nngu007
JF-Expert Member
- Aug 2, 2010
- 15,862
- 5,797
Hellen Hunter
Nyerere's role in the affair is less clear. In mid-1963 when Hanga and several other ASP leaders first approached him for arms and financial support, the Tanganyika President reportedly turned the group down, mainly on the grounds that he did not think their revolutionary plan could succeed. Behind the scenes, Nyerere was working to affect a coalition of the ASP with the ZPPP, which would secure a place for the ASP in the government. Since the longstanding mutual dislike between Karume and Shamte, the leader of the ZPPP, militated against any such reconciliation of the two parties, Hanga believed that the lack of an alternative to use of force would eventually compel Nyerere to give his approval to his plan. This is apparently just what happened. Although Nyerere obviously knew and apparently approved of the general plan for the revolution, Kambona may have kept the details from the President. There is reason to believe that he was never told about military supplies that Kambona gave to the ASP.
Tanganyika complicity with the ASP leaders who were planning a revolution had been well-established. Hanga and Tanganyika minister of foreign affairs and defense minister Kambona were old friends, having been roommates in London. Sympathetic to the desire of the Africans to wrest power from the Arab minority, Kambona was apparently privy to the coup planning all along; he supported the undertaking with Tanganyika arms and money. In mid-1963 he reportedly gave Hanga and his followers 2 machine guns and 10 rifles on a clandestine basis. Part of the arms shipment from Algeria to Tanganyika, which had been arranged by Kambona, may have found its way into the hands of the Zanzibar revolutionaries, although the majority of the arms were probably intended for the Mozambique nationalists.
There were reports that Kenya home affairs minister Oginga Odinga was also in concert with Hanga and Kambona in planning the Zanzibar revolution. One reliable source stated that he was in face as deeply involved as Kambona. As with Kambona, Hanga has a personal relationship with Odinga, who has assisted him in studying abroad. (Because of this, Hanga often publicly credited Odinga with his success in education and politics.) Thus, there is a general feeling that Odinga probably had a hand in events in Zanzibar, though his actual involvement in the coup has never been established.
After the revolution, Odinga is reported to have had several contacts with Okello, who he tried to help after the latter's removal from power in Zanzibar. The nature of their relationship, in particular the reason for Odinga's interest in Okello, is unclear; it may stem for the fact that Okello lived and worked in Kenya from Dec 1954 until Sept 1959. There is no evidence that there was any contact between the two men before the revolution, however. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Okello was part of any planning for the revolution in which Odinga may or may not have been involved.
According to one report, President Kenyatta was informed of the planning for the revolution but was given no definite date as to when it would take place. He is supposed to have agreed not to send in the Kenyan army should the Zanzibar government request outside support against the rebels.
The most important figure in ASP revolution planning clearly was Hanga, who, according to one unconfirmed report, assembled a small company of men in the bush for about two months before the revolution. John Okello was reportedly among the group under training. Hanga was helped in these endeavors by members of the extreme wing of the ASP especially by number persons from the trade unions. In particular, Hassan Nassor Moyo, the general-secretary of the ZPFL and a leader in the ASP, was in on the planning. Karume personally was never involved; O.Shariff and Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi of the ASP were also probably not aware of the plan.
Apparently, the original plan called for a coup in March or April 1964. In December 1963 Moyo visited Kenya, and while there stated privately that prospects were good for him and the ASP; he predicted confidently that elements that he represented would win out soon. Viewed in retrospect, he seems to have been referring to a coup which was then planned for early spring. In early January 1964, two Tanganyika's arrived in London to inspect an order for military equipment that was reported to have come from Kambona. When the Zanzibar revolution started, they left suddenly, saying the coup had happened sooner than they expected.
While many reports identified either Babu or Hanga as the man behind the revolution, a few put forward a claim for John Okello, the curious figure who emerged from obscurity to national leadership as the military here of the coup. A Ugandan by birth, Okello is reported to have come to Zanzibar in September 1959 and to have worked as a bricklayer on Pemba Island. At the same time that Umma and ASP groups were advocating the violent overthrow of the government.
As for the role of Babu in the coup-there is no convincing evidence that he played any significant part in the revolution at all. Although he may have known of ASP planning for a revolution.
Moreover, the supplies of arms and ammunition that the Umma Party had brought to Zanzibar and concealed in different spots on the island were never used in the attack. Umma Party members even refused to disclose the caches to their Afro-Shiraz comrades in the new Zanzibar government.
Okello was a powerful figure after the revolution-because of support from his fellow rebels. The leaders of Zanzibar's new government seemed to know as little about him as the rest of the world.
Tanganyika minister for external affairs and defense Kambona, who was in close touch with the Zanzibar revolutionaries, claimed to know nothing about Okello. Apparently, his only previous experience in politics had been as a branch secretary of the ASP in Pemba during 1960-62.
Nyerere's role in the affair is less clear. In mid-1963 when Hanga and several other ASP leaders first approached him for arms and financial support, the Tanganyika President reportedly turned the group down, mainly on the grounds that he did not think their revolutionary plan could succeed. Behind the scenes, Nyerere was working to affect a coalition of the ASP with the ZPPP, which would secure a place for the ASP in the government. Since the longstanding mutual dislike between Karume and Shamte, the leader of the ZPPP, militated against any such reconciliation of the two parties, Hanga believed that the lack of an alternative to use of force would eventually compel Nyerere to give his approval to his plan. This is apparently just what happened. Although Nyerere obviously knew and apparently approved of the general plan for the revolution, Kambona may have kept the details from the President. There is reason to believe that he was never told about military supplies that Kambona gave to the ASP.
Tanganyika complicity with the ASP leaders who were planning a revolution had been well-established. Hanga and Tanganyika minister of foreign affairs and defense minister Kambona were old friends, having been roommates in London. Sympathetic to the desire of the Africans to wrest power from the Arab minority, Kambona was apparently privy to the coup planning all along; he supported the undertaking with Tanganyika arms and money. In mid-1963 he reportedly gave Hanga and his followers 2 machine guns and 10 rifles on a clandestine basis. Part of the arms shipment from Algeria to Tanganyika, which had been arranged by Kambona, may have found its way into the hands of the Zanzibar revolutionaries, although the majority of the arms were probably intended for the Mozambique nationalists.
There were reports that Kenya home affairs minister Oginga Odinga was also in concert with Hanga and Kambona in planning the Zanzibar revolution. One reliable source stated that he was in face as deeply involved as Kambona. As with Kambona, Hanga has a personal relationship with Odinga, who has assisted him in studying abroad. (Because of this, Hanga often publicly credited Odinga with his success in education and politics.) Thus, there is a general feeling that Odinga probably had a hand in events in Zanzibar, though his actual involvement in the coup has never been established.
After the revolution, Odinga is reported to have had several contacts with Okello, who he tried to help after the latter's removal from power in Zanzibar. The nature of their relationship, in particular the reason for Odinga's interest in Okello, is unclear; it may stem for the fact that Okello lived and worked in Kenya from Dec 1954 until Sept 1959. There is no evidence that there was any contact between the two men before the revolution, however. Thus, there is no reason to believe that Okello was part of any planning for the revolution in which Odinga may or may not have been involved.
According to one report, President Kenyatta was informed of the planning for the revolution but was given no definite date as to when it would take place. He is supposed to have agreed not to send in the Kenyan army should the Zanzibar government request outside support against the rebels.
The most important figure in ASP revolution planning clearly was Hanga, who, according to one unconfirmed report, assembled a small company of men in the bush for about two months before the revolution. John Okello was reportedly among the group under training. Hanga was helped in these endeavors by members of the extreme wing of the ASP especially by number persons from the trade unions. In particular, Hassan Nassor Moyo, the general-secretary of the ZPFL and a leader in the ASP, was in on the planning. Karume personally was never involved; O.Shariff and Aboud Jumbe Mwinyi of the ASP were also probably not aware of the plan.
Apparently, the original plan called for a coup in March or April 1964. In December 1963 Moyo visited Kenya, and while there stated privately that prospects were good for him and the ASP; he predicted confidently that elements that he represented would win out soon. Viewed in retrospect, he seems to have been referring to a coup which was then planned for early spring. In early January 1964, two Tanganyika's arrived in London to inspect an order for military equipment that was reported to have come from Kambona. When the Zanzibar revolution started, they left suddenly, saying the coup had happened sooner than they expected.
While many reports identified either Babu or Hanga as the man behind the revolution, a few put forward a claim for John Okello, the curious figure who emerged from obscurity to national leadership as the military here of the coup. A Ugandan by birth, Okello is reported to have come to Zanzibar in September 1959 and to have worked as a bricklayer on Pemba Island. At the same time that Umma and ASP groups were advocating the violent overthrow of the government.
As for the role of Babu in the coup-there is no convincing evidence that he played any significant part in the revolution at all. Although he may have known of ASP planning for a revolution.
Moreover, the supplies of arms and ammunition that the Umma Party had brought to Zanzibar and concealed in different spots on the island were never used in the attack. Umma Party members even refused to disclose the caches to their Afro-Shiraz comrades in the new Zanzibar government.
Okello was a powerful figure after the revolution-because of support from his fellow rebels. The leaders of Zanzibar's new government seemed to know as little about him as the rest of the world.
Tanganyika minister for external affairs and defense Kambona, who was in close touch with the Zanzibar revolutionaries, claimed to know nothing about Okello. Apparently, his only previous experience in politics had been as a branch secretary of the ASP in Pemba during 1960-62.