Hawa Wachina Ni Wakombozi Wa Africa Au?

Apr 27, 2006
26,588
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JUST THINKING!

Pole pole inaanza kuonekana kuwa Wa-China, wanaweza kuwa ndio jawabu la waa-Afrika katika kupambana na ufisadi wa The West, katika kujikomboa kiuchumi. Biashara kati ya China na Afrika, imeongezeka kwa kasi kubwa toka mwaka 2001 hadi leo kufikia DOLA BILLIONI 40, kulinganisha na DOLA BILLIONI 15-20, katika mwaka wa 1999. China inafuata nyayo za waliowatangulia katika biashara hizo na Afrika, yaani kwanza Waarabu na baadaye The West, ambao waliweza kujenga Empire zao huko Ulaya kwa kutumia jasho na damu la Waa-Afrika, na baadaye kupigana nasi katika kugombea uhuru wetu, ambao baadaye walitupatia kwa njia za ujanja ambazo zimetuacha wa-Afrika kukwama kiuchumi, ambapo kazi yetu imeendelea kuwauzia the West vifaa muhimu kwa ajili ya maendeleo yao kwa bei ndogo, na kubaki soko kubwa la the West katika kuuza vifaa vyao vibovu au (Cheap manufactured goods).

Lakini Wachina wanaonekana kutupatia Waafrika, biashara na uchumi katika njia mpya ambazo ni staright business yaani za uwazi bila ujanja, na bila kuingilia siasa za ndani ya nchi zetu, ingawaje swali ni kwamba je ni kweli na wao hawana nia mbaya kama the West, waliokuja na Biblia wakatuacha tumeshikilia hizo Biblia zao mikononi mwetu, wakati wao wakigawana ardhi yetu? Ni swali linalowasumbua wasomi wengi wa nchi za Afrika sasa hivi.

Lakini kuna wanaosema kuwa wa-Afrika wanaweza kunufaika kwa kufuata busara za Wa-China ambao katika miaka ya karibuni tu wameweza kuwaondoa wananchi Billioni moja huko China, kutoka kwenye umasikini wa kutupwa, na kuji-Transform kutoka kwenye Agrarian backwater mpaka sasa hivi kuwa the world's fastest-growing economy! kufanikiwa huko kwa wa-china kumetokana na kuwa na viongozi imara katika siasa, ambao waliwapa viongozi wao wa uchumi uhuru wa kuamua maamuzi ya uchumi bila ya kuingiliwa na wanasiasa, kitu ambacho waa-Afrika tunaonekana kuwa kigumu sana kwetu kwa wanasiasa kuwaachia maamuzi mazito ya uchumi, viongozi wetu wa uchumi kina Kigoda na Mramba, ambao nafasi ya kwanza kwao ni kupeleka hela zote za bajeti katika majmbo yao ya uchaguzi!

Uchunguzi wa kisayansi unaonyesha kuwa hata Wa-china nao wana shida moja kubwa na Afrika, nayo ni kuchukua Raw Material tofauti yao ni kwamba hawatuingilii siasa zetu au kuja na maneno ya kuja kufuta corruption, lakini pia historia inaonyesha kwamba njia zote za kujaribu kugeuza utajiri ili uwasaidie Wa-Afrika wenyewe, zimeshindikana na hasa ukiangalia nchi kama Nigeria, ambayo ina utajiri mkubwa wa mafuta.

Ukiweli ni kwamba Waa-Afrika, tunapaswa kuamua wenyewe kwani mambo yote yako mezani na uamuzi ni wetu either kuendelea kuwafuata World Bank, na IMF ambao umetuua kabisa kiuchumi na uzoefu wa wa-china, ambao ndio umewakomboa kiuchumi, uamuzi ni wetu!
 
Wachina wangeendelea kuanzia miaka ya 50, kama hawangetawaliwa na Mao Tse Tung. Kitu kiliwachelewesha kuendelea ni ukiritimba wa mamlaka aliokuwa nao Mao. Huo ndio ulikuwa chanzo cha Cultural Revolution ya China (miaka ya 60). Viongozi thabiti wa China, eg. Deng Hsiao Ping, walikumbwa na huo uchu wa madaraka wa Mao, na hawakuweza kutoa mchango wao hadi alipokufa Mao.

Mara baada ya kifo cha mao, China iliingia kwenye mkumbo wa maendeleo ya haraka. Deng aliwaongoza chini ya battle cry ya "It is glorious to be rich". Hilo liliwasaidia kufuta mawazo aliyowajengea Mao ya kuatamia umasikini. Utawala wa Mao ulituathiri hata sisi. Mao alikuwa na uwezo mkubwa wa kushawishi, na Mwalimu alihadaika akawa mfuasi mkuu wa Mao. Aliiga hata staili ya kuvaa ya Mao. Jaribio la Mwalimu la "kutupeleka China" lilitubakisha nyuma sana.

Labda yaliyopita ni ndwele, tuangalie ukweli uliopo duniani sasa. Kuna Super Power moja tu, yaani Marekani, lakini nguvu za China zinakimbilia zile za Marekani haraka sana. Huenda China ikawa na uchumi mkubwa kuliko Marekani chini ya miaka 5 ijayo.

China inatupa counterbalance to US domination. Ni vema tunavyozogelea China. They are not, at the moment, practising the sort of brutal exploitation that is practised by "the West".

Augustine Moshi
 
CHINESE CARS HIT EUROPEAN MARKET

Opel on the Outside, Mao on the Inside

By Gerald Traufetter in Antwerp, Belgium

A Dutch car dealer is about to bring the first Chinese-built cars to Europe. It's not the prettiest car ever, but it is cheap. Most importantly, it's a powerful symbol of a globalization process that has seen European companies transferring technology to the Chinese for years. Now, with their know-how, they want to tackle the European market.



DER SPIEGEL
Dutch car dealer Peter Bijvelds: "The work is really pretty bad."
If Peter Bijvelds were a normal car dealer, you would be right to question his sanity. "This here," he says as he runs his finger nails over the dashboard, "is pretty cheap plastic."

Then he pokes his finger at another cheaply made part of the car. "The work is really pretty bad." If that wasn't already enough to keep one from buying the car, he then adds: "The motor is also a little bit weak."

But Bijvelds is beaming on this rainy summer morning. He then jumps into his real sales pitch: the price of the new 5-door sports utility vehicle is only €17,000. "You can't get as much car as this for that amount anywhere." And the 27-year-old Dutchman doesn't need to worry about advertising the car. He's getting tons of free publicity. Surrounded by camera teams, he proudly shows off three long rows of Landwind cars, a Chinese brand most European automobile industry insiders have never even heard of.

The cars are located on the quay at the port in Antwerp, Belgium, and they are creating a small chapter of business history. They are the first cars produced by the Chinese to reach European shores. D-Day brought American automobiles to Europe in 1944 and the Japanese arrived in the 1960s. Now, a new wave is invading Europe: "Made in China."

"The car is 40 percent cheaper than a comparable Western model," says Bijvelds, who clearly enjoys the shockwaves he is sending through established automobile manufacturers in Europe. "All 200 of the cars here have already been sold."


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But the Landwind is much more than a Chinese "Yugo" -- it's a tinny symbol of globalization. It's being produced by Chinese workers who, according to Bijvelds, receive a monthly salary of 40 to 50 euros (that's not even a fraction of the average monthly wage of €2,800 at Opel's plant in Bochum, Germany). The engine comes from Japan's Mitsubishi and the body closely resembles the Opel Frontera, which used to cost €30,000 until General Motors suspended its production a year ago. Thirty percent of Landwind's manufacturer, the Nanchang-based Jiangling Motors Company, is owned by American car-maker Ford. And General Motors gave the Chinese permission to use the Frontera's design. Indeed, the connections to the west can be seen everywhere in the project.

The irony of bringing Chinese cars to Europe doesn't escape Bijvelds, either. He says the way western car manufacturers deal with China is a bit schizophrenic. Everyone from Volkswagen to BMW wants their autos to be represented on the Chinese car market, one of the world's biggest. To do so, they've built modern factories in the Middle Kingdom, they've handed over the expensive technologies they've developed through licensing agreements and now they can only look on defenselessly as their own markets are attacked using weapons of their own creation.

But experts apparently think the Chinese tigers could present a real business opportunity for European car wholesalers like Bijvelds. And for his part, the Dutch importer is also negotiating with other Chinese firms to distribute their cars on the European market. This year alone, Bijvelds intends to sell 4,000 Landwind sport-utility vehicles.

So what do his customers get? Well, a car that's a lot like one of the fake Rolexes that are made in small, make-shift factories in Shanghai. The watches work for a few years, then the battery dies. You just replace the battery and the solid quartz clock mechanism starts ticking again.



Opel
The Landwind is an almost perfect copy of the Opel Frontera, pictured here, which ceased production last year.
Viewed from its exterior, the Landwind looks like a perfect copy of the Frontera. You can only see the sloppiness after you open the door. The buttons are cheaply attached and the floor is covered with poorly applied fake leather. But it's the fumes from the factory fresh cars that really get you -- they're so strong that they'll likely be giving new owners headaches for months to come. The seats are made of matching leather, but they don't have good footing when the car turns, which it does easily, with only the slightest turn of the steering wheel. Of course, there's also the clutch and the transmission, which are reminiscent of those in a delivery truck. Then again, Bijvelds isn't promising his customers any more than that.

For his part, Bijveld defends the car's durability. For at the heart of this car, like the Rolex with the solid quartz mechanism, the guts of the Landwind is a Mitsubishi motor. In fact, it's the same exact motor used in Mitsubishi's own Outlander SUV. It may not be perfect, but the engine does have a proven track record.

In fact, Bijveld believes the car has been too solidly built for the nuances of the western car market. "The Chinese engineers have put in a chassis and tires that are intended for the sand and other off-road driving," he says. After conducting test drives, Bijveld asked the Chinese to make modifications. "How are they supposed to know that people here prefer to drive their SUVs in the city?" he asks. For the Chinese, the first foray into the European automobile market is the start of a steep learning curve.

Source: http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,364992,00.html
 
Bandugu nyingine hii, Ila inatoa onyo la kupigana dhidi ya pollution:

China's growth shows no sign of slowing, according a new report by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
In its first analysis of China's economy, the OECD said the private sector now provided half its output.

It found much to praise in one of the most rapid economic transformations of modern times but said there was also room for progress in key areas.

China must do more to improve education spending and protect the environment.

Private sector engine

China's economy has grown by an average of 9.5% a year over the past 20 years and the OECD says it won't slow down any time soon.

In economic terms, the state's grip on the Chinese people is weakening


It predicts that China will overtake most Western economies in the next five years.

In economic terms at least, the state and communist party's grip on the Chinese people is weakening.

Well over half the national income now comes from the private sector, generating most of its new jobs.


China has to deal with its pollution problem, the report says

But China's cradle to grave welfare system has disappeared.

Only a fifth of the country's rural population, its poorest, have any kind of health cover.

Pollution problem

The OECD says the government needs to spend more on health and education.

The quality of the environment is also a serious cause for concern.

Five of the ten most polluted cities in the world lie in China.

The OECD warns that with the pace of economic change remaining strong, the state must work harder to reduce pollution.

Source:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4251526.stm
 
Bytheway, Pamoja na kwamba Wachina kwa namna moja au nyingine wanaonesha kuwa ni WAKOMBOZI wa Africa, ( ni competetion nzuri kwani west countries sasa watashusha vitu bei, then bongo tutafaidi) LAKINI hilo nloliona huko bongo KARIAKOO juzi Wachina wanashusha marobota ya nguo, na kupanga chini kama wamachinga! THIS IS TOO MUCH TO THE EXTENT OF AN ACCEPTABLE!

UHAMIAJI MPOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO?

________________
"U Can't Change The Nature"
 
By October 1, 1999, the PRC had undergone a glorious yet tortuous course of 50 years, amid great changes in Chinese society.

Before the founding of New China in 1949, China's highest yearly outputs of major industrial and agricultural products were 445,000 tons of yarn, 22.79 billion meters of cloth, 61,880,000 tons of coal, 320,000 tons of crude oil, 6 billion kwh of electric energy production, 150 million tons of grain, and 849,000 tons of cotton.

Since the founding of New China, especially in the 20 years after the start of reform and opening to the outside world in 1978 China has made great achievements in economic construction and social development.

In 1998, the GDP was 7,955.3 billion yuan, an increase of 6.4 times over 1978, at constant prices; the outputs of some major industrial and agricultural products, such as grain, cotton, meat, edible oil, coal, steel, cement, cloth and TV sets, leapt from a backward position to first place in the
world.

source: http://www.asianinfo.org/asianinfo/china/pro-economy.htm
 
If China's soaring economy has a hard landing, the rest of the world will feel the bump

A FASCINATING drama is about to be played out in the world's biggest country. China's economy is growing too fast for comfort, and the country's leaders know it. In recent weeks they have promised forceful measures to cool things down, but it is not clear what they will or can do. Rumours are rife that China's central bank may raise interest rates for the first time in nine years.

The authorities have tried to restrain investment, prices and lending through administrative fiat. The challenge facing them would be difficult for policymakers anywhere: to slow the economy enough to ensure sustainable growth, but not so much as to cause a damaging crash, the much-feared hard landing. But the task of China's policymakers is doubly difficult because they have far fewer tools at their disposal than their counterparts in developed countries (see article). Thousands of state-owned firms, as well as the banking system, do not respond much to pricing signals or interest rates. It is not only 1.2 billion Chinese who should hope that their leaders succeed despite these handicaps. The rest of the world also now has a huge stake in China's continued economic health.

During the past three years China has accounted for one-third of global economic growth (measured at purchasing-power parity), twice as much as America. In the past year, China's official GDP growth rate has surged to 9.7%. Even this may underestimate the true rate, which some economists reckon was as high as 13%.

China's scorching growth has helped to prop up other economies by sucking in imports, which surged by 40% last year alone. While America's industrial output has shrunk over the past three years, China's has increased by almost 50%. As a result, its demand for commodities has skyrocketed, driving up prices. Last year it consumed 40% of the world's output of cement. It also accounted for one-third of the growth in global oil consumption, 90% of the growth in world steel demand, and more than the whole of the increase in copper demand. If China's economy slows sharply, commodity prices will fall everywhere, especially hurting producers in countries such as Russia, Brazil and Australia, which have gained so handsomely from China's boom.

Shocked
The biggest losers from a hard landing in China would be its Asian neighbours. China accounted, on average, for almost half of the total export growth of the other East Asian economies last year. By some estimates, Japan's exports to China and capital spending linked to its export industries accounted for one-third of Japan's total GDP growth last year. Indeed, a slowdown in China would expose the chronic weakness of private consumption in Asia. The recent burst in growth in the region has been much too dependent on exports to China. Although Japan's GDP grew at an annual rate of 4.5% in the second half of 2003, consumer spending rose by only 1%. In South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, consumer spending fell slightly, on average, last year.

A slump in China would have a much smaller impact on America and Europe, but some companies would be hurt. Exports to China accounted for about one-fifth of total export growth last year in America and the European Union. However, the biggest risk to these economies lies elsewhere-in the indirect effect of a sharp slowdown in China on financial markets. Another risk lies in the fact that America depends on China to help finance its budget and current-account deficits. China's purchases of American Treasury bonds, along with purchases by Japan, have helped to hold down yields and hence American mortgage rates. If China's economy continues to overheat, its current-account surplus could soon turn to deficit, and then its central bank would no longer need to buy American Treasuries to hold down its currency.

Fortunately, there are some reasons to hope that avoiding a hard landing in China, despite the difficulties, is possible. This time China's policymakers are stepping in to cool things down earlier than they did in the early 1990s, when inflation was far higher and investment and credit were growing even faster than today. And unlike the East Asian countries which suffered so badly during their economic crisis in the late 1990s, China has a current-account surplus and little foreign debt.

Perhaps the biggest worry for the world economy is the prospect of a "twin tightening" of monetary policy in both China and America. Interest rates of 1% in the United States are dangerously low for an economy with 5% real GDP growth. If America's Federal Reserve is forced to raise rates more rapidly than expected and this happens at about the same time that China's economy slows sharply, stockmarkets would take a beating and global growth could stall. Monetary-policy announcements from Beijing are still not as important as the Delphic words of Alan Greenspan, the Fed's chairman. But as the weight of China's economy in the world continues to grow over coming years, one day they will be.

Source:http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2668015
 
Wanabodi ,

Mimi sidhani kama china inaweza kuwa mkombozi wa afrika ! Tofauti na nchi za magharibi Wachina sasa hivi wako desperate katika kujipatia natural resources na awajali kama hiyo nchi watakayonunua bidhaa kuna vita au lah , Ninachojaribu kusema ni kuwa hata hiyo nchi husika inakiuka haki za binaadamu wao awajali !

Kitu kingine ni kile alichosema FIKIRADUNI , Moja ya sababu inayofanya bidhaa za zinazozalishwa marekani ziwe ghali ni environmental issues ! Makampuni hapa marekani ni lazima ya treat uchafu wowote kabla ya kuwa discharged na EPA wako very serious katika hiyo issue , kwani wameshaona athari zake ! Case ya china ni tofauti wao kwa sasa awajali mazingira yao, ila read my leaps soon or later they are going to learn the hard way .....Magonjwa kama kansa yatawaua sana wachina katika miaka ijayo.

Kitu kingine ni siasa za china , waafrika tutagemea vipi China kuwa mkombozi wetu wakati china yenyewe aiheshimu haki za binaadamu ? China wanajifanya hawataki kuingilia siasa za ndani za nchi husika huu ni uongo , huwezi kuniambia utainvest milions of dollars sehemu ambayo ni politically unstable.

Kitu kingine ni currency yao YUAN, wachina ni wahuni wameamua kwa makusudi kuidevalue currency yao in relative to the dollar kusudi waweze kuhuza bidhaa zao kirahisi marekani , wamarekani wamelalamika sana kuhus hili jambo ila wachina hawataki kubadili uamuzi ! Kitu ninachojaribu kusema ni kuwa vitu vingi sana katika china haviwi determine na economic principles rather what is best for china at that time, it may sound good in the short run but it will haunt them in the future.

K
 
Mzee Rufiji,

Great thinking, ninaziona point zako kuhusu wa-China na kama sikosei ni Haki za binadamu, mazingira, na short terms results, labda in the short term strategically, they had to do what they had to, lakini the fact kwmba wameweza ku-deliver huoni kwamba ni plus?

Kwani viongozi wao wengi ukiongea nao wanasema kwamba, kwao cha muhimu ni deliverence kwanza, halafu the rest vitafuata baadaye, maana hata hao US, kwa mfano huo mto wao hapo Hudson River si umejaa Mecury huo toka kwenye viwanda vya General Electric, na kusababisha samaki wake kuwa hatari kwa maisha ya binadamu, kwa hiyo kwenye la mazingara hata West bado linawasumbua,

Halafu the fact kwamba hawa Wachina hawajali siasa za ndani yaani local, as opposed na the West wanaotuambia kuwa msaada lazima kuwa na demokrasia ambayo wewe na mimi tunajua kuwa hapa bongo tumeliwa kamali, huoni kwamba ni plus nyingine kwa Wachina katika kutusaidia,

otherwise maneno na point zako ni nzito na kuna elimu hapo!
 
Rufiji et al,

Mojawapo ya economies of scale wanayo enjoy China ni gharama ya kulipa wafanyakazi. China walijenga viwanda vijijini kabisaa ambako gharama za maisha ni ndogo, kwahiyo wanalipa mishahara midogo(ofcourse sio kuwapunja) ni kama ujenge kiwanda Kiburugwa au Kilwa Kipatimu, gharama ya maisha ni ndogo, you will only need to attract skilled labour, wengine ambao ni kama 80% unawapata cheaply, cost of production inakuwa ndogo na unainua maisha ya wananchi wa eneo lile!!, hence kutokomeza umasikini!!!!

Namba mbili, kupata hao skilled labour jamaa wamewekeza ktk ELIMU, na hii Elimu sio tu kujenga University million (nyingi:)), la hasha! ni pamoja na kupeleka wanafunzi ktk vyou vingine nchi za nje na kuwa na usimamiaji wa kueleweka kuwarudisha home.

Namba tatu, Udicteta, ila ku takeoff tunahitaji Kiongozi dicteta kidogo!! najua wengi mtapingana na hili lakini tunamhitaji kiongozi kama JKN au BWM. Kivipi??, OK, mipango inapangwa mikakati inawekwa watu wana lay down techniques, kiasha wana implement! hakuna ku deviate from the plans unless ime prove failure!! Akitokea Mahalu amekula fedha yetu basi kimya kimya anapotezwa!! (hapa nina maana ya wale big ones), akitoke Mkira amekamatwa na rushwa ya tzs 10,000/= Jela maisha!!!!!!! akitokea SAM amekamatwa na Rushwa ya Tzs 400,000,000/= Jela maisha!!!!

Kwa ujumla China wana mikakati waliyojenga siku nyingi. Kwa mtazamo wangu mdogo, Tanzania tunahitaji 20 years tu!! sio zaidi ya hapo kuivusha nchi hii kutoaka kwenye dunia ya tatu mpaka ya kwanza!! Yes INAWEZEKANA. Miaka mitano ya kwanza kusomesha(wataalamu majuu) huku tukitafuta hela na kuwafundisha wananchi kuhusu mabadiliko na huku sheria tukiibadilisha.
Mitano ya pili ni Implememntation na kurekebisha palipo na makosa na kujenga viwanda kuwekeza kwenye kilimo mifugo na kuwa weka wataalamu wetu kwenye vituo vya kazi, mitano ya tatu ni kufanya kazi na take off, ya mwisho ni kuuza na kujitosheleza wenyewe kwa asilimia 90 kwa bidhaa za humu humu nchini!!

Maisha bora kwa kila Mtanzania!

FD
 
Beijing is selling off ownership stakes in its state-owned companies. The goal isn't capital; it's transparency.
http://www.strategy-business.com/press/sbkw2/sbkwarticle/sbkw060726?pg=all
Foreign companies are in the midst of an extraordinary shopping spree in China. In October 2005, Carlyle Group became the first direct buyer of a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE), with its $375 million bid for an 85 percent stake in Xugong Group Construction, the country's largest construction machinery manufacturer and distributor. That deal was quickly followed by a handful of other high-profile foreign bids for Chinese SOEs, including the January 2006 announcement that Goldman Sachs, Allianz Group of Germany, and American Express would pay $3.8 billion for a minority stake in Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the country's largest government-owned bank.

The big news is not that foreign companies are investing in Chinese firms; this has been going on, mainly through joint ventures, for some 15 years. What makes the latest wave of deals so unusual is that for the first time the Chinese government is offering outsiders ownership positions in its thousands of state-owned enterprises. The shift is an unmistakable signal that China has made reform at its biggest companies a top priority. No longer silent partners, foreign investors will be in a position to bring new management approaches, better incentive systems, greater transparency, and a whole new level of corporate governance. "This is not merely a transactional process, but a starting point for deep change," says Edward Tse, managing director of Greater China for Booz Allen Hamilton.

Indeed, the Chinese government's sale of SOEs is not about gaining access to foreign capital. Marshall Meyer, professor of management at Wharton, points to China's $800 billion in foreign reserves to make that point. "China doesn't need the money," says Meyer. "For them, it's secondary." Rather, China's move is aimed at importing Western business expertise. Quickly moving state-owned firms to sound commercial footing, says Professor Meyer, requires not just cash but experience. Once a firm becomes a shareholding company rather than a wholly state-owned enterprise, it is required by Chinese securities law to install directors and corporate governance systems, which increase transparency and help companies become competitive in an open market. "Clearly the aspiration of the Chinese government is to raise overall management capabilities within these businesses," says Mr. Tse.

That was the explicit purpose of the December 2005 sale of a 24.975 percent stake in the country's third-largest insurance company, China Pacific Life Insurance Co. (CPIC Life), also to the Carlyle Group, for $410 million. At the time of the transaction, Carlyle announced the partnership would provide CPIC Life with "strategic, operational and industry expertise to strengthen the company's performance and competitive position." Carlyle outlined additional areas of support, including "corporate governance, risk management, investment management, product sales, marketing and IT systems."

China is treading this path cautiously, however. Russia's "shock" privatization in the 1990s, which led to economic collapse, has proven a powerful lesson to Beijing, says Professor Meyer. "You just don't liquidate state assets overnight. If you do, a few oligarchs end up grabbing everything," he says. Instead, China's government is only gradually loosening its grip, opening the door for outside investors while maintaining a strong state influence. "They want it both ways," says Professor Meyer. "They want companies to act like companies, and not arms of the state, but they also want to retain controlling interest." So far, that demand hasn't dampened foreign interest in the SOEs; the opportunity to crack the Chinese market via an ownership stake of whatever size in large, established domestic companies is still a huge enticement, even if the central government insists on having the upper hand.

Ownership diversification has taken place mainly in the steel, insurance, and construction industries, which are most often controlled out of Beijing, but pushing reform outside the capital city is a greater challenge. Consider China's banks, which would benefit greatly from reform to deal with widespread nonperforming loans and bloated, ineffective management: Most large banks in China are locally entrenched and are focused on parochial interests. "The tug-of-war is between the local governments, which are particularly sensitive to jobs, and the central government, which is trying to put even the largest state-owned enterprises on sound footing," says Professor Meyer. That tension arises in just about all industries undergoing reform - most large SOEs have many local subsidiaries - and can slow down the pace of change.

Buyer Beware
Foreign investors should perform their due diligence with great care, says Mr. Tse. Prior to striking a deal, foreign investors tend to spend time at the acquiring company's main office, where capabilities may be high, leading investors to assume similar skill levels across the entire company. "The competitiveness of some SOEs is quite high, particularly at the headquarters," says Mr. Tse. "But these competencies can drop when you go to the regional or local offices." Such problems are particularly pronounced in Chinese SOEs, says Mr. Tse, where many managers and staff at the local and regional offices lack the right skills and training.

Mr. Meyer cautions against jumping into China for fear of missing an opportunity. China's banking system, as noted above, is particularly perilous, leading many to question why firms like Citigroup - which offered twice the book value for Guangdong Development Bank in a recently quashed consortium deal - are clamoring to get in. Investment in China's national banks, according to Mr. Meyer, opens the entire Chinese market to foreign banks who would otherwise have to be licensed one city at a time. However, the Chinese banks have not completely solved the problem of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and anticipate an increase in NPLs this year. (Although Beijing has given billions in handouts to the banks to cover past NPLs, new high-risk loans are being made at an alarming rate, notes Professor Meyer.)

As with any mergers and acquisitions activity, the number crunching will most likely be the easy part. Once the "hardware" of these deals has been completed, it's the "software" that will pose the biggest challenge, says Mr. Tse. "The best companies in the world have a clear vision and well-defined values that transcend locations and national borders," he says. "How will you get two companies together to agree on a common set of values when values reflect the deepest layers of history?" For example, there are substantial differences in the way Easterners and Westerners approach work. The Western capitalist notions of meritocracy and careers that define the individual will run headlong into the dramatically different views that prevail in China. "For most people working in a SOE," notes Mr. Tse, "it's just a job."

Although Mr. Tse is confident that the government is serious about SOE reform, some observers are reserving judgment until privatization and Western-style governance take a stronger - and more visible - hold. That's still a way off: Beijing's stated goal is to go from about 135,000 wholly state-owned enterprises to a "core" of 1,000. (A lack of transparency on ownership makes those numbers difficult to verify. The vast majority of listings on the Chinese stock exchange are actually for minority shares in subsidiaries of wholly government-controlled companies.)

Not Just for Foreigners
Local investors have also started eyeing SOEs. In early March, a delegation of about 50 firms from Wenzhou, in Zhejiang province on the east coast of China, visited the capital as guests of the Beijing Assets and Equity Exchange Center (BAEEC), which oversees the reform of SOEs, to discuss investment opportunities. The discussions revolved around the possibility of the Wenzhou companies, known for their entrepreneurial skills, either taking over or investing in about 180 SOEs in Beijing. BAEEC president Xiong Yan told the local media that the discussions were intended to send a signal "to the private capital of China that Beijing needs your investment."

In another bold step, the Chinese government is experimenting with inviting outside directors - from within and without the country - to sit on the boards of some of its SOEs. At Baosteel, the number of outside directors on the board exceeds that of internal ones. Booz Allen's Mr. Tse describes the government's experiment as "another way of creating better corporate governance." In traditional state-owned enterprises, he explains, there was no requirement for - and, in fact, no definition of - a board of directors. Concludes Mr. Tse: "The government is now realizing that to truly change an enterprise, you need to go inside of it and fundamentally change its heart and soul."
 
Mimi naomba kuchangia hoja hii kwa kumpongeza Mzee ES kwa kuanzisha mjadala. China kwa kweli ni fastest growing superpower kwa sasa na moja ya sababu ni kwa vile wana watu bilioni moja na kuendelea. Wana soko kabla hata hawajazalisha.

Mkurugenzi mkuu wa kampuni ya sigara mojawapo nchini Marekani aliwahi kuulizwa ni nini marketing strategy yake akasema ni kufikiria kumshawishi kila raia wa china avute sigara moja tu kwa siku, manake hizo zinggekuwa ni sigara takriban bilioni moja na milioni mia tatu kwa siku! hivyo utaona kwamba uwingi wa watu ni marketing opportunity, sasa sisi waafrika tunaambiwa tudhibiti idadi ya watu wakati china wanajivunia uwingi wa watu.

China moja ya sababu za kuimarika kwake ni kuwa tayari kuwaachia raia wake wasonge mbele kwa kwenda nje kusoma na kurejea nyumbani kuchapa mzigo. Uingereza idadi kubwa ya international students ni wachina naamini ni vivyo kwingineko.

Hakika uchina ina raia milioni arobaini na nane nje ya nchi! more than the population of tanzania by nearly 10m people, sasa wenzetu wana wizara inaitwa ministry of chinese community abroad(wizara inayoshughulikia wachina waliopo nje) ukiondoka unaombwa ujisajili na una web space yako unaweza kupaupdate details throughout your absences na hivyo wanaweza kukusaidia ina case ya matatizo nk na pia kwa wanafunzi wakitaka kazi au hata mazoezi ya kazi wanapost humo na jamaa wanamatach that way china huwa ni ya mwanzo kuiba teknolojia za nje.

Sisi tanzania kwa mujibu wa takwimu za tume ya kurekebisha sheria wanasema kuna watanzania milioni 1.2 nje ya nchi hii ni chini kidogo ya asilimia tatu ya taifa lakini hakuna mbinu madhubuti za kuwaangalia na kuwa-attact waendeleze kwao au washirikishwe, wenzetu uganda sasa hivi wanadebate kuwe na kitengo cha masuala ya kijamii kwenye wizara ya mambo ya nje ili kuwe na mchakato mzuri wa kushirikishwa.

Sasa inatia moyo Dr Migiro ndio kaamua kulivalia njuga suala hili manake this year kasema kutakuwepo na mbinu za kuwashirikisha watanzania waliopo nje washiriki katika kuchangia maendeleo ya taifa.

Tuna mengi ya kujifunza toka china.
 
Tafiti.

Point point points!!! safi sana. Nimejifunza kuhusu hilo la wizara!!

Asante
 
Wazee!

As we ponder whether Chinese are our way forward interms of economic growth, lets also look at another emerging economy of India and see how our economic can evolve around these two economies.

India vs. China
by Deepak Lal

Deepak Lal is professor of international development studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, and an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.


What are the lessons from the Chinese economic miracle for India? Who is likely to win the race for economic growth -- the hare or the tortoise?

There are greater similarities rather than differences in the policies followed and their outcomes in both the periods of economic repression and reform in India and China.

China carried its repression further as it has its reforms than India. But in both countries the liberalization of foreign trade and the ending of planning gave a boost to growth.

The major difference has been in their respective investment rates, with China's at over 40 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) being roughly twice that of India's.

But, given the continuing deadweight of the State Owned Enterprises on the Chinese growth path, this has not led to a commensurate difference in their growth rates during their reform periods, with Chinese growth between 1978-98 being 9.7 per cent per annum on official and over 7 per cent per annum on the best independent estimates, whilst India grew by 6.1 per cent per annum from 1991-2000.

But the growth in China has been more labor intensive than India's. This was the unintended consequence of the end of collectivization in agriculture which led to an explosion of labor intensive small-scale rural industry for export.

This export led industrialization was facilitated by the much better and more extensive infrastructure created in China, and by the freedom to hire and fire as well as the absence of any 'social' burdens carried by firms in this fast growing non-state sector.

India by contrast continues to hobble the development of small-scale and labor intensive industry with its policy of reservations, and refusal to repeal the archaic labor laws it inherited from the Raj.

In both China and India the dynamics of their growth have been provided by areas which the State had overlooked as being of little importance: the small-scale rural industries in China, and the information based service sector in India.

These were the areas where capitalism was allowed to take its natural course and once foreign markets were opened with the liberalization of foreign trade, the native wit and entrepreneurship of the economic agents not subject to the dead hand of the State, generated a dynamism which no planner could have created.

Unlike the Indian, the Chinese policy elite has fully embraced capitalism. The new (often Western trained) mandarins who run the Chinese state recognize, as many in India still do not, that this is the only route to both prosperity and power for their nation -- and like mandarins of yore, it is the Chinese State and not any ideology that they serve.

They are desperately seeking ways to remove the remaining vestiges of their dirigiste past: the loss making state enterprises.

India by contrast seems stuck with its 'Left' still unwilling to abandon its past dirigisme, who continue to block the necessary privatization of its public enterprises.

These differences in the embrace of global capitalism are reflected in both the much greater trade liberalization undertaken by China and its more relaxed attitudes to foreign investment.

Thus whereas exports were 19 per cent of Chinese GDP in 1998, they were about 8 per cent in India. Whilst the stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) was $261 billion in China in 1998, it was a mere $13 billion in India.

Moreover, the foreign investment in China which has flowed to the non-state sector from the Chinese diaspora to finance industrial exports has loosened the constraint on its growth from its weak domestic capital markets.

The multinationals, by contrast, have been lured into joint ventures with state enterprises to service the large domestic market and have usually lost their shirts.

In both countries wherever growth has occurred there have been dramatic reductions in poverty. However whilst labor intensive industrial growth seems to be spreading faster to the hinterland in China through fierce locational competition for joint ventures with foreign investors, the Hindu heartland in the eastern Gangetic plain still remains mired in its ancient equilibrium.

While inequality had increased in China since the planned period, there is no clamor in an ostensibly Communist country for egalitarianism. This is because like India, China for millennia has been a hierarchical society.

It was the foreign Enlightenment virus of socialism which for half a century infected their intelligentsia, but whereas the Chinese seem to have overcome it, India's intellectuals unfortunately still remain deeply infected.

From this it would seem that there is no contest in the growth race between the hare and the tortoise. But there are some signs that appearances maybe deceptive.

The fragility of the Chinese financial system is a case in point. Though India's financial system is healthier, it shares with China the problem of unsustainable fiscal deficits fuelled by economically unjustifiable subsidies.

As I have suggested, China might be able to tackle this problem more easily if it used its foreign exchange reserves creatively. By contrast, the political roadblocks to ending the subsidies debauching the Indian budget remain significant.

Nevertheless, India currently has a head start in both the instruments it can provide for savings as well as in the mechanisms through the financial system for their efficient deployment.

There are two other advantages which India has over China as part of the legacy of the Raj: the rule of law, and the English language. Even though China has in the most recent revision of its Constitution put private firms on an equal footing as state owned firms, entrepreneurs are still suspicious of the State.

When Forbes recently published a list of the top 50 Chinese millionaires, the individuals complained, as the tax authorities showed an interest.

It explains why most of these new entrepreneurs rely on self or foreign financing of their firms and are reluctant to put their head above the parapet by listing their companies on the stock exchange. This cannot bode well for the future of Chinese growth.

India's advantage in having a large pool of English speaking people is likely to be eroded in a generation. Apart from the much higher literacy rate in China, it has now decreed that everyone from the age of five will have to learn English -- the commercial and scientific lingua franca of the world.

Given its fiercely meritocratic education system, without any quotas or affirmative action, it is on the way to producing one of the most highly skilled populations in the world.

This is a danger India needs to guard against, by helping the spread of private schools in the rural areas and abandoning the Mandalism which has already done great harm to its system of university education.

If affirmative action is extended to the private sector, it would further handicap India in its ongoing race with China.

Last, but not least, whilst China with the ageing of its population is likely to see an end to the savings bonanza promoted by the demographic transition accompanying its one child policy, when the dependency ratio declines as the birth rate and population growth rate fall, India is just entering its own demographic transition.

These life cycle effects will raise Indian savings for the next few decades. This should allow a substantial rise in India's investment rate, just as after 2010 demographic effects lead to falling Chinese savings rates.

If by then India has completed the second generation of reforms, built up its infrastructure and fully integrated itself into the world economy, we might find that the tortoise overtakes the hare.

This race between the two Asian giants is set to be the most dramatic event of this century.

This article appeared in India's Business Standard, March 15, 2005.
source:http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3767&print=Y


Similar articles can be found from http://finance.yahoo.com/columnist/article/futureinvest/2237
http://finance.yahoo.com/columnist/article/futureinvest/2369
 
Mugishagwe,

kwa mtizamo wangu ni kwamba suala la china kuwa mkombozi ni 50/50. China wamendelea sana kiviwanda kulinganisha na sisi. Kwa maana hiyo si rahisi kwetu kupata soko la bidhaa za viwanda kutoka nchini mwetu. Ukiangalia Europe na America wote wanapiga kelele juu ya cheap products from China.

Kwa Mtizamo huu, ukombozi wa Uchina ungekuwa kwenye soko la raw materials like cotton and the like. Sasa hapo tunagota kwa vile kilimo chetu bado ni duni mno.
 
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