Annex 5: Some alleged instances of grand corruption, note prepared for the Tanzanian Governance Working Group

Disclaimer:
Please note that the people who have contributed to the notes below have no first-hand knowledge of any of the cases described and cannot vouch for the veracity or accuracy of any of the information or data presented. All of the information and data are either derived or quoted from articles, comments and reports in newspapers, reports, books, or on-line sources, etc., so there is a good chance that some of them are not correct

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Description	Approx Value US$m	Corruption dimension and/or Background Information
Bank of Tanzania "The Tanzanian authorities are undertaking actions … to address the allegations of impropriety in the management of the … external payments arrears account managed by the Bank of Tanzania." Murilo Portugal, Deputy Managing Director, IMF, February 2007 (THISDAY, May 2007)		
BoT Twin Towers	337	Price escalation to TShs 430 billion by July 2007 Estimated loss: $265m. *(ThisDay*, I August 2007).
BoT External Payment Arrears	120-150	'A reputable international audit firm wrote to the Bank of Tanzania governor in September 2006, questioning over $120 million that was paid to several companies in Tanzania between May 2005 and March 2006 under the Commercial Debt Programme (one company was paid $40 million).' An investigation is currently under way by a team from the Office of the Attorney General, the Police and the PCCB, and headed by the Attorney General. "Our investigations is like opening up a Pandora Box because all the 22 companies involved in the EPA scandal have issued written statements that implicate the ruling CCM," said a source close to the team, who spoke on condition of anonymity. The Team which started its job by tracing the accounts of the suspects, has to a large extent managed to freeze some of them including those of their beneficiaries. "The only beneficiary, who has severally been mentioned by the 22 companies and who appears to be 'unreacheable', is CCM," the source said. (East African Business Week (Kampala) 7 April 2008)
Deep Green Finance (but only as one of the many BoT EPA recipients)		"Deep Green Finance opened a bank at National Bank of Commerce (NBC) Corporate Branch, Dar es Salaam on 1May2004 a public holiday. Despite the name Deep Green 'Finance' the list of financial institutions published by the Bank of Tanzania on 21 August 2007 does not indicate that the company was ever registered by BoT as a financial institution! A total of TSh 10,484,005.39 were deposited into Deep Green Finance account, mainly from the BoT and Tangold Ltd. between 1 August and 10 December 2005 just before the national general election process and/or campaigns on 14 December 2005. The company was voluntarily dissolved on 27 February 2007. It is understood that the file for Deep

Description	Approx Value US$m	Corruption dimension and/or Background Information
		Green Finance that was supposed to be at BRELA has disappeared. "We have every reason to believe that this company was a shell company, established to act as a conduit for public funds from BoT to undisclosed destinations during the general election of 2005." (ThisDay, 5 November 2007 and "List of Shame").
Meremeta Gold Mine	132	BOT guaranteed a joint venture between a South African firm and the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence. It collapsed with an estimated total loss of $232m. "Meremeta Gold was registered as a joint venture company owned on a 50-50 basis by the Tanzanian Army and a private South African company called Trinnex (Pty) Limited, before it was liquidated some time ago. The shares held by Triennex were of "subservient status" in that no benefits in the assets or in the income of Meremeta would be permitted to accrue to Triennex in any way. The Meremeta company was set up in London, UK, as the parties required British jurisdiction, believing that the UK's rigid company legislation and the Bank of England's rules provided the best jurisdiction in which to ensure compliance and transparency." (East African, 21 April 2003) "The assets and liabilities of Meremeta Gold - including the Buhemba gold mine were later transferred to Tangold Limited, a new company ostensibly wholly owned by the government. Both Meremeta Gold and Tangold have also been the beneficiaries of questionable BoT payments to the tune of over $130m (approx. 160bn/-) through accounts at various banks. In the case of Meremeta Gold, investigations by THISDAY have already established that the central bank made a payment of over $118m (approx. 150bn/-) to Nedbank the same South African bank where one of the Deep Green Finance directors is a senior officer - through the New York-based HSB Bank. This payment was apparently made to liquidate a loan issued to Meremeta Gold after it had filed for bankruptcy. Official audit queries have since been raised as to why the government -- through the central bank -- decided to clear the loan on behalf of Meremeta Gold after it became bankrupt, instead of Nedbank itself filing its claim directly to the liquidator. Government sources have told THISDAY that in order to effect the payments to Meremeta Gold and Tangold, BoT purchased a huge 155bn/- Treasury bond and later exchanged the amount into US dollar currency." (ThisDay, 5 November 2007)
Tangold Limited	13.34	Company said to be state-owned, but registered offshore in Mauritius, is understood to have been the beneficiary of a highly-questionable $13.34m (approx. TSh 17bn/-) payment from the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) within the past year. At least five top government functionaries listed as directors.
Alex Stewart (Assayers)		Alex Stewart is a gold auditing company that receives nearly two-thirds of the gold royalty received by the government. Hired by BOT, Alex Stewart has occasioned estimated losses of $68m over four years, excluding non-payment of taxes.
Kagera Sugar Co	75	BOT guaranteed a syndicated loan from three pension funds and four banks (2004) which the companies are unable to service.

Electricity "Some Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) members are arguing that some of the(se) operational costs, which Tanesco uses to justify increased power tariffs, are … corruption-triggered. (Tarimo 2007)		
IPTL	?	Tanesco selected Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL) through non-competitive public procurement processes and signed a 20 year Power Purchasing Agreement (PPA) to build and run a 100 megawatt slow-speed diesel (SSD) power plant at Tegeta, Dar es Salaam at a cost of $163.5 million. GoT commissioned ACRES to produce a report on IPTL - report confirmed that project was expensive, would be damaging, but GoT proceeded with the contract. Without informing Tanesco, IPTL negotiated with Wärtsila of Finland to build a cheaper medium-speed diesel (MSD) plant, reducing considerably the scope of the project. The contract was subsequently disputed and referred to the World Bank's International Centre for the Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID). ISCID found that IPTL was overpriced by $23.5 million but that the contract still stood since TANESCO was aware of the switch from SSD to MSD. Two Tanzanian officials signed affidavits claiming they were offered bribes by the IPTL Director. For some time, Tanzanian parliamentarians pressed for an official investigation into the IPTL contract, but government resisted. The agreement was clearly not in the economic interests of the country, and despite the fact that other competitors with better offers were available, the top leadership was not able to override the networks within the party who supported the deal. The eventual outcome was that Tanzania now has one of the highest electricity tariffs in Africa. To date, no one has been charged with corruption or any other crime in connexion with IPTL. (Synthesis from: Privatisation of water and energy in Africa, Kate Bayliss and David Hall, September 2000; The Power and the Vainglory: Anatomy of a $100 Million Malaysian IPP in Tanzania Brian Cooksey, 2004; State Weakness In Developing Countries And Strategies Of Institutional Reform – Operational Implications For Anti-Corruption Policy And A Case-Study Of Tanzania, Mushtaq Husain Khan and Hazel Gray, 2005).
Richmond Development Company/Dowans	173	A so-called "brief case" company was awarded the contract for a 100 MW power plant. Non-delivery helped prolong the power crisis of 2006. The Richmond public procurement process was declared corruption-free by the Prevention of Corruption Bureau in May 2007, although it did report there were irregularities that did not fall under the old Prevention of Corruption Act. Consequently, it forwarded the dossier for further action to the Public Procurement Appeals Authority. A Parliamentary Commission has subsequently called into question the PCB's conclusions. President Kikwete has appointed an investigation team headed by the Attorney General and including investigators from the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, the Police and the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau to investigate the case and to report to him by the end of June 2008.
Kiwira Coal Mine	272	Owned 85% by Tanpower Resources, and financed with a Chinese soft loan, the privatised mine will provide fuel for a power plant to sell electricity to TANESCO for 5-6 US cents per unit. "Investigations by THISDAY supported by official documents from the Business Registration and Licensing Authority (BRELA) have revealed that Tanpower Resources was the joint brainchild of Benjamin Mkapa and Daniel Yona, formed during the later stages of the third phase government when one was still serving as president of the United Republic and the other as minister for energy and minerals, respectively.

		At the time of the company's registration in 2004, its first listed directors were the then first lady, Mrs Anna Mkapa; minister Yona; Nicholas Mkapa (the president and Mrs. Mkapa's son); Joseph Mbuna (Nicholas Mkapa's father-in-law); and Evans Mapundi." (ThisDay, 07 April 2008) "The infrastructure at the Kiwira mine was built by the state at a cost of TSh 4 bn/- in the 1980s, and the coal deposits alone are estimated to be worth hundreds of billions of shillings. Out of the TSh 700m/- purchase price, Tanpower Resources are understood to have made a down ayment of just TSh70 m/- for a majority stake in the coal mine, and proceeded to sign a lucrative $271.8m (approx. TSh 362 bn/-) power generation deal with the stte-run Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) in March 2006." (ThisDay 24 April 08) "Mkapa and Yona may have broken several laws, including the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act of 1995, in their conduct over the Kiwira … saga. According to the ethics legislation, a public leader shall be considered to have breached the Act if he or she acquires any significant financial advantage, or assists another person to acquire such gain, by ''improperly using or benefiting from information which is obtained in the course of his/her official duties and which is not generally available to the public.'' (ThisDay, 25Apr08)
Procurement 'The government's procurement watchdog has described the culture of secrecy prevailing in many of the lucrative state procurement tenders as one of the major corruption loopholes in the country.' (Maendaenda 2007). IMF estimates $300m losses per annum through corrupt procurement (Cooksey 2005). The Controller and Auditor General reported unaccounted for government expenditure of TShs 273 billion in 2005/06, TShs 242 billion (89%) by central government ministries led by the Ministry of Energy and Minerals (47 billion).		
Presidential Jet (2002)	47	G550 Gulf Stream jet purchase brokered by Sailesh Vithlani.
BAE - Dual-purpose radar (2002)	40	Deal with BAE brokered by Sailesh Vithlani and Tanil Somaiya. USD 12 million 'commission' paid into a Swiss bank account. Former Minister of International Development Clare Short embarrassed Downing Street yesterday when she suggested corruption in the Dollars 40m sale of an air traffic control system to Tanzania. The prime minister's official spokesman said there was "no evidence" to support Ms Short's suggestion, while BAE Systems, the defence group, said the deal was "completely above board". Ms Short said… "I find it very difficult to believe that a contract like that could have been made cleanly, although I have no information to that effect (Financial Times, 26 April 26 2002) A lengthy Serious Fraud Office investigation in the UK subsequently discovered that 31% of the deal's contract price had been diverted via Switzerland. BAE transferred the money to a subsidiary, Red Diamond Trading, registered anonymously in the British Virgin Islands. Red Diamond then moved the cash to a Swiss account in the name of a Panama company, Envers Trading Corporation. This entity had two Panamanian nominee directors. But it was secretly controlled by a

		Tanzanian middleman, Shailesh Vithlani, according to Dar es Salaam court papers. (The Guardian, UK, 12 April 2008) The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB), which has been working with authorities in the UK, Switzerland and Jersey, wants to establish if the money is linked to $12m (approx. TSh 15bn/-) in secret commission payments made by BAE in connection with the radar deal. (ThisDay, 14 April 08)
Trucks for TPDF	E 55m (Shs 94 bn)	Deal with FIAT/IVECO for 628 military vehicles also brokered by Sailesh Vithlani. "Concerns have been raised in some military circles that the new fleet of IVECO trucks may not be adequate to replace the army's ageing vehicles, citing the high unit price of the vehicles, uneconomic fuel consumption and high maintenance costs. Some officials have even gone as far as to predict that the IVECO military trucks deal may turn out to be a financial nightmare for the country's hard-pressed military coffers." (ThisDay, 27April 07)
Military Helicopters	18.5	"It has now been revealed that the Ministry of Defence and National Service paid a vastly inflated price for the same helicopters it had earlier officially rejected as being unfit for military use. According to latest THISDAY findings, the ministry paid more than $9m (approx. 11bn/-) for each of the four Agusta Bell choppers, which was almost double the actual unit price of around $4.7m (approx. 6bn/-), going by prevailing market prices. This means that defence ministry officials squandered a total of $18.25m (about 22bn/-) in overpaying for the helicopters under dubious circumstances." (ThisDay, 5 July 2007)
Fibre-optics backbone	170	China will supply the goods and services for $170m; a World Bank regional project would cost Tanzania $80-100m.
Tanzania International Container Terminal Services (TICTS)		Irregular, possibly illegal, extension of a contract to a firm that, allegedly, is owned in part by several senior political figures. . (ThisDay Report, 18 February 2007) The Executive has refused to provide a copy of the original contract to Parliament (MP)
Lake Victoria-Shinyanga Water Line Project		"Total cost is $225 million. The project, which will supply water and power to Shinyanga, Mwanza and Dodoma, has five contractors from China and Saudi Arabia selected on a sole-source basis: Contract #1 – China Civil Engineering Company $27 million Contract #2 – Sinohydro Company – laying of pipes from Mabale intake to Solwa and Shinyanga Contracts # 3 and 4 – laying of pipes from Shinyanga to Kahama at $63 million plus $2.6 million for project supervision Contract # 5 – National Corporation Power Supply (Saudi) for the supply of power for $6.3 million" (East African, 18-24 December, 2006 (Moses Mathew and Mike Mande).
National ID Cards	100	"The $176 million (about Tsh 200 billion) Tanzania National Identity Cards Project has stalled for decades now with documents, meetings, tendering moving from one office to the other, and now it has eventually attracted the international community, including the World Bank. The tendering process has also entered the courts of law, which has also

		been another hitch for the speedy and smooth processing of the project. Sources say, the key players at the decision making stage in the project are the Prime Minister's Office and the Ministry of Home Affairs while businessmen and the World Bank have also joined the relay as to how the project should be managed. The dilly-dallying, well placed government sources say, has been caused by personal interests by government officials from the Prime Minister's office, Ministry of Home Affairs, a prominent businessman who's close to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and a senior Bank of Tanzania official." (East African Business Week (Kampala, 25 February 2008)
Rome Embassy	3.2	Tanzania Embassy officials, including former Ambassador Prof. Ricky Costa Mahalu are accused of paying a total of €3,098,741.40 in two payments into two separate bank accounts in Italy of €2,065,826,60 and €1,032,913.80 and of forging the purchase price for the embassy building in Rome.
Etcetera		See CAG report (various years) for examples of large-scale procurement fraud, particularly by central government ministries.
Privatisations "…there is growing evidence of ministerial interference in privatizations which the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission has been handling, and of attempts to by-pass the PSRC in negotiation of private entry into certain strategic sectors. It is widely suspected that high-level corruption is involved in certain of these arrangements." (World Bank, 1998)		
TTCL	56	"The Government privatised the telephone utility to a company known as MSI from the Netherlands for an amount of USD 120 Million. After raising USD 60,000,000 on the assets of the company to pay for 35% shareholding, MSI used the funds for the expansion of a mobile operator for the utility. MSI claimed the accounts were wrong and therefore the second tranche of USD 60 Million would not be paid. The Government negotiated to settle with MSI for a payment of USD 4 Million. First, MSI should have done due diligence prior to offering USD 120 Million. Secondly, it is NOT appropriate or ethical to raise funds on the assets of the company you are buying. Lastly, to pay USD 4 Million for a company you bid USD120 Million at the time of tender is plain illegal and corruption ridden. The Minister of Transport and Communication, Prof. Mwandosya also found it very hard to explain how his daughter got a scholarship from MSI to study abroad." (Letter to Director General, ILO, and Mary Robinson, Ethical Globalisation Initiative, from Concerned Citizen, 20October04)
NBC	55	"The National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was to be privatised under the Privatisation Scheme supported by the Government and the World Bank as part of the effort to bring free market and institutional reforms and remove government from operating businesses as it has done for decades. The NBC was by all means an ill performing bank. ABSA Bid 15,000,000 USD for it. As is the case, most companies carry out a due diligence prior to buying a bank and therefore, cannot come later to change the bid. As common with all South African companies currently operating in Tanzania and which have purchased Government enterprises, ABSA included an accounting method in the contract allowing them to change the price at a later date after taking charge of the bank. It has come to the knowledge of the Parliament of Tanzania that in actual fact, ABSA did not pay anything and used the poor accounts to justify not paying anything for the bank. They should have checked the accounts before bidding for the bank. It is apparent that some Government Officials were compromised and signed an agreement that was faulty and questionable at best. It should be noted that NBC has properties alone worth over USD 40,000,000 all over the nation. The Tanzania Government has not been transparent about the Sale of NBC and stonewalls critics. They should explain how they sold the bank for free,

		ABSA should explain why they paid nothing and there should be a detailed investigation into why Barclays was not given the bank though they had been the initial winner." (Letter to Director General, ILO, and Mary Robinson, Ethical Globalisation Initiative, from Concerned Citizen, 20October04)
Tax exemptions 'Firms report that over-assessment of tax liabilities is common, followed by 'negotiations' between the tax officer(s). With the exception of the larger enterprises, taxpayers continue to experience discretionary assessments and claims for bribes, rather than willing, responsive service.' Tanzania: Sector Study of the Effective Tax Burden 2006		
Tax exemptions	48-64 p.a.	Customs duty exemptions fell from 30% in 2000 to 25% in 2005, but VAT exemptions rose from 20% in 2000 to 25% in 2005 (50% in 2004). Total exemptions accounted for 23% of total tax revenue in 2005/06.
Natural resources ''… the wildlife division (of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism) has been fraught with mounting allegations of corruption in the tourist hunting industry and dismal performance in government revenue collection and protection of dwindling wildlife resources.' (THISDAY Reporter 2007). The Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism, Professor Jumanne Magembe told the media in Dodoma (24 July 2007) 'that he had received a list of business people involved in illegal logging "… "and I cannot touch some of those on the list … because they are presidential appointees".' (Hayuka 2007).		
Illegal logging	58	$58m per annum in lost revenues: Up to 96 per cent of revenues lost through under-collection. (Mwamunyange 2007b)
Uncollected export duties	???	In July 2004, the Minister of Natural Resources & Tourism visited the harbour of Dar es Salaam to establish whether the new Act was implemented. During this visit, 187 containers were found containing logs that either had not been legally acquired or were not licensed/allowed for export. Further inspections were ordered in all coastal districts, which revealed 6,898 m3 of illegal logs valued at 382.65 million TZS, or 55,715 TZS/ m3. Some staff of the MNRT have been disciplined administratively in this case but to date no private sector actors have been charged in connexion with these crimes. (Interview with MNRT staff, February 2008) Tanzanian Customs only collect export duties on 10% of the high-value timber products exported to China. (TRAFFIC Report, 2007). Over half of the companies surveyed were found to have personal links to officials of the Ministry of Natural Resources or central or local government (Africa Confidential, 6July2007)
Deep-water fishing	220 pa	"Poor control mechanisms in licensing, monitoring and setting of fish quotas [contribute] to a …loss of over $220m per year … from illegal foreign fishing …" (Mwakyusa 2007). Deep sea fishing boats pay US$18,0000 per annum for a license. They are estimated to recover that amount well before the end of their first day of fishing, and they fish some 220 days per annum.
Tourist hunting	?	''… the … director of wildlife seems to be under heavy pressure to allocate hunting blocks as political patronage.' (*THISDAY* 11 September, 2007 citing *African Indaba,* September 2007). "…Suspect contracts for lease of professional hunting blocks milk the country of a staggering Sh 100 billion (about $80 million) annually, Parliament was told yesterday. Hunting companies run the sub-sector as a cartel with close involvement of Wildlife Division senior officials who benefit from the system…" (The Citizen, 25 April 08)
Loliondo Hunting		"The defining incident of corruption in Tanzania during the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995) was the Loliondo scandal, commonly known as Loliondogate in Tanzania. Loliondo is part of a game reserve on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, in Northern Tanzania. In circumstances that have never been fully explained

		by the government, foreign hunters and collectors of game were given a free hand to do whatever they desired in a wide track of land in Loliondo. According to reports, transport planes from the Arab world would land in the middle of the night at Kilimanjaro International Airport, bringing hunters, and also spiriting away valuable game which is a Tanzania national resource. …" (Chris Maina Peter, Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Insolences in Tanzania. AAPS Occasional Paper 6, 2 (Pretoria: AAPS, 2002)
Buzwagi Gold Mine	?	"Kigoma North legislator Zitto Kabwe asked the National Assembly to form a committee to delve into why Energy and Minerals minister Nazir Karamagi ``suspiciously`` signed the mining development agreement with Barrick Gold in London in February 2008." (The Guardian, 2 October 2007). GoT has replied in a statement that: ``The contract passed through all the relevant stages, including endorsement by the Mining Advisory Committee. Experts were involved in discussions in connection with the contract. All members of the committee that passed it are Tanzanians and the decision they made was in the nation's interests," (Guardian 02 October 2007)
Kiwira Coal Mines	?	"Ex-president Benjamin Mkapa and his energy and minerals minister, Daniel Yona, sold the formerly state-owned Kiwira Coal Mines Limited to their own private company for a mere 700m/- in 2005 while the mine was actually built at a cost of over 4bn/-." (ThisDay, 07 April 2008)
Mchuchuma Mining Deal		"TANESCO under Net Group Solutions stopped the Mchuchuma coal and energy project (Iringa Region) which had already been approved by the government. Tanzanians and opposition MPs need satisfactory explanation as from where Tanesco and Net group Solutions got power to change decisions made by the Cabinet." (Guardian, 18 July 2006) "The National Development Corporation (NDC) has signed a contract with a British firm, DLA Piper, for the provision of advisory services for the procurement of investors in the Mchuchuma coal, energy and Liganga iron ore projects." (Guardian, 20 March 2008)
Mwananchi Gold Deal		"At least $3 million has been sunk into the project so far. The BoT had in 2003 extended an interest-free loan to NDC amounting to $1,865,000 (about 2bn/-) for purchase of the plot where the refinery is located." (ThisDay, 28 July 2006) "A 2005/06 report by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) raised key audit queries on dubious payments amounting to several billions of shillings made by the Bank of Tanzania (BoT) to the privately-owned Mwananchi Gold company. The CAG report cites irregularities in the BoT's involvement with Mwananchi Gold and queries dubious loans made to the company amounting to $5,512,398.55 (approx. 7bn/-) by last year." (This Day, 28 September 2007)
Mwananchi Trust Co.		"According to BRELA records, Mwananchi Gold Ltd. Is a private company whose shareholders are the Bank of Tanzania (500 shares), the National Development Corporation (500 shares), the Mwananchi Trust Co. Ltd. (1,123 shares) and Chimera Co. Ltd. (500 shares). This company was registered as a private company on 12 December 2002. Its lawyers are Nyalali, Warioba & Mahalu Associates" (List of Shame, 2007) "CCM Trust Company Limited is the majority shareholder in Mwananchi Trust, which has a 45 per cent stake in the private gold refinery project, dubbed Mwananchi Gold Company Limited." (ThisDay, 28 July 2006)
Chimela Co. Ltd. (sometimes spelt		As above – Chimela and Chimera seem to be interchangeable but there is little reference to either one of them on the internet.

Chimera)		
VMB Holdings Co. Ltd		"CCM Trust Company Limited incorporated in 2004 has listed Mr Joseph Warioba and businessman Mr. Yusuph Mushi as subscribers, directors and first shareholders of the company. CCM Trust Company Limited is the majority shareholder in Mwananchi Trust, which has a 45 per cent stake in the private gold refinery project, dubbed Mwananchi Gold Company Limited. Records at BRELA show that both Mr Warioba and Mr Mushi are linked to the company using CCM's name. Mr Warioba and Mr Mushi already own other shares in Mwananchi Trust through Umoja Entertainment and Y.M. Holding Company respectively. Another shareholder in Mwananchi Trust is VMB Holdings owned by Mrs Vulfrida Mahalu." (ThisDay, 28 July 2006)
Etcetera		Most large mining companies' contracts are secret and controversial, leading to widespread but so far undocumented suspicion that they involved corruption.
Roads, construction and real estate '… construction firms give out 10-15 per cent .. to buy or win a tender (leading to) the construction of poor quality roads in the country.' (Damian 2007). In Tanzania corruption in plot allocation seems to exists even where there is a clear line of execution. However, as mentioned earlier, there are officials and influential people who want to be allocated with the prime sites in the layouts at any cost and this is a cause for breaking the formal process.		
Mafuta House	63	Commissioned for $38m in 1997 the (still unoccupied) structure has cost at least an additional $25m. Those involved include TPDC, NSSF.
Sale of government houses	200+	2004-05: several thousand senior public servants and politicians were allowed to purchase their official residences at a fraction of their worth. Prime plots are now worth USD 0.5m and more. "The sales do not constitute privatisation as part of a planned government withdrawal from providing accommodation for civil servants, which would be a consistent policy. On the contrary, the Ministry of Works, through the Tanzania Buildings Agency, continues to contract new house construction for sale to civil servants, at a loss. "President Mkapa launched a programme allowing Government officials and politicians to purchase the houses in which they lived at greatly discounted prices. The logic adduced was that IMF and World Bank had insisted on Government removing itself from being a real estate manager, and Government officials were somehow disadvantaged. There are several problems with this policy. The policy has seen expensive property given to Government personnel for virtually free. Firstly, the properties have been built by taxpayers' and citizens' money. Therefore, there should have been at the very least a law enacted for allowing the sale, and not just a policy from the State House and/or Cabinet. Secondly, all Tanzanians should have been given the opportunity to purchase the houses. We are not, after all, second class citizens compared to Government officials. Thirdly, the policy is illegal in light of current laws requiring Government to advertise any sale of central government property and assets. One has to question the logic and legality, as well as the political and economic sense of the policy. After all, how can the President decide to sell at below

		market prices a property to his colleagues and friends without asking the people of Tanzania?" (Letter to Director General, ILO, and Mary Robinson, Ethical Globalisation Initiative, from Concerned Citizen, 20October04)
Quality Group Ltd warehouses	84	The National Social Security Fund (NSSF) bought the Hifadhi EPZ warehouses in Ubungo; The Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF) bought Quality Plaza (Nyerere Road) for a total of TShs 83.5 billion from Yusuf Manji's Quality Group. Both purchases were claimed to be highly overpriced and of dubious profitability.
Land administration in general		"Tanzania's own Prevention of Corruption Bureau in 2005 complained that the Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Human Settlements Development was particularly unprincipled. There were dubious deals everywhere, regarding commercial plots, residential places, and open spaces. Petrol stations had multiplied, despite the rules. Appraisers had helped to falsify title deeds. Building permits were issued only after the payment of bribes. In 2006, the Minister of Lands himself told parliament that his officials were "dirty." He said that his deputy minister at the time was suspect." (Africa's Successes: Evaluating Accomplishment, Robert I. Rotberg, Harvard University, 2007)
Etcetera		

Source: This table draws extensively on and then adds considerably to a table in Cooksey, Brian (2007), Corruption in Tanzania, Patterns, causes and consequences. Paper prepared for the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre and Tiri on the Essentials of Anti-Corruption. September 17-19, 2007. Coral Beach Hotel, Dar es Salaam