Kuntakinte

JF-Expert Member
May 26, 2007
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Waungwana katika pita pita yangu nimekutana na makala moja iliyoandaliwa na jamaa zetu wa USA.

Kwa mujibu wa ripoti iitwayo International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, iliyotolewa hivi karibuni na Wizara ya Mambo ya Ndani ya nchi hiyo, kisiwa cha Jersey ni moja ya maeneo yaliyo rahisi kwa biashara haramu ya fedha na ambako wanasiasa na viongozi wengi wa umma hupata mwanya wa kuweka fedha zao 'haramu.'

Tanzania

Tanzania is not considered an important regional financial center, but it is vulnerable to money laundering because of the weaknesses of its financial institutions and law enforcement capabilities. A weak financial sector and an under-trained, under-funded law enforcement apparatus make money laundering difficult to track and prosecute. Officials suspect that some real estate and used car businesses are used for money laundering purposes. Government officials have also cited the emerging casino industry as an area of concern for money laundering. Money laundering is even more likely to occur in the informal non-bank financial sector, as the formal sector is still relatively undeveloped. Front companies used to launder funds include hawaladars and bureaux de change, especially on the island of Zanzibar, where fewer federal regulations apply. Officials indicate that money laundering schemes in Zanzibar generally take the form of foreign investment in the tourist industry and bulk cash smuggling. The most likely sources of illicit funds include Asia and the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Europe. Such transactions rarely include significant amounts of U.S. currency.

The Proceeds of Crime Act of 1991 criminalizes narcotics-related money laundering. However, the Act does not adequately define money laundering, and it has only been used to prosecute corruption cases. The law obliges financial institutions to maintain records of financial transactions exceeding 100,000 shillings (approximately $109) for a period of 10 years.

Current law does not include banker negligence laws. If the institution has reasonable grounds to believe that a transaction relates to money laundering, it may communicate this information to the police for investigation, although such reporting is not required. The Central Bank, the Bank of Tanzania (BOT), (Wazushi wengine hawa)has issued regulations requiring financial institutions to file suspicious transaction reports (STRs), but this requirement is not being enforced, and no mechanism currently exists for receiving and analyzing the STRs.

The 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act criminalizes terrorist financing. It also requires all financial institutions to inform the government each quarter as to whether any of their assets or transactions may be associated with a terrorist group, although the implementing regulations for this provision have not yet been drafted. Under the Act, the government may seize assets associated with terrorist groups. The BOT circulates to Tanzanian financial institutions the names of suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations on the UNSCR 1267 Sanction Committee’s consolidated list, but to date no assets have been frozen under this provision. The Government of Tanzania (GOT) did take action in 2004 against one charitable organization on the list by closing its offices and deporting its foreign directors. However, it is not clear whether Tanzania has the investigative capacity to identify and seize related assets. Tanzania has cooperated with the U.S. in investigating and combating terrorism and exchanging counterterrorism information. There are no specific laws in place allowing Tanzania to exchange record with the U.S. on narcotics transactions and narcotics-related money laundering.

The GOT became a party to the UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in 2003. Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. It has not yet signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). The GOT continues to play a leading role in the operation of this FATF-style regional body and has detailed personnel to the ESAAMLG Secretariat, located in donated office space in Dar Es Salaam. Tanzania also continues to host the annual ESAAMLG task force meetings.

Tanzania has created a multi-disciplinary committee on money laundering and a drafting committee that has prepared new anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. A Tanzanian Ministry of Finance (MOF) official stated in August 2004 that the drafting committee was in the process of receiving comments on the language of its draft bill from various stakeholders, and that the bill would likely be presented to the Parliament in January 2005. However, the GOT delayed tabling the AML legislation in Parliament. The national multi-disciplinary committee, established with the help of ESAAMLG, revised the draft AML bill from January through May 2005, gaining additional stakeholder input. In May 2005, the Committee presented the AML legislation to the Cabinet for approval. According to officials from the MOF and the BOT, the Cabinet failed to approve and send the AML bill to Parliament due to time constraints and focus on the 2005 national elections. Representatives from the multi-disciplinary committee are hopeful that the legislation will be tabled in Parliament as early as February 2006. Among its other provisions, the proposed legislation provides for the creation of a financial intelligence unit (FIU) that will collect mandatory suspicious transaction reporting from financial institutions and will be empowered to share this information with other FIUs and foreign law enforcement agencies.

Money laundering controls and reporting requirements are not currently applied to non-bank financial institutions, such as cash couriers, casinos, hawaladars and bureaux de change. The draft AML bill includes the expansion of money laundering controls to cover such institutions. Currently, the BOT supervises bureaux de change through annual audits and inspections, while the National Gaming Authority supervises casinos and other gaming activities involving large sums of money, including lotteries. There are no legal requirements for non-bank financial institutions to report suspicious transactions. There are currently no cross-border currency reporting requirements, even for cash couriers, although the Proceeds of Crime Act does characterize cash smuggling as a "predicate offense." The draft AML bill includes strengthened provisions to criminalize cash smuggling in and out of Tanzania.

The Government of Tanzania should finally enact and implement the anti-money laundering law that has been under review for several years. It should continue to work through the Eastern and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) to establish the financial intelligence unit (FIU) mandated in the draft law and to otherwise develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering regime that comports with international standards. It should become a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
HAIWEZEKANI KWA WAZEE WANAOONA MABILIONI NI VIJISENTI.

Tafakari kisha Jadili kuhusu "Vijisenti"

Inapatikana hapa.
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vol2/html/62145.htm
 
hii cha mtoto wewe google CORRUPTION INVOLVED JERSEY ISLAND ENGLAND halafu utaona mafisadi kwanini wanapenda kuweka pesa kwenye hiki kisiwa, jamani enhe wekeni thread kuhusu hiki kisiwa kuelezea kilivyokubuu kwa kuweka pesa za wizi.
 
The Anti-Money Laundering ACT 2006 was enacted and is inforce. The Tanzania Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) has also been established and the President has also appointed one BOT Fisadi by the name of Herman Mark Kessy as its first Commisioner. As I write this, the FIU is busy recruiting albeit not in a so open and competitive manner(apparently, personnel for the unit are appointed and they will only come from the public sector) this in my view is a recipe for failure.

Every so often the Tanzanian government comes up with some profound plans to tackle this or that, they enact laws and establish agencies but then implementation is usually carried out so horribly that everything fails in the end. This FIU is a classic example of this. Why appoint people? I belive the FIU will be better served if they advertised job positions competitvely, that way they stand a chance of getting the best and brightest.

Second, based on what I gathered from the ACT establishing the FIU, the FIU will be pretty much a toothless organization.They are only empowered to "recieve" "analyze" and "desseminate" information. This in my view will make the FIU a very passive agency.If we are serious about fighting economic and financial crimes,we need to take a foward-leaning approach The ACT should have given the FIU a more proactive role. How about amending the legislation so that it empowers the FIU to not only receive information, but also look for information, go after information, collect information"Gather" information. How about amending the legislation so that it empowers the FIU to prosecute/institute criminal proceedings.The way things are right now is if after analysis of recieved information it deems the information importatnt, the FIU can then disseminate "recived" infomation to relevant law enforcment agenices so that they can act upon it if they so wish. This is total BS!!
 
The Anti-Money Laundering ACT 2006 was enacted and is inforce. The Tanzania Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) has also been established and the President has also appointed one BOT Fisadi by the name of Herman Mark Kessy as its first Commisioner. As I write this, the FIU is busy recruiting albeit not in a so open and competitive manner(apparently, personnel for the unit are appointed and they will only come from the public sector) this in my view is a recipe for failure.

Every so often the Tanzanian government comes up with some profound plans to tackle this or that, they enact laws and establish agencies but then implementation is usually carried out so horribly that everything fails in the end. This FIU is a classic example of this. Why appoint people? I belive the FIU will be better served if they advertised job positions competitvely, that way they stand a chance of getting the best and brightest.

Second, based on what I gathered from the ACT establishing the FIU, the FIU will be pretty much a toothless organization.They are only empowered to "recieve" "analyze" and "desseminate" information. This in my view will make the FIU a very passive agency.If we are serious about fighting economic and financial crimes,we need to take a foward-leaning approach The ACT should have given the FIU a more proactive role. How about amending the legislation so that it empowers the FIU to not only receive information, but also look for information, go after information, collect information"Gather" information. How about amending the legislation so that it empowers the FIU to prosecute/institute criminal proceedings.The way things are right now is if after analysis of recieved information it deems the information importatnt, the FIU can then disseminate "recived" infomation to relevant law enforcment agenices so that they can act upon it if they so wish. This is total BS!!

BS indeed,How could i have missed this....

Over a year ago march 18th Jackson Madzima, Researcher: Organised Crime and Money Laundering Programme, with ISS (The Institute for Security Studies) in Cape Town, SA, wrote an article on the ISS monogram titled :politics, Corruption and Money Laundering in Tanzania – An Unholy Trinity

http://www.iss.co.za/static/templat...d=3126&slink_id=5689&slink_type=12&link_id=28

This is my take, and mine only.......

There are 4 types of money laundering prosecution. There are, firstly, those "mixed" cases in which money laundering can be charged or included on an indictment in which the underlying proceeds -generating predicate offence is included.

The subsets of this are:

"Own proceeds" or "self laundering", where the defendant in a money laundering case may also be the author of the predicate crime;
Laundering by a person or persons other than the author of the predicate offence.

Secondly, there are those cases where money laundering is the sole charge capable of proof or the easiest charge to prove. Again, there are two subsets:

"Own proceeds" laundering;
Laundering by a person other than the author of the predicate offence.

Proving that proceeds are the benefit of "criminal conduct" will usually be done by circumstantial evidence.

Where money laundering offences are proceeded with on the same indictment as the underlying crimes, the underlying criminal conduct will be proved as part of the proceedings to the requisite standard. Where the money laundering proceedings are "stand alone" it is necessary to prove the underlying criminal conduct in the money laundering prosecution.

It is not necessary in "stand alone" money laundering prosecutions to wait for a conviction in relation to the "criminal conduct" (i.e. the underlying or predicate offences giving rise to the criminal property).

Prosecutors are not required to prove that the property in question is the benefit of a particular or a specific act of criminal conduct, as such an interpretation would restrict the operation of the legislation. The prosecution need to be in a position, as a minimum, to be able to produce sufficient “circumstantial evidence” or other evidence from which inferences can be drawn to the required criminal standard that the property in question has a criminal origin.

Typically evidence of the criminal origin of proceeds may be provided in money laundering proceedings by:

Accomplice evidence;

Circumstantial evidence and/or other evidence;

Evidence of complex audit trails, from which an accountancy expert may be able to conclude that the complexity of the transactions indicate that the property was the proceeds of crime. (Vijisenti on his offshore accounts). While this was not a money laundering prosecution, by analogy, it would seem permissible for a witness to give expert evidence that the facts lead him to the conclusion that the property was the proceeds of crime);
Evidence of the unlikelihood of the property being of legitimate origin - Where the prosecution proves that Fida Hussein or Alfred Tibaigana has no legitimate explanation for possessing the property in question a jury may be willing to draw an inference that it is proceeds of crime.

Now the question would be;

Does money laundering investigation need the president’s approval before it commences?

And who would be able start a money laundering investigation?

for the first part the president approval already exists ,the ascent in 1992 by Hon Mwinyi on the Proceeds of Crimes Act 1991( money laundering provision on section 71) and 2007 by Hon kikwete on the Anti Money Laundering Act 2006.no need for a commission what so ever.

Although while interpreting law enforcement agency (Proceeds of Crimes Act 1991), the law states;
''Law enforcement agency'' means the Police Force, and including any person authorized in writing by the Inspector General of Police to perform investigative or monitoring duties under this Act;

To my street lawyer’s ability in interpretation this says clearly that the police force are the spearhead of any issues concerning this act (not the Attorney General’s nor the PCCB not even the FIU) “unless” the IGP authorises. (FYI: ACP Kasala heads the financial crimes division at the police HQ he’s also the Deputy DCI)

The law further interprets what a police officer is, and I quote;
‘‘Police officer'' means a, member of the police force of or above the
Rank of corporal;
My street ability in legal affairs suggests that any member of the police force can start a money laundering investigation or to be certain from the rank of corporal.
Police Officer what is merely suggested here is you do your job which is just to” uphold the law”
 
Hii thread nzuri sana hii..tukiendelea kuinarrow down naamini tutakubaliana kuwa kuuupiga vita ufisadi itabidi mpaka Queen of England naye atiwe ndani
 
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