

WANTED: A THIRD FORCE IN ZANZIBAR POLITICS

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THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY

ZANZIBARIS EVERYWHERE were shocked by the political shape of the country in the aftermath of the disastrous Tanzania's elections of October 1995. That the elections in the isles were rigged in favour of the ruling party came as no surprise. Everybody expected it, and the President of Zanzibar, Dr Salmin Amour, had already indicated, long before the elections, that he was determined to remain in power whatever the electoral outcome, win or lose. What has shocked many Zanzibaris, however, is what has been revealed by the outcome of the elections. For what the outcome has shown is that the country, for all practical purposes, is politically and geographically split in two. This division has led to a complex political *deadlock* never experienced in the last three decades of independence. The ruling party has "won" the election but not the country. The country is at a standstill waiting for a political solution.

The political *deadlock* has revealed two important factors, namely that, (a) the balance of political power has hardly altered since the 1950s' struggle for independence which led to the 1964 revolution, and (b) the political rivalry that has followed the advent of the multi-party electoral process has exacerbated rather than healed the great political divisions of the pre-independence era. And the political leadership, in the meantime, does not seem to be of the calibre that could find a way out of the *deadlock* and pave the way for the country to move forward. The result is, the country is in the doldrums and the people see themselves as drifting to an unknown future. The evidence of this utter hopelessness is that more Zanzibaris are leaving the country than their mainland compatriots. The entire generation of Zanzibaris below the age of forty see their country in a state of political degeneration, a state of confusion, without any sense of direction, and their own future in grave doubt.

To many non-Zanzibari observers this state of affairs may seem strange, in view of the fact that Zanzibar is only a part of the wider Tanzania body politic. It is difficult for outsiders to see why should one part of the country be at such a frustrating impasse and not the other. Constitutionally, of course, political parties in Zanzibar are required to be part of the bigger parties on mainland Tanzania; and the two major contending parties in Zanzibar, the Chama cha Mapinduzi, CCM, and the Civic United Front, CUF, are the off-shoots of their bigger parent parties on the mainland. Why then, one may wonder, should they evoke a sense of political uncertainty in Zanzibar but not on the

mainland? The answer to the riddle is that, although constitutionally the political parties are technically the same on both parts of the union, in practice things are different. Zanzibari parties are to all intents and purposes independent of their mainland counterpart. In this sense, the question of effective political leadership in Zanzibar must be looked at as a separate entity from those of the mainland.

THE BACKGROUND

This apparent anomaly was historically determined, and so were the socio-political divisions that arose from it. For, unlike the mainland, Zanzibar, in addition to having been a slave market, was also a slave society, and inevitably the "collective unconscious" of the existing society is a reflection of this historical heritage. Although not everybody in Zanzibar is an ex-slave or a slave-owner, collectively those who classify themselves as "Arabs" or associates of Arabs, rightly or wrongly (mostly wrongly), are categorised as the *mabwana* (privileged masters); and those who classify themselves as "Africans" identify themselves as victims of the old slave society. Consequently, loyalties to political parties are similarly identified, that is to say, you either affiliate with the masters or with their victims.

During the struggle for independence this division was reflected in the two major political parties, namely, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and the Afro-Shirazi (ASP). Objectively the former initially hardly consisted of the *mabwana* since the party comprised all sections of the society, at both the leadership as well as rank and file levels (it even included Marxist/Leninists and Maoists). But the opposition party, the ASP, was subjectively convinced that the ZNP was the party of the *mabwana*, and that was enough to win the support of those who categorised themselves as the victims of former slave society. ASP mobilised its supporters on the basis of this puerile platform. This emotional but essentially unrealistic division has always defined the political balance of power in Zanzibar.

To help get a clearer insight into the roots of the current political *deadlock* in Zanzibar, let me recount a bit of history in which I was personally involved, and which I think has some bearing on the present state of affairs. Before I do that, however, let me make the following observation. The division that has bedeviled Zanzibar politics is to a large extent not based on concrete reality. It is based on irrational fear; and the exploitation of fear has everywhere been the last recourse of political scoundrels. In practical politics the anti-dote to the politics of fear is to create conditions for the evolution of realistic, mature and enlightened political practice, supported by a progressive

political party with a resolute leadership, and clearly defined policies and their aims. In Zanzibar at the moment *fear* prevails to an alarming degree, and recent experience has shown that this is due to an absence of a movement with fresh vision beyond the present preoccupation with the past. An atmosphere of enlightened politics in Zanzibar, however, did prevail for some time, and there is no reason why it cannot be recaptured once again in the interest of breaking the *deadlock* once and for all.

THE ZNP/ASP FREEDOM-COMMITTEE

In late 1958 and most of 1959 there was truce between the two contending parties, ZNP and ASP, when we forged a working alliance under the rubric of the Freedom-Committee, consisting of leaders from both parties. The formation of this committee was in response to the pressure by the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central African (*PAFMECA*) at its inaugural meeting in Mwanza, Tanzania (then Tanganyika) in August 1958. At the end of the conference it was decided that, in order to hasten the process to independence, it must be accepted as a PAFMECA directive that, where there was more than one party in a member-country, then action should be taken to establish a Freedom-Committee whose function would be to minimise inter-party conflicts so as to out-manoeuvre the notorious imperialists' strategy of "divide and rule". Some reactionary forces within both the ASP and ZNP, however, were adamantly opposed to the formation of the Freedom-Committee which they saw as going counter to their political strategy of invoking *fear* as an instrument of political mobilisation. The reactionaries in the ASP did not want any association with the *mabwana*; and those in the ZNP were suspicious of ASP who might want to outwit ZNP and use the Freedom Committee as a means of retaining the political initiative at the expense of the ZNP. Within the ASP, most of the opposition to the Freedom Committee came from its section in the sister island of Pemba.

In an attempt to persuade the Pemba section to agree to work with the ZNP and to patch up the division within the ASP, a high powered delegation was dispatched to Zanzibar from Tanganyika by the dominant party there, the then Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was a political ally of the ASP. The TANU delegation included Sado Shakilange, one of TANU's president Julius Nyerere's top aides, Rashidi Kawawa, (who was also leader of the then Tanganyika Federation of Trades Unions), and Bibi Titi Mohamed, (leader of TANU's women section, who came later) and many others. Mohamed Shamte, the leader of the Pemba section, was invited by ASP leaders to come to Zanzibar to meet Kawawa. Thus on 23 June 1959 a meeting

was specially convened for the purpose of trying to heal the division within the ASP. Throughout the meeting Mohamed Shamte was adamant in his refusal to cooperate with the ZNP, emphasising that ASP was already a very powerful and self-sufficient party, and he saw no need to seek the assistance of the ZNP to achieve independence. Any cooperation with the ZNP, he insisted, was "dangerous and unnecessary". This meeting continued the following day, when it was addressed by Sheikh Abeid Karume himself and Hassan Nassor Moyo speaking in favour of ZNP/ASP cooperation. But Mohamed Shamte, now joined by Othman Shariff and his brother Ali Shariff, and Jamal Ramadhan Nasibu, continued to oppose any cooperation with the ZNP.²

While this drama within the ASP was going on, within ZNP too there was opposition to the Freedom Committee. It was led by Juma Aley, but fortunately, he was not sufficiently heavy-weight politically within the party to threaten a party split as was the case with Mohamed Shamte within the ASP. My own position within the ZNP at this time was a difficult one. While I was the Secretary General of the ZNP, I was also Secretary to the Freedom Committee at the insistence of the ASP leader Sheikh Abeid Karume. My loyalty, from now on, was no longer limited to sectional "party interest", but I was loyal to both the ASP and ZNP, not only because of my position as secretary of the Freedom Committee, but also because of my commitment to consolidate the unity of the nation. In other words, my loyalty henceforth was to all the people of Zanzibar, irrespective of their party affiliation. And during the Freedom Committee phase, this was also the position adopted by all the progressive forces in both the ZNP and ASP who had been struggling for national unity. The progressives in both camps were no longer "party loyalists" for its own sake, but patriots fighting for the good of the country and the people. It was a great moment in Zanzibar's political history. For the first time we had the sweet taste of national unity which was by far the most positive and rewarding experience in our struggle.

THE ZNP/ASP ACCRA ACCORD

The ASP/ZNP united front was also recognised as a Pan-African initiative. During the All African Peoples' Conference in December 1958 in Accra, Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah himself and George Padmore convened a special meeting in Nkrumah's private residence. Sheikh Karume (ASP) and Sheikh Ali Muhsin (ZNP) represented their respective parties, and I took part as ZNP Secretary General as well as secretary of the Freedom Committee. Kanyama Chiume of the Malawi

²(See Public Record Office document CO822/1376. Also see Appendix I below for the text of the document.)

Congress Party attended the meeting as the official representative of the *PAFMECA*. At the end of the meeting both Karume and Ali Muhsin were asked to sign a document, later to be known as the *ACCRA ACCORD*, pledging commitment to the ASP/ZNP united front, and solemnly undertaking not to support any splinter group from either party in the event of possible splits arising out of the implementation of the *ACCORD*. This undertaking was specifically requested by Sheikh Karume who said he was certain of strong opposition to the *ACCORD* from within his party. The *PAFMECA* initiative and the *ACCRA ACCORD* thus put Zanzibar on course for a genuine *NATIONAL UNITY* for the first time in the country's long history of racial divisions - between Arabs, Africans, Shirazis, Asians, etc. - and the mutual suspicion inherent in such divisions. Although the two parties continued to conduct their affairs separately, there was consultation at *FREEDOM COMMITTEE* level most of the time. The political atmosphere became peaceful and it ushered in what came to be known as the epoch of hope for the future. Unfortunately, this happy phase was to be short-lived. For, while the progressives on both parties were unified in celebrating the newly found national unity, the reactionaries within both parties were each busy plotting for disunity. Their conspiracy succeeded by the end of 1959, when suddenly there was a major split within the ASP. But first let me make a few points clear.

These kinds of splits and disagreements within organisations, however, were not new in Zanzibar's political history. Reactionary plots have always undermined genuine political progress in Zanzibar by effectively utilising the instrumentality of *fear*. In a society like Zanzibar with its history of slavery, racism and subjugation of the weak by the strong, the potential for irrational divisions arising out of fear has always been present. And there were always unscrupulous leaders who would exploit this "weakest link" in national unity in order to advance their own personal gains.

In contrast to such negative forces, there were positive forces too, and they were in the majority. Even before the advent of party politics Zanzibar experienced dedicated leaders committed to struggle against divisive tendencies, especially the tendency to utilise irrational fear as a means of sustaining such divisions. They constantly sought to create favourable conditions for positive social relations as a way of bringing about political harmony. They insisted that a small country like Zanzibar could not afford irrational social divisions which were a sure way to national ruin. People of progressive outlook, they urged, were obliged to struggle against the heritage of violence, exploitation, arrogance and subjugation deeply rooted in the Zanzibaris' psyche.

These two social trends, ie, the negative and the positive, the reactionary and the progressive have always been in contention throughout the history of Zanzibar. The split within the ASP was therefore, a reflection of the delicate political balance in Zanzibar between the forces of reaction and forces of progress. In this latest split, the negative, ie, the divisive forces had temporarily won against the positive, the unifying forces.

As it happened, the ASP split occurred when the FREEDOM COMMITTEE had temporarily adjourned and I was out of the country on party business. Just before the end of 1959 I had gone to Egypt to establish a ZNP mission in Cairo. While I was still negotiating with the Egyptian officials about the mission, suddenly, like a bolt from the blue, the shocking news came about the split within the ASP. Almost the entire section of the ASP in Pemba, under the leadership of none other than Mohamed Shamte himself, had left the ASP and formed a new party to be known as the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). Our painstaking work for the unity of the people of Zanzibar was suddenly in ruin.

THE ZNP/ZPPP ALLIANCE

As if this was not bad enough, more shocking news came later that my own party, the ZNP, warmly welcomed the split, and that our leaders were actively collaborating with the ZPPP leaders in opposition to the ASP. The worst irony was that the very Mohamed Shamte who, only a few months earlier, had claimed it was dangerous to have anything to do with the ZNP, had now, as the leader of the breakaway ZPPP, been embraced as the saviour of the ZNP. All this seemed to me to be not only bad politics in the volatile political atmosphere of Zanzibar at the time, but also a callous opportunism and a breach of our solemn undertaking under the *ACCRA ACCORD*. I immediately sent a telegram to the ZNP leader, Sheikh Ali Muhsin, urging him not to support the breakaway party and reminding him about our commitment to the *ACCRA ACCORD*. I also urged him to support Karume as we had solemnly undertaken to do under the *ACCORD*. The reply was curt, negative and disappointing. I was told the situation had changed in the country and that I should wait until I returned before expressing any opinion. The arrogance in the tone of the reply made me instinctively aware that we were witnessing the end of our carefully nurtured inter-party unity. Once again, it was a victory for the reactionaries in both parties, and goodbye to Zanzibar's political stability.

Unfortunately, I could not rush back to Zanzibar immediately because I was scheduled to go on to China and other socialist countries which kept me out of the country for another two months.

When I returned in February of 1960 the situation was extremely tense, as was to be expected. There was no longer any dialogue between the ZNP and ASP, instead there was a nasty public slanging match of invective and threats. What was worse, the land-owning supporters of the ZNP had been kicking the "squatters" out of their plantations, thus breaking one of the oldest and enduring Zanzibar traditions of land usage. This tradition had its roots in the feudal social relations of the past.

In the days of slavery and feudalism most of the land was owned by Arabs who earlier used slave labour on their plantations. When slavery was abolished most of the farm labour came from the mainland as contract labour during the clove picking season. Some of these contract labourers remained in the country, established roots locally through marriage, and for generations integrated in the society as Zanzibaris. Being themselves landless, they stayed on the plantations they had been working on as "squatters". This system endured all the changes in the social and production relations in which Zanzibar went through. Even when land ownership had ceased to be the exclusive preserve of the slave owning landlords, the new land owning classes, big or small, which comprised all races, did not disrupt the system of squatting. As the majority of the land-owners in Zanzibar were traditionally absentee landlords, interested only in the annual clove harvest, most of them had no interest in the land for the day-to-day farming. The system of "squatting", therefore, became a sensible economic proposition to both the squatter and the landlord. Squatters were encouraged to farm the land without paying any land fee in cash or in kind, because, in the course of their farming activity, they were actually helping to keep the land weed-free and thus raise clove yields.

Thus by disrupting this old tradition, the ZNP anti-squatter campaign aggravated the already bad situation with disastrous social, political and economic consequences. It deepened the fear and hatred of a large section of the peasants. It confirmed everything the reactionary leaders within the ASP had been saying about the danger of "the Arabs coming to power" with independence.

My first meeting with the ZNP leaders on my return was centred on the question of the anti-squatter campaign and of the party's abandonment of the *ACCRA ACCORD*. Their explanation was most unsatisfactory. They could not justify their silence on the anti-squatter campaign, nor could they show anything which the ASP had done that could conceivably have undermined the letter or the spirit of the *ACCORD*. It was clear that the party's action on both counts was simply crude opportunism and a reactionary act of betrayal of principles. For the first time it became

obvious to me and my comrades in the party that a large section of the leadership of the ZNP was no longer really interested in a genuine political liberation. They were simply concerned with their individual positions in the post-colonial government and with ways of accommodating the British colonialists after independence. From now on, the reactionary leaders of the ZNP, to all intents and purposes, abandoned the party's revolutionary tradition, and the party ceased to be the instrument of social and political transformation as we had envisaged at its inception.³

One of the after effects of ZNP's alignment with the ZPPP was that, backward forces within the ASP were able to gain the upper hand. Gradually the political divide deteriorated to explosive levels, and there was no chance for reconciliation and accommodation from within either of the two parties. As the country was getting nearer to independence events followed each other in rapid succession. There was a general election in 1961 which was accompanied by riots in which several people lost their lives. The country attained Self Government under ZNP/ZPPP reactionary alliance in June 1962. In the meantime the ZNP was deteriorating politically by adopting more and more reactionary policies in its attempt to appease the ZPPP and its president Mohamed Shante, who had now become the "Chief Minister", was implementing his backward-looking repressive policies. I and some of my colleagues were detained in prison and then, in connivance with the colonialists, I was singled out to be taken to court and, thanks to the then Solicitor General, Wolfgang Dourado's prosecution, I landed in prison for 15 months under the colonial law of "sedition".⁴

The real purpose of my imprisonment was, of course, to remove me from the scene and weaken my colleagues in the party in order to open the way for reactionary forces within the party to gain total control of the party machine, and abandon the FREEDOM COMMITTEE. Altogether, with the earlier detention without trial, I wasted about two years in prison.

3. There is no need here to go into the analysis of how this metamorphosis within the ZNP came about as this is not the purpose of this essay. And I have already done such an analysis elsewhere (in the Introduction to Amrit Wilson's book the "Creation of Tanzania"). The purpose here is to discuss the kind of vehicle we need to take us out of the post-election political deadlock in Zanzibar, learning from this critical historical experience as a guide to our future action.)

'The same Dourado, now champion of human rights, twelve years later, as the Attorney General of the "revolutionary Gov't" of Zanzibar, under his able prosecution, managed to get me sentenced to death in a kangaroo court - history repeats itself in rather funny ways!

When I came out I found the political atmosphere had radically changed for the worse. The division between the ZNP and ASP was so deep and hostility so intense that neither of the two parties was capable of offering any policies that could chart a way out of the stalemate. On the contrary, each party was intensifying the politics of hatred. In such a boiling situation where no responsible political leader could stand by and watch the country sink into the quagmire of hate and despair, and given that I was still the Secretary General of the ZNP as well as secretary of the now virtually defunct FREEDOM COMMITTEE, I decided to see Sheikh Karume and tell him about my concern and disappointment. Short of telling me "I told-you-so" or reminding me of his warning in Accra, just before signing the *ACCORD*, when he told me not to trust "Arabs", he just said he too was equally disappointed and that even his position as president of the ASP was being challenged by the reactionary group headed by Othman Shariff. Although the progressive elements within the ASP had rallied behind him, the party was in such chaos that the extremists took over complete command.

It was under these perilous conditions that some of us in the ZNP decided to think about a "third force" which would be progressive, patriotic, internationalist, socialist, and resolutely determined to break the political stalemate. We felt that the country needed a political movement of a new type that would bring together progressive forces from all parties and save the country from the mad rush to ruin.

THE UMMA PARTY AND REVOLUTION

This led to the formation of the *UMMA PARTY*, a party of the Left uniquely East African, with a programme to bring unity within the country, but also to bring together all the Left forces in East and Central Africa.

Between the formation of the *UMMA PARTY* and the Revolution of January 1964, a period of hardly one year, several things happened in the country. On the eve of independence one of the earliest repressive acts of the ZNP/ZPPP government was to introduce two bills designed to give it power to ban any political party and publications which they saw as a threat to their rule. Thus as soon as the bills became law the *UMMA PARTY*, which was the actual target of the repressive laws, was accordingly banned before it could even consolidate itself. Its publications were proscribed, and a court case was being prepared to charge me, as Chairman of the Party, for "treason". Independence was proclaimed in December 1963, but the repressive government was overthrown on January 12, 1964, hardly a month after it had been installed. Although the *UMMA*

PARTY did not directly engineer the revolution of 1964, as it was widely alleged, some of the party cadre did take an active part in trying to stabilise the country after the chaos and confusion that followed the revolution. They were struggling to transform what was essentially a lumpen uprising into a social revolution. (See Appendix 2 for *UMMA PARTY'S* call then for a "national government" when the election results, which were shared almost fifty-fifty between the two contending parties, were as indecisive as the results of the current one.)

A "Revolutionary Council" was formed immediately after the revolution, headed by Sheikh Karume, with Abdulla Kassim Hanga as Prime Minister. Two days after the formation of the revolutionary council Hanga was forced to resign as prime minister by the reactionary forces in the council, and he was elevated to an ineffective position of vice president. It was the beginning of the end of the progressive effective presence in the revolutionary council. A group of some unruly activists, who actually launched the revolution of January 12, gradually began to gain influence in the revolutionary council by weakening the position of the progressive members of the council. And soon, one by one of the latter began to be victimised and systematically murdered by the reactionary clique who later described themselves as the "committee of fourteen". From now on the revolution ran out of steam and the council was then totally dominated by this notorious committee who introduced a reign of terror through intimidation and murder.

As a result, the revolution, which could have lifted the country from the hopeless condition it was in and put it on the road to progressive development and economic prosperity, was soon subverted by the combined forces of the American CIA and the reactionary forces in both Zanzibar and Tanganyika, which led to the formation of a ramshackle union of Tanzania.⁵ Thus, in the process of undermining the revolution the government itself fell into the wrong hands, the very hands which, during the days of ASP extremism, were instrumental in exacerbating the pre-independence political tension.

The progressive forces, in both the ASP but especially in the *UMMA PARTY* could, at this juncture, have saved the situation from deteriorating further had they not themselves been divided by internecine conflicts arising out of endless struggles for power within the party ranks. Some of the *UMMA PARTY'S* discredited cadres even sought to form alliances with the reactionary forces within the revolutionary council in order to advance their own self-seeking ends. These splits

⁵See Amrit Wilson's *the Creation of Tanzania*, Pluto Press, London

among what were thought to be comrades in the progressive ranks resulted in strengthening and consolidating the position of the reactionaries in government.

THE REVOLUTION BETRAYED

Although Sheikh Karume was still the President of Zanzibar he was unfortunately hostage to the reactionaries who, now with power to arbitrarily impose death sentences, seemed to have developed a sadistic enjoyment in transforming themselves into torturers and cold blooded murderers as well. The very mention of the "committee of fourteen" was enough to evoke fear and a sense of terror. This committee later became responsible for the murder of hundreds of innocent Zanzibaris, including, as mentioned above, the well-known progressive leaders of the ASP such as Abdala Kassim Hanga, Abdul Aziz Twala, Saleh Saadala, etc. - they killed all these innocent people in the name of Karume.

On several occasions when I visited Zanzibar Karume himself would complain to me about the viciousness of this committee and how helpless he was in the circumstances. But he had no counter force to challenge them. The *UMMA PARTY* could have played that role, but Karume was by now alienated from it under the influence of the committee of fourteen and some *TANU* instigators in the mainland.

The committee of fourteen, through their murderous actions, succeeded in making Karume a possible target for vengeance by all those who had lost their dear ones. In the end he did actually become the target on 7 April 1972 when young Lt. Humud Mohamed assassinated Karume to avenge his father, Mohamed Humud, who was one of the victims of the death squads of the "committee of fourteen". (The irony of it all is that Karume has been dead for more than 25 years now, but the thug who actually fired the shot that killed Humud's father, in Karume's name but most likely without his knowledge or consent, is still around. He is well known, and enjoying the prestige of state power having been protected by both erstwhile Tanzanian presidents Julius Nyerere and Ali Hassan Mwinyi.)

This brief historical account tells us one important reality about Zanzibar, namely, that if the "third force", ie, the *UMMA PARTY*, had time to consolidate itself for a few more months of its existence prior to independence, Zanzibar politics would have undergone tremendous change for the better. In less than one week of its existence the *UMMA PARTY* started to attract hundreds of new members from all political parties, especially the two major ones, the majority of whom were from the working class, the peasantry and the "squatters". The Party programme highlighted the

reality of the situation in the country on the eve of independence. It highlighted the threat to the country posed by the new forces on the political arena who earlier, at the height of the anti-colonial struggle, were in league with the colonialists and who now joined the political movements in order to hijack the impending independence and revert the country to neo-colonialism. The Party leadership and its cadres were seen as devoted fighters for justice. Their moral strength was expressed through their solidarity among themselves and strict self-imposed discipline. Their style of work and their modest mode of living immediately won them the confidence and respect of the broad masses of the people, especially the youth. The Party was immediately recognised as the possible antidote to the prevailing uncertain political atmosphere and that it was the only force that could save the country from the stalemate arising out of the reactionary policies of the two leading pre-independence parties. It was also seen as providing an untainted leadership, free from the politics of mutual suspicion. The country badly needed that kind of leadership at that critical moment in its history, and the Party could have brought together all progressive forces in the country to form a formidable political force. That this did not happen, due to the *UMMA PARTY* having been nibbled in the bud, is one of the most unfortunate aspects of our history and one of its consequences is the current political confusion nourished by the politics of hatred.

THE PAST AND THE PRESENT

As we look at the current *deadlock* resulting from the botched election of October 1995 one cannot help noting the ominous historical parallels to the politics of 1960s. Unlike the mainland, in Zanzibar the balance of political forces has not changed at all; give a few votes either way, it has remained almost just as it was on the eve of the revolution in 1964. ZNP/ZPPP alliance is now virtually represented by CUF, only this time its leadership consists of senior defectors from ASP/CCM, some with a murky track record. If in the mainland almost all members of the opposition parties left CCM on ideological or other reasons, in Zanzibar it was different. Here the old party divisions and loyalties not only remained virtually solid as in 1964, but also hardly anyone from the rank and file moved from CCM to CUF or vice versa, apart from few insignificant exceptions. This marks the important distinction between Zanzibar and mainland politics.

If CUF is the offspring of ZPPP/ZNP, CCM Zanzibar is ASP in a new garb, headed by an amalgam of progressive and reactionary leadership. This mixture of opposing forces within the same movement has made the ruling party politically indecisive, and, because of the resultant faltering stance, it has subjected the party to remain under the grip of what is left of the old guard of

the committee of fourteen. Dr Salmin Amour, like Sk Karume before him, is virtually hostage to the same forces. As a result, the progressives within the ruling party have remained in a very weak position, so weak that they are unable to press for any decisive changes within the party that could break the political *deadlock*. Although both parties are technically part of the mainland parties, the reality is that, the two Zanzibar sections pursue policies often conflicting those of their mainland counterpart, and this reflects the distinct nature of Zanzibaris' political priorities.

The party divisions in Zanzibar not only echo the same old pre-independence divisions, but even their respective political agitations are expressed in the same old language of hostility and rage. All a CCM activist needs to do to evoke fear in the members of his party is to refer to CUF as "HIZBU" (literally meaning the "party", ie, ZNP). Similarly, CUF activists would evoke fear by referring to CCM as "GOZI", that is, "skin" politics. CUF is suspected of having strong links with, and getting massive financial and material support from, the Gulf where many Zanzibaris now live and work. There is no evidence to prove this allegation, and anyway there is nothing wrong with it as any Zanzibari is legitimately entitled to help a political party of his/her own choice. Most of these Gulf Zanzibaris have fled from the tyranny of ASP/CCM in the 1960s in Zanzibar and most of them are now determined to see the end of CCM rule. It is one of the most unfortunate outcomes of the 1964 Zanzibar revolution that the country has lost a large number of its best brains and much of its skilled work-force as a result of the tyrannical rule that followed that revolution.

The ruling party assumes that most of these Gulf Zanzibaris are motivated by revenge and that, in the event of CUF winning, they would want to go back to Zanzibar to settle old scores. Apart from a handful of bitter individuals, or those who have lost their dear ones, the majority of Gulf Zanzibaris just want to see security restored in the country so that they could return and contribute to the country's development. Life in exile, however successful it may turn out to be, can never be a satisfactory choice. They all long to go back home. Although some may want to reclaim their confiscated lands and property, it will be impossible for any government, CUF or CCM, to entertain a return to the old status quo as most people of various political persuasion have to some extent benefited from the post-revolution land reform, however unjustly it was carried out.

On the other hand, CCM is seen by the other half of Zanzibaris as nothing more than a stooge of the mainland CCM leaders who are said to be a bunch of corrupt political operators. Recent independent initiatives by the ruling CCM Zanzibar in defiance to the mainland government does not seem to support this view. However, the point still remains that the two sides actually re-live

the divisions of the 1960s. (Once again, this is a typical example of the Marxian adage, that history repeats itself, first as a tragedy, and then as a farce! The state of the country in the post-October 1995 elections in Zanzibar, and the confusion in which political leaders find themselves in its wake is a farce, if ever there was one).

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

WHAT IS TO BE DONE? Is it possible for the two contending parties to form a government of "national unity", as it has been urged by some influential voices in mainland Tanzania? The answer is: No, it is absolutely impossible. Why? Because the fight now is between leaders with past grudges, and not between the parties. For instance, effective top leaders of CUF Zanzibar, as we have seen, hail from the CCM's party hierarchy; they were also senior political heads in various CCM government departments, in Zanzibar and in mainland Tanzania. They were, naturally, deeply involved in the traditions of that party. They were unfairly expelled from the CCM in the most humiliating circumstances. To expect them to agree to have anything to do with those who have inflicted on them such a horrendous humiliation, is to expect a superhuman capacity for magnanimity on their part.

On the other hand, CCM leaders in Zanzibar are among the arch-plotters who conspired to humiliate these ex-CCM leaders now leading CUF. Now, if anything, antagonisms have deepened as the latter are likely to be regarded as "traitors" by their erstwhile colleagues in the CCM. In other words, the leaders in both camps have more reasons to disagree than to agree, and consequently there do not seem to be any common grounds for the reconciliation necessary for forming a national government.

The contradictions between the two parties are thus not only not conducive to forming a national government, but also they are so antagonistic that it is impossible even to form a "united front" of the sort that led to the formation of the FREEDOM COMMITTEE in 1959. (It is not the classical Maoist category of "contradiction among the people"). This is because firstly, circumstances are entirely different; secondly, the antagonism between the two camps is not only deep but also irrational, and thus there is no basis even for a dialogue between the progressives within the two parties as was the case in the 1960s. Thirdly, of course, the country is not ruled by an external enemy, to constitute the Maoist "antagonistic contradiction" and against whom to mobilise popular support, as was the case under colonialism.

If thus there are no grounds for the two parties to unite it is clear that the only way to break the *deadlock* in Zanzibar is by political intervention of a "*third force*" in the same way as was the case in the 1960s when the *UMMA PARTY* intervened as an independent third force, which was above the irrational preoccupation of the two contending parties. For, even if new elections were to be held tomorrow, as it is demanded by the opposition, and even if CUF were to be finally installed as the new ruling party, given the actual vote count of the 1995 election, the result would be more or less the same: half the country would not recognise the new rulers. The deadlock would remain in tact. In the more politically backward countries, as in some parts of Africa and Latin America, the "convenient" way to break such a deadlock has been to resort to a military coup d'etat and describe it as "redemption". In Zanzibar such a path is out of the question. For one thing, the country would be ungovernable.

THE CASE FOR A "THIRD FORCE"

The only politically viable option, and one which is likely to win over the majority of the people in both Pemba and (Unguja) Zanzibar, therefore, is through the intervention of a third force as an alternative. It will be a mistake though to recreate the *UMMA PARTY*, because existing political conditions are vastly different from those of the 1960s. There is a huge generation and ideological gap between the mood and ideologies of the 1960s and today. Socialist ideals which inspired the *UMMA PARTY* then were on the ascendancy world-wide and the majority of the people saw their future as part of a world-wide socialist internationalism. Now those ideals are in temporary retreat due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. This has brought the rise of the "free-market" fanaticism which creates vast unemployment and intensifies poverty among the people, on the one hand, and glorifies greed, selfishness and the me-first pursuits as the motivating forces for progress, on the other. As a result, there is a lot of confusion of means and ends.

In Zanzibar, this confusion is further confounded by a new phenomenon: religious politics. Like the rest of the Muslim world, the upsurge of Islamic revival in Zanzibar is a new fact of life. People, young and old, have become religious zealots in a way never seen before, and the leaders of both the CCM and CUF, whether by conviction or political expediency, also reflect this trend.

In spite of such an unfavourable atmosphere for serious Left politics, a third force movement must not give up. In fact, the tide is turning once again in favour of socialism, in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Even in Russia, the heartland of recent reaction, people are returning to *socialism* and

are abandoning the dream world of free-market paradise. In the US too, the fountain of right wing ideas, people are turning against those ideas in favour of policies which social conscience and communitarian justice. The *march of time* is on our side! Therefore, instead of being overwhelmed by the temporary right-wing trend, the *third force* movement must, for a start, work out its own political agenda for social change. Then define its historical task by devising realistic policies at two levels: a) at the *tactical level*, where policies should take into account the prevailing political atmosphere in the country, and b) at the *strategic level*, where it should strictly adhere to its ideology and its political line, firmly widening its scope by training its cadres, and constantly struggling to deepen the clarity of its world outlook. Temporary political situations which require immediate action must be dealt with by devising temporary but workable solutions, while long-term radical and progressive objectives must be organised with the seriousness and professionalism they deserve.

Talking to different sections of the Zanzibaris, one is at once made aware that, the current mood in Zanzibar is one of anxiety and disillusionment to the vast majority of the people. Zanzibaris are apprehensive of the political *impasse* in the country, and they are uncertain of what tomorrow may bring. Young people, especially, are uncertain of their own future. They have reached the realistic conclusion that, neither CCM nor CUF can claim to be speaking on behalf of the majority. They see the country as split right in the middle between the two parties, none of which is dominant over the other - a classical condition for a political *impasse*. They sense some danger brewing.

The same was true in the aftermath of the pre-independence elections of 1963. ASP had won a fraction of votes more than ZNP/ZPPP alliance, but the latter, thanks to the system of first-past-the-post, won a couple of more seats in parliament and thus were handed over the government by the departing colonialists. However, the ZNP/ZPPP alliance, once in power, refused to look for the way out of the *impasse*. And, as we have seen above, instead of accepting the reality of the political balance of forces in the country and form a national government with the opposition, when the conditions for such a coalition were more favourable than now, they stupidly proceeded to unscrupulously use repressive instruments of the state to suppress any form of opposition, which included people from the then Tanganyika. The result, as we all know, their government did not last for more than three weeks before it was violently overthrown, and the country was ushered into a thirty-year rule of unprecedented brutality and loss of Zanzibar identity. Just as nature abhors vacuum, in politics too, prolonged periods of political *stalemate* are intolerable and can be

extremely dangerous. Responsible leaders must always relentlessly seek to find a way out of such situations before catastrophe strikes.

THE TASK OF A THIRD FORCE

The task of a *third force* movement, therefore, should be to awaken the country to the reality of the current state of affairs and to the danger it poses, especially the possible fragmentation of our society. (The break up of Yugoslavia and its mad, bloody and savage outcome should be a warning to us all!) The *third force* movement must try to convince as many people as possible of the urgent need to break *deadlock*. The movement, let's call it a *Third Force Party (TFP)* for convenience, must set up an organisation to mobilise popular support and train its young cadres in the theory and practice of socio change and political liberation as a prelude to mass political education. People must know why the country needs a third force at this critical juncture, before they can be ready to want to know how to do it. That would be the task of the trained cadres. They must also be trained effectively in the technique of conducting "concrete analysis of the concrete situation". They must understand the demands of the day, and of the epoch they are in. Past prejudices must never be allowed to blind the people to the new reality. Old politics has served its historical epoch, positively and sometimes negatively. Today's needs, however, are of a different nature, politically, socially and economically.

The above observations on Zanzibar in general has sought to appraise the current situation, but what is required for the purpose of organising is serious investigation (research) on the existing situation, an analysis based on relevant and concrete information. It must be done by the people on the ground. And it must be done not simply by analyzing cold data, but also by actively engaging in political work and interacting with people of different political persuasion. It must not only assess the "majority opinion" but it must help to form that opinion. We need "analysis in action" approach. That is the primary task of the *TFP*. It must explain to the people why them, and not others; what is special about them. As far as the people are concerned, the majority are already aware through their own experience that, what the country needs just now is not political bickering between rival forces. They want to see politics of conviction and of vision that would outline in a realistic and coherent way the destiny of the country. They want to see convincing policies that are likely to achieve the set objective. They want to see the country seriously preparing itself, like the rest of the world, for the march to the new world of science and technology, the march to the next millennium, guided by appropriate policies. They want a movement that would clearly identify the true

potentialities of the country and its people, and what role each Zanzibari, individually and collectively, could play in turning potentialities to reality.

The *TFP* must, therefore, convince the people that they are such a force with fresh ideas, sound policies and capable of leading the country out of its present chaos, rebuild confidence and stability, and chart the way to prosperity. It must prove its credentials for such a leadership through a political programme and an economic strategy which make sense to the people.

WHAT KIND OF A THIRD FORCE?

What sort of movement, what sort of political "line" should the new party adopt that would be capable of the momentous task of, first, breaking the *deadlock* and then set in motion the necessary process towards national reconstruction? The *TFP* must be such a party, and in view of the massive poverty in the country it must of necessity be of *socialist orientation*, the champion of the poor. It must, in other words, be the spearhead of the oppressed to provide its own leadership and the formation of what is known as the *active mass*. In other words, it must be the party *of the people, for the people, by the people*.

If Zanzibar cannot form a party independent of the mainland, then *TFP* must form an alliance with a party on the mainland with more or less similar ideological persuasion. That party must have certain characteristics which, in addition to ideological affinity, must be conversant with, and sympathetic to the struggle of the people of Zanzibar in the context of Tanzania body politic. It must be free from the historical/political baggage which the existing parties are burdened with. It must have a strong political presence in the mainland, enjoying wide popular support that will ensure, sooner or later, the toppling of the corrupt CCM hegemony. Of the existing parties, the only one which can seriously challenge the ruling CCM party and capable of toppling it is the *National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi)*. It is the most popular in the country; its policies are progressive and democratic, with an economic programme which, with some modification, can lead the way out of the *blind alley* into which CCM has put the country. Furthermore, the ideology and objectives of the *NCCR-Mageuzi* are more likely to fit with the needed objectives as outlined above.

But to be the right vehicle for Zanzibar's political revival and, in turn, to be taken seriously by the vast majority of Zanzibaris, *NCCR-Mageuzi* must be seen to have the characteristics outline above. It must further accept that Zanzibar is a sovereign state within the union of Tanzania, and that it has the right to enjoy more sovereign powers than it does at present under the union

constitution. *NCCR-Mageuzi* must accept that the present structure of the Union is outdated and therefore it precludes the possibility of attracting other countries to widen it. (The Union of Tanzania has existed for more than 30 years, but not a single country has even expressed any interest to join it. In fact, instead of attracting new member countries for a wider regional unification, the Union's constitution, which does not recognise the sovereignty of individual member countries, has actually become an obstruction for new members to join it). The Tanzania model is not for a positive "union of nations" but a negative one, ie, a union to "disintegrate nations", which, as in this case, has led to an unacceptable, but latent instability.

NCCR must therefore accept its Zanzibari ally as an equal, self-determining and self-governing entity, just as self-determining as itself, irrespective of the differences in the sizes of the population. *NCCR* must be clear about the immediate tasks of each of the two parts of the alliance. That is to say, whereas in the mainland, *NCCR's* immediate primary task is to get rid of CCM which will then pave the way for restructuring and reconstructing the economy, the *TFP's* immediate task in Zanzibar is to break the *political deadlock* so as to pave the way for economic restructuring and reconstruction. The respective strategies of the two parties will thus be slightly different to begin with. Breaking the *deadlock* is the most essential first step, the *key link*, to any kind of progress in Zanzibar. For the harsh reality which must be faced honestly in Zanzibar is that, as experience has shown, defeating CCM by CUF in Zanzibar would be meaningless, any more than defeating CUF by CCM makes any sense, as we are witnessing just now. Whoever wins, the result will remain the same: *DEADLOCK!* In either case the tense atmosphere will continue to get worse, and the road to progress will remain blocked. The country and the people, meanwhile, far from seeing any hope for the future, will be wallowing in the politics of fear and uncertainty. This kind of tension cannot last for a long time before it explodes. The *deadlock* must be broken first as a precondition for stability and progress.

Therefore, once the respective roles of the two parties are clearly defined and agreed, then they must work out the form and principles of the alliance. The principle of non-interference in each party's internal affairs must remain a key one if the alliance is to survive. Having established its autonomy within the alliance, the *TFP* must then work out its *Political Programme*, guided by its *socialist* principles and policies, highlighting the specific Zanzibari characteristics.

THE PARTY AND ITS PROGRAMME

Any serious political organisation must be guided by a *Political Programme*. The function of the programme is to outline the nature of the society we are in, the social classes that comprise the whole of the society, and their respective positions in production. For instance, unlike the mainland in Zanzibar such an analysis will have to take into account the fact that here society has traditionally been divided into the classical class patterns. Zanzibar passed through a phase of a slave society then of a feudal Sultanate, a monarchy under colonial hegemony. The revolution of 1964 brought a sort of lumpen rule, patronised and protected by the mainland TANU and CCM political hierarchy. The composition of the ruling elites may be difficult to define in the formal class definitions. But the programme must try to define it as near accurate as possible.

The *political programme* must then outline the nature of the state power and the "driving force" behind it: what social group benefits most from the economy? why? alone or in alliance with other forces, local or foreign? what are these forces? why? what are their respective roles in production? what is their connection, if any, with external financial, trade or/and economic forces, big or small? etc. On the outcome of this analysis then work out a policy that will best advance the interests of the country and of those of the oppressed social groups whose champion the is.

All this must be put in the context of the continental African struggle, beginning with the state of affairs in Tanzania, then in our immediate neighbourhood, and our present position within it, and what the *TFP-NCCR* alliance policy should be in our future relations with them. The purpose of this exercise is to help formulate a sound policy that would, first, ensure our country's security and stability, and, secondly, outline regional trade and economic policies designed to maximise mutual benefits throughout the region. Again, this must be viewed in the context of the contemporary world situation, which should be analyzed carefully and then identify the envisaged role of Tanzania, and the role of the region in the African context.

This is important because we cannot hope to work out sound policies for Zanzibar's and Tanzania's progress without viewing our position within the broader picture. Without this programmatic overview we will end up, at worst, without any policy, or at best, with half-baked policies that lead nowhere, as sadly characterised by the Nyerere/Mwinyi status quo. After working out the *programme*, and after getting the approval of all levels of the party, the final result would then be presented as the *Political Programme* of the Party which could either be a separate party document, or preferably as a preamble to the party constitution. However, as the programme will

take some time to prepare, given the above prerequisites, what can be done here is only to propose a tentative preamble to the political programme which may take the following form:

TENTATIVE PREAMBLE TO THE POLITICAL PROGRAMME OF TFP:

TFP as a popular, socialist, and democratic front cannot but be a party involving all Zanzibaris irrespective of their *class, colour, religion or creed*. Its primary purpose is to become the reliable organ through which Zanzibaris can liberate themselves from the tyranny of political and economic oppression, and to transform the country from its present status of the "second poorest in the world" to a relatively prosperous country with bright future prospects.

The politico/economic system handed down from colonialism, and consolidated and extended by the ruling party TANU-cum-CCM, has failed to liberate the people of Zanzibar bodily and mentally from the bondage of colonialism, and it has now turned the country into a bastion of neocolonialism. Zanzibaris are not yet free in their own country. The majority of the people have been condemned to live under sub-human conditions. They are forced by circumstances to subsist below the poverty level. This state of national humiliation and hopelessness must be struggled against and eradicated once and for all from our country.

The role of leading the struggle for eradicating this intolerable condition must be the responsibility of TFP and its cadres, guided by socialist principles. Only such a party is capable of bringing about new conditions that will ensure the true dignity of Zanzibaris, now and in the future. In order to be able to carry out such a lofty, honourable and glorious task:-

Membership to TFP, therefore, implies hard-work, dedication and struggle to achieve the party's objectives through constructive and consistent action. To the *cadre of TFP* no task is unsurmountable. Spinelessness has no place among our ranks, and personal suffering can never deter us from the pursuit of our ultimate objective of liberating ourselves. The *TFP* will guard itself against the infiltration of opportunists, self-seekers, or corrupt elements, among its ranks and the party will always be vigilant against such destructive forces.

TFP is a serious party of Zanzibaris, and its members are expected to be serving the people honestly, selflessly and without any desire for reward or personal gains. Our deserving reward is the liberation of the people of Zanzibar and Tanzania. Party cadres must show examples of excellence in leadership, exemplified by good character and high morality; by courage in face of difficulties; by learning and fully grasping the nature and characteristics of the Zanzibar struggle, guided by mastering the theory and practice of *socialism*, combining the best experiences of the African

liberation movements and of other struggles of the oppressed. The party cadres must distinguish themselves by being disciplined, sincere, candid, and of cheerful disposition, characterised by highest self-respect and self-esteem.

Criticism and self-criticism must be conducted fearlessly in accordance with the discipline of the party and in the spirit of solidarity. Unprincipled criticism must, therefore, be discouraged at all time. Mistakes must be pointed out in the spirit of correcting them and not for the purpose of simply scoring points or for self-promotion. The party will oppose all tendencies to lie or deception among its ranks and guard against all forms of self-conceit. *Truth, honesty and reliability* will constantly remain the party's guiding code.

They TFP cadres are required to be in constant touch with the people and be wholeheartedly at the service of the people must be champions of the people, understand their needs and helping them in solving their own problems. In order to be effective in our political work and to cultivate a sound leadership attitude, TFP cadres are obliged to always remind ourselves of the often overlooked fact that some people may be limited in some aspects of knowledge, *but on the whole people are not stupid.* This must be the guiding principle in our mass work.

Every party member is obliged to tirelessly work to strengthen the unity and solidarity of the party. Only in a strong unity can we really serve the people effectively and bring about the conditions for changes that are necessary for building a future that will restore our national dignity and self-respect.

The party requires each of its member to work actively towards the realisation of the party's POLITICAL PROGRAMME and all decisions of the party in order to abolish once and for all the humiliation of bondage and poverty.

Then, of course, there must be an *economic programme* to indicate the proposed direction of the national economy. As this too may take some time to prepare comprehensively, an indicative overview may take the following form:

TENTATIVE ECONOMIC PROGRAMME:

Just as will be outlined in the party's POLITICAL PROGRAMME, the economic programme must have as its primary aim the liberation of Zanzibar from the tyranny of poverty which is the direct result of the ruling party CCM's extension of colonialism and neocolonialism in Tanzania. Such policies have succeeded in turning a potentially rich Tanzania into the poorest country in the world, and dragging Zanzibar into poverty as well.

The key aims of the economic programme will therefore be to reverse such failed policies and introduce more dynamic policies that will ensure the following:

BASIC NEEDS: *The target of the economy under of TFP after taking over state power will be to change the current colonial structure to a structure that will promote production of the people's basic needs. The objective will be to build an economy that will be self-sustaining, independent and nationally integrated.*

While we will continue to respect our international obligations to the multilateral and other agencies, our relations with such agencies must be on our terms. We will not allow others to dictate what is good for us, although we shall always be ready to discuss our economic vision with various agencies, both national and foreign, which are open to learning from each other.

PLANNING: *The national economy will be directed by planning principles which are distinct from command economy. We shall institute central coordination, without embarking on command economy. On the other hand, a socialist-market economy, by means of controlled use of the law of value, will be encouraged, without undermining the all round objectives of the national economic plan.*

PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION, EXCHANGE, CONSUMPTION: *The second target of TFP's economic objective will be to gear policies on production, distribution, exchange and consumption towards serving people's basic needs. Other priorities like foreign trade, and economic cooperation in the so-called "world market", will be pursued in the same spirit of seeking to promote production of the basic needs, raising living standard and expansion of the home market.*

AGRICULTURE: *As nearly 90% of our population are engaged in Agriculture, the modernisation of Agriculture must be our top priority, with the raising of rural incomes as the motive force of our economy. By improving rural skills through production and construction (ie, irrigation, water conservation, fish farming, soil improvement, etc.) and by combining modern technology and traditional farming, the modernisation of Agriculture will thus help promote rural industrialisation, leading to a break up of the destructive rural-urban dichotomy and bring about a balanced development of the two sectors. In addition to supplying food for domestic consumption, Agriculture will also produce the raw-material crops for industry, eg, various oil seeds, coconut products, clove distillation with its various derivatives, cotton for textile and garment industry, etc.*

Industry, in turn, will be geared towards promoting agricultural modernisation, and raising the standards and quality of rural life.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT: *Financial, fiscal and monetary policies* will be guided by the need to develop the internal base of the *real economy* as well as by the need to facilitate the overall objective of the economy towards the provision of the *basic needs* of the people and improving living standard.

TRADE: *TFP policy on trade* will be to advance the quality and quantity of our national export products, not limiting to exporting the colonially imposed primary commodities, the so-called *cash crops*. The primary target will be to export finished products, with a view to enhancing skills and adding value to our export products. The objective of foreign trade with advanced countries will be to enable Zanzibar to import modern equipment and technology so as to facilitate the rapid modernisation of our national economy.

PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES: *While Zanzibar and Tanzania will continue* to be a member of the World Trade Organisation, the *TFP's* objective for such membership will be to ensure fair trade practices between strong and weak countries. We will pursue the policy of promoting local production of *basic needs* by encouraging production of industrial consumer goods as the principal means of modernising the national economy. We shall protect our local industries from the multinational predators whose aim is known to be the destruction of local industries which do not come under their pernicious subordination.

FOREIGN DEBT: *Tanzania carries a debt burden of more than \$7 billion dollars. Immediately upon taking over power TFP-NCCR alliance government will,* therefore, enter into discussion with our foreign creditors with a view to renegotiating the method of servicing and repayment of our crippling foreign debt obligation. Thanks to CCM's reckless borrowing practices, most of which has not been authorised by the people, and for which there is little to show on the ground, every Tanzanian today, young and old, carries a debt burden of more than \$300 - in a country with an annual per capita income of only \$90! This intolerable condition is not conducive to economic development and it intensifies poverty in an already extremely poor country.

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION: *These are very important sectors of the national economy* and it will be the task of the TFP government to promote and modernise them so as to provide service to every corner of the country and to achieve our cherished goal of building a *self-sustaining, independent and nationally integrated economy*.

CONSTRUCTION AND HOUSING: *In order to raise the living standards of the people and improve the quality of life, modern housing is one of the key ingredients. The TFP government will promote housing not just as an aspect of welfare provisions, but as the most important element towards developing our construction industry. Housing for the people is one of the three basic human needs - ie, food, clothing and shelter.*

HEALTH AND EDUCATION: *National health, education and modern technology are the essential provisions to push the country to high standards of health, culture and material affluence. The TFP government will promote these two sectors by giving them top priority in expertise and allocation of funds.*

TO SUM UP, THE IMMEDIATE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES ARE: (a) TO BREAK THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK WHICH HAS SHACKLED THE COUNTRY TO ITS STUBBORN AND ANTAGONISTIC SOCIAL CONTRADICTIONS WHICH ARE HISTORICALLY CONDITIONED, AND,

(b) TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ZANZIBAR'S HISTORICAL ROLE IN THE WORLD TRADE AND ITS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION AS A POTENTIAL ASSET IN THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY.

(For full discussion on Zanzibar's geographical location and its potential in the modern world economy, see Appendix III)

CONCLUSION:

This essay is largely concerned with the situation in Zanzibar. Many Zanzibaris are not at ease with the current tension. It is true that *tension* is the essential ingredient in the evolution of society. But there are two qualitatively different kinds of tension: the *creative* and the *destructive tension*. Whereas in mainland Tanzania, for instance, party politics is characterised by *creative tension*, and therefore positive, in Zanzibar it is the opposite. Here party politics is characterised by *destructive tension*, which is dangerously negative. The latent danger in this latter kind of tension is that, destructive tension as a rule often tends to get out of hand, with devastating consequences, as we have experienced in the 1964 revolution. It is, therefore, the duty of every Zanzibari to help find a way out of the destructive to creative tension. They should contribute to this debate, not in the spirit of rivalry, but in the spirit of seeking a lasting solution to this intricate problem. We must leave behind all past prejudices and come together in an effort to resolve the problem in the name of

Zanzibari solidarity - neither CCM nor CUF, *but all of us together*. This is a matter of national emergency.

It is now more than thirty years since the chaotic revolution of 1964, but the political balance of forces, as we have seen, has still not changed significantly. And if we continue with the same traditional political practice and loyalties as we have been doing ever since, it does not need a wizard to predict that the next thirty years will see no change whatsoever, only more of the same. Let us pause for a moment and ask ourselves: what do we want to hand down to our children and grand-children? Do we want to leave them a heritage of more chaos, more destructive tension? I have tried to outline above the historical background that has led us to the present situation in the hope that history will help to guide us avoid future pitfalls. Are we not strong enough to face the reality of our situation and admit that, the logic of the situation points to the need for change if we are to bring about stability, and regain our country's glory and start to embark on the road to real prosperity? Whatever mistakes that may have been made in the past, the only useful way is to *learn never to repeat them*, as the old wisdom tells us: "Those who do not learn from the mistakes of the past are condemned to repeat them".

The suggestion for the intervention of a *third force* is deliberately designed to find a way out of the *deadlock*, and not to advance political interests of party affiliation. I have chosen *NCCR-MAGEUZI* as a likely ally of *TFP* because it is the only neutral and credible party that can shoulder the task, of liberating Tanzania since, (a) of all the opposition parties it has the largest following in the mainland, (b) it is guided by progressive and credible policies of *social democracy* which are relevant to the present conditions of Tanzania, of Africa and the world, and (c) it is a young and dynamic movement, and therefore, capable of looking at the problem of Zanzibar from a fresh starting point unencumbered with past prejudices. Let us therefore all work together in solidarity to stop the slide down the political slippery slope. *LET US, THEREFORE, RESOLVE, ALL OF US TOGETHER, TO BUILD A NEW ZANZIBAR FREED FROM THE PREJUDICES OF AN EARLIER ERA. WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES AND TO FUTURE GENERATIONS TO BUILD A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS ZANZIBAR. HISTORY IS ON OUR SIDE!*

LONG-LIVE ZANZIBAR AND ZANZIBARIS!
