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The Roots of Student Unrest in African Universities



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Omari • P B Mihyo

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UNREST IN AFRICAN UNIVERSITIES**



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Preface

The bulk of this study was done at the time when three major universities in Eastern and Southern Africa were closed due to student unrest. These were the University of Dar-es-Salaam, the University of Zambia, and the University of Zimbabwe. It was in response to the recurrent student unrest and resultant closure of universities that the researchers decided to embark on this study. It seemed to us that while student protests have been quite perennial and, since independence, have had a profound impact on the nature and character of universities, as well as society in general, they have remained rather peripheral to disciplined inquiry.

The research was carried out with the support of four universities. After personal visits and consultations with the Vice-Chancellors and Pro-Vice-Chancellors of the universities between April and May 1990, a team of national contact persons for the study was formed. It was composed of Dr. Naison Mutizwa-Mangiza of the University of Zimbabwe, Professor Lyson Tembo of Zambia, Mr E. Jambo of the University of Dar-es-Salaam, and Professor Okoth-Ogendo of the University of Nairobi. The members of this team, who have wide experience in student affairs, made several contributions to this work. At a planning meeting held at Naivasha, Kenya, in July 1990, they presented preliminary observations on student unrest in their respective universities. Between July and December 1990, individual members of this team contributed to the study through correspondence and exchange of primary documents. We made several visits to these universities, discussed certain aspects of the study with senior academics and a number of student leaders. We are sure our work would have been more difficult, if not fruitless, without their contributions. We would like to thank them jointly and severally for their valued contributions.

The write-up was done while Professor P.B. Mihyo (Law and Development Studies) was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Social Studies in Holland and Professor

I.M. Omari (Education and Psychology) was Adjunct visiting Professor at the University of British Columbia, Canada on sabbatical leave from IDRC where he is a Senior Program Officer. We would like to greatly appreciate the contributions of these two institutions which provided homes for the study. The study received partial support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) which is hereby highly acknowledged. However, the opinions expressed in this work are those of the authors and not those of the institutions to which they are affiliated.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Preface	i
Introduction	1
Student Unrest and the Perceptions of the Role and Character of Universities	2
The Basis of the Current Study	5
General Causes of Student Unrest	6
Power, Authority, and Resolution of student Unrest in Universities	13
Categories of Causes of Student Unrest	18
The Political Process and Issues	20
Academic Issues	38
Welfare Matters and Student Unrest	44
The Managerial and Allocative Issues	54
A Synthesis of the Causes of Student Unrest	58
Institutional and State Responses to Student Unrest	69
Dialogue as a Predicament of Universities and States	75
Precipitating Factors During Negotiations	80
University Closures and After	82
Student Tactics, Victories, and Failures	86
Conclusions and Recommendations	93
Observations and Guiding Principles	98
Student Services Needing Analysis and Support	101
 ANNEXES	
I: Evolution of Four University Crises	105
1a. Evolution of the 6/10/1989 University of Zimbabwe Crisis	105

1b.	The Evolution of the May 12, 1990 Crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam	106
1c.	The Evolution of the July 1971, University of Dar-es-Salaam Crisis	109
1d.	The Evolution of the 1986 University of Zambia Crisis	112
II:	Sample of Students Protests Documents	115
2a.	Open Letter to the Vice-Chancellor, University of Dar-es-Salaam 8/7/1971	115
2b.	University of Zimbabwe Students on:	
(a)	Academic Freedom	118
(b)	Corruption	121
2c.	An Editorial in Student Paper: <i>ECHO</i> , University of Dar-es-Salaam 21/8/1971	122
2d.	Circular Letter on Ministers Attack on Students University of Zimbabwe 22/5/1989	123
	References	126
	List of Tables	
1.	Number and Size of Public Universities in Four Countries	7
2.	Causes of Student Unrest	21
	List of Figures	
1.	Students and youths in pro-democracy protests	39
2.	The Carrot and Stick Diplomacy and Culture	46
3.	The Tug of War Between Students and Political Establishment	50
4.	An Administrative Framework for Students Services	68

Introduction

The current search for excellence in higher education in African countries has concentrated primarily on institutional issues such as input resources, rapid expansion of higher education, managerial and allocative efficiency, programme relevance, and output mix in terms of students employability, research, and service. Indeed, overwhelming evidence suggests that there has been a dramatic decline in the quality of higher education and in the general performance of institutions of higher learning in the last decade (Court, 1990; Jayox, 1990; Mwiria, 1991). Solutions being articulated include improvement in funding, management, revamping of the curriculum and retention of quality teaching staff. However, the broader issues of the social context of higher education, especially the social role and the qualitative impact of student and faculty protests in the improvement of the climate in the delivery of quality higher education has not been adequately addressed. The present paper examines the patterns and causes of the recurrent student unrest in four African Universities (Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) with a view to delineating the social context and impact of this perennial issue of student disquiet. Specifically, the study will examine the role of student protests on the democratization debates and processes, maintenance of quality education, and sustaining quality life on university campuses.

The phenomenon of student unrest has persisted since the inauguration of universities in the early 1960s and has defied ideological boundaries and university size, such that each year resources are wasted due to recurrent cessation of teaching and learning, which sometimes results in the closure of universities. Yet not much has been done to locate the phenomenon in its historical and social contexts with a view to evaluating its merits and demerits. And unfortunately, student unrest has been conceived and portrayed mostly as a negative and disruptive process. Little attention is given to its importance in the democratic transformation of the society and qualitative improvements

in higher education, except in the broad context of the class struggle as in Peter and Mvungi (1986).

Student Unrest and Perceptions of the Role and Character of Universities

Universities are generally treated with the respect, reverence, and dignity befitting serious minds engaged in intellectual adventure, discovery, and reflection. As described by a well respected Zambian law professor (Ndulo, 1986), the university is supposed to be a birth place of fresh insight, vision, and an arena where fundamental ideas are pronounced, challenged, clarified, and disputed in the most dignified and collegial manner. This had, in earlier times, tempted the famous British philosopher, S. Mills, to describe a university as a 'reclusive place where students are trained to methodize their knowledge and become the masters of their disciplines' (Wallerstein and Starr, 1971). The university was seen as calm, ascetic, secluded, scientific where ideas flourished. This image of a university was shattered in the west by the student and staff protests of the 1960s. These were set against the hegemony of capitalism, militarism, consumerism, and against the conflation of the state and academia which were threatening to undermine the pillars of academic freedom. That traditional image of a university has by and large now been restored in the west (Graaft, 1978; Nesbit, 1971).

In the developing countries of Africa, however, amidst an acute economic crisis, the image of the university is still being damaged by frequent student and faculty protests against state repression, university mismanagement, the shabby treatment of students, corruption, and inefficiency in the nation states. The perception of scholarship as civility devoid of passion, love, or outrage, and being irrelevant to the immediate needs of man is continuously being challenged by staff and students who are getting more and more convinced that there cannot be advancement of learning at the expense of man. They are

rejecting the notion of academic neutrality in developmental choices. Instead, as citizens and an informed group, they favour active participation in these choices, and in the determination of how universities should be treated, but hopefully without sacrifice to intellectual diversity and independent criticism which are the two essential tenets of the mission of any university. It is indeed the constant tensions between the university ideal, critical capacity, and the evolution of diverse visions on the one hand, and the powers of secular services which continually delimit its hope and horizons of activity on the other that will yet unleash the most brilliant contributions of universities. This contradiction between the image of an institution which claims to be completely and truly dedicated to human reason and progressive thought, and the violence, protests and revolts associated with universities baffles the public that invests so heavily in these institutions. The issue, though, is whether the tensions need to manifest themselves in the manner and intensity observed in some of these African countries, and whether these fragile young nations can perhaps harness them for social development, or whether they will degenerate into chaos.

Apart from the damages to the university image as a source of inspiration and service, the recurrent crises have resulted in the massive destruction of university and public property; loss of life for both students and the public; increase in costs of running universities due to stoppages of instruction; creeping deprofessionalization of the academia, loss of public esteem and respect for the teaching staff; unnecessary changes in the staffing of higher education; dislocation in the planning for human resources development and deployment; loss of funding, consultancies, and intellectual contacts. Some universities have been closed for years. The well respected and effective former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nairobi, Professor Philip Mbithi, admitted recently that the intermittent closures of the university had 'cost two years of study and research and shaken public confidence in it. Because of instability, new students had to wait for three years before they could join the first year' (Wahome, *Daily Nation*, 7 April 1986).

Besides the destruction of property worth millions of dollars in Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya, Nigeria, and Zaire, the political elite have found students and staff quite an irritant, and the only vocal and publicly dissenting voice. It has not hesitated, often in haste, to mobilize and unleash the forces of state repression on the students and faculty. The attitudes and views of politicians are like those of the President of Tanzania, Mr. A.H. Mwinyi, who when he sent home over 3000 students of the University of Dar-es-Salaam for seven months, after months of protracted but non-violent protests against state repression, official corruption, waste, and inefficiency in government, said: 'The University which is supposed to be the fountain of learning and the source of wisdom in the land, turned into a citadel of hooliganism, indiscipline, and senseless acts' (Kulekana, *Daily News*, 15 May 1990).

On the other hand, both faculty and students, sometimes with tacit public encouragement, are not showing any signs of remorse, regret, or repentance. They are not even thinking of changing their views on the role of the academia and the university. They are capitalizing on the conviction that the university, as the institutionalized embodiment of the life of dialogue and communal inquiry, should be expected to determine, through its own critical capacities, whether the society it is to serve is a place where the spirit of man has the possibility of blossoming, being nurtured, and advanced in a variety of ways. It is in this context that the violence and unrest associated with university students and staff has to be examined. The context includes developmental debates and choices, economic crises associated with structural adjustments, the monolithic, militaristic, and often dictatorial social and political systems in place in Africa; widespread corruption and inefficiencies in these countries, and in associated public institutions, including universities. In more recent times, the university unrest has taken on the challenge of the unfolding pressures for political, social and economic pluralism and basic democratic freedoms all over the third world, after years of sporadic resistance and oscillations (Shivji, 1991). The students are taking up concrete positions in national developmental debates. When in 1989

the government of Zimbabwe started to advance the idea of one a party state while there were numerous reports that corruption was rampant in the system, it was the University of Zimbabwe students who put up the most pitched resistance through demonstrations and intellectual articulation. The students' official position was:

This university is the last island of democracy in this country and we will fight to the bitter end and hilt to sustain these democratic rights and extend them to the generality of the masses of Zimbabwe. That one fought for this country does not justify them to loot, plunder, and wreck the economy of Zimbabwe, let alone stifle peoples democratic rights.

(Meldrum, 1989, citing student leader Mutambara)

In the same spirit, their Tanzania counterparts in the 1990 crisis, focusing on corruption, inefficiency, and lack of accountability put forward their case as follows:

It is our responsibility as youths, to examine the problems of this country in greater depth and explain them to people and to cooperate with the government to solve them. To engage in criticisms, self criticism, and to criticize each other is central to national development.

(Nhende, 21 April 1990, citing student leader Matiku Matare)

This then is the context of students and staff unrest in African countries, characterized by increased social fragmentation, polarization, repression, violent struggles for democracy and fundamental human rights, freedom and autonomy of universities, and search for alternative developmental paradigms.

The Basis of the Current Study

The present paper examines the causes, and manifestations of student unrest, state responses, and the management of the crises. It is based on discussions and documentation in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Tanzania. The number and size of public universities are given in Table 1.

The Universities were selected to give diversity in size, growth patterns, variety, and intensity of student crises. The Kenyan situation is bound to change very dramatically, given the recent double intakes. Four case studies were developed by national researchers and discussed in several joint and bilateral meetings. Recent student unrest events in Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Ethiopia, and Zaire were also targeted for review to enrich the case studies. The phenomenon was found to be quite widespread in varying degrees not only in the region but also in the whole continent of Africa. The case studies were to give a variety of contexts, with Tanzania representing leftist leaning, Kenya the rather conservative side, Zambia oscillating between capitalism and socialism (i.e. humanism), and Zimbabwe still defining itself. The analysis concentrates on students' unrest but this is not to suggest that faculty members are not involved in this struggle. While often most members of staff have been busy identifying what professor Brzezinski (1971) called gray areas, interposing themselves between the warring sides, reports by Sheriff (1991) and Makamure (1991) suggested that they were openly and widely sympathetic to recent student protests in Tanzania and Zimbabwe respectively. The Mungai (1971) report had similar messages. In all these countries many members of staff have been imprisoned or picked up for questioning during student crises and at times 'charged with inciting students to riot' (*Daily Nation*, 18 September 1990). Likewise, their participation in the refinement of students' agenda during protests is widely acknowledged. Thus, the students were singled out for convenience in analysis rather than having a monopoly of these protests. Sometimes, however, one cannot help feeling that students have been used as guinea pigs, both by staff and other opposition groups, who abandoned them when the struggle got too hot.

General Causes of Student Unrest

True to humanity, student unrest in Africa constitutes a complex phenomenon, affirming Aristotle's contention that, in consideration of mankind, one should realize that the parts

are greater than the whole. It is easy to see the causes of student struggles as a manifestation of the destruction and decline of academic authority, the weakening of state power, and the politicization of intellectuals. It is easy to adduce psychological and sociological theories of alienation, rejection of parental authority, fear of adulthood, disenchantment with human societies; apprehensions about loss of comradeship, freedom, protection and identity at graduation, as causes of the unrest.

Table 1: Number and Sizes of Public Universities in Four Countries

Country	Names of Institutions	Enrolments	National Populations#	Index of Representation ¹
Kenya	University of Nairobi	11,271 +	24,870,000	867:1
	Kenyatta University	6,414 +		
	Moi University	6,000		
	Egerton University	5,000		
Total		28,691*		
Tanzania	University of Dar-es-Salaam	3,000 ~	24,800,000	7085:1
	Sokoine University	500		
	Total	3,500		
Zambia	University of Zambia	4,200	7,800,000	1560:1
	Copperbelt University	1,500		
	Total	5,000		
Zimbabwe	University of Zimbabwe	9,288**	9,120,000	982:1

Sources:

- # Population figures are from: *United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, Vol. XLV, No. 1, January 1991.
- * The representation index gives the ratio of the number of people in the national populations to one student in universities. Obviously Kenya and Zimbabwe have an edge over the others, which, given the proposed free trade and flow of high-level manpower under the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) may have serious implications in regional dominance and repatriation of earnings. This index of representation is quite consistent with the UNESCO 1987 figures relating the number of students in the third-level of schooling per 100,000 people in the population, showing Kenya, 121; Tanzania, 21; Zambia, 173; Zimbabwe, 396; Ethiopia, 66; and Uganda, 75 (Statistical Yearbook, 1990; Paris: UNESCO, 1990). The Kenya situation must have changed dramatically with the double intakes of 1989/90/91.
- + Republic of Kenya Statistical Abstract (1988); Republic of Kenya, Development Plan (1989)
- ~ The Ministry of Education (1990)
- " The Kenya situation is bound to have changed dramatically due to double intakes necessitated by the recent change from A-Level to O-Level entry. Mwiria (1990) estimated a total enrolment of 40,000 but bound to slide after the bulge cohort.
- ** Mukushi (1989)

It is easy to attribute the crises to immaturity of university students, pubertal rites of passage, conflict of generations epitomized by an unconscious hatred and rejection of authority (the famous Freudian Oedipal complex), and the seemingly unpatriotic nature of university communities. Yet all these are an oversimplification of a quite complex phenomenon which, at times, seems like an irresolvable paradox that teases and frustrates those who attempt to grasp its essence. To start with, there are the social contexts in which the crises manifest themselves. There is no doubt that the current period of African history is volatile, characterized by both a sense of hope and despair, a sense of change that will unravel new possibilities in terms of life styles, morals, politics, and consciousness. And yet there is a sense of crisis in the air and a real possibility that such military dictatorships as exist in Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria, Liberia, and Ghana, to mention but a few, will spread and become endemic while current one party autocracies, oligarchies, and kleptocracies struggle for their survival. As hitherto marginalized groups such as students, workers, peasants, and the urban underclass struggle for democracy and more equitable distribution of resources, the elite in control will tend to be more defensive, protective of existing power and economic structures, and possibly more repressive. This will only exacerbate the crises. Academics and policy makers may fail to take a critical look at the structural, political, and policy distortions which contribute to this disquiet.

Nesbit (1971), in a comprehensive review of the social, political, and psychological factors which surround protracted revolts in general and in universities in particular, delineates ten nurturing preconditions which seem to apply in varying degrees in Africa. These conditions included:

1. Rapid social and economic changes that affect and redefine social roles and status in society.

2. A feeling (real or perceived) of a breakdown of the established authority patterns and hence the questioning of the legitimacy of new regimes and competition for power.
3. Perceptible social and intellectual developments among key groups sharing power, privilege, and access to key resources.
4. Liberalization of systems of communication and participation in the society.
5. Great politicization processes going on among groups.
6. Existence of power-sensitive, power-eager intellectual elites.
7. Occurrence of precipitating events, which may not be necessarily related but causing cracks.
8. Moral issues being articulated by large sections of the society regarding what should and ought to be, and what is right and wrong.
9. Existence of contrasting scenes of declared corruption, hypocrisy, and interference with human rights.
10. Presumed or real existence of a 'reservoir of guilt' on the part of those in power.

Given the volatility and nature of African regimes, almost all being either military dictatorships or one party autocracies, ranging from soft to hard authoritarianism as seen in Zambia and Zaire respectively, most of these conditions do obtain in varying degrees of intensity. The situation will, of necessity, entail a redefining of the social and political roles of students and the university community in general. This state of crisis and tensions between the state and the universities may be a healthy one under the circumstances prevailing in Africa, although it need not take the violent form it often does. One informed regular commentator on student activism around the world, P.G. Altbach (1982) had this to say about student unrest in developing countries:

Activism is even more unpredictable in the Third World and at the same time more important. Intellectual communities in general and the

universities in particular remain of considerable importance in shaping national consciousness. Because of their political traditions, and the expectations of society and pivotal role of the academic community, students will remain a potentially important element of the political equation. Students have often acted as the visible manifestation of the concern and consciousness of the educated middle classes and sometimes of even broader segments of the population. They are easy to mobilize and reflect the social classes from which they come. Because of the lack of alternative social and political infrastructures, students are often an important barometer of opinion and consciousness for their societies. (p. 69)

In most African countries, most of the university students have peasantry backgrounds, as such it is a truism that they (students and staff) occupy a special position in the society. It is a special and privileged position with respect to access to intellectual power, articulation of ideal governance models, and playing a brokerage role in the process of acquisition, articulation, distribution, diffusion, and utilization of knowledge for social and technological development. They are not, however privileged in immediate access to material resources. The uncertainties of future jobs and economic bases have increased dramatically in recent times. In the meanwhile, the political elite has been bent on personal aggrandizement and sharing with multinationals the non renewable resources. In fact, things have changed dramatically in the last decade. University education no longer guarantees an individual a decent job, and when it does, there is no guaranteed access to a car, a house, social prestige, and the serenity that was associated with it before. In short, the current generation of university students end up as an elite of labour rather than an elite of leisure. Yet universities as institutions remain one of the most powerful social forces in all these countries.

Both Altbach (1982) and Hanna (1975) have converged on educational, political, and social configurations which make students and university staff an important ameliorative force to reckon with, especially in developing countries. Such factors and additional elaborations are:

- First, there are no political institutions for channelling their views and making diverse impacts. In one party-state where dissent is banned, it is in universities, in the context of academic freedom, that both the university community and a significant section of public help to keep the pressure on the establishment. Political leaders cannot easily instruct the universities to simply regurgitate political slogans. However, they urge for constructive criticism in subjecting politics, economic structures, aid, and development policies to debate and critical analysis. Yet this is only possible in the more tolerant regimes since blatantly repressive and corrupt regimes impose limits.
- Second, there is no doubt that by virtue of the heavy concentration of a highly educated elite group in one place, it constitutes a real or potential threat to opinion leadership. Many students naturally assume that they will be the future leaders of their country. They therefore want to communicate their views through the mass media, books, and in student groupings. And yet the political systems have censored and controlled

much of the mass media. It has banned most student publications in all the universities being studied.

- Third, the students in most of these countries read the history of activism in liberation movements and opposition to repressive regimes during colonial times. Many of the current political leaders were student activists during their university life. It is therefore not surprising that the students continue the tradition of protest against oppression and evils.
- Fourth, some students and staff come from a primarily literate background with connections and access to the power elites and structures. This is particularly true in urban areas where they can exert a lot of political influence and cause much anxiety in those circles.
- Fifth, with their simplicity and youthfulness, the students and younger faculty can easily mix with the masses, both in the rural and urban areas and this can be threatening to current regimes. It was quite dramatic in the 1990 Zambian crisis as students eluded security men and police by disappearing into the shanty towns. There they campaigned for support against maize meal price hikes, only to regroup in the city for a major demonstration that changed the history of Zambia from one party to multi-party politics. Taking refuge in shanties and among the peasants is quite a common practice among students in the region.

- Sixth, students and staff constitute an easily mobilized sophisticated group that cuts across ethnic lines and can thus speak in the name of the country, a position which lends some truth to the claim that they are the conscience of the nation.

It is quite evident that this analysis tend to suggest that all student protests are of a political nature. Far from it. Some have been against academic issues such as the definition of legitimate knowledge, the relevancy of academic programmes, examinations, welfare matters such as bad food and congestion in dormitories, and managerial matters such as lack of students participation in university governance. Yet, as will be seen later, the most dramatic and eventful crises have had a political slant, and their frequency justifies the emphasis without necessarily suggesting their glorification.

Power, Authority and Resolution of Student Unrest in Universities

When it comes to the less politically motivated student protests, it is the power structure and the way things are done in universities which seem to incite students to overt protests. In many of these countries and their universities, things are generally slow, with a rather perverted and archaic work ethic or ideology which does not seem to stress diligence, punctuality, deferment of gratification, and the primacy of the work domain (Rose, 1985). Both commission reports of the respected High Court Judge of Tanzania, Justice Mroso (1990) and the Vice-Chancellor of Egerton University, Professor Musangi (1980) complain of the lack of implementation of feasible key agreed upon recommendations of previous

university commissions of inquiry. They contended that the lack of a sense of urgency, caring, and diligence conditioned students to the feeling that the only way to get things done and attract attention to their plight is to protest, demonstrate, boycott classes, and attack significant figures. Political regimes have collapsed and vice-chancellors have lost their jobs because of student protests, and both fear this eventuality. Students sometimes deliberately exploit this fear, and protest knowing that some action will be taken, but in the process, they tend to overestimate their invincibility and the power of collective optimism.

The concept of a university as a 'village of priests' or as a conglomeration of an intellectual oligarchy or as one hierarchical corporate entity like any other parastatal organization needs to change among politicians and administrators in developing countries. The President of the University of California, Clark Kerr (Wallerstein and Starr, 1971), in late 1960s used the concept of a 'multiversity' to depict the complex nature of modern universities. This complexity of universities as institutions increases with size, yet even small universities of no more than 2000 students are causing administrative difficulties exactly because of their very nature. Kerr used to educate conservatives like the former U.S.A. President (Reagan) on the importance of academic freedoms, institutional autonomy, and the complex nature of modern universities. Ultimately he lost his job as conservatives were determined to use force to silence students and staff as a source of revolts in America, with Reagan believing that all problems were caused by subversives and that there was too much freedom on university campuses (Reagan, 1971). Yet that never became a lasting solution. Student protests continued for years.

Politicians often assume that the university is also subject to negative sanctions such as the dismissal of heads, deans, and top administrators, and that students can be expelled or rusticated just as people are in other parastatals. Yet they soon realize that a university is different due to the fragmented nature of its three distinct power blocks. The administrative branch is hierarchical in structure but rather loose in power to sanction discipline within its own branch, let alone in others, even when it has the authority. The academic block can at best be described as having a flat governance structure and as being somewhat chaotic in terms of authority to sanction discipline. University teachers, especially professors, have a great degree of autonomy from the heads of departments and deans of faculties. In some countries such as Italy they are made barons to symbolize their power, and being tenured as well as occupying an endowed position is held as sacrosanct. Then there is the student block whose administration and leadership is transient, spontaneous, and more than often cantankerous. The university administration may have the authority but does not always have the power over the academic and student leadership. Much of what goes on depends on influence and persuasion rather than regulations (Hartnett, 1971). Therefore, governments cannot merely give orders for the discipline of faculty members and students unless one is prepared to court serious ruptures in the institution. This is because the perception of the legitimacy of such sanctions differ greatly between the three power blocks. Classical cases of defiance of authority, power diffusion, and vulnerability of university leadership occurred in the 1971 crisis in the University of Dar-es-Salaam. A student leader, Mr. Akivaga, was able to address a rally on the campus, inciting students against the university after he had been rusticated by the authorities. The

same thing happened in Nairobi in 1985 when student Mwandoro was able to hold rallies (kamukunji) on the campus after having been expelled.

Ordinarily, students move with a sense of power and indispensability, knowing that the worst that can befall them is rustication and expulsion, as no country can do without students, although, in outrage, some politicians like Nyerere (1990), believing as Reagan did, in the existence of subversives (terrorist group), would like the world to think that the University of Dar-es-Salaam can be closed indefinitely. In the same manner, students are the most vulnerable to political sanction than the administration and the teaching staff but often enjoy taking on the state as an act of faith, and believe in the temporary nature of such sanctions.

While universities in developing countries are much smaller in size and simpler in structure, complexities in power and authority are similar to and reminiscent of many liberal universities. They all consist of several communities and associated subcultures which any administration has to reckon with. They all have communities of undergraduates, graduates, humanists/artists, social scientists, natural scientists, professional schools such as law and accounting, non academic personnel, administrators, an assortment of proletariat who are on and off on casual jobs, and contracting companies working on university projects. Students themselves are similarly fragmented by interests and specialisms such that there are pleasure seekers, serious academics, athletes, vocational centred students, non conformists, leisure groups, and political activists. Thus administrators and academics have to contend with the fascinating pageantry of such

diversity, part of which are their interactions or clashes, and all of which provide inspiration for intellectual growth. Student unrest is obviously part of all this.

Within the university, and especially during times of student and staff crises, the categories of actors are innumerable. They include the Chancellor, who in developing countries is normally the President of the country, often confusing the roles of presidency and chancellorship and with very limited knowledge or intimate affinity with the institution; the ministers responsible for education, manpower, and employment/labour, finance, and sectoral ministries such as health and agriculture. Then there are the university administrators imposed on an academic staff, often clashing on key university priorities, management issues, control and distribution of resources, and on student freedoms and welfare. The students themselves are often divided by the imposition of party youth leaguers as the official organ or watchdog, while the ruling party keeps an eye on the running of the university. Internal and external state intelligence officers closely monitor staff and students activities, as happened to the well known Makerere University professor, Ali Mazrui (1978). During a crisis violators and agent provocateurs likewise attempt to steer the university in particular directions. In the meanwhile, interest groups such as parents and employers associations, funders and other clients of university services wonder how much damage a student crisis will render to their interests and preoccupations. It is thus to be expected that universities as complex institutions may be gripped with events that may not lend themselves to easy cookbook solutions.

Paramount to the whole set-up is the fact that within this unrest is the fluidity of the model of a university that most of these countries want to adapt. The extremes are between liberal democratic institutions with a decentralized autonomy such as might exist in Botswana, and the highly hierarchical, seemingly government controlled institutions such as in Kenya. In the process, a variety of interested groups (local and international), students and staff, strive to influence the future profiles, structures, operational ideals, and paradigms emerging from these institutions, hence recurrent seminars and retreats for university administrators, faculty and policy makers. Naturally some of the ideals, models, and paradigms are conflictual. These conflicts are not necessarily in themselves retrogressive and inimical. They often lead to productive debate and innovations. Yet in young and fragile intellectual communities, some of the current crises in universities can be attributed to such clashes, contradictions, and antagonisms between the intelligentsia and the polity, and within the universities between the administration, academic staff, and student bodies, among whom you also see clashes based on training heritage, class, ethnicity, ideology, and position.

Categories of Causes of Student Unrest

In an attempt to map out the pattern of student unrest, each event over a period of about 25 years was examined and classified according to the primary motive. Four categories of related causes emerged and are given in Table 2. They converged on the following areas of discontent:

- Political processes and issues outside the purview and physical confines of the university. These included protests against imperialism, neo-colonialism, political murders, corruption, government inadequacies, interference in university affairs, and prioritization of national issues and investment paths.
- Academic issues such as protests against difficult examinations, incompetence of lecturers, shortage of books, introduction of new courses, and favouritism in teaching and examinations.
- Welfare matters such as bad food, congested dormitories, shoddy catering services, freedom in residential halls, and access to recreational and guidance services.
- Management and allocative issues within the university, centred on administrative inadequacies, debates regarding the allocation of resources, discipline matters on the campus, and disputes on management styles. By extension, this section will also deal with management of crises.

Obviously these categories are not mutually exclusive and are subjectively determined for analytical convenience. The process of classifying the events into these four categories itself may not adequately take into account the temporal dynamics of a given unrest. Characteristically, student revolts started with minor issues and incidents, then took on new

tensions and agenda as negotiations proceeded and new frustrations were encountered. Likewise, in deciding on what amounted to a crisis from interviews and documentary sources, some events might have been omitted but attempts were made to include any protracted university-wide protests leading to a cessation of classes and/or closure of the university for one or more days. In conjoint situations, when more than one demand was made in the same protest, no attempt was made to assign differential weights in the escalation of the conflict. However, the assignment of the issues to the four categories was agreed upon by at least three people, including the authors and the national researchers in each country. The University of Nairobi seems to have the highest incidence of protests but this could reflect better record keeping and media coverage rather than a higher propensity to strike even though they may be facing a more complex situation than the others.

The Political Processes and Issues

Evidence independently and overwhelmingly support the findings of Nesbit (1971), in North America, that the majority of crises and revolts were not motivated primarily by academic concerns but rather political and welfare issues. It affirms Kellner's (1989) position that new forms of contradictions and conflicts may not be primarily of a class nature, gravitating around material reproduction, but rather a matter of cultural and intellectual reproduction. Two political processes and struggles seem to surround the conflicts falling under this category. On the one hand, there seem to be struggles by the political elite to control, shape, and influence such processes as intellectual reproduction,

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crisis*	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocative
I. Ntorebi	Against a colonial politician addressing students	—	—	—
[1] 18.05.1961 (1)		—	—	—
[2] 12.02.1963 (1)	—	—	Underground tunnel beneath a highway wanted	—
[3] 15.02.1965 (1)	Protest against U.S.A. bombing of villages in Uganda by planes from Zaïre	—	—	—
[4] 06.12.1965 (3)	—	—	Against sharing of rooms in dormitories	—
[5] 12.03.1968 (1)	Protest against British indifference to hanging of Africans in Rhodesia	—	—	—
[6] 24.01.1969 (21)	Protest against government ban on opposition leader (Oginga) to address students	—	—	—
[7] 11.11.1970 (3)	Violence erupts after student elections and police intervene	—	—	—
[8] 10.05.1971 (2)	—	—	—	Protest against the punishing of female students who beat their warden
[9] 21.11.1971 (1)	—	—	Underground tunnel beneath a highway wanted	—
[10] 17.07.1972 (2)	—	—	Went the tunnel in [9]	—
[11] 30.06.1972 (1)	Protest against expulsion of two students and one lecturer alleged to have published seditious materials in a student publication (this was banned)	—	—	—

*Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.
Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry other sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crisis**	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocative
I. Nairobi				
[12] 26.02.1974 (35)	—	Architecture students protest against mass failures in examinations and get supported by other students	—	—
[13] 14.08.1974 (5 months)	—	Classes boycotted, students claiming shortage of teaching staff	• Protest against congestion in dormitories • Protest against delays in getting allowances	—
[14] 15.03.1975 (30)	Protest mysterious death of a populist politician, J.M. Kariuki	—	—	—
[15] 02.03.1976 (1)	Violent anniversary demonstration for the death of J.M. Kariuki in [14] and anniversaries continued each year until terms were deliberately changed	—	—	—
[16] 23.03.1977 (2)	—	Violent demonstration against favouritism in examinations in the Faculty of Commerce	—	—
[17] 19.12.1978 (1)	Demonstrations in support of release of political prisoners	—	—	—
[18] 07.10.1979 (1 month)	Violent demonstrations against government move to ban some candidates from contesting national elections	—	—	—
[19] 27.02.1980 (1 term)	—	—	Protest against poor food and catering services	Protest against corruption in food purchase, dirty kitchen and dining rooms

**Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.
Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crisis ^{***}	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/ Allocative
I. Nairobi				
[20] 11.1982/83 (1 year +)	Expulsion of students alleged to have participated in an attempted coup	—	—	—
[21] 10.1984 (2)	—	—	• Women students protest against restricted visiting hours • Students want meal allowances increased	—
[22] 02.1985 (4 weeks)	• New election procedures opposed • Release of students jailed in 1982 coup attempt demanded • Protest expulsion of students suspected of anti-government activities • Closed after 5 days of class boycotts	• More academic freedom wanted • Change of admission criteria to depend on merit demanded • Protest against a new education system	An increase in allowances wanted	—
[23] 11.1986	Protest against military conscription of university students	—	—	—
[24] 02.1990 (3)	Protest the mysterious death of foreign minister (Ouko)		—	—
II Dar-es-Salaam				
[1] 02.1965 (1)	Protest against unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe)	—	—	—
[2] 22.10.1966 (1 year)	Violent protest against military conscription for all university students, salary slashes, privileges for bureaucrats	—	—	—

^{***}Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.

Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crises ^{xxxx}	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocativ e
II. Dar-es-Salaam				
[3] 13.07.1971 (1 week)	Protest against: • Banning students' publications and independent associations • Introduction of military training at university • Introduction of Party Youth Wingers as official student union • Bureaucracy and corruption	Protest against lengthening of academic year from 31 to 40 weeks	• Use of and bylaws passed by Parents' Association for halls of residence opposed • Consultations on university governance wanted	Students disagree with Vice-Chancellor's graduation speech
[4] 03.1971 (1)	Protest against the visit of a French Foreign Minister	—	—	—
[5] 11.1977 (1 week)	—	—	Protest punishments of students not observing residence regulations and administration attempts to influence elections	—
[6] 03.1978 (1-term closure)	Protest against: • Hefty fringe benefits and salary increases for members of Parliament and Party officials paid from government budget • Exploitation of peasants and workers • Allocation of regions to capitalist countries for development • Increase of minimum wages for workers and a price rise for peasants crops wanted	—	—	—
[7] 12.1982	—	Intermittent protests against lengthening of academic programme for education students	—	—

^{xxxx}Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.

Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crises ^{*****}	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocative
II. Dar-es-Salaam				
[8] 10.1986 (3)	—	Demand increase in books and stationery allowances, improved teaching, better environmental facilities (dormitories and theatres) wanted	Protest against a new spartan menu	—
[9] 10.1988	—	—	Protests against commercialization of cafeteria and introduction of meal cards	—
[10] 12.05.1990	Protest against: • Low government priority given to education • Corruption, inefficiency, and lack of accountability • Low wages, low crop prices • Poor environmental sanitation • Lack of democracy	• Academic freedom, and freedom of dissent wanted • A formal report on detained dissenting students urged	Increased personal allowances wanted	Protest against a lack of basic facilities such as chalk, paper, pens and course outlines.
III Zambia				
[1] 03.1971 (1 term)	Violent protest against government silence on French sale of mirage jets to South Africa	—	—	—
[2] 05.1976 (1 term)	Violent protest against government attempt to promote one political movement (UNITA) in Angola at the expense of another (MPLA)	—	—	—
[3] 11.1982 (1 term)	Protest against perceived pressure from President Kaunda to introduce humanism in the university	Students prefer scientific Marxist-Leninism to humanism so oppose change of programme	—	Students exploit perceived cleavage between top management (Principal vs. Vice-Chancellor)

^{*****}Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.

Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crisis	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocative
III Zambia				
[4] 01.1984 (1 month)	Protest the presence of paramilitary police and security officers on campus	—	Protest against delay in getting of allowances, use of meal cards, and restricted visiting hours	• Students find Principal punitive, vindictive, rigid and uncompromising • See divided management
[5] 05.1986 (3 months)	Protest against: • Catholic Church to form a Conscience Commission suspected of CIA infiltration • Party Youth Leaguers' interference with student union	—	Purchase of ambulance and transport for Deans office wanted	Exploit intra-managerial conflicts (Principal vs. Vice-Chancellor)
[6] 1989 (1 month)	Protest against cost-sharing introduced by the government, suspension of student union	—	Intermittent clashes on use of meal cards, poor catering services, and expensive meals	—
[7] 29.06.1990 (1 month)	• Protest against government raising of mealie meal and against corruption and smuggling by government officials • Introduction of multi-party system urged	—	Suspect prices of their meals will increase while allowances not increased in a cost-sharing situation	—
IV Zimbabwe				
[1] 13.4.1981 (1)			Against lack of mattresses, dirty halls of residence, insufficient food, expensive beer	Allegation of swindling by head of catering
[2] 19.10.1986 (1)	Demonstration against mysterious crash and death of Mozambican President Samora Machel	—	—	—

Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.

Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

Table 2: Causes of Student Unrest

University and Dates of Crisis*****	Type of Causes of Student Unrest			
	Political	Academic	Welfare	Managerial/Allocative
IV Zimbabwe [3] 18.04.1987 (1)	—	—	—	Students display violent and anti-social behaviour during independence celebrations
[4] 29.03.1988	Students want government to increase their loans, participation in university governance, and stop censorship of student publications	End to book shortages and late charges for library books urged	•Redress to transport and accommodation problems wanted •Control of their own student affairs and to have influence in the appointment of the Dean wanted	—
[5] 28.19.1988 (4 days)	Anti-corruption demonstration against corruption, scandals, and crimes committed by Party and Government official •Laxity in punishing culprits •Poor mass media •Muzzled criticism •Poor priorities in favour of ruling class •Land and squatter issues •One-party state moves •Multinationals •Want more democratic rights and accountability	—	—	—
[6] 10.1990-11.1990	Demonstrate against government attempts to get more control of universities through appointment powers and giving the Vice-Chancellor more authority for admissions, expulsions, and discipline of university staff	Academic freedom and university autonomy wanted	—	—
	45	11	21	9

***** Estimates of the number of days of disrupted classes in parentheses, unless stated in months, terms, or years.

Sources: Newspapers, Reports of Commissions of Inquiry, and sundry sources.

definition of legitimate knowledge, and expansion of thought process on university campuses. This is neither new nor unique to Africa. It is natural that governments which fund university education should have a say in planning for the capacities of these institutions, staffing policies, and the broad categories of offerings. However, in playing their legitimate role, governments have been seen to evoke actions which border on interference with academic freedoms on what should be taught, how, and to whom, and on the autonomy of the universities in operational matters. This has been one broad area of contention which fuels campus unrest and revolts against the state, especially when the legitimacy of many regimes is itself questionable.

On the other hand are the attempts by students and faculty members to make an impact on national political, social and economic processes and developmental choices, even when these do not have direct bearing on university affairs. In monolithic one party states and military dictatorships, the debate has been whether freedoms of speech, association, and conscience normally expected to exist in universities should be extended to the public articulation of dissenting views on the health of the state. Given the critical roles the intellectuals played in the liberation and independence movements [Kenyatta (Kenya); Banda (Malawi); Nkrumah (Ghana); Nyerere (Tanzania); Senghor (Senegal); Mugabe (Zimbabwe); Azikiwe (Nigeria)], the first generation of African leaders, many having been to universities themselves, must have expected that universities would play a collaborative role in the search for and articulation of the truth in the context of nationalism, Africanism, negritude, and national development. Indeed, early student movements (up to 1967) played a cooperative supportive role in all these countries. Students staged demonstrations against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism, as well as western political, cultural and economic hegemonic interests.

The climate was quite cordial in Kenya, where the charismatic and affable minister, Tom Mboya (1967), was emphasizing common goals of commitment to the

masses, responsibility, sacrifice, fight against tribalism, corruption, and the spirit of nation building. In Tanzania, Peter and Mvungi (1986) report of very passionate discussions between student leaders of the University of Dar-es-Salaam and government ministers. In 1965, one of the student leaders, J. Warioba, then ended up being the Prime Minister of Tanzania. It was thus quite natural that the President of Tanzania, Mr. J.K. Nyerere, in 1966, addressing the university community encouraged them to be extremely free and vocal in their search, for the truth:

I fully accept that the task of a university is to seek for the truth, and that its members should speak the truth as they see it regardless of the consequences to themselves. A university which tries to put its professors and its students into blinkers, will neither serve the cause of knowledge, nor the interest of society in which it exists ... What we expect from our university is both a complete objectivity in search for truth and also a commitment to society - a desire to serve it.

(Omari, 1980, pp. 45-46)

However, it seems that it is better said than done! The first advocates of free debate were also the first to act in a manner quite antithetical to that spirit as universities became the only place where a dissenting voice could be heard in all these countries. No wonder many leaders showed such rage when they discovered that the relations would be conflictual and the university could be a formidable adversary. The point was proved that education makes people easy to guide but difficult to lead: easy to govern but impossible to enslave.

The early protests in all the four countries were indeed directed against external forces. Thus, in Tanzania, the first student protest in 1965 was against the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). While the demonstration had popular appeal as the government was also opposed to the action and to British complacency, apparently the students were refused permission to vent popular anger. They defied the police order, demonstrated, damaging British and American properties and the

state had to use riot police to disperse them. The act of refusing to grant students permission to demonstrate may reflect the nature of the state which was still weak after the 1964 military attempts to take over power, protesting the slow process of Africanization and foreign dominance. The state became heavily dependent on American and British military and intelligence support for its survival until the arrival of Chinese and Russian support (Wilson, 1989). However, the fact that students could defy police instructions and engage in acts of violence must have sent a message to the state that students can be dangerously independent. Nyerere was even more outraged by the students' attempt to argue with him when they had been rounded up by the military forces, as this was counter to authoritarian African traditions emphasizing respect for elders and those in power (Peter and Mvungi, 1986).

Likewise, in Kenya, the first three student protests were against neocolonial complicity and a hankering for it. In both Zambia and Zimbabwe, early protests were against the racist minority rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Thus the first protest in Zambia was against the French government's sale of military aircraft to South Africa (1971) and the 1986 Zimbabwe protest was against South Africa's complicity in the death of the President of Mozambique in a mysterious air crash. Indeed, Cefkin (1975) reports of a long tradition of Zimbabwe university student protests against racism and minority rule during the pre-independence period before 1981, resulting in frequent closures and the stoppage of classroom instruction.

This honeymoon did not last long. As the states moved to introduce one party systems, arguing that the western model of democracy was not suited to the multi-ethnicity prevalent in Africa, and that it would militate against rapid economic development, both students and academics started to realize that dissent, characteristic of liberal universities, could not be accommodated within the proposed political structures of one party states. In fact, it was clear that justice and fair play could not prevail under such political

arrangements. Therefore, as argued by Peter and Mvungi (1986), student struggles and unrest need to be cast in a wider context in which authoritarian states in Africa have clamped down on all forms of civil and political organizations capable of articulating a dissenting political perspective. The manifestations of this move in universities was in the form of government attempts to influence and control student unions by either manipulating their leadership, banning them outright, infiltrating them, or replacing them with party youth wingers. This, in part, explains protest in Kenya in 1970, in Tanzania in 1971, in Zambia in 1986, and account for protracted tensions in all of them between independent student unions and the party activists, even today. Apart from Zimbabwe, student unions have in fact been banned in all the other countries at one point or another. This has been clearly seen as an attempt to interfere with students' freedom of association within the university regulations and laws governing student life.

In attempts to instil discipline, some regimes moved more forcefully to introduce compulsory military conscription for all university aspirants and graduands. This led to protests in Tanzania in 1966 where more than two thirds of the students were rusticated for a year after a bitter confrontation against military conscription, repression against the educated elite and the slashing of their salaries and employment benefits while the government and party officials retained hefty salaries and fringe benefits. It is here where Nesbit's (1971) concept of a 'reservoir of guilt' seems to apply. Indeed, President, J.K. Nyerere, slashed his own salary and those of other senior officials and ministers. In Kenya, the same phenomenon of conscription triggered violent student protests in 1986, leading to serious injuries among both the students and the police, as the students used their newly acquired military skills and courage to fight back. It is quite obvious that apart from a few officers, university graduates do not fight in armies so conscription must be propelled by control and influence motives rather than military capability and service after graduation.

While governments appreciate the universities as political and economic factors in the development equation, they also know universities are centres of dissent which could become quite formidable, and in countries as far apart as France, South Korea, Nigeria, and Zambia, student protests have had tremendous political consequences. In Tanzania, as early as 1966, the then Vice-President, R.M. Kawawa had to warn the university against fermenting disunity and 'constituting itself into unofficial opposition to the government' (Peter and Mvungi, 1986, p. 174). In Kenya, in 1969, students violently protested against government refusal to allow an opposition figure to speak to them as this was an infringement on their freedom. This type of protest has been quite recurrent in all the four universities as students and staff have to get government approval to invite opposition groups to speak to university audiences. In fact, governments are almost paranoid about opposition figures who seem to be popular in the universities, especially if the personalities have leftist leaning. Even in progressive countries like Tanzania, the regime was more worried about Marxists such as Dr. Walter Rodney and former minister Abrahman Babu than conservative intellectuals such as Professor Ali A. Mazrui and T.O. Ranger who had free access to students. Professor Ali Mazrui (1978) laments the impact of these restrictions on intellectual expansion through open diverse debates among students and staff which he himself enjoys immensely. In all these countries, professors lament the death of social thought, fearing that both the university administration and the classrooms are heavily infiltrated by informers and security agents whose presence curtails freedom of expression right there in the classroom, thus limiting intellectual expansion.

In all the four universities, the issues of academic freedom and university autonomy, the freedom of expression and that of the press have been raised in student protests. Student papers are good avenues for venting mental frustrations and tensions but above all they facilitate training for editorial work, responsible journalism, writing skills, and communication through the mass media. Because the national mass media is not free in most of these one party states, student papers tend to remain the only diverse, critical

and liberal publications. However, in all the four universities, the students' publications were either banned, severely censored, or have died a natural death after continued suffocation from lack of funds and disinterest on the part of the university administration.

In Tanzania, the 1971 revolt was in part a protest against the university and the government move to ban independent student associations and publications such as *Cheche*=(*Spark*). Likewise, in Nairobi, the 1972 crisis was sparked off by the expulsion of two students and the dismissal of one academic staff member for publishing what was called seditious materials in a student paper, *Platform*, which was soon banned. In Zambia, the Nyirenda (1983) commission of inquiry into student unrest highlighted the issue of student publications which were reported to be numerous, weak and suspiciously funded. The claims that they are used to abuse the Party, the Government, the President, and the University provided a good excuse for either banning or discouraging them. Instead of training and strengthening the editorial personnel for responsible journalism and accountability, different value systems are normally evoked, resulting in the banning of such publications. Likewise, during the 1989 crisis in the University of Zimbabwe, the seventh demand was to seek 'an end to the interference and censorship of the students' magazine,' *Focus* (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). Yet, even in universities in developed countries today, training for responsible journalism is a continuous process that a university has to manage while guarding against state interference. Indeed, all countries at different historical epochs tend to have what has been called 'moral constipation' when it comes to the free movement of ideas, but it is a freedom that has to be won and preserved. Obviously the route is not to ban ideas outright. States are slowly discovering that recovery from a greatly disabled mass media, resulting from censorship, can be extremely painful.

The pattern of student unrest related to the political set up in the four countries makes for interesting contrasts, especially in the more recent past. While in Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe the students seem to use the governments' own stated or implicit

ideology to challenge it, Kenya students have been more reactive to concrete events in the country. Thus one of the perennial source of unrest has been the mysterious deaths of important political personalities such as the former charismatic Minister of Economic Affairs, Tom Mboya, in 1968; a popular member of parliament, J.M. Kariuki, in 1975, and more recently in February 1990, the articulate Foreign Minister, Dr. R. Ouko. Students often demonstrate to express their anger and anguish at the government's inability to account for the mysterious death of such personalities. The second strand has been either the students or faculty being caught allegedly plotting, or conspiring with plotters, or providing sanctuary to dissidents, or protesting against how opposition groups and individuals are being treated, or demonstrating for the release of political prisoners. Indeed students and some staff have been in the centre of political struggles for democracy and academic freedom (Savage, 1990). Yet Kenyan students have not protested on equity issues, which could signify the success of the state in stamping out the more leftist agitation based on a socialistic ideology.

The other three countries, on the other hand, seem to have initially allowed the teaching of, and free access to Marxist-Leninist ideology and then discovered that the students and faculty were going too far in their interpretation of the practical meaning of the ideology. Thus, in 1978, the University of Dar-es-Salaam students staged a demonstration against the decision of the government and parliament to increase the salaries, pensions, and fringe benefits of members of parliament, regional administrators and ministers. The situation was aggravated by the seemingly uncaring attitude of the parliamentarians who, after making this decision, were depicted in newspapers on a merry-go-round in a children's recreation park. The students saw this as an extreme case of pathologies of vested interest within the national bourgeoisie, deciding on rewards to itself while the economy was stagnating and poverty among the workers and peasants was increasing. The cabinet met secretly to decide the fate of the demonstrating students, who were suddenly and summarily expelled and the university closed for a term. Likewise, the

seven months rustication and closure of the University of Dar-es-Salaam in May 1990 had its genesis in accusations relating to antisocialist practices such as corruption; inefficiency; wastage; lack of accountability among government and parastatal senior officials; low priority given to key sectors of the economy such as agriculture, health and education by the state; low producer prices and minimum wages. Indeed, after the closure of the university the state moved more forcefully on accountability, corruption, and rehabilitation of the university which the President personally supervised. Several heads also rolled in the university administration, thus affirming student claims that there was gross inefficiency in management and a lack of accountability, for otherwise the ministry and the university should have done the job of supervising the rehabilitation.

In Zambia, on the other hand, students protested over the lack of government support for a more progressive regime in Angola, and against perceived pressure from President K. Kaunda to introduce his pet ideology called 'humanism' instead of scientific socialism. Likewise, students opposed the formation of a Christian (Catholic) based conscientization committee on the campus, fearing that it would confuse scientific socialism with some Judaic quasi-religious ideologies. Obviously these are incidents of being on the left of the main stream which threaten many political leaders.

In Zimbabwe, where President R. Mugabe is a self proclaimed socialist of high intellectual stature, the first political protests against the regime were centred on issues of corruption, democracy, freedom of the press, and trade unions. In the 1988 student protest, the rallying theme was, 'The Petty Bourgeois must go and be replaced by a vanguard progressive leadership' (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990). With persistence and support from the press, legal commissions were formed to investigate corruption. They produced two reports called *Sandura 1 and 2*. Both reports indicted top government and party officials, leading to five ministers losing their jobs and one committing suicide, again confirming the existence of a 'reservoir of guilt' among the polity.

Another issue which conflates welfare and political protests relate to the loans, grants, and allowances that students get. They are said to be either too little, delayed, or not covering all the diverse needs of students. It touches the political process when the government is attacked for not being 'fair or considerate' to students' needs while politicians and senior officials receive hefty salaries and fringe benefits. This was an issue in Zambia in 1984 and 1989 when students objected to the cost-sharing scheme, was an issue in Zimbabwe in 1988, and was quite implicit in the 1978 and 1990 crises in Dar-es-Salaam. At the University of Nairobi, allowances were one of the demands precipitating the 1985 crisis, and cost sharing measures resulted in protests and closure of the four public universities for more than six months in late 1991.

Another area of conflict is the students struggle for more and effective participation in the decision making process relating to university governance, programming of academic affairs, and social welfare. The demands range from the wish for equitable representation in university governance organs (Council, Senate, Faculty Boards, Departmental Meetings, and Student Welfare Committees). It was a fact that some University Acts excluded students from these organs and some university bureaucrats had no experience in participative democracy. They were more comfortable with the more secretive consultative decision making processes. The 1971 crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam had an anti-bureaucracy slant. This was overwhelmingly supported by academic and non academic staff. As a result, the whole university changed, for better or for worse, from individualized to committee based administration. Likewise, the 1990 crisis had a plea for more democracy in the university. In Zimbabwe, the 1988 crisis had a demand that the University Act be reviewed to include more student participation in its governance. Since October 1990, the students in Zimbabwe have, with the support of staff, waged a struggle against new revisions of the University Act and a new Bill on higher education which gives more disciplinary powers to the vice-chancellor, and assigns the government as the appointing authority for the top management of the university rather than search committees

or elective processes. In both Zambia and Kenya, the students have persistently argued for more participation in university decision making machinery (Lugonzo, 1976; Nyirenda, 1986).

An assessment of the impact of student participation in university governance in most developed countries tends to conclude that it had 'not met the high-flown expectations of its radical advocates, but where it has not faded for lack of interest, it has become routine, contributing unspectacularly yet constructively to decision making' (Goldschmidt, 1978, pp. 164-165). However, in these countries, there are countervailing structures that tend to moderate many university decisions, such as employers, parents, alumni, boards of governors, strong diversified management, and trustees. In developing countries, there is no doubt that student participation has played a great mediational and moderating role, given the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of the state and the university administration.

Contrary to a popular feeling that student crises are often near examination time, since students do not want to finish their university education because to 'finish is to get finished,' any coincidence between protests and the last academic term may only reflect accumulated tensions and negotiating strategies. Even when there is no guarantee for employment after graduation, that does not seem to be a sufficient nor a necessary cause of student unrest. There has been student unrest even when good jobs were waiting for them such as in Zimbabwe today and in the 1970s in the other countries. There are, likewise, no student revolts in Europe now while no one is promised a job on graduation but rather may end up on the dole (social welfare). What seem to have happened occasionally is that graduating students want to negotiate better terms of employment as they join the job market, given the docility of trade unions, and want to have plans in place, before they graduate. These two issues have tended to precipitate crises, accumulated tensions during examination period notwithstanding. Also, near graduation period, one should expect fluidity in student leadership, with the outgoing group wanting

to make a lasting impact and the new leadership finding its own ideological path for negotiations with the university as well as looking for a place in national politics. Therefore, the period may be expected to be full of tension, conflictual, and fluid, needing close monitoring by the university administration.

More recently, the issue of political and economic pluralism and multiparty systems has featured in all the four universities. Figure 1 crisply captures the essence of that struggle. Encouraged by events in Eastern Europe, students and staff have been in the forefront of prodemocracy debates (Makamure, 1991; Shivji, 1991).

Academic Issues as Causes of Student Unrest

The naive expectation must have been that most university revolts and problems would concern academic matters since universities are academic institutions. On the contrary, academic issues were very infrequent (Table 2). It is quite conceivable, however, that many academic issues that could have spilled over into a university-wide crisis were handled and either solved or censored at the faculty level. Indeed many incidents are not reported. For instance, in the University of Dar-es-Salaam, students have vigorously participated in the definition of what is legitimate knowledge and how it is communicated since the late 1960s because of ideological clashes between conservative and progressive (socialist) elements. When an American inspired syllabus for legal studies, with a variety of new topics including military law, was to be introduced in 1969, it was the students in that faculty who protested and finally had the syllabus abandoned in favour of a more traditional British inspired one (Mazrui, 1978; Peter and Mvungi, 1986). When one American Professor, Dr. Singelton, in a political science class, made derogative comments on the works of the revolutionary Afro-Arab writer, Frans Fanon in 1970, it was the students who picketed his office and his contract got terminated. When a British Professor, P. Miall, in a physics class, in 1973, accused the country of hypocrisy by being against



Defiant youngsters flashing the two-finger multi party salute in Nairobi

Multi-Parties

Figure 1: Students and youths in pro-democracy protests

the west but yet depended on the west for importation of technology, it was the students who protested against the way the Professor handled knowledge, and his contract was terminated. Like in other countries, students have greatly influenced the nature and conduct of examinations, tilting them from rigid, terminal, and 'ambush' type ones to less threatening variations such as take home or open book examinations and untimed essays, or even self-made questions.

Likewise, minor incidents such as boycotting classes in departments and faculties due to shortages of teachers and books did not involve whole student bodies. It is also conceivable that the lack of serious protests about academic issues may reflect a value system regarding the quality of education and a candid evaluation of strategies, impacts and consequences of protracted battles with professors and deans of faculties who hold the key to the glory of intellectual heights but not the key to university resources and economic power. Yet the fact is, students in some of these countries have tolerated an awfully low quality university education, doing without textbooks, laboratory work, a full compliment of staff, and studying in collapsing lecture rooms (Mwiria, 1990; Nkinyangi, 1991).

The academic issues which are normally raised by students at the level of generality tend to include the irrelevancy of university education to day-to-day life. For instance, during the 1960s, students in North America complained about being told that courses such as those in psychology were relevant to laboratory rats and not to human life, and that political science had nothing to do with day to day politics (Lichtman, 1971). Indeed this happens all the time in developing countries where students learn about urban and rural planning, but no plans seem to work; they learn about medical ethics but only a few respect them; and they learn about democracy and accountability, but these hardly exist. It seems that university education gives people skills in the manipulation of facts and the suppression of their meanings. It is a trend which can lead to feelings of irrelevancy, meaninglessness, boredom, and hopelessness, all of which can be contributory to tensions

which just need a slight trigger to spark off a student revolt. Much of the tensions in African universities could be fuelled by some of these subtle processes which alienate university education from the realities of life.

The academic issues that sparked off student crises in the University of Nairobi, however, had to do with examinations (Table 2), such as mass failure in the Faculty of Architecture leading to a protest for the removal of the head of department (1974) and favouritism in examinations in the Faculty of Commerce where a failing student was allowed to proceed against university regulations (1977). The students also protested against shortages of teachers in 1974, resulting in university closure for five months. In the University of Dar-es-Salaam, the students twice protested against the lengthening of academic programmes but in both cases the university was not closed. One was against a change from a 31 to 40 week academic year which the students felt was not feasible and would cut into their vacation time (1971), and in the second, there was pressure from the Ministry of Education, conniving with the university administration, to lengthen the programme for education students from three to four academic years which the students felt was unnecessary and inefficient, given scarce government resources.

The 1982 Zambian crisis was a more classical case of an attempt by the political elite at the legitimization of a confusing national ideology called *Humanism*, vigorously articulated by President K. Kaunda. The academic elites and students used to studying scientific socialism in a Marxist-Leninist tradition felt that *Humanism* as an ideology was untested, unscientific, disabled, and only elevated to boost the ego of a few politicians hiding behind a facade of capitalistic motives and activities. The university was closed in anger for a term, and on returning, the students found the university militarized with security agents, guards and police patrolling and enforcing discipline, which increased tensions until the university was closed again two years later in 1984. In Zimbabwe, the only academic issue that has come to the surface so far is the shortage of books and the

surcharge for late return of library books. This was one of the 1989 nine demands but quite significant, given that the University of Zimbabwe is still one of the most well provided among the four universities. Shortage of books has been a cause of class boycotts in the Faculty of Medicine, University of Zambia in 1985 (Musonda, 1985). Yet, at the University of Dar-es-Salaam where there were no new books at all for several years, the library greatly outdated, and bookshop grossly mismanaged, no crisis was reported. The well respected professor of biostatistics, Hirji (1990) laments: 'Years of mismanagement, among other things, have reduced the university bookshop into a position where it cannot compete even with some street hawkers' (p. 11).

While there have not been protracted and overt negotiations between the staff and students on the definition and distribution of academic freedom between the two groups, it seems that academic freedom to decide on what is to be taught, how and to whom, has been eroded over the years in some universities. In the Nairobi University, for instance, professors cannot overtly profess a socialistic ideology and expose students to competing developmental discourse and paradigms; while in Dar-es-Salaam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to a lesser extent, there have been intrafaculty group pressures and censorship in favour of what has been called progressive discourse. Ultra conservative professors lost credibility and the confidence of students. In some places contracts of both leftist and ultra conservative expatriates were not renewed. The two extremes of leftists and rightists when they become exclusionary threaten intellectual diversity; yet it is widely acknowledged that without cross paradigmatic conversations intellectual discourse is never complete. Likewise, at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, during the proletarianization of university education, since the 1974 Musoma Resolution, there was a lot of pressure to relax the examination system and change teaching styles to suit adult students (Omari, 1991). This in many ways compromised intellectual rigour, admission policies, and examination standards.

The issue of academic freedom and university autonomy, from which many academic staff had shied away as they got entangled with the political elite and sympathized with national developmental ideologies seems to have been quite peripheral to student crises until lately when students in Zimbabwe brought it out as the central issue of their protests against the state. At institutional level, academic freedom should be synonymous with university autonomy, referring to independence from interferences in the allocation of internal resources, appointment of all staff, management, and in deciding on who should teach, what should be taught, who should be taught, and who should graduate, within the context of broad and long-term policies mutually agreed upon between the university and the government. At individual level (both students and staff), academic freedom would refer to the right to pursue academic work which includes teaching, learning, and publishing in accordance with intellectual convictions, ethos, and standards, without fear of persecution, on the grounds of both private life and public views within the law. This interpretation of academic freedom, partly articulated by Professors Benatar and Kewit in Benatar (1990), incorporating students who had hitherto been neglected, individual faculty, and the university as an institution is most comprehensive and widely accepted. It emphasizes an environment in which the emancipating and liberating powers of knowledge are not arbitrarily constrained by political regimes, and extends it to the possibility of scholarship playing a role in liberating mankind from inequality, iniquities, deprivation, fear, ignorance, and bigotry. Yet this freedom has been enjoyed in varying degrees by the four universities as in some, like those in Kenya, progressive literature such as works on Marxism and Leninism have not been allowed to circulate freely, while in others like Tanzania, the more classical and conservative literature has been shunned through self-censorship. Thus students in both instances have not been exposed to competing developmental paradigms. It is becoming increasingly clear that without discussions on divergent views, cross paradigmic references, university education remains incomplete and disabled, both in substantive knowledge and in methodologies of inquiry. As the well respected Nairobi Lawyer, Ooko Ombaka (1986) put it:

Students have to be exposed to the whole spectrum of human knowledge. They should be exposed to Marxism because it is the mainstream of international reality. Marxism is one of the greatest intellectual movements of our time. (p. 3)

Like religions, teach your children all religions but don't convert them. The silence of both students and staff on these matters may suggest how pervasive the restrictions have been.

Welfare Matters and Student Unrest

The four universities, with a British heritage, were set up like traditional elite universities, basically residential, co-educational, undergraduate institutions. They were heavily influenced by the *in loco parentis* ideology which stemmed from a court ruling, long ago, to the effect that a university cannot impose sanctions upon students which a parent would not have otherwise. While this ruling was meant to be a restriction on the university with respect to enforcement of discipline, it inadvertently provided an opening for the university to assume the role of paternal guardian over the moral, intellectual, and social activities of students. This has resulted in students being treated as academic novices with the teachers and university administrators substituting for parental authority, imposing restrictions on the total student life, sometimes both in and outside the university.

The pressure to enforce this *in loco parentis* ideology is even greater in public universities where students do not have to pay tuition fees, and are given grants, allowances for meals, out-of-pocket money, lodging and travel expenses. The university administration and teachers become quite compulsive as they assume also the role of custodians of public funds which should be spent properly, and which should only be provided if students behave well. Figure 2 vividly typifies that attitude and orientation of the conservative bureaucrats and scholars alike, to which students retort, "my freedom of expression and conscience cannot be bought".

This pursuit for dominance over student life becomes augmented by traditional assumptions and images of educated persons who are supposed to have a certain polish and sophistication - and thus a class status of their own - which many youth today find aversive. Very often the enforcement of this ideology is pursued outside the context of the fundamental purpose and mission of universities, which is, to focus on the articulation and transmission of knowledge, pursuit of truth through free inquiry, the development of students and the well being of the society in general, all of which have nothing to do with private lives of students. Students argue that this mission can only be realized in the context of academic freedom and responsibilities applying equally to students and staff, but this is not the case. The ideology has tended to be against basic student freedoms and exacerbates the dependency of students on the university for their welfare, thus sometimes forcing them to make undue demands on the university and the state as if they are saying: 'someone has to pay for the curtailed freedom, otherwise let me free!'

Even when student characteristics changed such that many students were really adults, over 21 years, and others married and working in some positions of responsibility, the *in loco parentis* ideology did not change much. In developed countries, things did not change until the late 1960s when students violently rejected the ideology, claiming that it allowed arbitrary and excessive repressions, distorting the essence of a university as a centre of conflict of ideas, and reinforced immaturity, disinterest, and virtues of conformity rather than creativity. In the extreme form, students collectively stated their position as follows:

The unexamined acceptance of authority which is often appropriate to the child-parent relationship must be replaced in the universities by the encouragement of a critical and dialectical relationship between the student and his community.

(Wallerstein and Starr, 1971, p.416)

Zimbabwe's *Sunday Mail* cartoonist Jay Gee, sums up the government attitude.




Figure 2: The carrot and stick Diplomacy and Culture

At one end of the pendulum of campus freedoms, some students argue that the basis of discipline in a university should be strictly academic performance and that any violation of the law is the business of the state which should be free to apply the laws of the land. Students, as adults, should enjoy all the privileges, protection, and rights, and endure the obligations, responsibilities and life risks as any other citizen. At the other end, universities would like to promulgate rules consistent with their assumed responsibility for the life of any *bonafide* student, both inside and outside the university. Indeed, many parents would like to feel that their parental authority, values and views are continued in universities, albeit by proxies. Some universities have enshrined regulations in University Acts which extend their jurisdiction beyond their geographical confines. Thus the University of Zimbabwe (1991 Calender) gives itself such a mandate when it says, 'The Proctors shall be charged with ensuring the proper observance of these rules by students *on and off* the university site' (p. 106, emphasis ours). Obviously there is room for confusion as universities tend to mix state laws and the university Codes of Conduct in punishing students. While some universities have managed to sort out what belongs to Caesar from what belongs to Jesus/Muhammad, others are placing students in 'double jeopardy' by allowing them to be prosecuted for the same social misconduct by both the university and the state. The University of Nairobi is quite categorical on this when it says:

The provisions of these regulations and any decisions made by the Disciplinary Committee (of the University) hereunder, shall not derogate from the right of the police or any member of the public so entitled, to bring any action or to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the same state of facts against any student in a court of law, nor shall anything herein preclude the State from taking any action which it may deem necessary against any student in the interest of security and public order.

(University of Nairobi Calender, 1989-90 p. 676)

Indeed, the issue of double jurisdiction (being governed by both university and state laws) has not been handled well due to the *in loco parentis* ideology as one does not have to face double jeopardy if one system of sanctions is used. Many students have been punished by both the state (detention, imprisonment, loss of scholarship) and the university through

expulsion, rustication, and the withholding of examination results. This double jeopardy problem is compounded by a lack of basic academic freedoms and slackness in the enforcement of the due process of law which would have guaranteed natural justice, including the right of appeal and legal representation. Besides, university regulations are part of national legal systems and derive their authority from national statutes. They do not and should not be seen to constitute an autonomous set of rules. Natural justice demands that no person shall suffer twice for the same offence. University disciplinary committees like all quasi-judicial bodies are bound by rules of natural justice.

Most universities in the region, while they have Rules of Student Conduct and Discipline, 'have no statements relating to students' fundamental rights such as freedom of expression in the classroom, freedom of association on the campus, citizenship rights, disclosure of personal information, autonomy of students' publications. The standards of discipline are similarly flawed by bureaucratic circumversion and intolerance. It is not rare to hear of university administrators accused of being members of the state security and often suspected of colluding with the state law apparatus to suppress students' rights. They don't seem to mind the loss of confidence in the university among the students. This loss of confidence in the integrity of the top administrators and the institution in general has led to violent attacks on university administrators and the institution, often resulting in closures. Closures of the University of Dar-es-Salaam in 1971, Nairobi in 1985, Zimbabwe in 1989, and Zambia in 1984 are cases in point. Of course one could ask 'Why should students enjoy all these privileges and rights while the adult community does not have them?' Yet universities, by their very nature, are expected to be futuristic, imaginative models for the society and a training ground for a responsible citizenship. Thus, although the university is a part of the nation, it does not have to be a mirror image of the country. It has a future to take care of. The dictum that universities look deep into the past and deep into the future, and that these are often in conflict with the present is paramount.

One final point of a general nature relating to the *in loco parentis* ideology is that, besides the image that university students are children, there is an assumption that they are a privileged group to have free university education, giving them easy access to personal glory, material well being, power, and membership to the elite. They should therefore

behave and be grateful, otherwise they will be expelled from the university. Figure 3 captures the intensity of this struggle and raises a number of questions. Who is not privileged in all these developing countries? The students could contend that at university they are the underprivileged, for politicians and senior administrators are getting richer and richer while students are toiling. The students also say they cannot trade in their freedoms and rights as citizens for the education being given. They emphasize that it is their right to be treated well, especially when the society wants them to come out as highly educated and enlightened persons who will become the responsible leaders of tomorrow. The students argue further that they are, in fact, carrying a burden on behalf of the society which wants to reproduce itself in an increasingly competitive world. It is the society which imposes certain standards and requirements in the labour market and not the students. Some of the students also contend that they would have made more money without university education, which is true in countries such as Kenya where many good office secretaries earn more money than university graduates.

Thus, besides the prestige and higher private returns associated with education, they argue that going to school for that long was for the common good and there can be no justification for treating students poorly, without due regard to the opportunity costs involved.

Coombe (1991), in a survey commissioned by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations revealed some of the most demeaning conditions in student life, with rooms meant to accommodate two students now being occupied by twelve students sleeping on mats.

In this tug of war for this knife, who will get hurt?

University Students and Doctors



The Party and Government

Figure 3: The Tug-of-war Between Students and Political Establishment.

In fact, many leaders in Africa have been surprised by the defiance of university students who even after being given higher allowances by the state, would turn around and say: 'This is my right, my parents' sweat and toil. It is less than what the politicians are accumulating every day. I will keep it but my freedom to criticise cannot be bought.' This was the theme of Kenyan students in 1985/86, and in Tanzania in 1966, 1978, and in 1990. The position that university students were privileged and should be ashamed to demand more from the state when the majority of their kith and kin were poor seem to have been overblown, especially by early researchers on this issue like Hanna (1975). The politicians have used this argument to treat university students rather shabbily as if they have to live in penury and squalor for the mistake they made in seeking a higher education.

The welfare issues raised by students seem to vary just slightly by the location of a given university. For instance, the students at the University of Nairobi have to worry about traffic issues since the university is located right in the town, with heavy traffic during rush hours. Therefore they have been demanding tunnels for their security in three violent occasions and have stoned vehicles to make their point. Indeed, even now that there are tunnels, the students still stone cars whenever there is a crisis, irrespective of the cause. This makes them lose public sympathy, despite the fact that they have a good case. The University of Zimbabwe students, on the other hand, have raised the issue of improved transport between the university and the town since it is not situated near a highway like the University of Zambia and Dar-es-Salaam, although they too have experienced transport problems when the economies were in recession, since this creates problems for off campus students.

Otherwise most of the other protests in all the four universities have centred on the sharing of rooms in dormitories without choice, congestions in halls of residence, monotonous and bad food, poor catering services, freedom in halls of residence, commercialization of catering services, the high cost of meals and use of meal cards,

participation in decisions relating to their welfare, levels and delays of meal allowances, and cost sharing. It is quite self evident that the *in loco parentis* ideology permeates all these protests, reflecting both the nature, structure, and ideology of the universities. A classical case in point was the 1971 crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam where the University asked the Parents Association (TAPA) to formulate by-laws to govern the conduct and discipline of students at the Universities. The students were outraged and violently protested against the university trying to have parents extend their control and influence on them even at the university level.

Obviously universities will need to find ways of liberating the students so that academic life is quite independent of their welfare needs, interests, and practices without compromising the quality of university education.

As Turner and Gidio (1990) noted with respect to student affairs, absolute freedom in all aspects of the students' university life amounts to anarchy and absolute orderliness means tyranny, both quite antithetical to the mission, and character of the university. Obviously for some students encounters with the opportunities and dilemmas of freedom can be traumatic and difficult, needing guidance. It is the judicious manipulation of the two extremes that will count. One end emphasises the students' freedoms and rights to learn and thus the privileges, opportunities, and protection which facilitate the learning, and at the other end of the continuum are the duties, responsibilities, and obligations placed upon each student to refrain from activities which do not promote the rights of others to enjoy their freedoms to learn. Presumably all educated persons should know this. For students, that is why they are there to be educated. The university should therefore be a learning institution in the broadest sense of the word, training students to appreciate mutually accepted principles and standards of university life.

There may not be easy ways out of this tradition but a slow process of liberating the university from its bondage to the students private lives is needed. That process might entail some of the following steps:

- Simplification of regulations and by-laws supposed to bind student life on the campus such that they have more freedom to take care of themselves;
- separation of academic requirements and freedoms from welfare obligations and responsibilities;
- separation of university requirements from civil requirements such that 'double jeopardy' is minimized and civil cases do not interfere with the students freedom to access university education when they are qualified and aspiring;
- students being directly responsible for financing some of their educational expenses such as food and transport;
- reducing the proportion of students in residence such that close to 50 percent are off campus;
- design of sanctions which are educative and rehabilitative such as community work on campus and in the community;
- making sure that sanctions are mediated by the full force of the *due process of law* requirements such that justice is not only done but appears to have been done.

The Managerial and Allocative Issues as Causes of Student Crises

In practical terms, each student crisis, has a managerial aspect. As will be seen later, most revolts start with very mundane demands such as the provision of eggs for the breakfast, lack of stationery, introduction of an unpopular course, residential regulations, and demands for freedom to meet and discuss issues. Any mismanagement of the early stages of the crisis will create tensions which result in violence. In general terms, many university crises are often a result of a long period of negligence and indifference on the part of staff and administrators. The renowned President of the University of California, Clark Kerr insists that perceptive university administrators can see restlessness among students and staff that can easily constitute incipient revolts that will explode soon or later and that intelligent early moves can preempt most crises (Wallerstein and Star, 1971). This might be a generalization but is worth noting.

The few incidents associated with university based managerial decisions precipitating crisis included the 1971 crisis in Nairobi in which female students beat up their wardens for enforcing strict residential regulations. The university decided to rusticate them and the whole student body rose against that punishment, resulting in violent clashes and two days of class boycott. The same type of crisis occurred in Dar-es-Salaam in 1977 when the university decided to rusticate a female student who decided to share her bed with a boyfriend while she was sharing the room with a Korean girl (A. Kajiru and M.W.D Kengaki Affair), and when a male student decided to stay with his 'wife' in the same room he was sharing with another male student (P.O. Achianja and N. Koyi Affair), both reported in Kaduma (1977). While due process procedures were applied, it seems that the appeal tribunal was not credible in the eyes of students as it had no student representation and was tipped in favour of the university administration. In addition, there were no half measures such that students could be deprived of the privilege of staying on campus but continue with their studies, thus sustaining the independence of academic freedom from

welfare matters. Likewise, in the 1971 crisis at the same university when students disagreed with the Vice-Chancellor's inauguration speech, they also rejected the appeals committee decisions since as they said, 'we were never called into the Appeals Committee officially. We were merely observers and the Tribunal being under the chairmanship of his immediate assistant (Chief Academic Officer) makes a mockery of the Vice-Chancellors assertion that an uninterested party should chair the Appeals Tribunal' (Moshi, 1971). Thus, the question of credibility of the mechanism for the due process of law in management processes needs to be scrutinized further as students complain that all appeal tribunals are tipped in favour of the administration, especially in their membership and chairmanship. Indeed in the last case in point, the members were all friends of the registrar who filed the case of the appellant and their ruling against the students seem to have been based on personal and emotional affinities rather than facts.

The 1990 crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam reflects gross negligence of the students' basic needs, both in the academic and welfare spheres. The classes had no chalk, dusters, seats, desks, course outlines, timetables, prospectuses, and the buildings were decaying such that even the university administrators themselves were appalled when they visited the dormitories, saying: 'The Committee also noted with deep concern the appalling conditions in which the students live in the Halls of Residence' (Mkude, 1990). Under these conditions anything could happen.

At the University of Zambia, in both the 1984 and 1986 revolts there was a clear case of disagreement between a Vice-Chancellor for the federal university with multicampuses and the Principal of the Lusaka campus. The students viewed the Vice-Chancellor as being more polished, gentle, and sympathetic with students needs while the Principal was seen as rigid, punitive and uncompromising. The students knew about this cleavage and exploited the intramanagerial divisions and intrigues to the full by negotiating with both levels at the same time (Mijere Report, 1988, p. 9). In the 1990 Tanzania crisis,

it was quite obvious that within the university, there were different opinions on the goals and strategies for their attainment. This led to competition among the actors for control and influence of the agenda. Once the students had helped the Vice-Chancellor antagonize the administration by calling upon him to summon his senior administrators to be quizzed and humiliated by the students on issues of corruption, accountability and efficiency in a general meeting (baraza), both staff and students started using the Vice-Chancellor for their own motives and at one point, he was literally held hostage (Mroso, 1990). There was the Party Branch which was also meddling in the crisis while the Academic Staff Association linked up with the students and marginalized the Vice-Chancellor, using him only for their own purposes. Finally, the Council was called upon to negotiate with the students, with the councillors themselves competing for influence on the students and the university. In the government, likewise, there was the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Education, the Minister of Education, the Prime Minister, and the President, all competing for influence and patronage but in the process giving conflicting signals as to whether students should continue to press their case or change tactics and go back to the classrooms while negotiations continue. This is not obviously the way to negotiate with students, who, given their underpowered negotiating position, use a cryptic mode of discourse and work with multiple agenda, some of which are hidden. For instance, when students sent a delegation to see President A.H. Mwinyi but said the delegation had no negotiating powers, they must have had a hidden agenda which should have been pursued and defused.

Obviously when other negotiators like the Prime Minister came in, there were conflicts in their perception of the problems and strategies for solving them. It seems that maintaining consistency requires having a common negotiating front of one or two senior officers. At the same time, a negotiation structure needs to develop quite early without being spoiled by other interested parties. There should also be a perceived solidarity in each camp. Any cracks, real or perceived, will be exploited by the other side. Likewise, different perceptions of a problem may lead to different and sometimes

conflicting strategies and possible solutions. In this context vice-chancellors may wish to consider having crisis management teams and special advisers on university matters so as to maintain consistency in handling university crises.

It seems that politicians like to paint different pictures of student crises. For instance, in the 1990 crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, the Minister of Education (Mayagila, 1990) told Parliament that the cause of the crisis was the clash between the Party Youth Wing and the autonomous student union which was operating through a clandestine group called *PUNCH*, specializing in graphic wall literature and graffiti. Yet this would be a gross simplification of the issues at hand and the aggravating factors associated with Ministry officials. The Minister went on to say the closure was meant to avert bloodshed from clashes between students and security forces, and between the students themselves. It was meant to let the students reflect and agonize so that they change the bad habits they had acquired. However, students did not change, and on coming back demanded reinstatement of their leaders who had been expelled from the university, and rectification of their grievances (*Business Times*, 11 January 1991). On the other hand, Nyerere (1990) believed that the crisis was caused by the existence of a 'Mafia terrorist group' which was exploiting the managerial weaknesses of the university to usurp powers of social legitimation. Valid issues raised by students were all ignored at that stage. Concentration was on political survival, personality cults, and witch-hunting. Surely someone like Nyerere was abandoning the students as they were fighting for socialism, efficiency, and accountability; issues that he himself had fought for.

The matter of wall literature and graffiti in universities, especially where student publications are banned, need more analysis for it has both positive and negative aspects. One has to determine if one is dealing with warped minds specializing in secretive petty terrorism due to ill will, or if one is dealing with a more complex phenomenon embedded in a political and educational culture devoid of thrusts for cultural understanding. Obviously

a university can track down and counsel students against such modes of discourse. A university does not have to be closed for this reason. It just shows how weak and fragile these institutions are.

A Synthesis of the Causes of Student Unrest

It is now vividly documented that peoples' behaviours are very much conditioned and influenced by what they purport to know about their environment as they mutually and continuously influence each other in a dynamic fashion (Huttner, 1982). Any analysis of student revolts in African universities has to take cognizance of this common but fundamental observation. At macro level, the political ideologies in most of these African countries lean heavily towards factionalism exhibiting carelessness about the truth and lasting values. Both legitimacy and legitimization processes are in question, given the one party autocracies and military dictatorships. The university seems to be the only lawful avenue for any popular dissent. Many of the political issues raised by the students in Table 2 could have been raised by the other countervailing structures such as opposition parties, churches, trade unions, a free mass media, and employers' associations but these have either been silenced by being incorporated into the ruling parties or completely muzzled by decrees and dictatorial tendencies of the ruling cliques. The anticorruption crusade of the University of Zimbabwe in 1988 and 1989 provides classical illustrations of the positive contributions of university students to social justice. When the mass media picked up the theme of anticorruption and revealed many cases of corruption, hypocrisy and partiality within government, public commissions confirmed them and ministers lost their jobs, one even committing suicide, but none was jailed. This shows how flawed the legislation mechanisms are. Likewise, in Tanzania the drive for efficiency, accountability, and eradication of corruption was popular and the polity had to drop several ministers and senior officials, but again no one was brought to book. In Kenya, the mysterious death of political leaders is a serious phenomenon in which even the government has invested a lot

of energy and money trying to disentangle the circumstances leading to the deaths and, indeed, students cannot be blamed for raising it as a matter of concern.

In Zambia, there was no doubt at all that by 1990 the regime was so unpopular that anything could have happened. Zambians privately say the students saved the situation by demonstrating to draw the attention of the polity to the plight of the society under siege. The demonstrations resulted in legalization of the multiparty system and release of all political prisoners. In all these countries there are always suspicions, rumours, and scenarios of corruption in higher circles which fuel unrest among students, either due to moral indignation or protest against the lack of distributive justice, destruction of common and intergenerational resources, and a lack of civil liberties. The political elite has the duty to cleanse itself from these negative attributions and images. It has to assure the public that politically motivated student unrest is not a microcosm of the conflicts in the wider society. Studies tend to suggest that these political conflicts reflect inherent failures in the power structures to handle societal inequalities, iniquities, power integration, and legitimization processes. When students in Zaire put out graffiti saying, 'Mobutu thief,' nobody gets surprised (*Africa Events*, June 1990). He is known to be corrupt. Indeed early studies in Hanna (1975) showed how negative student opinions of politicians were for they saw them as corrupt, unclean, morally weak and cynical.

The issue of immaturity of students needs to be raised. It is true that students have little experience in operating with bureaucracies and that their demands often lack realism, may appear spontaneous or badly timed. Yet one has to ask the question as to why they do things as they do? It could be that their actions are based on their perception of opportunities and cracks in the system. But it could also be that this is the only way they can get things done (Mroso, 1990). Some universities (Mijere, 1986) have suggested that they should recruit adult students with working experience, thinking that these would have less propensity to cause student unrest. Yet in Dar-es-Salaam, after the 1974 experiment

with exactly this notion, they had the most challenging crisis in the history of the University in 1978, when adult and mature students objected to the raise of salaries and fringe benefits of the government officials and party bureaucrats. Some of the demonstrators were already senior party and youth leaders, who have since then held ministerial level positions. An examination of the documents they presented to the authorities during the crisis reveals a lot of maturity, although violence surrounds the message. In the 1990 crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, a letter signed by Mr. G.F. Lubega (Secretary of Student Union) to the Tanzanian President complaining about the malicious and vindictive press campaign against students, and castigating his henchmen as corrupt and hypocritical, sounded better and was more error-free than that of the Vice-Chancellor to the same audience (both in Mroso, 1990).

Many of the political issues raised by these students in Africa tend to be of a universal nature and mirror those of the 1960s in North America and the 1990s in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and China. The recent fiasco in Tiananmen Square in China centred on the fight against official profiteering or *guandao* (which sounded like a Kiswahili version of *magendo* in Kenya, and *cadonga* in Mozambique) which was said to be rampant, especially among the children, wives, and relatives of high ranking officials (Mu and Thompson, 1989). They were manipulating the prices of scarce commodities such as cars, television sets and the like, bought by the state and sold through relatives who also had enhanced access to foreign currency for importation and sale of the same at exorbitant prices. Listening to what is happening in many of these African countries, and reading the Chinese students demands for accountability, democracy, press freedom, better education, and equality, similar plights emerge.

At micro level, some writers contend that student crises reflect alienation, immaturity, high spirits, and political posturing characteristic of adolescents and young persons. Their attempt to fight for equality and clean government is sometimes seen as

hypocritical since students end up doing the opposite on graduation. Yet this might be a simplification, bordering on taking a Durkheim bourgeois view that individuals have no morality that transcends personal interests (Baurricaud, 1987), while there are many cases of students being martyrs of their own conscience. Of course it is a truism that in many countries, students are often more prepared than any other sector of the population to advocate social changes whenever there is general discontent both within institutions and outside. It is the impatience of youth, their excitement with new ideas, their flexibility, their sense of group solidarity, indispensability, invisibility, moral purity, and courage that propel them to take leadership and assume the role of being the 'conscience of the nation' (Hanna, 1975; Mu and Thompson, 1990). Yet this is not to deny the existence of real problems in universities. Only that their marginalized position makes them more prepared to overtly protest against perceived iniquities and moral distortions in public life.

One issue often raised relates to the sanity and intellectual level of student leaders. Extensive reviews by Professor Kenneth Keniston, an authority in youth affairs, suggest that student leaders had no special aberrations or hatred for authority or signs of an oedipal complex. In fact, the evidence indicates that student leaders were not neurotic, suicidal, enraged, or alienated but, to the contrary, were more integrated, self-accepting, and more advanced in a psychological sense than their less politically active contemporaries (cited in Wallerstein and Starr, 1971). Most of the student leaders were only professing standard progressive values of decency, equity, and fair play, and those with a leftist ideology were found to be high on autonomy while the more conservative ones seemed to be high on authoritarianism, but both groups were average in intelligence (Okpako, 1985). Furthermore, evidence by Rich (1979) shows that university students only change their cognition with respect to their roles in local, national and international issues but not their political affectivity which seem to be determined by social background factors such as social economic status and concomitant family ideology. It therefore seems that there is no evidence to adduce personality aberrations and problems among student leaders.

Rather, the issues associated with each crisis and the circumstances necessitating a crisis need to be independently and critically addressed.

Both Baffour's (1989) and Nahdi's (1987) surveys of African universities reveal that most of the student revolts are against real issues such as bad teaching, poor academic and social conditions in universities, unpaid scholarships, rising prices of basic goods, crumbling ivory towers, lack of concern by those in charge of universities, general deterioration of educational conditions, institutional oppression, shortage of staff, poor salaries and fringe benefits, mismanagement, and corruption in the universities. All these breed tensions that precipitate student revolts.

In some universities such as the University of Nairobi and Egerton University, a small incident such as not providing eggs or chicken for a meal can spark off a major confrontation (Kinyanjui, 1990). Obviously this is not normal. People don't behave like that: Fight for an egg or chicken? Such behaviour only reflects tensions and a breakdown in internal communications such that students don't decide on their own meals or cannot be reached in advance to be forewarned and given reasons for a change of menu. These kinds of spontaneous and instantaneous revolts may reflect the fluidity in political values, boredom, meaninglessness of experiences, a lack of morals and the existence of a power vacuum. As one student put it : 'Having no prescribed channel to air their grievances leaves students simmering with their anger and frustrations until they boil over. Efforts at communication with the university are largely a monologue rather than a dialogue.'

In Tanzania, during the heyday of President J.K. Nyerere, whose power of oration and conviction smacked of voodoo, university students would fetch water in buckets from miles away, carry it on their heads and shoulders ten stories upto their dormitories. Even many villagers had better access to water than these university students but they never

rioted for that, presumably because there was a perceived fairness in the distributive justice and social equality. One paper put it this way: 'We sent students, staff, and workers to the university to teach them, not to torture them. I am puzzled and surprised that things in some places could deteriorate so low and so long.' Teaching staff were called barefoot professors who walked with brown paper bags to line up for sugar and bread! The situation was aggravated by an uncreative university administration which advocated going back to village life with pit latrines, after years of using modern toilets. A full-fledged faculty of engineering could not locate and rectify the university water system until some Swiss engineers came to their rescue. In Dar-es-Salaam, Nairobi and Zambia, commissions appointed to inquire into student revolts found falling standards in the dining halls and residences. In Dar-es-Salaam they were described as being in appalling condition (Mkude, 1990), similarly in Zambia (Mijere, 1986), and Nairobi (Musangi, 1980). In Nairobi, the Okoth-Ogendo Commission (1988) found the kitchen in such a 'state of dilapidation that it ordered its closure immediately'. They also found little appreciation by the staff of students' concerns as regards sanitation, security, recreational facilities, and residential comfort, which in turn had resulted in a lack of personal discipline with respect to communal goals and facilities. Likewise, the Musangi Report (1980) at the University of Nairobi found students being served by dirty, illiterate cafeteria workers in tattered clothes using the same brooms to clean the dining room floor and tables. These were not matters of resources, but what Turner and Gidio (1990) called a lack of philosophy and/or appreciation of student services as an integral part of higher education. This situation may not only militate against academic excellence but also the training for modernization, leadership, and social responsibility which are so central to the purpose and mission of university education.

The usual response from bureaucrats on welfare matters tend to be that, the students have been demanding too much; more than they will afford when they graduate while the masses of the people are starving. Yet there is no evidence that deprivation of

university students has much to do with the alleviation of the plight of the underclass. In fact, modernization theories would advise that university students should have higher social aspirations and look outward rather than inward towards village life. This is not necessarily in conflict or contradiction with decency, accountability, humility, and service to the masses at graduation. In fact, confidence and arrogance based on knowledge and legitimate authority is necessary for development, and has nothing to do with being exploitative and spiteful to the underprivileged masses. In retrospect, the alleged dangers and fears of arrogance (Nyerere, 1967) could reflect a conspiracy to tame the elite, given the literacy levels of many of the first generation of leaders after independence. Even today, many ministers and senior party leaders in charge of party mobilization and legitimization processes have no university education. It would thus be naive to expect anything less than a stand against the confidence, arrogance, and sophistication associated with university education. Indeed, some of the tensions leading to student university crises stem from this struggle for dominance in national politics.

The issue of student life in universities need more thought if nations are to produce responsible and civil leaders for tomorrow. While the question of scarcity of resources is very real, some issues are matters of management culture. One experienced commentator on student affairs (Omari, 1990), makes a compendium of managerial factors associated with the deterioration of student services at the University of Dar-es-Salaam:

- degeneration of discipline, morals, cultural norms, social cohesion and authority;
- emergence of gangsters based on class, sex, study areas, faculties, ethnicity, and academic performance in university work;
- lack of recreational facilities, counselling and health services;

- breakdown of communication between and among students, staff and administration;
- lack of maintenance services and poor residential facilities.

Some of these require rational managerial action rather than financial resources. The deterioration could also signal a clash of cultures between rural and urban, modern and primitive styles of personal life, what Mazrui (1990) calls importation of modern technologies and institutions without parallel importation of the cultural norms and discipline associated with their maintenance and renewal.

Tunner and Gidio (1990) present a comprehensive model for student services in universities (Figure 4). Obviously this is quite an elaborate model but worth adapting in individual university circumstances. Most elements of student campus life are dealt with. However, it does not seem plausible that the Vice-Chancellor and Pro Vice-Chancellors should rely on the registrar for student affairs. This has been one of the weakest links resulting in Vice-Chancellors being caught by surprise when students are in crisis. Rather, the Dean of Students should report directly to the Vice-Chancellor or one of the Pro Vice-Chancellors who should also be the disciplinary authority rather than an administrative registrar. The post of the Dean of Students need to be elevated to a very strategic line position. A cursory observation in the region shows that in all the universities under study, the position of the Dean of Students has been thoroughly marginalized in the institutional power structure such that he is only heard of during student crisis rather than being part and parcel of the day to day management of the university. The former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nairobi, Philip Mbithi, realized the importance of this office and took such a keen interest in it that he would know what was happening to the students throughout the day. Even at night, when students were stoning cars, he would appear unexpectedly and save the situation as Rogoncho (1990) reports:

University of Nairobi students went on the rampage on Thursday night and stoned vehicles along State House Road after a two hour public

lecture by two Anglican Bishops at Ufungamano House, Nairobi. But a quick action by the University's Vice-Chancellor, Professor Philip Mbithi saved the day when he agreed to walk with the students to any destination of their choice as long as they stopped stoning vehicles.

(Daily Nation, 29 September 1990)

At the University of Nairobi this kind of intervention happened so often that wonders for how long the Vice-Chancellor will be doing this and for how long students would continue to appreciate and respect his intervention. Obviously, the Dean of Students and the student leadership should take care of such incidents so that the Vice-Chancellor can concentrate on broader policy issues related to higher education and the management of the institution.

More seriously, there is the whole area of tightening university administration to ensure accountability, efficiency, clean business and enhanced potential for giving quick and coherent responses to student crises. The university, with its intellectual and practical expertise, has no excuse for not having and enforcing conflict of interest regulations. The Musangi (1980) Commission reported conflict of interests in tenders for student food in Nairobi. The Mroso (1991) and Kauzeni (1990) reports in Dar-es-Salaam revealed outrageous situations where the Registrar authorized repair of a landrover for \$4259 and then bought it as scrap for \$144.6. Likewise, the estates manager had a private construction company, and the university doctor had a private pharmacy, and both authorized orders of stocks for the university and their companies from the same sources. Given the rampant corrupt practices in the country, anyone would be suspicious of their practices, especially when they got rich so fast. Yet it was the students who raised the issue of conflict of interests, leading to the resignation/dismissal of the culprits. It should have been obvious as a source of tension long ago. Likewise, the Registrar at the University of Dar-es-Salaam was allowed to circumvent the tendering process and went to buy food for students personally from his friends at his home village and in the process, bought rotten beans, not fit for human consumption 'which contributed in fuelling the student crisis and caused a big loss to the university' (Kauzeni, 1990, p. 42). The same

person was keeping university staff in a motel he owned. All these cases reflect badly on the university image and executive authority. Nyirenda (1983) in a Presidential commission of inquiry at the University of Zambia observes that there were 'no rules and regulations to govern the discipline of both academic and administrative staff and hence the numerous cases of indiscipline which fuels student unrest'. The famous Yale University President, Kingman Brewster (1971) speaking against excessive participatory management, pointed out that accountability as a central element in executive responsibility may go counter to participatory democracy, but a lack of executive powers in the hands of a vice-chancellor may lead to institutional paralysis. Obviously these matters of conflict of interest needed executive direction. However, in developing countries like Tanzania where the top university executives, including deans of faculties, are presidential appointees, and often appointed to maintain the power balance, rather than to enhance institutional excellence, and at times appointed on ethnic grounds rather than merit, each person can claim personal authority in defiance of institutional norms. Yet only the chief executive, as the custodian of durable institutional values and morality is expected to enforce discipline, rules and procedures. Obviously universities cannot be operating in a vacuum and these administrative malpractices might be reflecting a much more widespread phenomenon in society since public transparency and accountability have not been strong points in African governance. However, universities can make an effort to show by example that efficiency, accountability, and transparency in institutional governance are issues of concern and enforce them accordingly. Universities are not expected to be mirrors of the current social order but examples of excellence in whatever they do.




Figure 4: An Administrative Framework for Students Services

Institutional and State Responses to Student Unrest

Once a crisis has emerged, its course and finality is purely a matter of management, negotiation strategies, and tactics. Characteristically, the students have been provocative and vocal in raising their issues. Almost all commissions of inquiry show that students start from an adversarial position, quite antagonistic to the government and those in authority, and unless proved otherwise, assume that the university administration is part of the establishment so when there is a student crisis, it will abandon the students. Either because of naivety or inadvertently, the students overstate their case, overestimate their strength, and underestimate their vulnerability. As a voiceless underpowered group, they believe (and have been vindicated in this belief), that the only way to make sure they are heard and something is done about their plight is to storm the university shouting: 'Hey, stop what you are doing and listen! We are suffering here and you don't seem to care!'; a position corroborated by the recent Commission of Inquiry in Dar-es-Salaam, led by a High Court judge, Justice Mroso (1990).

The situation gets compounded by the harsh and at times revolutionary language that the students use. For instance, in the 1971 University of Dar-es-Salaam crisis, the open letter to the Vice-Chancellor (Annex 2a) stated, interalia:

The way you have handled this university has caused concern and continues to cause concern to any thinking mind. You are aware that since the inception of this university there has been general mismanagement unfortunately shrouded in lies calculated to deceive both the Chancellor and the outside world ... It is now clear that the university is like a floating ship without the competent leadership to direct it. The only salvation in the university lies in the students. While we live we shall not tolerate to see our institution turned into a child's toy.

(Mungai, 1971, Annex 2a, pp. 1-2)

Then the students called for class boycotts and ordered the Vice-Chancellor, Mr. Pius Msekwa, to come and explain himself. Likewise, in 1985 in Zimbabwe, the students gave the widely respected Vice-Chancellor, Professor Walter Kamba, a four-day ultimatum to

accomplish nine demands, some of which were impossible, beyond his purview and capabilities. The same students gave the well-respected President of Zimbabwe, Mr. Robert Mugabe, an ultimatum in an Anti-Corruption Document (Annex 2b), urging that the 'Petty bourgeois element must go and be replaced by a (vanguard) progressive leadership,' and that the 'President should act now, we repeat now, none other than now is acceptable' (Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1990, p.9). This happens now and again, whether in Nairobi or in Dar-es-Salaam, sending administrators and politicians into rage. As Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski concluded, students like to play a protracted game of hide-and-seek, probing and testing the reactions of authorities while searching for appealing issues around which to rally for amelioration of their grievances. But in the process they fall into the trap of committing errors associated with excessive demands designed to radicalize and politicize their cause. When demands look absurd, they loose support in the press and with the populace. Students will have to learn how to cultivate support for the resolution of genuine issues. Then when their initial demands are not met immediately, either by open dialogue or actions, they resort to class boycotts and violence which escalate the crisis. Obviously students need to appraise this strategy of threats and ultimatums, so as to check whether it is the most effective, productive, and civil path for resolving conflicts and bringing about the attainment of their goals.

The approach does not augur well with African leaders and university administrators who, despite their relatively high levels of education, have cultural blinkers shrouded in what the prolific professor of cultural and political hegemony, Mazrui (1978), called the 'elder tradition' which emphasizes paternalism, consensus, reverence, conformity, obedience, and reaffirmation of loyalty towards a given leadership. This tradition cannot be condoned, as it is inherently inimical to intellectual rigour, independence, dissent, and disputations. Both parties need to appraise their reactions and approaches to conflict resolution and, if necessary, train in the art of negotiation for that kind of eventuality. Characteristically, the university administrators are put on the

defensive while governments invoke intimidating language to match the students' ultimatums, and both sides start being obtrusive such that no one wins. Even the real issues get underplayed, and the focus shifts to polemics, personality factors, and calling each other names. A Kenyan critic of the situation, Dr. Ooko Ombaka (1986) had this to say of the deadlock:

Both sides do not bother to understand one another. I am irked by the wrong perception that students are immature and empty receptacles, and that lecturers are agents of external forces. I resent this. The government has the capacity to deal with such agents if they exist without the frenzy of rhetoric and witch hunts.

(p. 1)

As the crisis gets protracted, the issues raised by the students loose their staying power. The externalization of the crisis complicates negotiations as it criminalizes legitimate processes and polarizes the groups, with one posing as patriotic pro status quo and the others being on the wrong side. The administration resorts to legalism, procrastination. avoiding direct negotiations, confrontation, and quick dramatic action that would have solved the crisis at infancy.

Indeed, as people in authority start calling staff and students names, doubting their patriotism and intellectual integrity, they should expect violent objections. A catalogue of vicious epithet and phrases used in recent crises include the following which describe university students and staff as:

- behaving like a donkey that kicks the hand that feeds it;
- agents of CIA/KGB;
- spoilt, pampered, irrational, unruly kids;
- bunch of gullible fools;
- perverse, traitors, rebellious, ungrateful lot;
- privileged few, unproductive sector, immature;
- being manipulated by a black hand.

With these kind of caricatures, which smack of the Chinese authorities who, during the Cultural Revolution, labelled their intelligentsia as the 'stinking ninth category with a black hand manipulating them,' nothing prevents the students from declaring that 'the emperor has no clothes,' and proceed to mount all kinds of offensive graffiti meant to inflict psychological violence on the other party. After all that is the only weapon they have.

The situation is made worse by a mass media which is mostly monopolized by the state and used to unleash negative campaigns against students and the university community during times of crisis. Given the lack of free press, and that most students' publications are banned, the only avenue of uncensored free expression is graffiti and bonfires of public newspapers carrying negative messages about them. Sometimes the mass media carries blatant lies such as the recent portrayal of University of the Dar-es-Salaam students eating while watching television in a country which has no television station. All evidence shows that castigating and alienating the students and the university does not solve the problems at hand but only aggravates the situation.

The mistake made quite often by authoritarian university administrators and government officials is to dismiss dialogue as a means of solving conflicts. The Chinese Premier, Li Peng, missed a golden opportunity when he dismissed student leaders in the following manner: 'You are all young, no more than twenty-two or twenty-three years of age. My youngest son is older than you. I have three children ... To us you are like our own children' (Mu and Thompson, 1989, p. 57). The student leader, Kaixi, retorted in a more mature tone: 'If we go on like this, there will never be enough time.' He implied that all this was irrelevant to issues of democracy, freedom of the press, the independence of student movements, and the withdrawal of offensive official press comments that the students were 'unpatriotic' for demanding all these! The meeting ended in shouting matches and the Tianenmen massacres were the eventuality.

This same phenomenon precipitated the closure of the University of Dar-es-Salaam when the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Education castigated the students and suppressed their positions on the University Council in the spirit of the 'elder tradition', suggesting that the students were immature and spoilt. The students retreated, regrouped, refined their agenda, and then retaliated so hard that he lost his job. When the President, Mr. A.H. Mwinyi, told university staff and students that 'an advice from an elder was an order,' he was obviously evoking both civil service procedures and the 'elder tradition', both objectionable to university intellectual culture. When the President said the university staff and students had no right to have access to government sponsored reports on how much money the state was using to rebuild the Central Bank which was carelessly set on fire, a defunct ferry which was bought in suspicious circumstances, the killing of people in sugar estates and the fate of people whose health was being threatened by the dumping of city garbage and wastes, he was contradicting himself on his policy of accountability. As one professor put it, 'He does not understand that accountability subsumes full disclosure and is a two way affair.'

But this position taken by a head of state is a fundamental one. Firstly, it raises the issue of the right of the university community and the public in general to know what their governments are doing with taxpayers' money, which is so central to the whole notion of accountability and transparency in public governance. Secondly, it raises the issue of university neutrality in national debates and developmental choices. On the first one, university students and staff will clearly take the position that accountability is not to a superior only but is a two way affair in which governments are accountable to the people they serve. It is indeed now widely acknowledged that accountability as an executive privilege calls for full disclosure of what the executive branch of government is doing. Governments in developing countries will have to seriously review their procedures for classification of documents and the mode for conducting government business such that they are not seen to be protecting their friends and proteges from public outrage and sanctions.

Otherwise, if people don't know what their governments are doing the whole rhetoric about accountability will be meaningless. Obviously, universities are the most qualified institutions to investigate and debate matters of accountability and efficiency in governance.

The second issue of university neutrality is even more complex, as it has been a matter of contention for a long time. It seems that a university cannot, even if it wanted to, choose to be really value free, and hence neutral. It can only choose good and bad values or remain ignorant of the values to which it aspires. A university should articulate its own perspectives and be allowed to do so, so that people are free to choose what to apply or modify. The issue is not that the university is neutral or should try to be neutral but rather that it should aspire to more just values and social perspectives, articulating long term social goals, showing both sides of the coin and explaining the stand of each. The danger comes when some people advocate that since the university cannot be neutral then it should tilt towards a particular ideology. This is a sure road to disaster as the university will cease to be balanced, fair, and just. In essence, neutrality suffers from the worst forms of disability as it is just as bad not to act as it is to act in bad faith. A university that will not speak for man and his well being, whatever task it continues to perform, must have ceased to be a human enterprise. The mere understanding that a society is corrupt does not place one outside corruption. If a university cannot uphold human values and maintain high standards of human decency in all facets of its affairs, it is difficult to think of any other institution in these countries that will. Academics have to deal with questions of ethics and values. Being silent on human problems in the name of pursuit of the academic purity and spirituality is tantamount to assuming that there can be value free social science inquiry, which has been dubbed as the 'bugaboo of escapist science'. To participate in the projection and the making of the future is part and parcel of the responsibilities of intellectuals for it is not a violation of the central purpose of a university. It is only serving the society. It is therefore through democratic dialogues that governments in developing countries can reap the maximum benefit of having a university. Telling universities that

they don't have the right to raise questions on accountability on the part of the state does not help in this respect.

Dialogue as a Predicament of Universities and States

One of the students' demands in many of the revolts is their wish to have open dialogue between students, the university administration, and the government (Masibo, 1990; Mroso, 1990; Mungai, 1971). The 1985 University of Nairobi crisis captured this yearning for dialogue: 'We are not going to be addressed by the Vice-Chancellor of the University from Newspapers or the radio. He has an office here and we are the people he leads. He must come and talk to us' (*Daily Nation*, 20 September 1985). Of course it is dangerous to face drunk, angry students with stones in their pockets, but the issue is what can be done to restore dialogue rather than shying away from it as there is evidence that in several instances dialogue has saved situations from getting violent (Mkishi, 1989). There is great need, however, to structure the mechanisms for the dialogue and to articulate limits, rules, and procedures. For instance, is it in the interest of anybody to drag the Head of State to a confrontational dialogue with university students? Should university problems wait for the intervention of the Minister of Education? Can problems be sorted out during meetings with group leaders rather than the whole university student body? Can a Vice-Chancellor solve any problem in a speech to a rowdy crowd, or does there always have to be a leadership for negotiation?

In all the four universities, the moment the university administrators refuse or delay talking to students, the crisis escalates. Thus, consistent with evidence from conflict resolution research results and theoretical postulates, the communication channels should always be kept open as a measure of strength rather than weakness. The University of Dar-es-Salaam was closed twice because, ridiculous as it may sound, neither the Vice-Chancellor nor the President of the country would listen to the students, saying they used

'abusive language' in their open letters and graffiti (Mroso, 1990; Mungai, 1971). Instead of patiently discussing with students and teachers the best educative and rehabilitative punishment, leaders tend to be too sensitive of their status. They therefore evoke violence as a means of solving problem rather than dialogue.

Evidence seems to suggest that reactions to student unrest have often sprung primarily from fear, anger, outrage, confusion, and frustration rather than from a profound practical and theoretical analysis of a crisis. In the 1985 University of Nairobi crisis, contradictions in high places were reported by Mulaki (*Daily Nation*, 2 February 1985). The Provincial Commissioner, Mr. F. Waiganjo, and the Chief of Police cited a presidential order for the students to resume classes or otherwise face severe punishment, and the next day the Chief Secretary, Mr. S. Nyachae, denied the President ever issuing such an order or directive and that the police were only doing their job according to the law. Obviously, students took advantage of such confusion and continued to protest until the University was closed on 13, February 1985.

Worse still is when the government seems like it is not sure of its information and data. This may be a general problem in developing countries. For example, during the 1990 University of Dar-es-Salaam crisis, the students and staff alleged that government spending on education was only 4.0 percent of its 1989/90 annual recurrent budget compared to 14.16 percent spent on defence, but President Mwinyi (1990) said the figure was actually 11.3 percent while the Ministry of Education official statistics showed that it was 5.9 percent (Ministry of Education, 1990). Similarly, Nyerere (1985) said education consumed 22.1 percent of the annual government budget in 1983/84, and the same Ministry of Education source gives 11.7 percent for the same year. Obviously the state cannot be trusted if it gives contradictory data, in some way designed to paint a positive image of itself. This leaves data open to misuse such that various groups will talk about the percentage without reference to whether it was with respect to the recurrent budget, total

budget, gross domestic product, or gross national product. Thus there is a need for a crisis management group during protracted student unrest, a need to get the facts correct and be aware of existing contradictions. Such a group would ensure consistency and continuity.

On the other hand, the universities do not have working rules of conduct for campus communications. Thus students are free to scandalize each other and fight without any limitations with respect to sexual harassment, hate literature, and malicious propaganda. For instance, legal limitations for perjury and libelous expressions need to be applied and avenues for reconciliation and amelioration of the aggrieved need to be worked out. When jungle law is given a free hand in universities, everyone is affected. Laws and regulations need to be consistently and fairly applied in cases of perjury, libel, and contempt of legitimate authority. This is an essential part of the training for responsible citizenship, although the training is only effective if the rest of the society is law-abiding and has respect for socialized communal values and procedures for legitimation and reconciliation. Likewise, students should be responsible for any physical, social and psychological damage caused to property, individuals, and groups of people. This needs to be supplemented by the full force of law and civil procedures.

The universities are in some sort of a predicament with respect to the legal issues surrounding staff and student disputations. Both staff and students are convinced that it is legal and legitimate for them to constitute themselves into pressure groups to influence the internal and external policies of their countries. This could be due to a lack of initiative on the side of the government, limitations of protocol, or when in search of truth to fill in the vacuum created by national political dynamics and any lacuna in international relations. Yet law enforcement agencies, with tacit support of the state, criminalize these kinds of initiatives rather than licensing any activity which borders on political pronouncement. They want to monopolize the interpretation of reality. And unfortunately, universities are not entrusted with the machinery for enforcing law and order. Also, unlike trade unions,

universities do not have bi-partite structures for handling disputes. Thus law-enforcement agencies, more often than not, intervene in university disputes even without invitation. It is not likely that universities will give up their belief in the freedom of speech as a non-negotiable right which needs no license to be exercised. Thus, both students and staff will continue the confrontations while the police intensifies its zeal to teach the 'spoilt kids' a lesson and the students believe 'these illiterate dogs of the system don't understand'. Obviously the solution is not more police interference, but less of it and more internal debates, structuring, and even changing the University Acts to make the participation of students and staff in university governance more meaningful.

One problem with student politics is the transient nature of student representation in university organs. Hardly does a student stay for more than two years on a committee. This makes it difficult for them to make any impact within that period as they struggle both to understand the rules of the game and achieve academically. The asymmetrical power relations in these organs add to the disadvantage inherent in their small numbers in most of the university organs. It is therefore very difficult for universities to build durable bridges with a transient student constituency for continuity and stability in university governance. Therefore, the only viable path would be that of strengthening the management of student affairs units such as publications, unions, associations, advocacy groups, and counselling, which should in turn maintain a durable corporate memory and representation. Most commission reports suggest a lack of trained student administrators, including deans, wardens' hall committees, managers, guidance counsellors, and games coaches. Likewise, security in universities has deteriorated so much due to both physical and social porosity such that they have become sanctuaries for criminals from outside the university.

At the University of Nairobi, students have resorted to mob justice when they catch a suspected thief, while at the University of Dar-es-Salaam, non-student persons have

been caught eating in the university cafeteria for free, and theft of students' property in dormitories has become very common. As a result of this deterioration of student services, cases of suicide, withdrawal, dropout, rape, alcoholism, drug trafficking, and illicit business are quite rampant on university campuses.

Another very crucial step is for the senior university administrator to have regular formal and informal meetings with student leaders. It is alleged that in some of these universities, the Vice-Chancellor got to know student leaders only during the time of crisis, which makes negotiations very difficult as there is no sense of reflexive loyalty to individuals or the institution, and no respect nor common purpose between them. In fact, these contacts should be all the way down to departmental and faculty levels such that a sense of joint ownership is inculcated among administrators, students, and staff. In this way, accountability, communication, and participation can be emphasized (Okpako, 1985).

Likewise, university administrators should negotiate a working relationship with the police and security forces such that university crises are not externalized too soon, which more than often aggravates the conflict as coercive forces are applied. If governance in academia is to remain as a process of setting freedom, power, and authority loose in the production of knowledge, use of coercive force should be greatly minimized. Emphasis should be on actions which restore tranquillity, passion for knowledge, and respect for the institution. In all the four universities, there were complaints of indiscriminate intrusion of police and security people into campus life. Tunner and Gidio (1990) lament the influence of this surveillance and intrusion, as it results in negative media reporting, rumours, and innuendoes. It suggests a lack of appreciation for and protection of academic freedom, university autonomy, or high standards of academic life and militates against the attraction of the institution to quality staff and executives. The University of Zimbabwe has lost most of the top experienced administrators because of this loss of esteem and respect for the institution. The University of Dar-es-Salaam has been used for dumping

disgraced administrators and has been without a chief of finance for over 15 years because no serious executive wants to go there for lack of respect, responsibility, and executive authority.

Precipitating Factors During Negotiations

In order to delineate the precipitating factors, an attempt was made to look at the sequence of events in four major student revolts in three universities (Dar-es-Salaam, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). These are reproduced as Annex 1 (a-d). In Annex 1a (Zimbabwe), it seems that the 1989 confrontation could have been predicted from the one in 1988 when the police intervened. The action of the police to refuse permission for on-campus seminars was provocative and a turning point in the crisis. The pre-dawn police arrest of student leaders, apparently without coordination with the University, just aggravated the situation and resulted in violent protests. It exposed the university administration to unnecessary embarrassment and violence because when it failed to explain what happened, and could not produce the student leaders, it became suspected of collusion with the State security apparatus, which the students resented. Consequently they stormed the university administration.

Annex 1b (1990, Dar-es-Salaam) seems to suggest that the tensions were there already given the earlier illegal search, arrest, and detention of two staff members and two student leaders and the shortages of basic tools for any academic activity. Likewise, the issue of student allowances could have been resolved within the university through discussions such that there would have been no antagonistic debate at the Council level even though students would have voted against the budget. The lack of provision for emergency meetings and the locking of the Assembly Hall when students were known to be angry just precipitated the crisis. The multitude of negotiators at all levels and the vacillation between acceptance of dialogue and refusal to dialogue tended to give conflicting signals.

The use of the mass media to intimidate and scandalize students did not help either. The positioning of armed security officers on the university campus to monitor and remove anti-government graffiti was uncalled for as the University could have done it.

Likewise, in the 1971 Dar-es-Salaam crisis (Annex 1c) the tensions which were surrounding the change of vice-chancellorship, banning of student publications and independent associations, the imposition of by-laws from outside, and the introduction of military training, all point towards a major confrontation. The attempt to single out one student leader for punishment and use of police to evict him from the university just aggravated the situation.

The 1986 Zambia situation (Annex 1d) is more complicated but allowing a sectarian organization like the Catholic Church to establish a suspicious committee for the conscientization of students was a precipitative factor, given earlier tensions within the administration and the student body. While the issue had university-wide implications, it was left to a low-level officer such as a marginalized dean of students to handle for almost a month. The physical assault on the Vice-Chancellor was a final blow leading to the closure of the university.

The precipitating factors thus include evocation of unwritten seniority regulations guarding interpersonal relationships between adults and students, with Presidents in Tanzania saying 'advice from seniors is an order'; criminalization of legitimate university debates and disputations by involving the police and paramilitary police; students' use of offensive language and resorting to riots; externalization of the conflicts, all of which diminish the chances of evolving internal solutions. The externalization of university conflicts is more than often circumscribed in the structure of power in these countries. Given that the top university administrators are appointed by the President of the country, who is also the Chancellor of the university, the administrators have felt it safer to alert the

Head of State whenever there is a slight crisis on the campus. The Head of State, in turn, takes over instead of saying 'solve it', sending his own security men to investigate and report. Sooner or later the Vice-Chancellor and students start competing for favours, attention, and patronage of the Head of State. The whole situation becomes quite awkward but some heads of state seem to enjoy such situations where they can inflict psychological violence on the intelligentsia too. Sometimes one wonders if some heads of state or their proxies have not precipitated crises in universities so as to get an excuse for firing some administrators who have fallen out of favour.

University Closures and After

It has become quite fashionable for the state to take draconian measures against students - for example, closure of the university as a collective punishment to students. The reasons for closures often are that the situation was turning violent as a result of a breakdown of dialogue, the criminalization of the conflict, and the use of police. But obviously this is a negative and counterproductive punishment for both parties. First, closure as a punishment reflects badly on the state and the university's ability to negotiate with students as there must have been other more positive and constructive options. It is also bad for the students too as that was not their choice and it is never the optimum solution for attainment of their goals. Secondly, closure results in wastage of scarce financial, human and physical resources. In democratic and fair society, closures as collective punishment offend rules of natural justice. Apart from the fact that protest is not an offence in itself, closures affect those who angered the administration by protesting and those who did not protest. A system that fails to control protest through the rule of the law, e.g. court action against protestors for known offences, cannot be excused for resorting to the primitive tradition of collective punishment. It is illegal at the least and unconstitutional at its worst, especially insofar as it imposes punishment without investigation, arraignment or hearing and it assumes the

victims are guilty until pardoned. It is extremely essential for both parties to avoid any acts of provocation that result in the closure of a university.

On the other hand, it is difficult to determine how much punishment has to be administered to deter students from conducting themselves in the same manner again. What has become increasingly clear is that closure of universities, irrespective of duration, does not deter students from revolts and agitation. In fact, the same students come back even after a year and demonstrate again, as happened in Zimbabwe and Zambia. In Kenya, Egerton University was closed three times in one year (Kinyanjui, 1990). Thus closure as a punishment is not working in getting the students to stop their revolts. When necessary, for security reasons, closure should be very brief. Indeed, the University of Nairobi has deliberately decided that when the situation is tense, they close quite quickly before damage is done for only a short period of one to two weeks to sort out administrative and student leadership issues and readmit students, maybe by faculties, because closing for too long does not seem to solve the problem.

Likewise, the University of Zimbabwe in 1989 closed briefly, recalled students to do their examinations and leave, and then opened the university a month or so after the normal beginning of the academic year. Long closures result in a wastage of public funds, human resources, loss of institutional credibility, derailment of confidence among the parents, funders, governments, and international students and staff. What is clear is that the students, when asked to leave the campus, do so peacefully without any damage to university property. When they come back they demand rectification of most of the things that they fought for. It seems as if being sent down becomes incarnated as a heroic event. However, during the brief closure, student leaders can be isolated for counselling, reprimand by parents, bishops, and other elders, and if necessary, suspended for some time to cool down. These steps are impossible to take during the time of crisis. In fact, in all the universities, any attempt to isolate the so-called ringleaders for selective punishment has

aggravated the crisis rather than frightening others to stop rioting. It seems better to negotiate with current legitimate student leadership rather than create a new one as indeed university administrators have no control on that process of leadership legitimation. Attempts to pick up ring leaders during student rallies just aggravates the situation, leading to more riots and death. In fact, most closures have been precipitated by unnecessary intervention of the State, using the police and the military.

It also seems fashionable to create commissions of inquiry to investigate circumstances surrounding major student crises in all the four universities. Three forms of commissions seem to emerge. One path very much used by the University of Nairobi is to set up an internal committee, mostly of Senate, to investigate and report to the Vice-Chancellor and Senate. The other one is to have a Commission of the Council which investigates and reports to the Council and the Chancellor. The third is to establish government commissions which investigate and report to the responsible ministry and the head of state. There is one variation of the second path used in Zambia consisting of the Vice-Chancellor's and Staff Association Study Groups, which investigate and report back. The dividing line here should rather be that of external and internal reviews. An examination of most of the external reviews tend to suggest that there is more witch-hunting, taking a rather bureaucratic and legalistic view. Many of the recommendations of these external commissions are hardly implemented. In addition, they do not examine critically issues related to the state and where the 'emperor goofed,' no mention is made for fear of rebuke or retribution. In principle, the University Acts provide for frequent external reviews of the universities (vide Triennial Reviews) commissioned by the chancellors, but this practice ceased to exist in East Africa since the late 1960s (Mazrui, 1978). Mkushi (1989) says the same for Zimbabwe. The reviews generally generated debates, an interest in university renewal and provided governments with the basis for funding. Indeed, if such reviews continued, some of the surprises of 'dilapidation and dirt' being revealed by crisis-driven external commissions may be abated.

On the other hand, the internally inspired reviews, when orchestrated and commissioned in good faith, tend to be more critical, practical, and reflective despite the danger of being fraught with pathologies of vested interests, personality clashes, symbolization, and self-promotion. Yet universities need to do more of these kinds of internal reviews rather than wait for the externalization of the process during a crisis.

It is normally claimed that triennial reviews are expensive and unnecessary since universities have annual reports and external examiners to check on the quality of instruction and learning. However, such exercises have tended to be incomprehensive, fragmented, and often biased so that not much attention is paid to the broader issues of institutional health. Therefore, universities may wish to maintain a system of regular external reviews to generate data and debate that may sustain quality and stability.

The university of Nairobi has also adopted a policy of divide and rule. While, in effect, the government has taken direct control of the university and academic freedom is completely eroded (Savage, 1990), the structure of the university has been reconstituted into six constituent colleges (Arts, Business, Health, Agriculture, Science, and Education). This compartmentalization and regimentation supposedly weakens student power and makes it easy to disperse opposition. The monitoring and administration of student activities at faculty level makes top-down tracking of trouble makers possible. Yet observations in many places suggest that without credibility and legitimacy of systems, functionality cannot be guaranteed. Most universities do not have any early-warning systems because of imposed structures which are not perceived as having legitimation powers in any conflict. Therefore, participation in committees has remained passive as the perception of the whole set-up is negative. Apart from the formal existence of committees in all sectors of university life, there has to be an atmosphere of trust, respect, and a vision of shared goals between administration, teaching staff, and students. This is a long-term process which needs to be in place for early-warning systems to work.

It has now become fashionable to look for culprits of student protests among university administrators and ministry officials after any crisis. Very often this witch-hunting is done with little regard to the complexity of the incident at hand. This has resulted in the worst forms of humiliation of some of the best brains in most of these countries. Vice chancellors are over night dismissed and placed behind ministerial desks without files or secretarial support for months. Some of the postings into powerless, or better still harmless, positions such as open universities in Tanzania and higher education councils in Kenya, or the President's Office in Zambia are now dubbed 'cemeteries.' Years of dedication and commitment to excellence in service are immediately forgotten as the individuals become enemies of the system. The impact of such dismissals during and immediately after a crisis must be quite traumatic to larger sections of the academic community who have to ask: 'If it happened to so and so, who is safe?' Governments may need to design better methods of making changes in universities so that apathy, brain drain, and waste are averted or moderated.

Student Tactics, Victories, and Failures

In the meanwhile, university students are getting more sophisticated in combining violence, court procedures, and negotiation. Encouraged by the fact that they are winning battles though not the wars, they talk like Paine who is cited by one student leader with respect to the 1971 Tanzanian crisis (Ekirapa, 1971) as saying: "Tyranny like hell is difficult to conquer but we have the consolation that the deeper the conflict the greater the triumph. So fail we may today, tomorrow we know not who wins. Here we stand condemned but tomorrow history will say differently of us" (Annex 2c). They seem to believe, like others before them in the pride of engaging the force and power of wealth, privilege, property, and state violence with little more than their ideals, fears, and a vague sense of outrage at the injustices of society until the states open up for dialogue and arrest the situations. In some countries of Africa students appear to be neglected and harassed

in ways hardly consistent with democratic ideals or productive learning, and it seems that the less vocal the opposition among the student body, the greater the neglect and harassment is likely to be. Therefore it seems that students, though lacking a cohesive social movement, and thus cannot be labelled revolutionary in the true sense of the word, are likely to continue the struggle to affirm their right to live, to be heard, and to participate in the democratization of their societies. They don't seem to want to see prosperity without lasting values and security as this may end in chaos.

In the political processes, students have been quite instrumental to many changes in the region. The democratization of university governance in Dar-es-Salaam was due mainly to student protests. Resultant Commission reports (Mungai, 1971) there and in Nairobi (Lugonzo, 1974), Zimbabwe (Mkushi Report, 1989), and Zambia (Nyirenda, 1983) made an impact. In the case of Zambia, the dismantling of the one-party, one man rule and the acceptance of a multiparty system can be greatly attributed to the student protest in 1989/90, while in Zimbabwe the students have been in the forefront of the pro-democracy movement. The current leadership in Zimbabwe has now publicly abandoned its one-party state plans. In Kenya, student activism has been in the forefront of pro-democracy movements and seems to be gaining wide support.

Characteristically, students' tactics have focused on issues and systems rather than individuals. They have tried not to attack the head of state in a head-on confrontation. However, they tend to use a progressive ideology such as struggling for equality, justice, and progress which strike a sympathetic chord with the masses, trade unions, and other underclasses, which the state fears might join the protests. The University of Zimbabwe student leaders put it this way: 'As a student union we should never betray the working class and the peasantry' (Annex 2d). But even progressive leaders like Nyerere and Mugabe do not want groups on their left, for they present a challenge and a potential threat to their power bases. Thus, Nyerere, one time (1978), at the University of Dar-es-Salaam,

when his version of socialism was challenged by students, told them to 'try to teach Marxism to their mothers' and not him. Mugabe, in 1989, had to go public to argue that people who ran away from the struggle for the liberation of the country and now pretended to know socialism and revolution more than him were misguided misfits.

Yet, although students do not start with attacking the heads of state head on, on matters of corruption, inefficiency and oppression, they definitely point at their closest advisors. In Zimbabwe, the Ministers who lost their jobs due to corruption, especially the one who committed suicide (Mr. Nyagumbo) were very close to the President. In Zambia, they point at the President's wife, and son who was being groomed as heir apparent. In Tanzania, the students point to the President's closest proteges, such as Mr. Kitwana Kondo, whose poor administration of the city of Dar-es-Salaam has made it one of the most chaotic and dirtiest cities in the continent. Likewise, the issue of accountability and lack of disclosure of probe committee reports on a second-hand ferry that collapsed on arrival and killed people point to the President's friend, Mr. Mustafa Nyang'anyi, who was the responsible minister. In Kenya, protests will always point fingers at the closest allies of the powers that be, such as Mr. Biwott some of whom are even being refused to participate in the burials of people who died mysteriously. Some heads of state have taken cues from such attacks to distance themselves and take the appropriate actions. But the strategy cannot work in situations where allegations cannot be substantiated beyond reasonable doubt or where the accused actually hold the reigns of power or have a following which can create more political problems if fired.

When the protests get too protracted and students get a feeling of futility of their struggle, then they turn on the head of state. Their attack is a last resort and is often done in desperation. Students are also starting to utilize the legal machinery to advance their causes. In systems where the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed, this seems to be working. For instance, in Botswana, when some of the students peacefully demonstrated

against the introduction of fees in 1989, the university was closed to weed out ringleaders and to introduce new conditions of admission. The Students appealed to the high court against the closure and their eviction from the university. The judgement came in their favour, saying that since not all students boycotted classes, collective punishment was unjustified and the Council cannot close the university primarily to 'sift' out students and to induce those it accepted to again sign a declaration (Kheola, 1990).

On the other hand, when the University of Lesotho was closed in March 1990, due to a student boycott of classes protesting against a new fee structure, the court only gave them a temporary injunction to have access to their belongings. It upheld the Council's decision to close the university, because, first, students were given a chance to be heard; second, all students were boycotting classes, and finally as a precautionary measure since students were becoming violent.

In Kenya, when several students were expelled from Egerton University and their examination results and certificates confiscated, they went to the High Court, which ruled that 'University authorities have no right to expel students before giving them a chance to defend themselves as such action was a breach of the laws of natural and traditional justice because it denied an aggrieved party a chance to be heard before being condemned' (Kinyanjui, 1990, p. 1). Thus the students won the case to the astonishment of the University, which claimed that the Council had the right to discipline students as it wished according to the University Act. This obviously is wishful thinking as no institution is above the law and universities cannot be exceptions, and the earlier they recognize this the better as they will apply legal machinery and laws of natural justice in handling student and staff conflicts and disputes.

In Tanzania, where the judiciary has been thoroughly muzzled, students have not been able to use the High Court to intervene in their struggles against the State. In the

1990 crisis, on coming back after seven months of rustication, students realized that 21 of their fellows were not readmitted. Both the staff and students observed that, 'no procedures under the University Act, or criminal procedures under the laws of the land were followed in handing down the punishment to the 21 students, contrary to the University Act and elementary principles of national justice' (Business Times, Tanzania, 1 January 1991, p. 1). The students and staff declared that the return to normalcy, peace, and stability on the campus required that justice be done and that the issues that the students were fighting for still needed rectification. It is not likely that the courts in Tanzania will entertain a legal battle with the students, given the tradition of what a famous law professor (Kumar, 1986) characterized as 'expediency overrunning legality'. This was established earlier when staff and students were illegally and improperly searched, arrested, and detained without intervention and protest from the legal professions (as reported in *CODESTRIA Bulletin* Number 4, 1989, pp. 14-16).

In the meantime, students are running ahead of their times in anticipation of political pluralism in the region. They are starting to articulate their views, roles, and responsibilities in the new context. The fear of many politicians in developing countries is that the universities can easily be used by opposition parties to destabilize their countries. Indeed, if universities as institutions or the staff and student associations as entities decided to back certain political parties, this would jeopardize their own academic freedom and university autonomy, which may have serious consequences on the management and funding of higher education. Yet individuals as citizens should have the right to express their opinions on issues being articulated by any political party. The University of Zambia students who participated in the pro-democracy movement in the country until the multiparty system was legalized, put their position as follows:

Unza students were for multipartyism but would not affiliate [with] any political party because such a move would deny them their autonomy

which assure them of the freedom to criticize the government for its shortcomings and misdeeds.

(Sefuka, 1990)

The student leader insisted that they wanted to be a watchdog institution of peoples' rights and no party would be allowed to set foot on the campus. This student leader was addressing a crowd of over 70,000 people with other multiparty leaders. He urged the separation of the party from the government, the lifting of the ban on student unions, and a guarantee of freedom of the press.

Likewise, the University of Zimbabwe students have been in the forefront of pro-democracy and their student leader, Mr. A.G.A. Mutambara (1989), who is known to be a first-class engineering student, wrote of their position:

We don't see the rationale of establishing a petty bourgeoisie one-party state. In this vein we unreservedly condemn the refusal by the police to grant permission to ZUM [an opposition party] to hold their political rallies on Sunday. We want to make it abundantly clear that our condemnation of the police decision is from very principled grounds of sustaining national democratic rights and not out of allegiance to ZUM.

(Annex 2b, p. 2).

Of course, like any other movement, students are subject to manipulation, wittingly or unwittingly, depending on many variables such as ethnicity, quality of leadership, current power balances, sense of fair play, and, above all, the nature of guidance from universities and the government. Yet this position by the students suggesting that the university should remain above party politics is a commendable one, and needs to be capitalized on, and thus students movements should always be on the lookout for evil forces out to destroy their movements.

Students, as a voice in African politics and in the debate on the role of higher education in national development, will have to stay clear of other partisan movements such as the church, trade unions, and professional groups agitating for democracy in Africa.

They need to retain the distinct character of an impartial critic and champion of justice, equality, and decent government. Their intellectual agenda, inputs and destiny need to be different from the political and moral agendas of trade unions and churches, as much as happy convergences and coincidences should be appreciated and harnessed. Carrying the clergy shoulder high as university students do in Kenya will only compromise that sense of purity of intellectual criticism. Moreover, the state will use such actions as evidence of partisan postures, and thus oppress and suppress students further. In Zambia the church proved quite conservative and disintegrative in the student movement when they tried to orchestrate a neoconservative conscientization committee to fight student radicalism. In Tanzania, the workers movement, whose weekly paper *Mfanyakazi* was initially the only avenue for students to articulate and communicate their plights to the people, proved quite vicious once the students appeared to have a more militant, radical, and independent agenda. In Zimbabwe, the trade unions use the university on constitutional matters but do not want to be closely associated with the students' radical agenda. It does not seem that intimate and formal student alliance with these groups is neither feasible nor desirable but can be productively complementary. Universities as institutions have a mandate and a mission that transcends ideologies and partisan movements. They need to be protected. The independence of student movements as articulated by the UNZA and UZI students is quite consistent with the ethos of academic institutions which are expected to be autonomous and impartial but critical of social institutions. Although one cannot go as far as Mazrui (1978) who counsels students against street demonstrations which more than often end in uncalled for violence, intellectuals must differentiate between demonstrations associated with legitimate criticism and partisan politics, irresponsible political posturing or violence.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The students in African universities live in a world of contradictions. In times of peace universities are referred to as the mirror of the nation. In times of crisis it becomes clear that this mirror is not expected to reflect the image of the nation but rather an aberration, alienating youths from their true social roots. Secondly, universities are projected as ivory towers but within these towers decay and deprivation abound, and students live close to the legend of poor Lazarus projected as a king. Some of the high-rise buildings which characterize most university campuses are now commonly referred to as withering heights or tottering towers. The ivory tower claim is either a result of ignorance about the actual realities or a conspiracy to accentuate the perceived gap between students and other struggling groups. Thirdly, public policy pronouncements would lead one to believe that students are expected to approach issues with an open mind and articulate them freely and loudly. However, the behaviour of the state suggests the contrary. It has become quite clear that students are expected to keep quiet about societal issues. Fourth, and a most interesting contradiction, is that when it suits the interest of power groups, students are referred to as mature adults who should be exemplary leaders of tomorrow. When students try to take independent and critical action or positions, they are quickly dismissed as misguided, irresponsible, and treacherous or simply as adulterated youths.

In Africa, it is reasonable to assume, as in Okpako (1985), that student activism will continue and demands for fair play, freedom of expression, democracy, accountability, transparency efficiency, and quality education will persist. Resistance to current social structures and political arrangements will surge, too. This is especially so in the light of the collapse of one-party and military dictatorship in some African countries, Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R., which had given inspiration and a facade of legitimacy to these prototypes and proteges. Indeed, one has to agree with Olugbade (1990) that given current antiquated and accelestial political and social systems in contemporary Africa, student

activism will play a very significant role in reforms and progressive changes for the betterment of society. What needs to be developed is a sense of realism, patience, better organization in protests, and a sense of direction among students on the one hand, and on the other, improvement in the managerial skills of government, a sense of direction, and maintenance of a healthy balance between toleration of activism, facilitation of expression of dissent, and control. Unfortunately, it seems that state hegemonic interests have so far dictated the use of police, troops, and spies for which the regimes seem to be most efficiently specialized (Tilly, 1978). Instead of perceiving student activism in the negative sense only, it should be identified as one of the most important social forces shaping societies and institutions of social and higher learning. Academicians, administrators, and politicians could concentrate on how to channel this activism and the concomitant ideas, forces and energies towards the most productive social and intellectual avenues. This calls for change in the social order such that conflict is seen as potentially productive and healthy rather than inimical and disruptive. Both students and staff seem to express an awareness that all the yearning for stability, order, equilibrium, tranquillity, and normality shrouded in the current developmental ideology is quite characteristic of class interest in the maintenance of the status quo and continued prosperity of the empowered groups. The state needs to also realize that:

When political legitimacy is fully secure, the citizens do not question the government's right to govern ... but when it is not secure, challenges to authority may allow little differentiation between dissent, insubordination, rebellion, and outright treason.

(Mazrui, 1978, pp. 273-274)

Likewise, as history teaches, when power degenerates into anarchy, and governments violate the fundamental rights of people, subjects are normally relieved of their obligation to obey the law. Thus, some of the student protests and violence might be seen as anarchy, as they are attacks on power, but may be raising more fundamental issues than hitherto appreciated.

Some regimes, such as in Zambia and Tanzania, have started to initiate talks about political and economic liberalism through referendums, commissions to collect opinions, and cosmetic initiatives meant to silence opposition groups such as students and the intelligentsia in general. Yet for university students it seems that democracy and freedom of expression and association are not negotiable commodities. In many countries in Africa, both sides will lose if things proceed the way they are doing now, which is an uncompromising confrontation. The states need to learn how to handle nonviolent protests for it is their inexperience which pushes them to using force. The intensity of the struggles, involving police who seem to take pride in "teaching a lesson" to the students whom they call 'spoilt kids' who in turn call them 'dogs, hogs, and buga buga' for '*trash trash*' in Ghana, suggest elements of both class struggle and premeditated state violence against unarmed opponents of current social arrangements. This has to stop if stability is to be achieved.

One of the popularly proclaimed goal of university education is that of 'preparing young people to play a dynamic and constructive part in the development of the society in which all members share fairly in the good and bad fortune of the group ... and to inculcate a sense of commitment to the total community' (Nyerere, cited in Olugbade, 1990, p.40). Indeed, like adults, students have to choose between conformity, acting in a ritualistic or opportunistic manner, being passive and acquiescent or retreating to assure safety on the one hand, and being innovative, active, constructive, and engaging in a manner that can be positive but at times temporarily oppositional, on the other. Obviously, the second choice is more befitting and consistent with the analysis so far, as university education needs to be both socially and intellectually engaging if it is to be relevant, complete, and wholesome. Likewise, most regimes in contemporary Africa need active public opinion to stay healthy and retain legitimacy, and thus coercion and use of force need to be absolutely avoided as they do not further that goal. The fact of life is that the university will remain forever what Mazrui (1975) called the most powerful multinational

entity linking countries directly and indirectly to a system of international knowledge accumulation, articulation, distribution, dissemination, and utilization. Moreover, the university can be used for reducing technological dependency, fighting decolonization and domestication of the modernization process. Fighting it the way it is done now just militates against achievement of these goals.

It is high time people questioned the tendency to see the university as a cultural cauldron of imperialism and international intellectual hegemony. Much of the university staff in Africa, for good or for worse, has been localized and are educated enough to take independent views regarding what is good, appropriate, and productive in their cultural and social contexts. No one has a monopoly on the wisdom guiding any developmental ideology. Sometimes it seems that current regimes are telling universities: let a thousand flowers blossom but all of them have to be blue. This kind of orientation only alienates universities and solidifies opposition groups as indeed some of the reactions to violence in universities do boomerang. Likewise, when states issue warnings and ultimatums in the most peremptory terms, students don't seem to take them seriously; they are only part of the games and struggles. Thus it is only through concrete organization, and decency in state instruments that the pattern of confrontation can be arrested.

Universities, on the other hand, do not seem to be able to improve their image for rehabilitation and restoration of confidence after closures. Musangi (1980), of the University of Nairobi, complains of a lack of strategy for the university to restore its damaged image, through a mass media publicity blitz including interviews and meetings with senior officials, and reporting key accomplishments and ongoing activities of the university. One wonders for how long a university remains blemished. Universities do not talk about their relationship with their communities, as if their privileged position absolves them from investing in creating a dialogue. In fact, these days, one hears about the university only either during a crisis or when government officials are performing

ceremonial functions. Universities need to maintain continued vigilance against damage to their image for they stand to lose a lot of goodwill and support from their constituents. The eroded confidence, disillusionment with the system, brain drain, and sense of futility associated with recurrent student crises have to be tackled aggressively so that respect for knowledge and talented people is restored immediately after a crisis. For academics, loss of freedom of speech is a serious infliction that even governments cannot afford as it will stunt innovation and social progress. Some governments, adding insult to injury, continue to harbour hardened attitudes towards higher education, enforcing more surveillance and repression and cutting down financial support to the university after such a crisis. This just worsens the situation. China cut down financial support by 19.4 percent and 10.8 percent for graduate and undergraduate education respectively, but soon realized that it only aggravated the crisis of the State rather than the university (Forester, 1990), much like a dog biting its own tail.

It is the duty of the state and the university to first arrive at an amicable understanding when the image of the university has been damaged by any protracted crisis culminating in violence and closure. The fact of the matter is that student protests expose some of the most private and personal aspects of the ways universities are governed revealing corruption, inefficiency and conflict. It helps nobody to let the university image remain severely damaged for long, since too much has been invested in these institutions of higher learning. Likewise, the causes of the student crisis need to be investigated further after closure and resumption of operations so that all the necessary follow-up actions are taken. Evidence suggests that if one crisis is not satisfactorily settled, it tends to feed into the next one. It is thus absolutely necessary that all efforts be made to ensure that grievances are settled as amicably as possible. Imposed solutions do not seem to work. It is also to be appreciated that many of the student agitations have had positive effects, and that the demands for accountability, efficiency, democracy, press freedom, better education, academic freedom merely affirm the point that the economic and intellectual development

of the people has reached a level where they feel they are sufficiently empowered to assert these demands as their right. It is not a retrogressive step. In fact, one gets surprised by the similarity of the struggles, given that the students in the region do not have a common forum, and thus do not constitute a coordinated movement across the campuses. It might be a good idea for the Association of African Universities to encourage similar pan-African or subregional bodies for students so that they may benefit from interlearning.

Observations and Guiding Principles

- The institution of the presidency in any democratic system needs to retain protocol, be held in high esteem, operate with some sanctity, reverence, and sacrosanctity. It has a big responsibility for the security and welfare of all the people. It should be the custodian of the highest and durable moral values. Civility owes it to universities to be the last institution to violate this posture and image of the institution unless state repression warrants it. The head of state should not be dragged into personal confrontations with students while it is known that a crisis has no limitations of protocol and cannot be solved through that path. Likewise, the head of state who happens to be the chancellor of the university should remain impartial so that he can perform an advocacy role. He should visit the university to give inspiration, encouragement, ceremonial blessings; receiving goodwill missions from the universities; making major policy pronouncements, and attending other ceremonies and academic occasions rather than negotiating allowances or debating the efficacy of his regime. This is better done elsewhere and differently, and yet still involve the university community. A head of state gets involved in student politics at his own risk. Otherwise the ministers and vice-chancellors should be the negotiators and gatekeepers. The

chancellor/president should be the final arbiter. In this way, he has a chance to act presidential and fatherly, as much as university populations are starting to resent the notion of 'a father of a nation', and question the whole idea of a Head of State being a formal chancellor of a university.

- To play a credible advocacy role for the university, a head of state should use the triennial visitation reports, and these should involve comprehensive reviews of the institution and its leadership, such that crises resulting from gross negligence may be anticipated and handled accordingly before they erupt.
- Universities as institutions should inspire and lead by example, with high standards of decency, impartiality, efficiency, moral integrity and competence. Then they can speak from a position of strength rather than weakness when it comes to crises.
- Universities can have in place regular mechanisms and procedures for monitoring and harmonizing restiveness and disruptive tendencies among students and staff. This is not achievable only in formal structures but by approaches that transcend structure, by ensuring collegial relationships and respect among all people in the university community.
- Once incipient revolts are spotted, issues should be narrowed down quickly and mechanisms for their resolution be put firmly and swiftly in place. Negotiations, dialogue, legitimacy, and respect for agreed rules and procedures will determine crisis outcomes. All evidence suggests that the collaborative dialogic model has the highest potential for constructive engagement and positive resolution.

- Universities should maintain one negotiating front only as much as other units should collaborate and contribute ideas. Having multiple fronts complicates situations, and exhibits conflicting signals and rewards which result in protraction of the crisis.
- Administrators saying 'No' to angry students in a mob does not help. 'No' is not the operative word but rather quiet negotiation, logic, and fair play. 'No' can be said in many ways, but students don't seem to appreciate a 'No,' nor will they respect the 'elder' tradition.
- Administrators should never underestimate any crisis. Brushing aside an incipient crisis as a minority view just gives student leadership time to evolve a more appealing agenda, making the administration the primary target, which can be costly.
- During a crisis, any attempt to isolate some student leaders for sanctions while other students are still on campus will spark off a revolt. It is better to negotiate with the given leadership, and if necessary, take time, or close the university for a brief period to isolate the leaders for counselling and evocation of sanctions.
- During a crisis, peremptory warnings and threats about use of force or penalties do not seem to work. Once the propensity towards violence has been put under control, then only one open system of legitimation should be used at a time. If one side doesn't follow procedures, laws and regulations, why expect the other to follow them? Civil servant rules and norms should not be evoked for these don't apply to students.

- When in crisis with students, all efforts should be made to prevent its externalization. As a crisis is externalized, the agenda is also expanded, refined, and legitimized so as to look credible. Use of police or the military forces to handle a university crisis is the worst crime that a university administration can commit. Immediately they are used, loaded issues such as brutality, academic freedom, university autonomy, freedom of speech, and fair play are brought in. Students will always say 'we were unarmed and peaceful', even when they had stones in their pockets.
- The whole institution of the Head of State being also the Chancellor of a university need re-examination. University officials seem to find it easy to call upon the Head of State as chancellor to intervene when they are in trouble but when the Head of State intervenes using both hats there is protest against interfering in academic freedom and institutional autonomy. Maybe it is high time this practice is abandoned altogether in favour of more neutral independent chancellors.
- It does not seem that students have exploited fully negotiation as a mechanism for conflict resolution. It will be important for universities to institute counselling and training facilities to enable students to use and pursue negotiation as the basic mode for handling their grievances and wildcat boycotts, standoffs, and violence as a last resort in any conflict.

Areas for Support

Students seem to have played a crucial role in the democratization of universities as educational institutions, and in promoting this ideal in their countries in general. They

campaigns for essential freedoms in areas of intellectual expansion such as a free press (on the campus and in the country), free association, participation in decision making, all of which are important in leadership training, development, and central to the purpose and mission of universities. They have struggled for efficiency and accountability in institutions of higher learning and in the state apparatus. They have reminded university authorities that they don't have to live in penury and squalor as a sacrifice for the education they are getting, especially when this state of affairs is related to negligence and inefficiency, either in the universities or the nation.

While there are problems in the manner students have raised and handled their cases, it is very difficult to indict them of unbridled political posturing and irresponsibility in raising the issues they fight for. The best course of action on the part of funders and administrators is to help students play an even qualitatively more important role in the enhancement and maintenance of quality and standards in higher education. Specifically, the areas of interest should be:

1. Student Welfare Issues

In any support given to higher education, attention should be paid to students welfare in areas such as:

- Catering, such that quality food and services can be offered. Systems of 'buy and eat' in small cafeterias selling affordable meals will need to be established instead of mass cooking, characteristic of military barracks.
- Residence facilities, such that decency can be maintained. Many more students may have to stay off campus but university residences need to be good examples of decent living.

- Recreation facilities need to be built and maintained. In particular, staff should include necessary personnel such as games coaches and counsellors.
- Regular reviews of living conditions and the financial circumstances of students need to be conducted so as to monitor the quality of life.

2. Knowledge Expansion

Consideration needs to be given to such areas as:

- Student publications with trained editorial groups. Likewise, university affairs general publications (could be monthly) need to be maintained to enlighten the public and inform other universities of what is going on.
- A student union secretariat, and facilities for international and national contacts.
- Student visits, both within the region and internationally for moot courts, science exhibitions, student conferences, debates and explorations of what other universities are teaching and how student unions are organized in other universities. Some of the conditionalities for funding universities should be the existence of free student unions, publications, and associations.
- Regular joint seminars or retreats for staff, students, and policy people to examine common goals and problems in higher education.

- Support for student subject associations such that there can be inter university exchange of students and, joint experiments, for example.

3. Student Administration

Areas of support could include:

- Training of administrators in negotiation skills and management of student crises.
- Provisions for the Dean of Students' offices.
- Training of student administration personnel such as counsellors, lawyers, and games and sports coaches.

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Evolution of Four University Crises

Annex 1a: Evolution of the 6/10/1989 University of Zimbabwe Crisis

Prelude:

28.9.1988-3.10.1988 Students launch an anticorruption campaign appealing to an end of scandals and corruption in the government and the ruling party. They were refused permission to demonstrate in town and this resulted in four days of violent struggle on the campus and in town involving police.

The 1989 Crisis

28.9.89 Students decided to have a Commemorative Gala cum Seminar on the campus for the Anticorruption Campaign of 1988.

29.9.89 The police advised that the Seminar was conceived in political terms so it needed government permission which the police refused to give. The students objected to police refusal so wanted to proceed with the seminar. The police arrived on the campus and blocked the meeting places. Violent struggles erupted.

2.10.89 Students sought audience with the Vice-Chancellor and the President (who is also the Chancellor) to protest against the police actions and then circulated a strongly worded document on Academic Freedom and University Autonomy.

3.10.89 The Vice-Chancellor and student leaders agreed on common strategies for the discussion of Academic Freedom and University Autonomy and agreed to clear arrangements for the Seminar to take place. A meeting with the Minister of Education was to be arranged.

4.10.89 Predawn arrest of two student leaders sparked class boycotts, violence against university administration, damage of buildings and vehicles. Police force was deployed in all day battles. By 17.30 the Vice-Chancellor and his team closed the University.

6.10.89 Council met, and endorsed the closure and appointed of a Commission of Inquiry.

Annex 1b: The Evolution of the May 12, 1990 Crisis at the University of Dar-es-Salaam

Prelude

- a. In 1989 two student leaders were arrested and detained improperly after a disagreement with the national youth movement leaders during a trip to North Korea.
- b. An independent students union has been challenging the Party youth leaguers on leadership in universities but was not registered.
- c. The academic staff had been working on a radical declaration on Academic Freedom and Social Responsibilities in early 1990.
- d. 13.1.1990 Students, in a circular letter discussed:
 - i.corruption and theft of public funds;
 - ii.need for more democratization in the country;
 - iii.dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation;
 - iv.increasing cases of human rights abuses in the country.

The 1990 Crisis

22.3.1990 A regular University Council met and rejected students' proposals to increase their allowances for books, travel, and meals. The Principal Secretary of the Ministry Of Education is said to have been harsh on students' request.

- 5.4.1990 Student leaders met to discuss the rejection of their proposals and decided to hold a general meeting of all students (*Baraza*) on 7.5.1990, so served notice of class cancellation and wanted to use the Assembly Hall. The Deputy Vice-Chancellor advised them to meet in the afternoon as mornings are busy.
- 7.4.1990 Students defied the advice and assembled in the morning to find the Hall closed. They force the Vice-Chancellor to open it and attend their meeting. Students also force the Vice-Chancellor to summon his five top officers (for administration, health, estates, finance, and catering) to be questioned by the students *Baraza* on efficiency, corruption and accountability in their places of work. Three were found 'guilty' so the *Baraza* wanted them dismissed and gave a warning to the other two. The Vice-Chancellor explained his part on the shortages of basic things such as chalk and seats, and suggests that the Minister of Education should be asked to answer questions pertaining to his Ministry and government, such as budget for education, accountability and efficiency. Students started class boycott until such a meeting takes place.
- 9.4.1990 Class boycott continues, the Ministry requested student leaders to go for discussion in the Ministry but the students refused; hold another *Baraza*, ask the Principal Secretary to come to address them.
- 10.4.1990 The Principal Secretary came. Students made a pitched presentation on low minimum wages and producer prices, high salaries of government officials, environmental issues, employment after graduation, low education budget. Many students walked out of the meeting saying the Principal Secretary's explanations were unsatisfactory. They want to see the President/Chancellor himself.
- 11.4.1990 Senate met and got briefed. Academic staff decide to support students. Party Branch urges students to resume classes.

- 12.4.1990 Staff and students met, raised a joint position paper and selected representatives, without power to negotiate, to present it to the Chancellor.
- 14.4.1990 Appointment Committee met to hear allegations against senior staff.
- 15.4.1990 The joint delegation met the President/Chancellor with his team, presented their paper, but desist from discussions, and then invited the Chancellor to come to the university for discussions. Chancellor urges resumption of classes as he travels to Europe, with a promise to visit University around 8th or 12th May, 1990.
- 16.4.1990 The delegation appraised the university. Many other meetings took place. Students refused to resume classes. Academic staff are divided on whether to continue supporting students or abandon them.
- 17.4.1990 The University Council met and urged students to obey the President's instruction to resume classes and directed the university to provide students with working tools such as paper, pens, chalk and desks. Government gave a peremptory ultimatum through the radio that students should resume classes otherwise they will be severely punished. Mass media blitz starts portraying university students as ungrateful, traitors, disloyal, and foreigners.
- 18.4.1990 Council meeting resolutions were communicated to the students by a Councillor, Mr. J.V. Mwapachu.
- 19.4.1990 Students resumed classes but boast that they did so on their own accord not out of government pressure.
- 20.4.1990 The Prime Minister, Mr. Joseph Warioba called meeting of University leadership, accused some members of staff of fermenting the crisis and advised that the President would visit the University as President and not as Chancellor, hence tacit message for protocol and use of coercive force. Students and staff continued to prepare their statement for the visit.

- 3.5.1990** The Prime Minister held another meeting with the University leadership, students, and staff, who complained about mass media reports but no apologies or regrets were tendered.
- 7.5.1990** The President paid an impromptu visit to the University, talked to Party and University leaders only (no students). He advised that since students didn't go to class as directed for two days, he was not obligated to meet them. He castigated university leadership for failing to handle the crisis. Students react angrily, call for the President to resign and dirty graffiti goes up on many walls. Security officials trying to pull down the posters clash with students and shots are heard.
- 9.5.1990** The President promises to visit the University now on 10.5.1990 to meet staff. Student leaders are arrested for questioning, graffiti increases in number and ferocity; boycott of classes continues, demonstrations are planned.
- 10.5.1990** The President cancelled the visit and says he knows of the dirty posters. Boycotts continue.
- 11.5.1990** Executive Committee of Council meets. President confirms he is not coming and boycotts continue.
- 12.5.1990** The University is closed by a radio announcement.
- 17.5.1990** University Council met, endorsed closure, appoints Commission of Inquiry.
- 1.1.1991** The University is reopened for continuing students only.

Annex 1c: The Evolution of the July 13, 1971 University of Dar-es-Salaam Crisis

Prelude

A new university had just been promulgated in July 1970, breaking away from the University of East Africa. A non-academic Vice-Chancellor, Mr. P. Msekwa, National Party Secretary, with a B.A in political science, had just been installed with a new team

replacing the well respected Principal Dr. W.K. Chagula and the Registrar, Chief P. Kunambi. The new administration had curbed freedom of association and press on the campus by banning student publications such as *Cheche*, and independent student unions in favour of the Party youth leaguers. It had endorsed socialist policies including the introduction of cooperative societies and military exercises for students. Thus the atmosphere was tense.

The 1971 Crisis

- 7.7.1971 Afternoon: The Vice-Chancellor made a graduation speech citing accomplishments, commitments and new plans for the university, including the introduction of socialistic structure such as cooperatives, military training, parental and party authority.
- 7.7.1971 Evening: Student leadership verbally expressed concerns and displeasure with the Vice-Chancellor's speech and promised to issue an open letter to challenge it, and these concerns reached the Vice-Chancellor during graduation festivities.
- 8.7.1971 Morning: The Vice-Chancellor, curious about the content of the letter went to student's office to try to discuss their concerns and find out the contents of the letter. The students cabinet under its president, Mr. S. Akivaga refused to divulge contents of the letter or to rescind it but discussed it generally.
- 8.7.1971 Afternoon: The letter is distributed on the campus and to the Press. Main complaints included mismanagement, unilateral decisions, stubbornness, lack of debates with students and faculty, *in loco parentis*, telling the public lies about the university, creating cleavages between the administration, students and teaching staff, conservatism, blocking dialogue, and personality cult. The letter summoned the Vice-Chancellor to a meeting to explain his stand.

8.7.1971 Evening: The Vice-Chancellor, in consultation with the provost, dean of students, and registrar decided to evoke disciplinary actions against the President of the Student Union. Charges were formally raised.

7.1971 Morning: The students leader with his cabinet appeared before the University Disciplinary Committee and he is personally charged for libelous statements against the Vice-Chancellor, undermining discipline in the student body, creating discord and disharmony between the students and the rest of the university. He warns the University that the charge is unfair and any action against him personally would lead to student revolts. However, the university decided to rusticate him immediately after finding him guilty. Then Faculty Deans were called for a meeting to be appraised of the developments and decisions. In the meantime, the student leader addressed a student *Baraza* which demanded an explanation why their leader should be singled out for punishment. The Vice-Chancellor fails, in fear, to turn up to address the meeting which degenerated into a violent revolt. The riot police had to be called to quell it and several students were injured. The students decided to boycott classes until their leader is brought back, condemned the use of the riot squad against unarmed students, called for resignation of the Vice-Chancellor, and proclaimed support for the Chancellor, Tanzania government and the Ruling Party. The Vice-Chancellor justified his action by saying he had no alternative 'because of the rude language used in the letter' (p. 8).

10.7.1971 Meetings were called for academic staff and university workers who decided to support the students' revolt which had spread to other campuses of the university. They condemned the action of the administration and recommended it rescind rustication and instead restructure the university to allow for participatory democracy and dialogue. The Party Youth Leaguers condemned the Vice-Chancellor for

'apotheosis and obscurantism, reaction and obduracy, with Hitlerite and neo Nazi style of leadership' (Mungai, 1971).

- 12.7.1971 The University Council met to endorse the charges, noted that the University Act was circumvented as there was no chance for appeal by the aggrieved, recommended a Committee to investigate the crisis. The crisis became a national issue so the Party, the Cabinet, and the President are briefed.
- 13.7.1971 Chairman of the Council addressed the students, another Student *Baraza* was called, two Senior academics address the students, a delegation of students is sent to see the President/Chancellor of the University to give their version of the story. The students appealed on behalf of their leader but the Appeal Tribunal of external administrators upheld the decision of the disciplinary Committee.
- 23.8.1971 Students leadership resigned and the whole student body decide not to cooperate with administration on anything until Mr. Akivaga is reinstated. Class boycotts were to continue until he is reinstated. Later he willingly transferred to the University of Nairobi.

Annex 1d: The Evolution of the 1986 University of Zambia Crisis

Prelude:

The 1984 crisis leading to university closure left tensions between the students and the Catholic Church. The negative campaign of the Zambia Press had continued and intra administration feuds between the federal university administration and campus administration had persisted.

Feb 1986: Catholic Church Conscientization Committee is formed with tacit approval of a section of students. The President of the Students Union accused it of being CIA inspired.

The 1986 Crises

- 5.3.1986 President of the Students Union for the entire university system showed disagreement with the local chapter of Student Union and formally accused the Catholic chaplains of being CIA agents.
- 6.3.1986 The meeting between the student leadership and the Catholic community aborted because of disagreements within student bodies and the Dean of Students failed to mediate the reconciliation between the Church and the students.
- 8.4.1986 Students leaders met, formed vigilantes who broke into the chaplain's office, ransacked it and dumped equipment outside. They grabbed a chaplain, forced him to speak to students, and dragged the leaders of the Catholic Council on the campus to the church house and threw them over the locked gates.
- 9.4.1986 Students held a general meeting and issued a scathing attack on the Catholic Church, the university administration and staff.
- 10.4.1986 Principal of the University required the student leaders to admit their attack on the Catholic Church, in writing, which they did. The Dean of Students tried to reconcile but students walked out of a meeting and the church was officially informed of the university's view on the attacks against the Catholic community.
- 21.4.1986 Students Union called for dissolution of the Catholic Council, which after consultations with the university and the Catholic community, demanded explanations why it should be dissolved on 5.5.1986.

- 2.5.1986** Student leaders issued an open ultimatum to buy an ambulance for the university clinic and a motor cycle for the Dean of Students by 8.5.1986.
- 7.5.1986** The University administration explained that the ambulance had been ordered but that a vehicle for the Dean's office was stolen in 1985 and could not be replaced until investigations regarding its disappearance were completed.
- 12.5.1986** The student leadership called for a boycott of classes for two days (12 and 13 May 1986).
- 13.5.1986** Students Union called for an all out meeting for secondary school students and other institutions of higher learning. The Principal called a meeting of academic deans and resolved that the President of the Student Union should be expelled from the university.
- 15.5.1986** The University counselled the students against holding the conference but students refused. The university cancelled the meeting and Dean of Education warns that students would be deregistered if they continued with the protest meetings.
- 16.5.1986** The President of Students Union physically assaulted the principal of the university and was arrested by police. Students became violent, damaged buildings, property and burnt official cars of the Principal and registrar.
- 18.5.1986** The University is closed due to escalating violence, to be reopened after a term.

Annex II: Samples of Students' Documents

Annex 2a: Open Letter to the Vice-Chancellor During the 1971 Crisis

DAR ES SALAAM UNIVERSITY STUDENTS' ORGANIZATION

University of Dar-es-Salaam
P.O. Box 35080
Dar es Salaam

DUSO/3

8th July 1971

The Vice-Chancellor
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar-es-Salaam

Dear Mr. Vice-Chancellor:

OPEN LETTER TO VICE-CHANCELLOR

The way you have handled this university has caused concern and continues to cause concern to any thinking mind. You are aware that since the inception of this university there has been a general mismanagement unfortunately shrouded in lies calculated to deceive both the Chancellor and the outside world. Indeed you have gone further to take unilateral decisions causing a lot of embarrassment to those affected by your decisions. Those involved in decision making in the university hear about major policy pronouncements in public places without prior discussion, consultation or even information. The result of such activities have proved detrimental to the progress and maturing of this university and believe you me will prove even more so to this nation.

You will recall how at the inauguration of the university you proceeded to unilaterally announce the 40 week academic year. Events and discussion revealed that the announcement had neither been given adequate thought nor was it practical. Your hastiness reflective of questionable ability results in this University's inertia, apathy and hopelessness.

Whereas the students appreciate the difficulties your post entails and have always sought for improved relations with the administration and lecturers you have taken this as an act of personal triumph.

You will recall how student representatives have spent long weary hours discussing with you, in the council or elsewhere the problems facing this community. In private you have always accepted our proposals but this has meant nothing to your stubborn refusal to engage in a meaningful debate.

Your speech at the graduation ceremony has given you away and we must expose the intrigue in order to arrive at the essence of the University.

1. COOPERATIVE SHOP

You will recall very well that at the 5th meeting of the University Council it was decided that the idea of the cooperative shop was going to be discussed further by the students and the other members of the community. It is wrong to start a shop by a few rich university bureaucrats for their obvious gain and student and workers exploitation under the banner of socialism. No doubt you were quick in announcing the founding of a cooperative shop before the university community had sat to discuss for whose benefit it will be. The students refuse to be used by a few financial magnates who ironically shelter under socialism.

2. THE BY-LAWS

When the by-laws were first promulgated, the students expressed in no uncertain terms their views towards them. You will remember that you and the other members of the administration pleaded indeed begged the student representatives not to take serious measures and that the mistake would be rectified. Negotiations went on and it was agreed that the matter would be handled by the Student Affairs Committee that will be 50% student. Can you declare to us and the world where you got this fanatical dream of taking the by-laws issue to TAPA? This is clearly an abnegation of the responsibility the nation has entrusted to you as a leader of this university and a clear example of your chronic fear of a debate with the students.

3. LECTURERS

You have announced that there is a cleavage between the administration, lecturers and students. Have you ever asked yourself why the cleavage exists? Have you made the least effort to solve it? Haven't we students persistently invited you to several of our functions and meetings but been turned down? How many times have you descended down from your office to meet and discuss matters with those you lead? Of course we are aware that you erupt with faulty or naked lies to the public about this University. We must make it absolutely clear that your reluctance and that of certain members of the administration to meet students and members of the academic staff has precipitated the cleavage you publicly talk about. While problems of this community cannot be solved in the mass media

we still expect you to save the situation by debating with the community. Hence your cry to the public about our problems without prior endeavour to seek the solution is indicative of deficient leadership.

Several developments and events have occurred in this university and hitherto, we have merely observed. It is now clear that the University is like a floating ship without the competent leadership to direct it. The only salvation in the university lies in the students. While we live we shall not tolerate to see our institution turned into a child's toy. We believe the big burden of restoring this institution to a university status lies with the students and the teaching staff for there is absolutely no iota of confidence in the administration. We can no longer stand the blunders being made in the university. Mwongozo, Para 15 declares that leaders should desist of telling lies but you publicly do and you know this.

The University is becoming a bastion of conservatism in a country that is moving and changing fast. Whereas the students keep struggling to think and be creative, their ideas have in most cases been thrown into the dust bin by those who occupy the seats of power in the administration.

By attempting to blow your trumpet about your achievements here on the hill you have sounded your own death knell, but unfortunately blocking any meaningful discussion. You cannot manipulate students to meet your own personal enhancement. Now the possibilities of a dialogue do not exist and you are responsible for the situation.

We are meeting the students to discuss the developments in the university. The ultimate decision lies with the students. You are, therefore invited to attend the meeting tomorrow at 8.30 p.m. to explain your stand.

Yours faithfully,

Signed (Symonds Akivaga)
PRESIDENT/DUSO

c.c. The Chief Administrative Officer
 The Chief Academic Officer
 The Dean of Students
 The Public Relations Officer
 All Students

**Annex 2b: The University of Zimbabwe Students Position Papers on:
(a) Academic Freedom, and (b) Corruption (shortened).
Presented during the 1988 and 1989 Crises**

STUDENTS UNION

2 October 1989

IN DEFENCE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM

Comrades on Friday 29 September 1989 we witnessed yet another violation of our legitimate inalienable democratic rights. The students' union organized a Gala (Seminar) to commemorate the Great Anti-corruption demo of 29 September 1988. This was entirely a student affair with student speakers in the local Great Hall. The government of Zimbabwe through the Z.R.P. evoked the notorious EMERGENCY POWERS and declared the seminar illegal and cancelled. To enforce their decision, a 200 strong battalion of the RIOT SQUAD was deployed and sealed off the Great Hall. They were armed with automatic rifle power, teargas, rubber batons and other forms of live ammunition. They harassed and terrorised students indiscriminately throughout the campus randomly teargassing halls of residents, wantonly clobbering and brutalizing students and threatening to use gunfire when necessary. This continued to 3 a.m. from 7 p.m.

Cdes. This is state terrorism at its worst!! Yes we did not apply for permission and we will never apply for permission from anyone in this country to hold a seminar at this university. The charter of establishment of any university enshrines academic and intellectual freedom as constituting the fundamental fabrics of such an autonomous institution. We envisage a university as a demonstrable melting pot of ideas. To them, the ruling dogs of imperialism, academic freedom involves the narrow acquisition of knowledge, domination of knowledge and who should be taught and by whom. Our conception of academic freedom involves the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge for the advancement of human kind, to eliminate poverty, disease and hunger, to realize the best in human beings. We demand ultimate academic freedom to freely participate in the socio-geo-economic-political debates raging on in Zimbabwe using the tools of analysis we have acquired through education.

Is it a government, Cdes, which used its entire machinery of violence - the police force and army to crush a student internal gathering in a University hall? Is it a government, which displays brute neo-fascist only comparable to that of South Africa before its own unarmed defenceless students? It's our strong submission that the institution of government has thus been rendered completely disreputable and hence the incumbents have completely lost legitimacy. Who in this government can have the audacity and credibility to criticise the De-Klerk regime in South Africa? Or are we even worse than De-Klerk? Ian Smith never

banned political seminars at this university! In this country emergency powers are being used against workers (doctors, NRZ, PTC) lecturers and students. The manifestation of excesses of neo-colonialism in this country is even defying bourgeois ethics and morals, we cannot even respect the bourgeois democratic rights of assembly, association, press and speech provided for by the reactionary Lancaster House Constitution.

Comrades what is at stake today affects the entirety of the university: students, lecturers, academic and non-academic staff, workers and the generality of the community that surrounds the university, i.e. the entire Zimbabwean community. The question is whether this is still a university or worse does it even qualify to be labelled a high school? Are we going to have to apply for permission to attend certain lectures/tutorials, apply for permission to have student general meetings, apply to have politically inclined film shows ... Cdes, are we going to apply for permission to live from Minister Mahachi? We must be under no illusions: the Friday scenario sets a terribly regrettable precedence and has serious implications for the university. It is the most serious direct threat to our autonomy and credibility as a university. There is now a greater need than ever for this university to act as a community. Administration, teaching staff, students and workers should have a common interest in the protection of this institution. It is quite deplorable that certain sections of the Administration have decided to sit on the fence. By not taking a position in the recent and ongoing unjustified manipulated and malicious decampaign against students, they have actually taken a position against students. We demand that now they join the rest of the university in fighting for what a university is essentially all about, Academic freedom.

We demand an immediate end to the misguided, naive and outright bankrupt onslaught being launched against students at both social and political public forums. We unreservedly condemn the attitude that students are young and hence confused and ignorant about the history of this country and what it should be. There is nothing young about our analysis and conceptualization of national issues. That one fought for this country does not justify them to loot, plunder and wreck the economy of Zimbabwe and let alone stifle people's democratic rights. The students union does not believe in personality cult but principles alone. We completely denounce in the strongest of terms anyone who takes advantage of public platform to attack students and we challenge them to come down to earth and rationally and objectively discuss issues with the students, if at all they have any political spine strong enough for them to intellectually and objectively debate with students.

The ugly scenes of FRIDAY should be understood in their definite class context. The political thought of the various social classes and groupings throughout civilization is above all characterized by their attitude towards the state and their definition of its essential nature. Every state is the organized political expression, the instrument of the decisive class in the economy. The violent brute coercion exercised by the state was the ultimate

resort for maintaining the material interests of the exploiters - the bourgeois. Them, the corrupt leadership being just a client class of imperialism, the comparador bourgeois!!

With immediate effect, the students union is demanding immediate urgent meetings with the Vice Chancellor, Kamba and the National Executive President, Mugabe who is also chancellor of the University. These meetings will be held with the entire student body with a thrust to address issues raised in this document and answering the fundamental question, WITHER UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE? An autonomous credible institution of higher learning or a bureaucratic extension of the Ministry of Higher Education run by the Ministry of Home Affairs? A strongly worded letter of protest will be sent to Mahachi reinstating that Churchill Road is the boundary for the notorious emergency powers. If the above efforts are frustrated other forms of struggle are going to be embarked on. There is no compromise whatsoever. This university is the last island of democracy in this country and we will fight to the bitter end and hilt to sustain these democratic rights and extend them to the generality of the masses of Zimbabwe. You can't push a cat into a corner, after all we are not cats but tigers!! Defeat is not on our AGENDA!!

ALUTA CONTINUA!!

**A.G.O. MUTAMBARA
PRESIDENT - S.R.C.
STUDENTS' UNION**

4 October 1989

COMRADES

The notorious Riot Police have struck! They ransacked Complex III and took into captivity Comrade President and the Secretary General for reasons best known to them. The president had to jump through his second floor window and sustained injuries and was profusely bleeding when they took him. We therefore call for an extraordinary General Meeting to decide on what actions to take.

Comrades, no apathy, it's a matter of our life and death. Let's meet in the Great Hall immediately.

S.R.C.

PLEASE BRING YOUR I.Ds

29 September 1988

ANTI CORRUPTION DOCUMENT

We the students of Zimbabwe are alarmed and concerned at the growing number of cases of corruption, scandals and crime that are committed by Party leaderships both at party and Government level. The problem of corruption in Zimbabwe has virtually become a daily topic for debate in so many places including the parliament and the media, but today 29 September, we the students of Zimbabwe have decided to turn the table against these evils. We the students of Zimbabwe review the situation from a progressive outlook as a reflection of the political and ideological bankruptcy of some of our petty bourgeois leadership. It is therefore imperative that we as students cannot allow such a leadership to lead our Party Zanu (PF) especially after the unity talks. Comrades our aspirations have been betrayed by the ideologically bankrupt leaders. It is high time we as students say, enough is enough, we therefore call upon the President to act now, we repeat now, none other than now is acceptable.

The student body is concerned with the betrayal of our heroes, the workers, peasants and indeed that of the whole progressive people. Our cherished national goals of transformation and harmonizing the means of production for the interests of the working class and peasants have been turned into an illustrious dream while some leaders of our Party have gone on a plunder, slander and looting spree without concern for the common people, we cannot afford to pretend nor to be blind to these evils. We say the ROUT SHOULD STOP.

Even our President, in his recent trip to London embarrassed himself when he admitted that some of our leaders have ignored the leadership code. He admitted that the government is corrupt and those "creatures" have to be weeded out. It is therefore in support of our President that we take the street to demonstrate our solidarity with the revolutionary classes of Zimbabwe, that is the workers, peasants and progressive intellectuals. We once again call for the President to act now, NOTHING OTHER THAN NOW IS ACCEPTABLE....

TO THE READERS REMEMBER THAT THE CRISIS LIVES ON AFTER YOU

We know not the conception of law but its application irritates. For why, the other day I read a passage from one history book that:

"In the West the Law has always been revered as something more or less sacrosanct, the queen of gods and men, imposing itself on everyone like a categorical imperative, defining and regulating, in an abstract way, the effects and conditions of all forms of activity. In the West there have been tribunals the role of which has been not only to apply the law, but often to interpret it in the light of debates where all the contradictory interests are represented and defended. In the West the juris consults have built, a corpus of 'doctrine' that ceaselessly tended to perfect and purify the technical elements of the systems of the positive law."

And so too in Mother Africa law has never been different from that description. What more need we say other than that the law is a dangerous weapon? Who was it that said that socialist law was different from capitalist law if all oppress and have no room for justice? Isn't society ever unjust and overriding? We wished we knew the cure to injustices meted out to small men, the powerless and armless! But as sons rebelling against their "father", we have been spoken to, in a language that we never will forget. One day we too gonna be fathers and manipulators of justice in the name of defending the integrity of ourselves.

At that time we shall look back to the days of to-day as the time when we were demeaned, despised, spat upon and told to shut up; time when the foreigner that we are, were reminded of the foreignism and its attendant ills and cures. Yet we thought a university was no finishing school where humans are to be taught how to be well behaved and how to acquire convenient social attitudes and general sense of good conduct! As Thomas Paine would say:

"Tyranny like hell is difficult to conquer but we have the consolation that the deeper conflict the greater the triumph -: So fail we may to-day, tomorrow we know not who wins. Here we stand condemned but tomorrow history will say differently of us. Sons of Africa, listen to your conscience and mind not yourself only but also others. We've been accused as a breed not committed to anything but perpetuating terror, ambition, complete irresponsibility and senselessness with minds truly "childish".

But never lose hope, be reserved and composed.

To all readers, I say bye bye for this be my last contribution on this page. All the same read on and educate yourselves about the crisis that has come to pass like an ill-wind that blows nobody no good. That be the crisis of injustice and ill-wind lives on to man!

EMENTONO J. EKIRAPA
GENERAL EDITOR UNIVERSITY
ECHO

**Annex 2d: University of Zimbabwe Circular Letter on Government Minister
Attack on them during the 1989 Crisis**

STUDENTS' UNION

22 May 1989

MINISTER KADUNGURE - A VICTIM OF MISCHIEVOUS DISINFORMATION
THE STUDENTS UNION STATES ITS CASE

As a student union we strongly feel that the views of the Minister of State (National Service) and Zanu (PF) Secretary for Youth Cde. Ernest Kadungure on Saturday 20th May 1989 as reported in the Sunday Mail 21st May 1989 when addressing a joint Zanu (PF) and P.F. Zanu youth league leaders meeting in Harare cannot go unchallenged. Kadungure said the country's enemies were more likely to infiltrate the youths, particularly "our students at our local university" ... "Rumour has it the MNR might infiltrate the country ..." The Minister's views were tantamount to equating students to the MNR, discrediting the genuine national role played by the students. With all due respect being awarded, we declare Kadungure a victim of mischievous disinformation, incompetent of intellectual objective analysis of student struggles and hence we question his credibility as a Minister. What infuriates the union is the fact that this is not the first time that he has addressed youths and condemned U.Z. students. The same thing happened after the GREAT DEMO of 29 September last year. As students we feel compelled to state our case very clearly.

As a student union we are completely opposed to corruption of any kind or level, bureaucratic squandering and looting, bourgeois profiteering and the prolific engagement in the futile establishment of white elephants.

We completely condemn the so called "New Investment Code" as a clear blueprint sign of the entrenchment of capitalism, a sell out move that has heavily compromised the

ideological standpoint of the government and hence signalling the complete shelving of the socialist agenda. We reject this total incapacity to carry out the revolutionary demands of the masses on the question of land and nationalisation and the building of a strong national economy. We completely deplore the total dependency on big international capital represented by the multinational corporations and hence the corrupt tendencies among the nationalists.

On democracy, we strongly condemn the attempts by the government to stifle and absurdly interfere with people's democratic rights. As a students' union, it is our unequivocal democratic right to demonstrate and the government cannot and not at all take away that democratic right from the union. As we fight to sustain and maintain this democracy for the union, we see the essence of extending this to the national framework. We don't see the rationale of establishing a petty bourgeois one party state. In this vein we unreservedly condemn the refusal by the police to grant permission to ZUM to hold their political rallies on Sunday. We want to make it abundantly clear that our condemnation of the police democratic rights and not out of allegiance to ZUM. This position is intended to ensure the existence of national democracy in the country, a necessary precondition for the mobilization of the working class. Joining a political party is an individual's decision and this does not lie in the confines of the policies and obligations of the union. But the students union demand national recognition of fundamental and hence inalienable, democratic and basically human rights of association and expression. It's a fundamental right for students to listen to whoever they so wish so that they can condemn or support them from the viewpoint of information and not disinformation.

To that end refusal to grant permission for the rallies "in the interest of public order", characterize fascist policies and the very same tactics will be applied on students when they apply for permission to demonstrate. On public order our question is, who determines this so-called "interest of public order or disorder" and how impartial is their thinking?

As a student union we should never betray the working class and the peasantry. We should continue to fight and combat against bourgeois ideology or hegemony over the working class. We should continue to work more closely inside the working class to strengthen its ideological independence and strengthen its independent trade union demands. As a student union we would also want to reiterate our complete autonomous existence from the U.Z. Administration and the Government. There is no one, in the U.Z. Administration or government who can try to control nor monitor our union activities and this includes the Vice-Chancellor and the state President (incidentally our chancellor). We have a complete separate existence and we will fight tooth and claw to sustain this healthy democratic environment of academic and intellectual freedom.

In a nutshell these are the underlying principles that constitute cogs and wheels of the union and they will be jealously guarded by every member of the union.

If the view of the Minister Kadungure is that anyone who upholds the above ideals is being used by MNR, then we not only agree to disagree with him, but also vehemently declare that the lines of battle have been defined, for we will never ever compromise on matters of principles. Anyway since the Minister is not anything near being a product of this institution thorough and concerted efforts will be made to have him explain his weird thinking before a general meeting of the students union.

ALUTA CONTINUA!!

A.G.O. MUTAMBARA
SECRETARY GENERAL - S.R.C.

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